Does this matter in regard to the overall project? The orator example is clearer, I think. The orator, according to Frankfurt does not care what his audience believes with regard to god and history; only that they draw a certain conclusion about what he, the orator, believes about such things. A prime example of humbug.
But that's not right. The orator's aim is the endorsement by their audience. If the audience does not admire those who are patriotic and god-fearing, the oration fails. Indeed it is those who do not accept these values who are most likely to recognise the humbug. — Banno
Nonetheless, I do not believe that it(the oration) adequately or accurately grasps the essential character of bullshit. It is correct to say of bullshit, as he says of humbug, both that it is short of lying and that chose who perpetrate it misrepresent themselves in a certain way. But Black’s account of these two features is significantly off the mark...
Interesting how folk want to jump to the end. — Banno
By misrepresenting one's certainty regarding a belief versus the belief itself produces a type of misrepresentation that falls short of lying, unless certainty is implied by the context.He's trying to make sense of how one could be said to be deliberately misrepresenting one's own thought and belief but somehow fall short of lying... — creativesoul
It is just this lack of connection to a concern with truth this indifference to how things really are — that I regard as of the essence of bullshit.
Humbug: deceptive misrepresentation, short of lying, especially by pretentious word or deed, of somebody’s own thoughts, feelings, or attitudes. — Banno
Bullshit he thinks is different in kind.
Now, does his argument support this contention? — Banno
What bullshit essentially misrepresents is neither the state of affairs to which it refers nor the beliefs of the speaker concerning that state of affairs. Those are what lies misrepresent, by virtue of being false. Since bullshit need not be false, it differs from lies in its misrepresentational intent. The bullshitter may not deceive us, or even intend to do so, either about the facts or about what he takes the facts to be. What he does necessarily attempt to deceive us about is his enterprise. His only indispensably distinctive characteristic is that in a certain way he misrepresents what he is up to.
Here's the core:
What bullshit essentially misrepresents is neither the state of affairs to which it refers nor the beliefs of the speaker concerning that state of affairs. Those are what lies misrepresent, by virtue of being false. Since bullshit need not be false, it differs from lies in its misrepresentational intent. The bullshitter may not deceive us, or even intend to do so, either about the facts or about what he takes the facts to be. What he does necessarily attempt to deceive us about is his enterprise. His only indispensably distinctive characteristic is that in a certain way he misrepresents what he is up to.
Taking states of affairs to include mental states, a lie has the intent to misrepresents a state of affairs, and hence the lier's consequent belief about that state of affairs. Bullshit may well misrepresent a state of affairs, but that would be incidental. Bullshit lacks any intent towards the truth or falsehood of its propositional content, the intent being something distinct from the erstwhile assertions being made. — Banno
And did you reach this conclusion after a read of the texts at hand? Do you suport them, or reject them? — Banno
The impossibility argument is underpinned by the following conceptions: "Either you know that you believe what you say or else you don't. And in either case you can't be mistaken. — Humbug article
Taking states of affairs to include mental states — Banno
What bullshit essentially misrepresents is neither the state of affairs to which it refers nor the beliefs of the speaker concerning that state of affairs. Those are what lies misrepresent, by virtue of being false.
Taking states of affairs to include mental states, a lie has the intent to misrepresents a state of affairs, and hence the lier's consequent belief about that state of affairs. — Banno
It's an image, Mr Wittgenstein. Of course she does not know what a dog that has bee run over feels like. But you yourself supposed that one can be certain when someone is in pain, upon seeing them writhing before you. You must have some idea of what it might be like to be a sick dog. — Banno
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