Obviously, I included the conclusion of the earlier argument, which demonstrated that the haecceity of the object is prior to the physical presence of the object, as a premise. Your claimed non-sequitur is because you conveniently forgot this conclusion, and didn't include that premise. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, definitely I didn't just assume that I should insert sentences from other posts there. I'm not sure which sentence(s) you were wanting me to insert.

I suggested that "the haecceity" and "the object" refer to one and the same thing, and you claimed to accept this. But I can see now that you do not really accept this. You have not released the idea that the object is necessarily a physical thing. Haecceitty refers to what the object is, and there is no necessity that what the object is physical. This is an unwarranted assumption if you agree to that proposal. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm fine with saying that the haecceity and the object are the same thing--and in fact, I'd say that insofar as haecceity makes sense, that's necessarily the case. The "thisness" of any object would be it's particularness as an existent thing. I'm not about to release the idea that the object--and any and everything else--is a physical thing prior to someone at least persuading me that the idea of nonphysical existents makes the slightest bit of sense.

If you say that the haecceity is necessarily physical, then we have no agreement.

And that's indeed what I'd say. That haecceity, again along with any and everything else, is a physical thing.

Remember that the argument demonstrates that there is something prior to the physical object, which determines that the physical object will exist as the particular physical object which it is, when that physical object comes into existence. So by inductive reasoning we can say that there is a "determining factor", or "determining factors" which are prior to each and every physical object, and therefore prior to all physical objects. — Metaphysician Undercover

You'd have to copy and paste the argument you're referring to.

As I noted earlier, I don't agree that there's any issue of a particular physical object existing as the particular physical object that it is--I'd not be able to make any sense out of any alternatives, so we'd need to establish why this would even be an issue in the first place.

By the way, we should probably clarify whether we're talking about, say, an electron (or all or the physical universe, say) "popping into existence" or whether we're talking about, say, a table "coming into existence" where earlier than that, there was maybe a tree that supplied the wood for the table. I keep wondering exactly which one we're talking about. I'd say the issues are different in both cases. For the former case, I don't reject that "something can come from nothing," although I also don't reject that the physical stuff we've got has always existed. Both are counterintuitive, but I'd say that we have no option other than counterintuitive options.

which assumes that a physical object cannot be anything other than the physical object which it is, and therefore there must be a determining factor, or determining factors which are prior to that object, — Metaphysician Undercover

But I don't at all buy that the fact that a particular is the particular it is implies that there's some prior determining factor for that. I don't think that's been established at all. As I've repeatedly said, I don't think it even makes any sense that we'd say that an object might be something other than the particular object that it is. So we'd need to establish how that would even make sense prior to wondering why one option rather than the other is the case.

You say that properties are what dynamic structures and relations of matter are "like". So "properties" aren't the very same thing as dynamic structures and relations of matter, they are some form of similitude. — Metaphysician Undercover

The misunderstanding is occurring with how you're parsing "like." For one, the term "like" was in quotation marks. I'm not using that term in the sense of a similie. I'm using it to denote something that I spelled out immediately after I used the term: the qualities they have, the way they interact with other things, etc. That's what "like" refers to there.

You observe that the human mind creates these similitudes, as ideas, descriptions of the real dynamic structures and relations of matter. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't say anything like that, and it's not something I agree with. (That's not to deny qualia in the mental sense of that term, but that's not what I was talking about in the passage you are responding to. I was talking about properties period, without any reference to persons at all--we could imagine no persons existing, for example)

However, you do not take the necessary steps to advance your understanding, — Metaphysician Undercover

C'mon, man Don't start to get patronizing. I could easily be patronizing to you, but that's not something I'd do unprovoked.

The world is the way that it is. We notice the contingency of objects, and because of this we can change the world to an extent, to make it be more the way we want it to be. Due to the nature of contingency we can see that it was not necessary that the world came to be in the way that it did. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is all fine, but it has nothing to do with the idea that an object could somehow be something other than the object it is. You'd need to support that particular idea (that it could even make sense). A suggestion as to how you might support it is by giving an example of it (that hopefully makes some sense).

But space and time are completely conceptual, — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't at all agree with that by the way.

But space and time are completely conceptual ... — Metaphysician Undercover


Are they? That seems more like nominalism than realism. — aletheist

It's anti-realism, but it doesn't have anything to do with nomalism (it's not about either universals or the idea of abstract existents . . . well, unless one takes space/time to necessarily be abstract existents, but I sure don't. I'm a nominalist and a realist on space and time. It's just that space and time are not "substances" in any sense that exist apart from matter/dynamic relations of matter.)

Okay, my mistake. It sounded like nominalism to me in the sense that "space" and "time" are just names that people give to concepts. I would not describe them as "substances," either. Rather, everything that exists (in my narrow sense) does so within space and time; together they serve as the theater in which all actual reactions occur. They are thus real, not merely conceptual. Space is that which makes it possible for different objects to have identical properties, while time is that which makes it possible for a single object to have contradictory properties.

