The other argument I mentioned is more compelling anyway. This is that:

There is now overwhelming biological and behavioral evidence that the brain contains no stable, high-resolution, full field representation of a visual scene, even though that is what we subjectively experience (Martinez-Conde et al. 2008). The structure of the primate visual system has been mapped in detail (Kaas and Collins 2003) and there is no area that could encode this detailed information. The subjective experience is thus inconsistent with the neural circuitry. Closely related problems include change- (Simons and Rensink 2005) and inattentional-blindness (Mack 2003), and the subjective unity of perception arising from activity in many separate brain areas (Fries 2009; Engel and Singer 2001).

...There is a plausible functional story for the stable world illusion. First of all, we do have a (top-down) sense of the space around us that we cannot currently see, based on memory and other sense data—primarily hearing, touch, and smell. Also, since we are heavily visual, it is adaptive to use vision as broadly as possible. Our illusion of a full field, high resolution image depends on peripheral vision—to see this, just block part of your peripheral field with one hand. Immediately, you lose the illusion that you are seeing the blocked sector. When we also consider change blindness, a simple and plausible story emerges. Our visual system (somehow) relies on the fact that the periphery is very sensitive to change. As long as no change is detected it is safe to assume that nothing is significantly altered in the parts of the visual field not currently attended.

But this functional story tells nothing about the neural mechanisms that support this magic. What we do know is that there is no place in the brain where there could be a direct neural encoding of the illusory detailed scene (Kaas and Collins 2003). That is, enough is known about the structure and function of the visual system to rule out any detailed neural representation that embodies the subjective experience. So, this version of the NBP really is a scientific mystery at this time.

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3538094/

bolds added.

That is a good question. My impression is that Plato was not invested in giving a clear answer. All the different discussions of perception and what different parts of souls were up to are unified in their purpose to make it a complex matter to consider but not to buttress a single theory of what it was all about. I think one is on firmer ground to identify what was being opposed by all the different observations.
There are centuries of Platonists arguing about this sort of thing. Jump in wherever you like.

Interesting, I think that Searle's emergence, or Hume's bundle theory, ought to be considered before this study proves dualism though.

However, the reason I think that Plato's argument fails (as it was presented in Philosphy demystified) is because premise 1 seems to contradict the conclusion. If nothing moves itself, then a soul can't move itself. So the soul's movement must be the product of some other thing and so on. Even if it is accepted that whatever is moved, because of something else, is itself causally impotent and whatever is its own source of movement is causally potent, we are left wondering if premise 1 is compatible with the notion that some things are their own source of motion. If somethings are their own source of motion, then it seems that some things can move by itself and premise 1 is false. — Walter B

You need not conclude that 1 is false. The argument takes the observation that movements of the body (or the parts of the body which originate the motions of the body as a whole, in your reformulation) are not caused by motions of other bodies. So a soul is posited as the source of motion of the body.

Let's suppose that to be consistent with 1, a soul cannot move itself. Plato assumes intelligible objects, which are not material bodies, and these may be responsible for the movements of the soul. So I'd say that the argument is meant to open one's mind to the reality of the fact that the immaterial realm is causally active, and not meant to show that the soul moves itself.

The argument takes the observation that movements of the body (or the parts of the body which originate the motions of the body as a whole, in your reformulation) are not caused by motions of other bodies. — Metaphysician Undercover

Premise 1, in the manner that it was presented by the author of "philosophy demystified," doesn't make the kind of qualification that you are making. It simply states that nothing moves itself and this is corroborated by our experiences; so Plato expects the listener to accept premise 1 as obviously true and self-evident- it is a metaphysical principle that Plato does not think needs to be argued for. The way you are presenting the argument seems to suggest that premise 1 should only ably to physical things.

