The forms of sensibility are time and space. These are a priori. We can't experience anything at all except through these forms. Matter, causality, phenomena or objects of any kind are experienced through these forms -- as representations. Beyond these representations is the unknown and unknowable -- the noumenon, the thing in itself.

This is Kant. To say phenomena is in some Twilight realm and "really exist" outside our representations is a complete misunderstanding. To say phenomena is just a "qualification" of an "external object" is likewise a misunderstanding -- any object whatsoever is an entity, a being, a phenomenon -- we only experience this as representation. What is the object, the phenomenon, the "external world" in itself? The noumenon.

I sometimes can't believe this is a philosophy forum.

Find your own. — Mww

Yeah, I figured as much.

I'm sorry you're so confused about this. Perhaps studying Kant would help.

And I don't have to "find my own" because you won't find your conception of "phenomena" in Kant anywhere.

For those interested:

Kant:

"Accordingly, it is only the form of sensuous intuition by which we can intuit things a priori, but by which we can know objects only as they appear to us (to our senses), not at the are in themselves[...]" Prolegomena, p. 17

The "thing-in-itself" is a crucial part of Kant's philosophy.

Thus,

And forget noumena; the notion of them is utterly irrelevant in discussions by humans about humans. — Mww

Is a bit ridiculous. And probably the source of his confusion.

The "thing-in-itself" is a crucial part of Kant's philosophy.

Thus,

And forget noumena; the notion of them is utterly irrelevant in discussions by humans about humans.
— Mww

Is a bit ridiculous. And probably the source of his confusion. — Xtrix

Hmmmm......here’s ridiculous: the claim, or even the intimation, that because noumena and the thing in itself are both unknowable to or by means of the human system, they are therefore the same thing. And the thing-in-itself is not crucial, per se, to the Kantian epistemology; it is merely given ontologically as extant, therefore inescapable and irrelevant. If it was crucial, why didn’t he talk about it, other than to say there’s nothing there to talk about? Reason has to do with what goes on in our heads, with respect to what’s outside it but not because of it.

Hell.....I can do this chit all day.
————————

Let the readers judge who’s confused. No one may comment, but if they judge by the content of the dialogue, they will certainly have the means to think it.

Hmmmm......here’s ridiculous: the claim, or even the intimation, that because noumena and the thing in itself are both unknowable to or by means of the human system, they are therefore the same thing. — Mww

I guess Kant is ridiculous then.

The "thing in itself" and "noumenon" is essentially the same thing, yes. If you have evidence otherwise, I'd be glad to hear it. Even a simple Wikipedia search admits it's pretty open-ended:

"In Kantian philosophy, the unknowable noumenon is often linked to the unknowable "thing-in-itself" (in Kant's German, Ding an sich), although how to characterize the nature of the relationship is a question still open to some controversy."

I could be completely wrong, but to say it's ridiculous is just nonsense. I see no evidence so far that I am wrong, of course -- except for your armchair philosophy.

If it was crucial, why didn’t he talk about it, other than to say there’s nothing there to talk about? — Mww

Oh lord. Is this a joke?

Hell.....I can do this chit all day. — Mww

You mean talk nonsense? Yes, that's obvious.

I notice also you're trying to avoid defending your ridiculous claims about phenomena. Which is a smart move on your part, to avoid further embarrassment.

If they're physical objects, or anything else whatsoever, then they're representations. — Xtrix

This is Locke’s representative realism, not Kant.

This is Locke’s representative realism, not Kant. — Wayfarer

Brilliant analysis.

I see no evidence so far that I am wrong, of course — Xtrix

You use wiki, I use Kant.

‘Nuff said.

Oh. It is armchair philosophy, yes. It also correct.

Cool. You’re back. Your self-restraint is admirable.

You use wiki, I use Kant. — Mww

No, you haven't. If you'd like to, feel free. I won't hold my breath.

And actually I've used both Kant and Schopenhauer. You've made a claim about phenomena and representations being different, refused to provide any relevant evidence to support the claim, told me to find it myself, then changed the subject. Now you want to behave as an adolescent. That's fine. Doesn't change the facts.

I refer again to https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/369165 . (For anyone serious who's interested in Kant's transcendental idealism.)

Representations and phenomena are the same thing, and beyond this the thing in itself. There is no phenomena as "unknown external object" -- that's the noumenon.

