There is now overwhelming biological and behavioral evidence that the brain contains no stable, high-resolution, full field representation of a visual scene, even though that is what we subjectively experience (Martinez-Conde et al. 2008). The structure of the primate visual system has been mapped in detail (Kaas and Collins 2003) and there is no area that could encode this detailed information. The subjective experience is thus inconsistent with the neural circuitry. Closely related problems include change- (Simons and Rensink 2005) and inattentional-blindness (Mack 2003), and the subjective unity of perception arising from activity in many separate brain areas (Fries 2009; Engel and Singer 2001).
...There is a plausible functional story for the stable world illusion. First of all, we do have a (top-down) sense of the space around us that we cannot currently see, based on memory and other sense data—primarily hearing, touch, and smell. Also, since we are heavily visual, it is adaptive to use vision as broadly as possible. Our illusion of a full field, high resolution image depends on peripheral vision—to see this, just block part of your peripheral field with one hand. Immediately, you lose the illusion that you are seeing the blocked sector. When we also consider change blindness, a simple and plausible story emerges. Our visual system (somehow) relies on the fact that the periphery is very sensitive to change. As long as no change is detected it is safe to assume that nothing is significantly altered in the parts of the visual field not currently attended.
But this functional story tells nothing about the neural mechanisms that support this magic. What we do know is that there is no place in the brain where there could be a direct neural encoding of the illusory detailed scene (Kaas and Collins 2003). That is, enough is known about the structure and function of the visual system to rule out any detailed neural representation that embodies the subjective experience. So, this version of the NBP really is a scientific mystery at this time.
However, the reason I think that Plato's argument fails (as it was presented in Philosphy demystified) is because premise 1 seems to contradict the conclusion. If nothing moves itself, then a soul can't move itself. So the soul's movement must be the product of some other thing and so on. Even if it is accepted that whatever is moved, because of something else, is itself causally impotent and whatever is its own source of movement is causally potent, we are left wondering if premise 1 is compatible with the notion that some things are their own source of motion. If somethings are their own source of motion, then it seems that some things can move by itself and premise 1 is false. — Walter B
The argument takes the observation that movements of the body (or the parts of the body which originate the motions of the body as a whole, in your reformulation) are not caused by motions of other bodies. — Metaphysician Undercover
So I'd say that the argument is meant to open one's mind to the reality of the fact that the immaterial realm is causally active, and not meant to show that the soul moves itself. — Metaphysician Undercover
The way you are presenting the argument seems to suggest that premise 1 should only ably to physical things. — Walter B
We don't know how immaterial things act as causes, only that they do. — Metaphysician Undercover
When I read it, it seems to be the equivalent of "nothing moves itself and this is corroborated by everyday experience so you shouldn't doubt what is so obviously self-evident." In fact, I read it as invoking a metaphysical principle, rather than as a description of the behavior of physical things. — Walter B
But that is not in itself a reason to jump to the conclusion that premise one should be read as a description of physical things instead of as a metaphysical truth. — Walter B
Suppose that I said that from nothing nothing comes, and then said just look around you, why should it mean that within the realm of immaterial things, some immaterial things may come from nothing? — Walter B
we need not jump to the conclusion that there must be something wholly other than a part of the body (or something material in the bodily realm), like some soul, that is responsible for moving the body — Walter B
its an illusion that i am a soul with free will inside, and controlling, a body
yet this is what most people believe
its the ignorant naive view of self — OmniscientNihilist
We live in a physical universe and as far as we know everything is composed of physical elements. — Mark Dennis
The illusion as ive already said, is thinking you know anything about illusions. — Mark Dennis
I thought you said the Mind was the illusion before? — Mark Dennis
What is your logical non monologic argument for that? — Mark Dennis
I thought you didn't want to be alive so why are you speaking? — Mark Dennis
I don't even believe in a soul but I do believe in the existence of the mind being rooted in our very physical brains. — Mark Dennis
Sorry if my grasp of philosophy is too far ahead for you to even understand what I'm talking about. Maybe when you get your masters we can talk again. — Mark Dennis
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