So I'd say that the argument is meant to open one's mind to the reality of the fact that the immaterial realm is causally active, and not meant to show that the soul moves itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think this is a plausible interpretation. However, Plato would then have to explain the mechanics of the immaterial realm and how it solves whatever dilemma there was in regards to the material realm

The way you are presenting the argument seems to suggest that premise 1 should only ably to physical things. — Walter B

No. I am saying that the soul might be moved by some other immaterial thing. You only approached an inconsistency with 1 by saying that the soul moves itself. If you allow that the soul moves the body, but the soul is itself moved by some other immaterial thing, you have no reason to reject 1.

Okay, so whatever moves the soul is moved by something else and so on and so on?

We don't know how immaterial things act as causes, only that they do. So we can't make any such assumption.

We don't know how immaterial things act as causes, only that they do. — Metaphysician Undercover

So then premise 1 is being interpreted to imply that it is true only for physical things while being silent on the behavior of immaterial things.

Yes, now that I think about it, the premise must only apply to material things. Premise one starts with "look around you". We cannot see immaterial things, so the premise is an inductive conclusion drawn from the observation of material things. Therefore it would not be applicable to immaterial things.

Well, I guess you interpret the "look around you part" differently from the way that I do. When I read it, it seems to be the equivalent of "nothing moves itself and this is corroborated by everyday experience so you shouldn't doubt what is so obviously self-evident." In fact, I read it as invoking a metaphysical truth, rather than as a description of the behavior of physical things.

In any case, I find your alternative reading of the argument as evidence that the author should have been more clear with how he wanted to present Plato's argument.

When I read it, it seems to be the equivalent of "nothing moves itself and this is corroborated by everyday experience so you shouldn't doubt what is so obviously self-evident." In fact, I read it as invoking a metaphysical principle, rather than as a description of the behavior of physical things. — Walter B

The "nothing moves itself" premise is a common starting point for numerous arguments concerning the nature of the immaterial, dating back to Plato. I believe it is supposed to be an inductive conclusion drawn from our sense observations of the material world. But that is no different from how you describe it as "corroborated by everyday experience". The movement of immaterial things is outside our field of "experience".

But that is not in itself a reason to jump to the conclusion that premise one should be read as a description of physical things instead of as a metaphysical truth. Suppose that I said that from nothing nothing comes, and then said just look around you, why should it mean that within the realm of immaterial things, some immaterial things may come from nothing?

But that is not in itself a reason to jump to the conclusion that premise one should be read as a description of physical things instead of as a metaphysical truth. — Walter B

Care to explain what you think is the difference between these two?

Suppose that I said that from nothing nothing comes, and then said just look around you, why should it mean that within the realm of immaterial things, some immaterial things may come from nothing? — Walter B

I cannot perceive any immaterial things by looking around me. So looking around me doesn't serve to give me any evidence to create any principles concerning immaterial things.

we need not jump to the conclusion that there must be something wholly other than a part of the body (or something material in the bodily realm), like some soul, that is responsible for moving the body — Walter B

The underlined word "material" is the cornerstone of the refutation. All motion till date have been material in cause and effect. Why introduce such a thing as "soul" of which we have no observable data regarding it causing motion?

As for the part-whole paradigm it still needs to explain how the parts move. However this doesn't negatively impact the data - matter moves matter.

its an illusion that i am a soul with free will inside, and controlling, a body

yet this is what most people believe

its the ignorant naive view of self — OmniscientNihilist

Is it an illusion? It seems to me that words like soul, consciousness, mind, will; whether they are monological or dialogical are all words in the toolbelt that are used to describe existing physical phenomenon we do not yet fully understand or comprehend.

The real illusion; is thinking we can know or understand what the illusion is. How can I know how big the iceberg is when I can only perceive what is on the surface? Which makes up just a small percentage of the true scale and depth of it all.

Or if you don't like the iceberg metaphor; There is the argument by dimensions; Imagine that the universe has 9 dimensions represented as a room with 9 sides. You inside the room only see a triangle shaped room with s tv screen showing you live footage of a small part of one of the other walls(Time wall) after another.

calling consciousness physical is blind and ignorant

I agree with your assessment of the author's critique of Plato's argument. Clearly talking about parts does not address it.