And that's where it stands thus far.

To summarize this non-exchange:

Phenomena and representation are different qualifications of the same thing, that being the external object. Representations are general things known to reason a priori, phenomena are unknown particulars. — Mww

Again: what "qualifications"?

Representations are not what's a priori -- the forms of intuition are.
Phenomena are not unknown particulars -- this is simply meaningless.

I really hope you don't teach.

If they're physical objects, or anything else whatsoever, then they're representations. — Xtrix

. Matter, causality, phenomena or objects of any kind are experienced through these forms -- as representations. — Xtrix

What I mean is, that to say that there's a representation of, or a representation and, is suggestive of representative realism, which is more like Locke's philosophy. I think the correct description of Kant's view is that they're not representations, they're phenomena, appearance. But, Kant himself muddies the waters by using the term 'representation', which naturally leads to the question 'representation of what'? This is discussed here

I think one clue is that Kant will often say mere representations, implying that the representation is not a reference to something else, but simply part of the machinery of thought which only deals in representations. (There's a parallel in Buddhist philosophy which speaks of the play of mind being 'mere appearance' i.e. not 'appearance' as distinct from something putatively real.)

I think the correct description of Kant's view is that they're not representations, they're phenomena, appearance. — Wayfarer

OK. This differs how from the following:

I’m talking more about Kant’s variation- that we as subjects have representations of the outside world (the phenomenon, the object). — Xtrix

(Which is where this diversion started.)

If there's any "difference" at all, it's simply that phenomena usually refer to something "outside" the subject -- i.e., the object. But this, in turn, is only known as representation -- or appearance, if you prefer. Makes no difference. Now, what the phenomenon or object is in itself we can't know and can say nothing about, because our world is the world of representation (meaning nothing other than sensations in time and space, activity of the brain). If representations "of" something - apart from what they are -makes any sense, it's of something we can't fully know since our understanding and knowledge is bounded by time and space.

This is why Schopenhauer titles his book "World as Will and Representation." He identifies the thing in itself with the will, whereas Kant said there's nothing to be said about it. Was Schopenhauer way off base as well?

Not once did I bring up Locke in this discussion.

What I mean is, that to say that there's a representation of, or a representation and, is suggestive of representative realism, which is more like Locke's philosophy. — Wayfarer

When do I say "representation of" or "representation and"? I'd like to see the context that was "suggestive" of this.

No, you haven't. If you'd like to, feel free. I won't hold my breath. — Xtrix

All my quotes are right out of CPR 1787. I use...if you MUST know....Miekeljohn online for C&P, backup by both Guyer, Cambridge 1998, and Kemp Smith, London, 1929, in print. Sometimes I will interchange the translations for clarity. And Palmquist,1993 for technical glossary with interpretive guidance.

All the evidence needed has been posted, except the distinction on noumena and phenomena. I don’t bother because the theory with which the critiques are concerned have to do with phenomena alone.

All my quotes are right out of CPR 1787. — Mww

Yes, and say nothing about the phenomenon being different from representation. But in any case, that's not what I was referring to. I asked for citations regarding:

The "thing in itself" and "noumenon" is essentially the same thing, yes. If you have evidence otherwise, I'd be glad to hear it. — Xtrix

Which you then claim you gave, while I merely cite Wikipedia.

So the point stands: you haven't.

When do I say "representation of" — Xtrix

Here:

I’m talking more about Kant’s variation - that we as subjects have representations of the outside world (the phenomenon, the object). — Xtrix

OK. I already referenced that sentence myself in the former post. That doesn't make it Lockean. But regardless, I'll rephrase: subjects have representations, some of which we call the outside world.

The "thing in itself" and "noumenon" is essentially the same thing, yes. If you have evidence otherwise, I'd be glad to hear it.
— Xtrix

Which you then claim you gave, while I merely cite Wikipedia.

So the point stands: you haven't. — Xtrix

The point doesn’t stand; I specifically said I gave no quotes on the distinction. The claim I referenced has to do with the phenomena/representation distinction.