Are they? That seems more like nominalism than realism. I lean toward the latter, as I believe you do, and was merely suggesting that there is a distinction between haecceity and essence. It may be just another Peircean terminological preference on my part, like limiting "existence" to actuality. — aletheist

The way I see it, we perceive objects. We have developed the concepts of space and time to assist us in understanding the existence of these objects. The concept of space helps us to understand relative positions, size, etc., and the concept of time helps us to understand change. I do believe that these concepts are substantiated by something real, or else they wouldn't be helping us to understand the existence of objects, they would be producing a misunderstanding of the existence of objects. That said, I think there is a fair degree of misunderstanding of the existence of objects, as is evident from my discussion with Terrapin. Therefore, the exact nature of the real things which are represented by these concepts, space and time, I don't believe is very well understood, and this is evident from the fact that the existence of objects is not well understood. So there is an issue of dispelling the misunderstanding, and redeveloping the concepts of space and time, before we can truly say that "space" and "time" refer to something real.

On my view space is simply the extension of matter and the extensional relation between matter, and time is simply the changing/in-motion relations of matter.

Are spatial and temporal relations the only relations that you consider to be real?

,

I am curious to know what both of you think of this statement that I offered earlier: Space is that which makes it possible for different objects to have identical properties, while time is that which makes it possible for a single object to have contradictory properties.

You'd have to copy and paste the argument you're referring to. — Terrapin Station

All this time, I thought we were discussing the results of that original argument I presented. Now I see that you've totally forgotten it. Here it is.

The argument from Aristotle is that all objects are particulars. Each and every object exists as the particular object which it is, and nothing else. When a particular object comes into existence, it necessarily comes into existence as the particular object which it is. It is impossible that it is other than what it is. Therefore what it is, or the object's essence, must precede the object's existence. If it did not, it would be possible for the object to come into existence as an object other than the object which it is, and this is contradictory. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is your reply:

There's a problem with this argument.

"All objects are particulars."

I agree with that.

"Each and every object exists as the particular object which it is, and nothing else."

I agree with that.

"When a particular object comes into existence, it necessarily comes into existence as the particular object which it is. It is impossible that it is other than what it is."

I agree with that, too.

"Therefore what it is, or the object's essence, must precede the object's existence."

I disagree with that however. First off I disagree with saying that what the object is has anything to do with "essence." You could, however, be saying that you're just defining "essence" as "what an object is," without any of the other typical associations that "essence" has, and that would be fine, but in that case, saying that what an object is must precede the object's existence makes no sense. The object can't be whatever it is prior to it being something (existing) in the first place.

"If it did not, it would be possible for the object to come into existence as an object other than the object which it is, and this is contradictory."

This seems to me like it's probably buying that substances separate from properties can make sense (which is something I disagree with). — Terrapin Station

So, your primary objection had to do with the word "essence", which we've replaced with "haecceity". Your second objection is that it makes no sense to you, that the properties of an object can exist prior to the physical object itself. But you have not backed this up with any logic. And, despite the fact that I've given you numerous examples now, of how it is so, that the properties of an object exist prior to the physical object, you keep whining like a little child, claiming "it doesn't make sense", "it doesn't make sense". But I see through your childish attitude, and what you are really saying is "I don't want it to be like that, therefore I refuse to accept the reality of this". You know, when a child can't accept that things are not the way that it wants them to be, it gets whiney.

With respect to this second objection, in order to quell your dissatisfaction with the idea that properties exist prior to the object, I suggested that we switch things around, such that physical existence is a property. In this way, the non-physical haecceity can exist as the object, and then receive its physical properties. But now you go back to your whining, saying that anything non-physical existing doesn't make sense.

But I don't at all buy that the fact that a particular is the particular it is implies that there's some prior determining factor for that. I don't think that's been established at all. — Terrapin Station

Well you seemed to agree to this in the initial argument. See, it states that when an object comes into existence it necessarily comes into existence as the object which it is, and not something else. That word "necessarily" implies a cause. If there were no cause, then the object wouldn't necessarily be the object which it is, it could be absolutely anything. But it's not anything, it is the object which it is, and therefore there is a cause of that, and this is what I now call the determining factors, if you like that better than haecceity.

C'mon, man Don't start to get patronizing. I could easily be patronizing to you, but that's not something I'd do unprovoked. — Terrapin Station

OK, now I've compared you to a whiney child, does that provoke you? Or is it impossible to provoke you?

This is all fine, but it has nothing to do with the idea that an object could somehow be something other than the object it is. You'd need to support that particular idea (that it could even make sense). A suggestion as to how you might support it is by giving an example of it (that hopefully makes some sense). — Terrapin Station

That's the whole point, an object cannot be other than what it is. We totally agree. So we have a premise which we both agree upon, now let's proceed. I ask, why is this the case, and see that it can only be the case if the object is caused to be the object which it is. If there were no cause of it being the object which it is, it could be absolutely anything. It is not absolutely anything, it is the object which it is, and nothing else. Therefore there must be a cause of it being the object which it is.

