To me, a fact is a record of events that actually happened. It is an experiential record. — BrianW
I seem to have a problem with a proposition being characterized as true or false because, by my understanding, a proposition is not definitive. Its values of truth and falsity are potential. To me, if the potentiality is verified, then it becomes an axiom. — BrianW
There are many entries, and if you scan a bunch of them it should be clear to you that the terms are in many of those defined as terms-of-art. — tim wood
Absent definition, usage is like a neighborhood of cats that each marks and defends its own territory and views the others with suspicion and hostile intent. Gosh, can you think of anyplace like that?!Facts seem to have a wider scope than your definition allows for. — StreetlightX
That "is" is a problem. I'd have thought that facts were things that propositions attempt to describe. — tim wood
That is, the proposition itself is never in-itself true - or rigorously provable. And there's nothing wrong with this; it's how the world works, including science-on-the-Charles. The issue here is usage and understanding. — tim wood
If it is of any interest for this observer or any one
else to know subsequently that the transit took place
then, the only way in which he can know it is by
knowing the historical fact that it was observed; and
historical facts are not apprehensible to our senses." — tim wood
Interesting point. Wile's proof of Fermat's last theorem involves maths that most folks don't and won't understand (so it's said, nor do I disagree). So the proposition is true, as true as 2+3=5, just wa-ay more difficult. The best most of us can do, then, is take it as a fact, something historically conditioned, and present the available evidence in support of it - which of course is not the proof itself - and appeal to the weight of the evidence. One difference: in the case of the proof, we know so, in the case of the fact, we suppose so. — tim wood
How about a fact is an expression of a state of affairs or circumstance. This can also fit in statements like "it is a fact that force is defined as mass multiplied by acceleration," and "it is a fact that fraud is illegal under the law." — BrianW
This seems prima faice inadequete. If you index facts to the past, one is hard pressed to make sense of straightforward statements like: "it is a fact that the heat death of the universe will occur"; similarly, if you index facts to experience ('experiential record'), what of "it is a fact that force is defined as mass multiplied by acceleration"? Or even analytic statements like "it is a fact that batchelors are unmarried men"?; Normativity is general wrecks all sorts of havok here, anything premised on some sort of commitment: "it is a fact that fraud is illegal under the law". Facts seem to have a wider scope than your definition allows for. — StreetlightX
So, facts must be truth-apt. — creativesoul
One might as well speak of true lies (not impossible, but very ugly). — StreetlightX
I suppose if facts cannot be false, but they can be true, then they must be true - by definition... on that use, or in that sense. Is that about right? — creativesoul
Depends I guess. If one holds to the classic (simplified) conception in which truth can only be predicated of propositions while facts simply are states of affairs (words vs things, roughly), then even to speak of 'true facts' is a kind of category mistake, or, like false facts, simply a mode of expression which is simply speaking a tautology (a 'round circle'). In this scheme one might say truths express facts or somesuch. — StreetlightX
You could do this (both sound odd to me, to be honest), but this seems like a stipulative definition, in which case it's not clear what the impetus for doing this is. — StreetlightX
I'm not sure about knowledge being about utility because while it seems instinctively desirable, tool-makers that we are, to put knowledge to some use, utility per se doesn't constitute an essential feature of the definition of knowledge. I mean that if ever we encounter a well-justified proposition it would still count as knowledge to know it even if it proved to be completely useless. — TheMadFool
I've tried to hold this sort of position before and I think my worry is it doesn't seem to give much of a difference between knowledge and information. I've been using utility to, primarily, differentiate between the two. Is there another way? — BrianW
Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon is a fact. — tim wood
2+3=5 is true. — tim wood
Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon. — tim wood
I guess the difference then is that some types of information are undesirable but knowledge is always valuable to possess. Can you pick up the thread from there? — TheMadFool
Yeah, thanks. I've learned quite a lot from that. It seems that there's an inherent idea that, at least, one of the differences between knowledge and information is based on some kind of judgement with respect to its significance to us, e.g. desirable/undesirable, valuable/useless, etc. — BrianW
Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon. — tim wood
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.