(Sigh) If I must.....this sure as hell won’t be in wiki:

“.....The conception of a noumenon, that is, of a thing which must be cogitated not as an object of sense, but as a thing in itself (solely through the pure understanding), is not self-contradictory, for we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition. Nay, further, this conception is necessary to restrain sensuous intuition within the bounds of phenomena, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensuous cognition; for things in themselves, which lie beyond its province, are called noumena for the very purpose of indicating that this cognition does not extend its application to all that the understanding thinks. But, after all, the possibility of such noumena is quite incomprehensible, and beyond the sphere of phenomena, all is for us a mere void; that is to say, we possess an understanding whose province does problematically extend beyond this sphere, but we do not possess an intuition, indeed, not even the conception of a possible intuition, by means of which objects beyond the region of sensibility could be given us, and in reference to which the understanding might be employed assertorically. The conception of a noumenon is therefore merely a limitative conception and therefore only of negative use. But it is not an arbitrary or fictitious notion, but is connected with the limitation of sensibility, without, however, being capable of presenting us with any positive datum beyond this sphere....”

Cogitated as a thing-in-itself, meaning cogitate noumena the same way the thing in itself is cogitated, both solely through pure understanding, which gives us no cognitions at all.

Thing-in-itself called noumena to indicate a limit, the limit being the same for both, the limit being sensible intuitions.

Noumena is not thing-in-itself. It is merely treated like one by the understanding. Thing-in-itself is external to us, noumena are intellectual intuitions given from pure understanding, thus necessarily within us. They cannot possibly be the same thing.

The only justification for conceiving noumena is because we are not entitled to claim our form of cognition is the only kind there is.

Happy now? You told me this was all basic stuff, but you didn’t seem to understand any of it. You admit to not being a Kantian and not holding with his philosophy, which doesn’t necessarily presupposes you know it, so I guess it’s ok.

The point doesn’t stand; I specifically said I gave no quotes on the distinction. The claim I referenced has to do with the phenomena/representation distinction. — Mww

Yes, you said you gave no quotes AFTER saying you cite Kant while I cite wikipedia regarding noumenon and the thing in itself, which you initially claimed was "ridiculous." How about going back and reading.

The conception of a noumenon, that is, of a thing which must be cogitated not as an object of sense, but as a thing in itself (solely through the pure understanding), is not self-contradictory, for we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition. — Mww

(Bold mine)

Exactly right.

Yet:

Noumena is not thing-in-itself. — Mww

First, Kant doesn't say noumena, he says noumenon and thing-in-itself, in the passage cited. Let's at least be clear. Pluralizing one and not the other is unclear. Notice when he does mention noumena (plural), he also pluralizes "phenomenon."

Second, look at the quote. Breaking it down further: the conception of a noumenon - a thing which must be cogitated NOT as an object of sense [representation] but as a thing in itself. I don't know how much more clear that can be. And this is your citation, remember.

Thing-in-itself is external to us, noumena are intellectual intuitions given from pure understanding, thus necessarily within us. — Mww

This is NOT what Kant says, as demonstrated by your own citation. Noumenon is no more "within us" than the thing-in-itself. There's no indication that there's a difference -- in fact Kant is literally saying they're the same thing in this passage.

What Kant is getting at in this passage is whether the thing-in-itself (the noumenon) is contradictory. Nowhere does he say the thing in itself is "external" and the noumenon "within us." Nowhere. You added that in yourself. Nor should you expect this, since the point he's making isn't even to differentiate the two -- it's justifying the use of the conception of "noumenon."

You told me this was all basic stuff, but you didn’t seem to understand any of it. — Mww

I would be embarrassed if I were in your positron. I hope others are reading this -- I'd like others' opinions of this passage. At the very least, it certainly doesn't support any notion that noumenon and thing in itself are different things - which is your claim. Quite the opposite, actually. Despite this embarrassment -- since you obviously don't see it -- you feel entitled about how little I understand? As my nephew would say: "that's cringe."

Happy now? — Mww

I get no joy in being proven right over and over again. I'd much rather learn something new.

Also:

for things in themselves, which lie beyond its province, are called noumena for the very purpose of indicating that this cognition does not extend its application to all that the understanding thinks — Mww

(My italics)

He's literally saying what I've been asserting twice in a passage you have chosen. And yet you still maintain that somehow he's saying the thing in itself is "external" and the noumenon "necessarily within us." That's telling.