Are spatial and temporal relations the only relations that you consider to be real? — aletheist

That's a good question. I don't think I've ever considered it before. It may be that we attempt to reduce all relations to space and time relations. That might be physicalism. But if there are non-physical existents, which I claim, then there are likely to be non-physical relations as well. As I implied in my last post, I don't believe that our present concepts of space and time are adequate for a full understand of the existence of objects. This would mean that there are aspects of reality which are not properly represented by these concepts, so if there are relations here, these may not be space or time relations.

In Christian theology they revere the father/son relation, represent it as Father/ Son, and this relation is sometimes called the Holy Spirit. Whether this relation can be represented completely in terms of space and time is questionable because there is a material element, content, which is the continuity of life, or some such thing, within the father son/relation. "Father" and "son" refer directly to a formal aspect Space and time are formal aspects, terms of essence. But there must still be another type of relationship which relates the formal to the underlying material aspect.

That's a good question. I don't think I've ever considered it before. — Metaphysician Undercover

Thanks, but I was mainly asking Terrapin Station, in response to his statement that "space is simply the extension of matter and the extensional relation between matter, and time is simply the changing/in-motion relations of matter."

But if there are non-physical existents, which I claim, then there are likely to be non-physical relations as well. — Metaphysician Undercover

Aside from my preference against using the term "existents" for anything non-actual, I am inclined to agree.

Are spatial and temporal relations the only relations that you consider to be real? — aletheist

That's a good question, especially as I'm not completely sure of my answer, but I would guess yes, that all relations I'd accept would be analyzable in terms of change/motion and extension.

Space is that which makes it possible for different objects to have identical properties, — aletheist

I don't believe that different objects can have identical properties.

Aside from that, though, I can't really grasp how that would work on your view.

time is that which makes it possible for a single object to have contradictory properties. — aletheist

Well, the properties at T1 can contradict properties at T2 (if we ignore that contradictions should be p & ~p at the same time, in the same respect, etc.), but I wouldn't say that literally, an object has contradictory properties. We could say it had properties that "contradict" its present properties, I suppose.

So, your primary objection had to do with the word "essence", — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, that was the first problem I was bringing up, yeah--the idea of essences (where essential properties are contrasted with accidental properties and so on).

An equal problem with it is that in my opinion, the conclusion ("Therefore what it is . . . ) doesn't at all follow.

And another problem is that "it would be possible for the object to come into existence as an object other than the object which it is," doesn't make any sense in my opinion. I wouldn't say that was possible. As I noted, it might at least appear to make some sense on a view that substances are some sort of mysterious, amorphous somethings that are later bestowed with properties, but I don't really think that view makes a lot of sense in the first place, and there's definitely no reason to believe it in my opinion.

Your second objection is that it makes no sense to you, that the properties of an object can exist prior to the physical object itself. But you have not backed this up with any logic. — Metaphysician Undercover

It seems kind of ridiculous to me to say that something not making any sense to someone should be "backed up with logic."

The only thing we can do when something makes no sense to someone is to try to explain it to them so that it does make sense to them. That might not be possible, of course, but if something makes sense to me but not to someone else, I'll approach it by trying to explain it in a bunch of different ways to see if starts to click with them at all. We'll all have varying degrees of patience with that, though . . . to wit:

And, despite the fact that I've given you numerous examples now, of how it is so, that the properties of an object exist prior to the physical object, you keep whining like a little child, claiming "it doesn't make sense", "it doesn't make sense". But I see through your childish attitude, and what you are really saying is "I don't want it to be like that, therefore I refuse to accept the reality of this". You know, when a child can't accept that things are not the way that it wants them to be, it gets whiney. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, did you see the comment about not being patronizing?

But now you go back to your whining, saying that anything non-physical existing doesn't make sense. — Metaphysician Undercover

One option for you is to try to explain how the idea of nonphysical existents makes sense. Of course, you can not bother, but I'm just saying that that's an option if it really makes sense to you. I may be skeptical that it does (make sense to you), but I'll try to refrain from being patronizing for a post or two more to see if we can get back on track.

See, it states that when an object comes into existence it necessarily comes into existence as the object which it is, and not something else. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I definitely agree with that part.

That word "necessarily" implies a cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

That part I don't agree with at all, however. I'd have no idea where you're getting a notion from that "necessarily" implies a cause. For example, if necessarily A = A, presumably then you'd think that there must be a cause for that. I just don't know why you'd think that. I suppose you see modal logic as significantly resting on causes then? That would be an unusual view.

If there were no cause, then the object wouldn't necessarily be the object which it is, it could be absolutely anything. — Metaphysician Undercover

I've asked this a number of times. Could you give an example, at least a hypothetical one, of an object not being what it is? Like maybe your example would be something like "A sock might be a puppy otherwise!" Maybe an apt example from you would help me figure out what it might amount to for something to be something other than what it is. Not that "A sock might be a puppy otherwise!" would do the trick, because I have no idea how the heck a sock could be a puppy. But maybe you could explain that.