I also agree that, as stated, the real problem with the argument is the apparent regress it would generate.

However, far from generating a regress the argument shows why positing something immaterial - a soul - appears to be the only way to stop one.

The argument talks about those things we can see - so, sensible objects - and says of them that they appear always to be moved by something other than themselves.

And indeed, the only kinds of thing that would appear capable of movement would be extended things - that is, things occupying some space (for it is only they that have somewhere to move to and from). And it is only extended things that are objects of sensible observation. So it is sensible things that move, and sensible things whose movements require external causal explanation.

So, what Plato says about sensible objects does not apply to insensible ones. Insensible objects, being unextended, do not move. For there is nowhere for them to move to or from. And insensible things, by their very nature, are not objects of sensible observation.

Bearing this in mind then, it seems reasonable to conclude that all things that move require something that moves them. But things that do not move, do not. So, sensible objects - objects extended in space - move and their movements require causal explanation.

Clearly, however, we would be off on a regress if we kept positing more and more moving things to explain the movement in one moving thing. My fingers are moving. They cannot move themselves, so there must be something else that moves them. We can posit tendons and such like, but eventually this has to come to an end. It cannot come to an end in another moving thing. It cannot be my brain. For my brain, being a sensible thing, is one of those things that moves and whose movements require external explanation. Therefore, it must terminate with an unmoved mover. And an unmoved mover is going to be an insensible thing - a soul.

Almost as ignorant as your answer. We live in a physical universe and as far as we know everything is composed of physical elements. I'm sure if you had a good counter you would have shared it right away. Good luck not crashing into the iceberg.

We live in a physical universe and as far as we know everything is composed of physical elements. — Mark Dennis

illusion

Maya Shanka, Mohini Lanka, Tyagam Tyagam Om.

The illusion as ive already said, is thinking you know anything about illusions.

Still not seeing an argument from you and one worded responses are boring to me.

The illusion as ive already said, is thinking you know anything about illusions. — Mark Dennis

an illusion is something that appears to the mind, to be different then it actually is in reality

I thought you said the Mind was the illusion before? Okay then. I'm done, you're not taking this seriously.

I thought you said the Mind was the illusion before? — Mark Dennis

i said the physical universe is an illusion

What is your logical non monologic argument for that? Or are you just good at mystical bs?

What is your logical non monologic argument for that? — Mark Dennis

the belief in the mind that reality is separate physical objects is an illusion.

it appears to be that way to the mind but in reality is not

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bundle_theory

We do not live in a physical universe and it is certainly question begging to assert that in the context of a debate about an argument for the soul - a non-physical thing!

Bartrick why are you still around? I thought you didn't want to be alive so why are you speaking?

I don't even believe in a soul but I do believe in the existence of the mind being rooted in our very physical brains.

Sorry if my grasp of philosophy is too far ahead for you to even understand what I'm talking about. Maybe when you get your masters we can talk again. :)

You want an argument against the reality of the physical universe? Well, how about this one (and yes, I realize this is as pointless as presenting this argument to a sparrow, but meh):

1. If a physical thing exists, it will be infinitely divisible
2. No infinitely divisible things exist
3. Therefore, no physical things exist.

I thought you didn't want to be alive so why are you speaking? — Mark Dennis

Er, where are you getting that from? Ah, I see what you've done - you've applied your reasoning skills to some other arguments I have made about the rank immorality of procreation and you've arrived at a conclusion that was in no way implied by them. Good stuff!

I don't even believe in a soul but I do believe in the existence of the mind being rooted in our very physical brains. — Mark Dennis

Then you have some demonstrably false beliefs - not surprising in the least.

Sorry if my grasp of philosophy is too far ahead for you to even understand what I'm talking about. Maybe when you get your masters we can talk again. — Mark Dennis

Let me remember, that's an MA in business ethics, right? You know that any academic achievement with 'business' in the title is a joke?