No on my view. — Terrapin Station

That is what I anticipated.

Yes on my view, but it's not representing something (real) that's not actualized. — Terrapin Station

Then what object--if not a real habit, necessity, law, or regularity--is that conditional proposition representing? Given that the antecedent never obtains, it cannot be something actual.

It's representing gravitational attraction in that case, which is actual.

In other words, I wouldn't say that the conditional "maps" to a conditional that is actual in the world. That conditional is a way of talking about the fact that gravitational attraction obtains.

I don't in general buy that the non-linguistic world is structured like language. That's (part of) why statements and the like don't represent anything "on their own." They need us to interpret them as you say.

It's representing gravitational attraction in that case, which is actual. — Terrapin Station

Gravitational attraction occurs whether the antecedent obtains or not, so that cannot be what the conditional proposition is representing. It says what would happen, not why it would happen.

I wouldn't say that the conditional "maps" to a conditional that is actual in the world. — Terrapin Station

Neither would I; rather, I would say that it maps to a habit/necessity/law/regularity that is real, regardless of whether it is actualized. Am I right to perceive that you see no meaningful distinction between reality and existence?

I don't in general buy that the non-linguistic world is structured like language. — Terrapin Station

The idea that I am entertaining is more along the lines that there is an alignment between reality and logic; how we think, in some sense and to some degree, reflects how the universe is--which is why we are able to learn about it at all.

so that cannot be what the conditional proposition is representing. — aletheist

Wait a minute--how do you figure that there are any limits on what a proposition is representing, so that we can say that a proposition isn't representing something?

Wait a minute--how do you figure that there are any limits on what a proposition is representing, so that we can say that a proposition isn't representing something? — Terrapin Station

Consider the proposition that the moon is made of green cheese. Can we say that this proposition is representing the fact that Abraham Lincoln was the 16th President of the United States? If not, then evidently there are some limits on what a proposition is representing.

The conditional proposition--that if I let go of the rock, then it will fall--is representing the fact that if I let go of the rock, then it will fall. Gravitational attraction is an explanation of this fact, not the fact itself--and it is a habit/necessity/law/regularity, not a mere brute actuality. Furthermore, the conditional proposition is true regardless of whether I ever actually let go of the rock, and would still be true even if no one ever expressed it as a statement.

Can we say that this proposition is representing the fact that Abraham Lincoln was the 16th President of the United States? — aletheist

Yes. Any words/text strings/sounds/drawings/whatevers could be taken by an individual to represent anything. Hence me wondering why you'd say something like, "X can't represent Y."

Yes. Any words/text strings/sounds/drawings/whatevers could be taken by an individual to represent anything. Hence me wondering why you'd say something like, "X can't represent Y." — Terrapin Station

But that proposition as ordinarily understood can't represent that fact as ordinarily understood.

Fine, we are back to words and their combinations being symbols that represent their objects by arbitrary conventions. Stipulating that we are using contemporary English vocabulary and grammar, the proposition that the moon is made of green cheese cannot represent the fact that Abraham Lincoln was the 16th President of the United States.

Is this a digression, or are you trying to make a relevant point?

But that proposition as ordinarily understood can't represent that fact as ordinarily understood. — Michael

Maybe as ordinarily understood it doesn't represent what I said . . . I'm not sure what philosophical significance that contingent fact would have, though.

Fine, we are back to words and their combinations being symbols that represent their objects by arbitrary conventions. — aletheist

Well, if you're using "convention" in a conventional way, that's why I brought up the objections I did earlier. Conventions are simply conventions. They're not correct or anything like that by virtue of being conventions, and the convention doesn't come first--it's just a contingent fact about how people are thinking about things (in this case) (and also of course conventions, once instantiated, can influence how people think about something, but that influence doesnt determine how individuals think about something, and it doesn't make the convention right, it doesn't limit how someone can think about something, etc.)

I wouldn't say that conditionals imply somehow extramentally instantiated "ifs," even if most folks think about what they represent that way. But I would say that conditionals can represent objective facts where the objective fact--that gravitational attraction obtains in this case, for example, has some significant relation to the conventional way if thinking about that conditional.

I am looking at HOW a particular sign represents its object. There are only three options--by resemblance (icon), by direct connection (index), or by convention (symbol). — aletheist

While it seems fairly clear that conventional symbols represent I don't think resemblance represents. Resemblance is symmetric, i.e. one thing resembles another by actually possessing some of its recognizable properties. Representation, however, is asymmetric, i.e. one thing represents another, regardless of whether they share properties.

Therefore, resemblance does not represent. Neither does direct connection (index) or perception. Conventional symbols, statements, and beliefs represent things. Resemblance and direct connection, or perception don't (they present things).

For example, a photograph presents properties which resemble properties of the optical state of affairs which was photographed, i.e. the photo reflects light in ways which resemble how the photographed things reflected light when they were photographed. The resemblance relation does not re-present the things (nor an impression inside the head of the photographer). It presents what's really there to see on the surface on the photo: properties shared by two different optical state of affairs.

A portrait does not represent the person whom it portrays (resemblance)? A weather vane does not represent the direction of the wind (connection)? You do not recognize a familiar face in a photograph (both)?