OK, now I've compared you to a whiney child, does that provoke you? Or is it impossible to provoke you? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm hoping to have a serious, good-faith conversation with you, because I'd like to try to figure out how some of this stuff works under the umbrella of your views.

That's the whole point, an object cannot be other than what it is. We totally agree. So we have a premise which we both agree upon, now let's proceed. I ask, why is this the case, — Metaphysician Undercover

I'd say that it's simply a matter of identity (that is, A=A) and non-contradiction (that is ~(P&~P)). I wouldn't say that has any cause. I've run into people who say that the idea of a materially instantiated contradiction or violation of identity makes sense to them, and where on examination they seemed to understand what it is to claim this (so that they weren't equivocating, etc.), but I've never been able to comprehend how they can conceive of this.

Perhaps. I can't see that 'essence' makes much sense. The something that makes a thing what it is...

Is that significantly different from "the reason we call it by such-and-such a name"?

I don't believe that different objects can have identical properties. — Terrapin Station

Not even as a thought experiment? It seems possible to me, at least in principle, for there to be two objects that are identical in every way, except for their spatial locations and the particular particles that comprise them. All of their qualities would be the same.

Well, the properties at T1 can contradict properties at T2 ... — Terrapin Station

Right, that is what I meant; it is still the same object at T1 and T2, despite having different properties that would be contradictory if possessed simultaneously.

Well I thought whatever is, is and by virtue of this claim we describe it.

Do you think some names are descriptive, they carry along their own history/meaning which is already in language as spoken. If so then what is entailed by a name is not significantly different from what I am calling an essence?

Or is it different, that names are not synonymous with descriptions, that it is all quite arbitrary, depending contingent circumstances.

Is it either/or? Especially if meaning and history are not separated. Indeed, is there such a thing as the meaning of a word?

The notion that Sartre was attempting to justify - that we 'choose' ourselves - drops out of meaning scepticism fairly readily; if meaning is a more or less arbitrary construction, then the meaning of any given individual's life is also a more or less arbitrary construction.

That strikes me as a much better approach than the almost medieval 'existence precedes essence'.

Sartre is on about a little bit more than just arbitrariness of meaning. He's pointing out that in our notions of "essence," we mistake an assigned meaning for who someone is and how they are capable. To think of it only in terms of "meaning" is all too throwaway. It not merely "meaning" that's at stake, but who and what we think people are, and it's relationship to logic. Not only is "meaning" to be "made," but it means our understanding go things cannot just be given "by nature." The world has do do some work.

Worldly meaning cannot be expressed simply by logic floating in the aether- no use of meaning (or language) can be so regardless of the world. Existence (the world) precedes essence (used meaning). One cannot go, as the essentialists do, from meaning (e.g. "human nature," "savage," "male," "female," etc., etc.-- essences) to a particular use in world (e.g. "humans who are necessarily X by nature" ).

And another problem is that "it would be possible for the object to come into existence as an object other than the object which it is," doesn't make any sense in my opinion. I wouldn't say that was possible. As I noted, it might at least appear to make some sense on a view that substances are some sort of mysterious, amorphous somethings that are later bestowed with properties, but I don't really think that view makes a lot of sense in the first place, and there's definitely no reason to believe it in my opinion. — Terrapin Station

OK, so we're in agreement here. As I said, it is necessary that the object comes into existence as the object which it is. Otherwise, "it would be possible for the object to come into existence as an object other than the object which it is", and this doesn't make any sense to you nor to me. So we have complete agreement on this necessity. The one is necessary because the alternative is nonsense.

Now we can ask, what makes this a necessity, what makes it so that it does not make any sense to me nor you, that the alternative could be the case. That the alternative is nonsense is what makes the first a "logical" necessity. But it is not the fact that we agree, which makes this actually the case, that this is true, It is the fact that it is a truth, which makes us agree. So, the object necessarily comes into existence as the object which it is. Why? It is not because the alternative is nonsense, that may be what makes us agree, but it's not our agreement which makes this the truth.

That part I don't agree with at all, however. I'd have no idea where you're getting a notion from that "necessarily" implies a cause. For example, if necessarily A = A, presumably then you'd think that there must be a cause for that. I just don't know why you'd think that. I suppose you see modal logic as significantly resting on causes then? That would be an unusual view. — Terrapin Station

You don't agree that if A = A there must be a cause of that? I would say that on both the right side, and the left side of the =, there is the same symbol, A, and the = sign represents some form of sameness. That is "why" A=A, or the cause of that necessity. When something is necessarily the case, this means that it is impossible to be otherwise. This is the exact opposite of a random or chance occurrence, which is said to be an uncaused occurrence, so there must be a cause of what is necessarily the case. If it were uncaused, it would be a random or chance occurrence, and not something which is necessarily the case. So do you agree, that when something is necessarily the case, such as "when an object comes into existence it is necessarily the object which it is, and not something else", it is very reasonable to ask why this is the case? It is reasonable to ask why because the necessity of the occurrence implies that there is a cause of it.

