No. The phrase is not ambiguous. The phrase is crystal clear. "I weigh 196 pounds." You get to wonder to what degree of precision, if you want, or even if it's true. But as to its ambiguity, no. Unless you simply do not know what the word "ambiguity" means.Right, and that's exactly why the phrase is ambiguous. We don't know who weighed you, how they weighed you, when they weighed you, and so the phrase is ambiguous. — Metaphysician Undercover
I would have deleted the OP if I'd seen it before it generated a discussion. It's so lacking in anything philosophical or interesting that it looks like just an attempt to get on the main page instead of the Lounge, where your threads usually end up. — jamalrob
Have you got anything to say about how it has been treated by philosophers? — jamalrob
In what way is its use vague, as you keep on saying it is, with no explanation? You have not described the problem with "I know" or how it is vague. It's your OP that is vague. There is no clear question, and what there is doesn't make much sense. — jamalrob
What is the philosophical issue? What does this have to do with formal languages, which is something you brought up? — jamalrob
I've been very clear. I've given you a chance to answer, to tell us all what the hell you have in mind, but you respond with evasiveness. — jamalrob
That's a long phrase to solve a problem I don't think I experience. In what contexts are you thinking we should substitute something like that? And if we really think we KNOW, that would not be conveying what we mean. I am not forced to take them at their word, but it does give me a clear message about they own assessment of their assertion. If someone I respect a lot says 'I know X to be the case' that is taken by me in one way, from a stranger another and so on. But it gives me a clear mess about that person's sense of what they are conveying. WE all know that people can think they know when in fact they don't have good ground for it. I don't feel compelled to accept what they say, but it does provide extra information. If someone goes out of their way to say 'to the best of my knowledge' I will think they are less certain or that's how they want to couch all their assertions. I won't know which until I get to know them. So, it's still not clear. And if it is someone I know, then I have a good sense of their thoroughness. I see no loss in the current common use of 'I know'. If I was naive and felt compelled or their were rules that I was compelled to accept any assertion starting that way, well, that would be a problem. But that's not the world I live in. If they say 'I think...' that conveys something else. And people can manage to convey their utter certainty and that one would be stupid to disagree with them when using 'to the best of my knowledge'. Just imagine that said in a condescending way. I don't think people should start using this long phrase that in itself might be incorrect. Perhaps they have actually seen counterexamples to what they are asserting so it isn't to the best of their knowledge, but they stubbornly believe. Any formulation is going to still be problematic if we conflate what the person means and the truth value of what they are saying.Usually, when we want to do this, we look for less ambiguous phrases to get the point across. The ambiguous "I know", can get substituted with "to the best of my knowledge", which seems to encapsulate the phrase into something coherent or palpable. — Wallows
We know some statement when at the least we believe it, it fits in with our other beliefs, and when it is true.
The "fits in with other beliefs" is a first approximation for a justification. Something stronger is needed, but material implication will not do.
Discard Gettier. The definition is not hard-and-fast.
It does not make sense to ask if we know X to be true; that's exactly the same as asking if we know X. The "we only know it if it is true" bit is only there because we can't know things that are false.
If you cannot provide a justification, that is, if you cannot provide other beliefs with which a given statement coheres, then you cannot be said to know it.
If the consequent Q is true, then so is the justification P > Q. If ravens are black, then grass is green justifies that ravens are black.
So that will not do. — Banno
Discard Gettier. The definition is not hard-and-fast.
I don't see what Gettier has to do with the OP. — Banno
Why add "really"? — Banno
You seem to be looking for something that we can be certain of, perhaps as a way of founding an epistemology.
But that seems to me to show a misunderstanding about belief.
Certainty is a type of belief - a belief that is beyond doubt. But of course, one can believe anything one wants - even things that are not true. Hence, one can be certain about anything one wants, even stuff that is not true.
But one cannot know stuff that is not true.
Compare:
"He is certain there is a Santa, but of course that's not true"
with
"He knows there is a Santa, but of course that's not true".
All I am doing here is pointing to how the words are used; I'm not setting out which things are true, believed or known. — Banno
But I did. The picture theory is not relevant for 'lower' languages. So it's not relevant for 'higher' languages, either. — Banno
And that's leaving aside the ambiguity of lower and higher. — Banno
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