A portrait does not represent the person whom it portrays (resemblance)? — aletheist

Any picture can represent the person, but then it is used as a symbol, regardless of its resemblance. A caricature, for instance, seldom resembles yet represents; resemblance is neither necessary nor sufficient for representation. A portrait, however, resembles, and a photographic portrait could be visually indistinguishable from the present features of the person. Granted that it could also represent the person, but if the question is: how does the picture signify, then it seems fairly clear that while a caricature represents by asymmetrically exaggerating or contorting known features of the person the portrait signifies primarily by resemblance.

A weather vane does not represent the direction of the wind (connection)? — aletheist

It represents the direction of the wind by being used as a conventional symbol for it, regardless of its direct causal connection to the wind.

You do not recognize a familiar face in a photograph (both)? — aletheist

There is no face in the photo but colour patches, and the photographic process arranged those patches in a way that resembles the way which makes the face familiar. The photo does not represent the face, it presents certain features which are recognizable as the face.

You are not adhering to the definitions that I am using, which come from Peirce and are well-established in semiotics, so we are just talking past each other. In particular, you seem to have a very narrow concept of representation. If "the portrait signifies primarily by resemblance," then it represents its object by resemblance--it is an icon. The weather vane represents (i.e., indicates) the direction of the wind, regardless of whether anyone interprets it as doing so--it is an index. If the photo "presents certain features which are recognizable as the face," then it represents the face--iconically due to the resemblance, and indexically due to the causal process that placed the image on the film. Now, just about every sign has all three aspects--iconic, indexical, and symbolic; but I am focusing on the predominant relation of the sign to its object.

You are not adhering to the definitions that I am using, which come from Peirce and are well-established in semiotics, so we are just talking past each other. — aletheist

There is no good reason to exclusively adhere to the terminology of a 19th century theory of signs. It is fairly easy to see that representation is an asymmetric relation whereas resemblance is symmetric. That's what sets portraits apart from representational symbols, e.g. traffic signs or words.

In particular, you seem to have a very narrow concept of representation. If "the portrait signifies primarily by resemblance," then it represents its object by resemblance--it is an icon. — aletheist

Granted that a portrait can both resemble and represent its object, but if resemblance is the predominant relation which determines how a portrait signifies its object, then in this respect (i.e. as in how it predominantly signifies its object) it cannot represent its object, because representation is asymmetric whereas resemblance is symmetric. The portrait may, of course, represent its object in other respects by way of convention, for instance. *

Would it make sense to say that the portrait primarily signifies its object symmetrically (by resemblance) and therefore "represents it" (i.e. signifies the object asymmetrically)? I don't think so.

The weather vane represents (i.e., indicates) the direction of the wind, regardless of whether anyone interprets it as doing so--it is an index. — aletheist

But the question is how, recall. A tumbling dust ball is also connected to the direction of the wind, but that does not make it a representation of it, does it?

If the photo "presents certain features which are recognizable as the face," then it represents the face--iconically due to the resemblance, and indexically due to the causal process that placed the image on the film. Now, just about every sign has all three aspects--iconic, indexical, and symbolic; but I am focusing on the predominant relation of the sign to its object. — aletheist

I'm also focusing on the predominant relation, but the mere application of semiotic terminology is not an argument for "HOW a particular sign represents its object".

(*some clarification the day after my original post)

Here's an example of signs and realism.

A photograph of Ghandi signifies its object, the man, by resemblance between some of his visual features and some of the visual features of the photo. The photo may also represent the man, or what he stood for. But as a representation the photo is used as a symbol, and in order to represent the man or what he stood for we could substitute the photo with his name without changing the representation relation. From the logical difference between resemblance and representation it follows that if a portrait resembles, then it cannot represent in the same respect.

For someone who does not know of Ghandi the photo may still signify by resemblance between some of its visual features and visual features of men, whereas its possible use as a representation of Ghandi or what he stood for remains unknown. Unlike what the photo resembles, what it represents does not depend on the photo but on symbolic convention. Someone who has never seen a photo, nor a half-naked man, could arguably still see a symmetric relation between colour patches on the photo and the visual features of the man.

A photograph of Ghandi signifies its object, the man, by resemblance between some of his visual features and some of the visual features of the photo. The photo may also represent the man, or what he stood for. But as a representation the photo is used as a symbol, and in order to represent the man or what he stood for we could substitute the photo with his name without changing the representation relation. From the logical difference between resemblance and representation it follows that if a portrait resembles, then it cannot represent in the same respect. — jkop

I think the distinction you're making between representation and resemblance makes some sense--it's clear that they're not coexhaustive, but I'd say that (a) resemblance is often a subset of representation, and (b) representations by resemblance often have representational aspects that other sorts of representations, such as just a name, for example, lack.

I don't know if you'd agree with me, though, that representations exclusively obtain via individuals thinking about things in a signifier/signified manner.

It seems clear that thought about things in a manner of signs and signified is presupposed in representation.

Yet an overwhelming amount of the things in our environment are not signs, they don't represent something else. We identify trees and pictures whose coloured shapes resemble trees because we have a background capacity to perceive and identify things in our environment and their properties, including differences and resemblances. In this sense resemblance is psychologically more primitive than representation.

For example, you see what a bundle of coloured shapes on a photograph resembles, but you've got to learn what a traffic sign represents. It seems clear that in order to know what something represents we need more than a capacity for identifying things: we need a symbol system, a language, and thus thought about the thing in a manner of sign and signified.


(clarified some parts, deleted others)