One option for you is to try to explain how the idea of nonphysical existents makes sense. — Terrapin Station

I think we've already been through this. We've talked about ideas. To me, ideas as non-physical existents makes sense. That's the most simple and straight forward way to understand the existence of ideas, i.e., as non-physical existents. It doesn't matter that the humanly produced concept, or idea, depends upon, or is created by the physically existing human being, the idea itself is still non-physical. Likewise, it doesn't matter that the physical object depends upon the non-physical as its cause of existence, it still exists as a physical object. I really don't see how you can make sense of reality without referring to non-physical existents.

I'd say that it's simply a matter of identity (that is, A=A) and non-contradiction (that is ~(P&~P)). I wouldn't say that has any cause. — Terrapin Station

Don't you see that things like identity and non-contradiction must have a cause? If there was no reason why A = A, or why contradiction was unacceptable, then we wouldn't accept these as fundamental principles. It is because these are reasonable, i.e. there is a reason why they are acceptable, that we do accept them as fundamental principles. It is not because we accept them, and agree on them that they become fundamental principles, it is because they are acceptable. Therefore there is a reason for identity, and non-contradiction, and that is that they state something real and true about the world, and this is why we accept them. So these principles have a real cause of existence, the cause is the way that the world is. The way that the world is causes the existence of these principles. If the world were otherwise, such that it were not describable by these principles, we would not have developed these principles.

SO the claim is that the world logically precedes what we say about it?

Can you seperate what is said from what it is about in this way? I think not.

If the world is the way it is for no particular reason(s), even if the world is absolutely contingent, it still is the way it is and we still talk the same world, and in the similar ways even though we may be on opposite sides of it. So yes " any given individual's life is also a more or less arbitrary construction.", yet we all have a definite history, leave a trail that others can follow...Sartre wants us to accept responsibility for what we decide, what we make of our self and we can only do that if we are free to choose.

Not really. That reading is all too empirical, as if "existence before essence" was suggesting something existed before the use of its meaning-- an obvious contradiction.

The statement is really about logic. It's not describing states of the world (e.g. the state was "nothing" until someone gave it a meaning), but rather identifying what we can say with logic. It's pointing out we can't use a concept or or idea to determine what the world must be.

We can't just say, for example, that "Humans are necessarily kind. It's always their nature." Or: "There Banno. He's necessarily a waiter by his nature." In any case, the mere logical idea is not enough to define that use of meaning.

The world has to do it. Humans are only kind when they are kind. Banno is only a waiter when he is a waiter. In the world, no use of meaning is necessary. It has to be performed by the world (existence). Therefore, the world (existence) must be in any performance of meaning. Mere logic alone ( "Banno is necessarily a waiter" ) has no performer and so cannot be a use of meaning.

That looks ok to me.

Logic? SO existential quantification is logically prior to predication?

More like separate. Existential quantification (something exists, a meaning is used-- e.g. Banno is a waiter) is different to logical quantification (a necessary truth-- e.g. Banno is necessarily a waiter and will be no matter what happens in the world).

They cannot be substituted. The essentialist cannot be correct. I can't say: "Banno is, by nature, necessarily a waiter." Since Banno is a state of the world, it takes an existential quantification ( "Banno is a waiter" ) to make it so.

No matter how absurd it is to me that Banno could be something other than a waiter, it's true.

So he is talking about the relation between existential quantification, predication and necessity.

And he is saying that they are different.

But which precedes which?

You don't agree that if A = A there must be a cause of that? I would say that on both the right side, and the left side of the =, there is the same symbol, A, and the = sign represents some form of sameness. That is "why" A=A, or the cause of that necessity. When something is necessarily the case, this means that it is impossible to be otherwise. This is the exact opposite of a random or chance occurrence, which is said to be an uncaused occurrence, so there must be a cause of what is necessarily the case. If it were uncaused, it would be a random or chance occurrence, and not something which is necessarily the case. So do you agree, that when something is necessarily the case, such as "when an object comes into existence it is necessarily the object which it is, and not something else", it is very reasonable to ask why this is the case? It is reasonable to ask why because the necessity of the occurrence implies that there is a cause of it. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I don't agree with that at all. For one, you're committing a category error by trying to read it temporally--you're talking about cause in a temporal sense, in the sense that we talk about causality in physics.

Aside from that, you seem to be imagining that there's some default state of randomness where nonsense could obtain so that something might not be itself if there isn't something to prevent that possibility. I have no idea why you'd believe this, though. What evidence, empirical or logical, would suggest such a default to you? (And re logical, I'm talking about entailment/validity, not loose heuristics that seem intuitively right to you.)

Perhaps you simply believe that "everything must have a cause," or "everything must have a reason that isn't itself," but I don't believe either, both obviously lead to infinite regresses, and neither has any empirical or logical support.