The only justification for conceiving noumena is because we are not entitled to claim our form of cognition is the only kind there is. — Mww

I congratulate you on one true statement. This is indeed what Kant is driving at in the passage. It's also simply repeating, almost verbatim, what he stated.

you still maintain that somehow he's saying the thing in itself is "external" and the noumenon "necessarily within us." That's telling. — Xtrix

Yes, it’s telling. That you don’t know he talks about the thing-in-itself in another section, describing it as the real, albeit known object of sensibility, and here, on noumena, he talks of the pure understanding cogitating noumena in the same way it cogitates the thing-in-itself. That you can’t deduce from that that one is internal (from pure understanding), the other external (from sensibility), is not my problem, is telling indeed. And that you fail to grasp they cannot be the same thing because of that alone, is just as telling.

And I congratulate you on finally getting a clue.

I would argue that the notion of both object and subject, within the most general of cases, remain correlative with one another, and necessarily so. Such that whether either term is regarded as applicable to a certain instance, is determined solely by the relations of each, between themselves and the theoretic-structure within which either's application is found; this, implies that they represent indistinct entities, yet are differentiated only insofar as their forms of expression require it, and are therefore separate only on the basis of an isolated modality through which they may appear, and be spoken of, whilst remaining as a whole, identical in constitution. In the sense that the propriety in usage of each, is bound by the relational alone, as pertaining to which element within any manner of phrase, has agency, and is permitted to act thereby, contrasting thusly with what is acted upon.

To establish this dichotomy, beyond that which is expressive, and of no greater function, lies in gross error, and reflects little else in its occurrence.

That you don’t know he talks about the thing-in-itself in another section, describing it as the real, albeit known object of sensibility, — Mww

No, he doesn't talk about that -- because what you're saying makes absolutely no sense. Which isn't a surprise. And if what he talks about "later" is so very important to your point, then why leave it out? Especially when the point was to demonstrate how the "thing in itself" and the "noumenon" are supposedly different? Kind of a crucial missing piece there. And no, I don't have the Critique of Pure Reason memorized. If you have a point to make, the make it. So far you haven't. And you certainly haven't earned being taken on faith. Cite the passage or shut up. You're boring me.

and here, on noumena, he talks of the pure understanding cogitating noumena in the same way it cogitates the thing-in-itself. — Mww

You really have no clue.

Here's what Kant is saying, for anyone else listening: The noumenon (the thing in itself) is simply that beyond our sensations and perceptions in time and space and hence unknowable -- yet not self-contradictory. That's it. If the "thing in itself" and the "noumenon" are different in any way, it's not indicated here, never mind one being "external" and the other "internal."

Reading comprehension wasn't your strong suit I see. Pity.

To summarize:

The noumenon (the unknown) is "internal" because it's "cognitated" by the pure understanding. The thing in itself (the unknown) is "external" because it's an object of sensibility.

Does anyone on here take this seriously?

Maybe no one's even listening. I don't blame them, given how ridiculous the above forumlation is -- without one citation of support.

Can you be more specific? How does falsifiability and paradigm shift, for example, imply a subject/object dualism?
— Andrew M

Both deal with scientific theories, and a knowing subject is thus assumed.

And again, I’m not necessarily talking about mind/body dualism. I’m talking more about Kant’s variation- that we as subjects have representations of the outside world (the phenomenon, the object). — Xtrix

There is the obvious sense in which a human being is needed to propose a scientific theory. Also any theory will be in human language, both ordinary and technical.

So I think naturalists and dualists can agree on that.

But what a scientific theory is about doesn't require a "knowing subject". For example, the Earth orbited the Sun long before life emerged to construct a theory of heliocentrism.

I already pointed out that a subject has a mental life while an object doesn't. Aside from that what is the difference?

The view from nowhere exists because science has to abstract from human perceptual relativity to get at the way things are, and not just as they appear to us. Otherwise, we're left with ancient skepticism or some form of idealism. — Marchesk

I think Special Relativity provides a useful model here. Things can have different properties in different reference frames (and one can translate between reference frames). But there is no absolute reference frame for how things "really" are.

Similarly, things can have properties that depend on one's perceptual machinery (which again we can discover). But there is no perception-free perspective.

That's nice and all, but one still has to deal with intentionality, consciousness and epistemology. — Marchesk

Yes, but it's sensible to stop using demonstrably broken frameworks. Imagine trying to model the Big Bang using the Ptolemaic model. Perhaps it can be done, but why unnecessarily handicap oneself?