To me, ideas as non-physical existents makes sense. That's the most simple and straight forward way to understand the existence of ideas, i.e., as non-physical existents. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not just asking you to name something as a nonphysical existent, though. You're not understanding that I think that the very idea of nonphysical existents is incoherent. So when you say that understanding ideas as nonphysical existents is the most simple and straightforward way to understand them, I read it as "understanding ideas as <<I haven't the faintest idea what the hell we might be referring to>> is the most simple and straightforward way to understand ideas."

What I'm looking for is some explanatory clue with respect to "what the hell we might be referring to." For all that "nonphysical existent" refers to in my view, we could just as well say, "understanding ideas as splooraffatoolees is the most simple and straightforward way to understand ideas." The semantic content of that would be the same for me. If I were to keep mentioning splooraffatoolees, and you said "I have no idea what that's referring to," it wouldn't do any good for me to say, "Coconuts are a good example of splooraffatoolees. That's the easiest way to understand coconuts." You haven't the faintest idea what splooraffatoolees is referring to/no one can make any sense of it for you. Associating coconuts with it doesn't help.

Don't you see that things like identity and non-contradiction must have a cause? — Metaphysician Undercover

No. I see the belief that they must have a cause as completely unsupported.

Therefore there is a reason for identity, and non-contradiction, and that is that they state something real and true about the world, and this is why we accept them. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's a fact about them, not a reason for them, and certainly not a temporally prior cause of them.

So these principles have a real cause of existence, the cause is the way that the world is. The way that the world is causes the existence of these principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, they are the way the world is.

There might be some confusion, by the way, a la thinking that I'm mentioning logical identity (A=A) as something we're claiming. I'm not. I'm mentioning it as an ontological fact--as a way that things are.

Can you seperate what is said from what it is about in this way? I think not. — Banno

If you can't separate what is said from what it's about you'd be in store for a lifetime if serious confusions.

as if "existence before essence" was suggesting something existed before the use of its meaning-- an obvious contradiction. — TheWillowOfDarkness

What's p in that contradiction?

It seems obvious to me that something existed "before the use of its meaning" (setting aside that "before the use of its meaning" is wonky in my opinion)

Since Banno is a state of the world, it takes an existential quantification ( "Banno is a waiter" ) to make it so. — TheWillowOfDarkness

?? Existential quantification doesn't include predication. Existential quantification is simply that "there is an" or "there exists a" or "there are some" or "for some" etc. In other words "there exists an x" (and we could add "such that x is Banno")--that's the existential quantification part.

Anyway, I don't agree that Sartre was doing logic per se.

No, I don't agree with that at all. For one, you're committing a category error by trying to read it temporally--you're talking about cause in a temporal sense, in the sense that we talk about causality in physics. — Terrapin Station

As far as I know, there is no type of cause other than temporal. Cause is a temporal concept, the cause is necessarily prior (temporally) to the effect. If you don't agree, then maybe you could describe a type of causation which is not like that.

Aside from that, you seem to be imagining that there's some default state of randomness where nonsense could obtain so that something might not be itself if there isn't something to prevent that possibility. I have no idea why you'd believe this, though. What evidence, empirical or logical, would suggest such a default to you? (And re logical, I'm talking about entailment/validity, not loose heuristics that seem intuitively right to you.) — Terrapin Station

The way that people use the terms "chance", "random", and "stochastic" suggests this to me. Referring to scientific theories, people talk about chance, or random mutations of living beings, and stochastic systems. If the entire universe went to a complete state of randomness, where it was impossible to predict what would be, from one moment to the next, there could be no objects here because the existence of an object requires a temporally extended stability (sameness for a period of time). In that universe it would be impossible for a thing to be itself because being itself requires that temporal extension. So this idea, "where nonsense could obtain" is science based, empirically based, it is the progress of science itself which has suggested this to me.

Perhaps you simply believe that "everything must have a cause," or "everything must have a reason that isn't itself," but I don't believe either, both obviously lead to infinite regresses, and neither has any empirical or logical support. — Terrapin Station

I believe that if things exist in an orderly fashion, there must be a reason, or cause for this. I think that it is definitively true, necessarily true, in the same sense that it is necessarily true that an object cannot be other than itself, that order cannot come from disorder, without a cause. Consider randomly placed objects strewn about in a disorderly way. If they are going to take on some sort of order, they must be moved, and this movement requires a cause. Any type of disorder requires movement before it can become ordered, and this requires a cause. A moving disorder will continue forever to move disorderly, according to the law of inertia, unless caused to move in an orderly way. I observe that things exist according to order, I know that there must be a cause of this.

I read it as "understanding ideas as <<I haven't the faintest idea what the hell we might be referring to>> is the most simple and straightforward way to understand ideas." — Terrapin Station

You're really self-contradictory here Terrapin. You use the word "idea", saying "I haven't the faintest idea", of what you mean by "idea". Don't you see that this is most likely some sort of lie, or deception, or at best contradiction, to say "I haven't the faintest idea what you mean by idea". Clearly you are using the word in a comprehensible way, so you must have some idea of what it means, yet in the same sentence you are claiming that you haven't the faintest idea of what it means.

What I'm looking for is some explanatory clue with respect to "what the hell we might be referring to." — Terrapin Station

Wow, I can't believe you are saying this, when my entire discourse with you for the last few days has been exactly that explanation. Do you not remember how I described that "what the object is", is separable from the physical object itself, and how I can talk about the house that I will build despite the fact that it hasn't been built yet, because I refer to what it is, rather than the physical object itself? And you said that this is a case of referring to the "idea" of that house? Do you always close your eyes when someone is trying to show you something? That's why I compared you to a whiney baby! You keep your eyes closed tight while I show you over and over again, and you exclaim: I CAN'T SEE IT! I CAN'T SEE IT!

As far as I know, there is no type of cause other than temporal. Cause is a temporal concept, the cause is necessarily prior (temporally) to the effect. If you don't agree, then maybe you could describe a type of causation which is not like that. — Metaphysician Undercover

Some people use "cause" as a synonym for "reason"--a la "what's the reason" for something, where they're looking for an explanation or simply for something to be put into other words. That's different than a cause in the other sense. You seemed to be conflating the two at times.

The way that people use the terms "chance", "random", and "stochastic" suggests this to me. Referring to scientific theories, people talk about chance, or random mutations of living beings, and stochastic systems. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why wouldn't you instead simply question their usage of those terms? It's not as if they're saying something that's accurate ontologically or that even makes sense just because they're saying something. And are you talking about people on message boards, or are you talking about confirmed academics from relevant fields (the sciences, philosophy, etc.)? Re the former, they might have very little idea what they're talking about. It could be some computer programmer who has an interest in science and who has read enough to be able to use key terms, but who is really saying a lot of things that evidence a lack of knowledge and understanding about the field. Someone in the "a little knowledge is a dangerous thing" category. Message boards are full of folks like that. A lot of people don't really know what the fuck they're talking about to put it bluntly.

I don't know, it just seems completely absurd to me to say that the reason you'd take some random state where nonsense like "object x not being itself" could obtain in lieu of causes that prevent that state as a default is the way that people use terms like "chance," "random," etc.

Anyway, so re your if:

If the entire universe went to a complete state of randomness, where it was impossible to predict what would be, from one moment to the next, — Metaphysician Undercover

We'd probably need to define just what we're saying in that hypothetical, but we could assume that you're saying something like "if it were in a state of 'maximum entropy'" (leaving the phrase "maximum entropy" unanalyzed just to make it easier) . . .

there could be no objects here because the existence of an object requires a temporally extended stability (sameness for a period of time). — Metaphysician Undercover

That part I don't at all agree with from a couple different angles:

(1) For there to be a universe at all, there has to be physical stuff (on my view, of course). That means, there at least need to be elementary particles, whatever they turn out to be (maybe quarks and leptons, etc., or whatever else they turn out to be). Well, those things are objects on my view. Maybe you were meaning something else by "object," though--I don't know.

and

(2) I don't buy logical identity through time. Part of the reason for this is what time is on my view--time is change or motion. So for time to occur, change/motion occurs, which means that the things in question are not identical (in the A=A sense) from Tn to Tn+1, at least in their relations to other things.

In that universe it would be impossible for a thing to be itself because being itself requires that temporal extension. — Metaphysician Undercover

This again I do not agree with. Identity obtains when we're dealing with the same thing, at the same time, in the same respect (that is, from the same perspective for example). Things are necessarily what they are, and they're not necessarily what they're not at particular moments of time.

Talking about something, like a tube of toothpaste or whatever, being "that same tube of toothpaste at T1 and T2" is an abstraction insofar as A=A identity goes. Really, it's tube of toothpaste1 at time T1 and tube of toothpaste2 at time T2, where tube of toothpaste1 is not logically identical to tube of toothpaste2. I've had a discussion about this before on this board, and the other guy was conflating logical identity (A=A) and the notion of identity found in personal identity (through time), which is related but different, and necessarily conceptual. Tube of toothpaste1 and tube of toothpaste2 (I should have picked an example with a shorter name) are the "same" tube of toothpaste by virtue of our conceptual abstraction, which has a lot to do with the fact that tube of toothpaste1 and tube of toothpaste2 are developmentally related via causality, contiguity, etc.

So something being itself doesn't require temporal extension at all. It obtains at the same time.. Hence why it's impossible for something to be other than whatever it is at a given time. Whatever it is, it is that, and it doesn't make any sense to suppose that it could be something else at that moment in time. At a different moment in time, on my view, it necessarily is something else, something non-identical (yet closely related) to what it was previously, that is.

So this idea, "where nonsense could obtain" is science based, empirically based, — Metaphysician Undercover

You just said that it was based on the way people use words, and I'm betting dollars to donuts that it's mostly a matter of what you've seen people you've encountered on message boards say.

Otherwise, let's actually specify some of the science in question. Let's start with this: what science posits the world as random by default? Let's see if we can find any sort of science textbook that says anything like that.

I believe that if things exist in an orderly fashion, there must be a reason, or cause for this. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, but that's not a belief I share. If it seems like an undeniable, brute fact to you, there's probably not much we can do about us disagreeing on this.

order cannot come from disorder, without a cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't even put much weight on the idea of order versus disorder. I believe that those terms are extremely messy in most usages and typically relative and based simply on subjective concerns. Re entropy, it's often expressed as order versus disorder, especially historically, but there's still a lot of vagueness there, and it's often contemporarily defined in terms of energy dispersion at particular temperatures (which has its own ontological problems in my view).

At any rate, whatever it would turn out that we're saying exactly with "order coming from disorder," I don't actually believe that "order can not come from disorder without a cause." I have no problem with the idea of all sorts of acausal events occurring. It doesn't seem intuitively obvious to me that such couldn't obtain. I'd be more prone to (at least epistemological) skepticism of causality in general, a la Hume, than I would be to rejecting that events could happen acausally.

Consider randomly placed objects strewn about in a disorderly way. — Metaphysician Undercover

Literally, on the received view of the sciences, this wouldn't actually be possible by the way--to have randomly placed, medium-sized-dry-goods objects strewn about.

I wouldn't say that it's impossible (although I don't think it's something we can really know, either, and I believe that calling something "randomly placed" would be about our conceptual schemes instead, but anyway, this doesn't matter . . . )

If they are going to take on some sort of order, they must be moved, and this movement requires a cause.

I'd agree that positions have to change, but again, I wouldn't agree that it MUST require a cause. Again, I have no problem buying that all sorts of phenomena could occur acausally.

In any event, the other thing I wanted to say is that throughout this paragraph, you're using "order/disorder" as if they're well-defined, and they're not. If you're strictly using a particular mathematical definition of entropy, that would be well-defined, but I'm not sure that's what you're doing.

I observe that things exist according to order, — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know what "according to order" would refer to. Order/disorder a la entropy is a relative measure, by the way.

You're really self-contradictory here Terrapin. You use the word "idea", saying "I haven't the faintest idea", of what you mean by "idea". — Metaphysician Undercover

That was in response to this:

<<I haven't the faintest idea what the hell we might be referring to>>

However, <<I haven't the faintest idea what the hell we might be referring to>> is a substition for "nonphysical existents," not a substitution for "idea." I don't know why that would have been difficult to understand, but maybe I should have spelled that out more.

Wow, I can't believe you are saying this, when my entire discourse with you for the last few days has been exactly that explanation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, what I was talking about was the idea of nonphysical existents (in general). If that's what you've been trying to explain--maybe it was--that sure flew over my head. I thought that you were just trying to explain why you agree with "essence preceding existence." To me, nothing about that is necessarily about someone positing nonphysical existents, although you did make it explicit eventually that you consider nonphysicality to be a characteristic of essences or haecceities (maybe just haecceities, as I remember you equating essences with all of the properties of an object). Of course, insofar as that goes, I think it's incoherent, and to me, it rather seems like you're closing your eyes to this fact (which I'd say you're probably doing because your views on this are related to ad hoc support of religious beliefs).

Cause is a temporal concept, the cause is necessarily prior (temporally) to the effect. If you don't agree, then maybe you could describe a type of causation which is not like that. — Metaphysician Undercover

What about final causation, which is often subsequent (temporally) to the effect? Even most efficient causation is really simultaneous with the effect, rather than prior to it; e.g., application of force to a mass causes acceleration, which ceases when the force is removed.

Identity obtains when we're dealing about the same thing, at the same time, in the same respect (that is, from the same perspective for example). — Terrapin Station

I take it that this is why you disagree with my comment about space being what enables different objects to have the same properties (in different locations) and time being what enables the same object to have different properties (at different moments). For you, no object shares any properties with any other object, not even "itself" at another instant. Right?

I take it that this is why you disagree with my comment about space being what enables different objects to have the same properties (in different locations) and time being what enables the same object to have different properties (at different moments). For you, no object shares any properties with any other object, not even "itself" at another instant. Right? — aletheist

Sorry--I read your response to me yesterday but I overlooked replying to you. (I couldn't reply right when I read it, then forgot later.)

Anyway, the problem I have with the idea is, in a nutshell, the non-identity of discernibles. Since we're talking about two different objects, we're talking about discernibles.

My rejection of universals is due to my view that the very idea of them seems incoherent. Aside from not being able to make sense of nonphysical existents in general, I can't make sense of how both (a) something (the universal, whatever it would be) would be instantiated in something else (the particular object exhibiting the universal) especially so that it's literally that universal somehow in the object (where the object isn't itself the universal), and (b) how the universal could be instantiated in more than one object so that we're talking about the universal being numerically identical in the two different objects--that is, the same, just one thing insofar as the universal goes.

I can't help but think that the ideas are a confusion precipitated by normal language usage at best.