@Zeus
So Zeus, your thread was taken down because there are a lot of antinatalism threads already. Here is an example of one. I tried to get that back up or added to another thread, but seems like that's not going to happen. That being the case, if you would like to continue the discussion, feel free to here.

I'm guessing this is about boredom, but many of us don't count boredom as a big issue. To me it's aging, disease, accidents, and crime/injustice that speak against existence. I can think of many experiences that I'd love to repeat again and again. — jjAmEs

No, not quite boredom, unless existential boredom. It's more like this:
1) The sun goes up and down, round and round.
2) You go to bed and get up again and again.
3) You eat and shit over and over.
4) You read your book, watch your movie, do your exercise, talk to your friend, again, again, again
5) You make it a point to travel to "new" (to you) places again and again and again
6) You seek out relationships over and over and over
7) You go to work each day again and again and again
8) You do stuff for maintenance like laundry, dishes, over and over
9) You take that millionth walk/run around the block or on your treadmill

It doesn't matter how many "novel" things you do to stay ahead of the curb, it's all repetitive actions to fulfill our primal motivations of survival, comfort-seeking, entertainment. But this is just repetitive actions that fill time and provide the absurdity I talk about. It's all been done to the umpteenth time by billions and billions of people over and over. There is no need to keep repeating the repetition again and again and again...

It doesn't matter how many "novel" things you do to stay ahead of the curb, it's all repetitive actions to fulfill our primal motivations of survival, comfort-seeking, entertainment. But this is just repetitive actions that fill time and provide the absurdity I talk about. It's all been done to the umpteenth time by billions and billions of people over and over. There is no need to keep repeating the repetition again and again and again... — schopenhauer1

Where should all this analysis lead us? Certainly, the case for antinatalism is strong. But, do take this point:

A group of people (who are already born and hence can derive no benefit out of antinatalism) arguing about whether or not parents should consider the opinions of the potential child before bringing it into existence, is as good as the proverbial crying over spilt milk. Say we make a good case for antinatalism and establish after some deliberation that an unborn child is way well off. It saves the unborn child some trouble. What trouble it saves me? So, does antinatalist philosophy lead man (who is already existing) to truth and clarity which will help him lead his life (now that he's born) better? No. It won't. On the contrary, a good case made for antinatalism will deprive life of all meanings. Now, is that what man wishes? No. A man (who is born) wants to be happy. That's ingrained in the tenets of biology making it a fact. Of course it's a point worth considering. But, it just that. A point worth considering. If a man deliberately wants to sad, he may brood over this topic, but the only kind of men who would want that are:
1. Men who seek only intellectual stimulation.
2. Men who want to find an excuse for their circumstances (circumstances which could very well be improved if a man dwells in a different view-point)

So, is it not worth it to find a philosophy which will make THIS life better?

So, does antinatalist philosophy lead man (who is already existing) to truth and clarity which will help him lead his life (now that he's born) better? No. It won't. On the contrary, a good case made for antinatalism will deprive life of all meanings. Now, is that what man wishes? No. A man (who is born) wants to be happy. That's ingrained in the tenets of biology making it a fact. Of course it's a point worth considering. But, it just that. A point worth considering. If a man deliberately wants to sad, he may brood over this topic, but the only kind of men who would want that are:
1. Men who seek only intellectual stimulation.
2. Men who want to find an excuse for their circumstances (circumstances which could very well be improved if a man dwells in a different view-point)

So, is it not worth it to find a philosophy which will make THIS life better? — Zeus

I don't think we can say one way or another about happiness ingrained in biology. There is a tendency for humans to prefer certain goods, but it would be extremely difficult to near impossible to pinpoint that to a biological process. Rather, the most we can say is humans tend towards certain goods, and when they experience them, tend to have positive feelings associated with it.

A pessimist would not necessarily try to discourage trying to maximize your preferences. What they might do is say that there is a pattern in our own psychology whereby we cannot simply "be" but only becoming, where we must find some goal in the distance that we think needs to overcome to give us something to cling to. They may recognize the absurdity of the repetition of even the goods of life (relationships, pleasure, beauty, humor, etc.). They may recognize that we are all in this together. So if there were a lot of pessimists, a communal pessimism, there may be a feeling of brotherhood in our rebellion against that which puts us in this position. In a way, there is a positivity in this shared recognition.

Think of the economy. You are but a pawn in it as your needs and wants force others to work, and their needs and wants force you to work. Your survival needs force you to work even if you were in a completely isolated one-person economy. The repetition to keep you alive, so that you can stay alive, so that you can stay alive, so that you can stay alive.. All forced repetition. Then the epiphenomenal institutions that are created which look at you not as the individual but as the laborer.. You are a laborer who they want output from.. enculturate it so that it happens, etc. etc. Keep the system alive and going with more people. Perhaps the pessimist can recognize it for what it is. It is the foundation of government policy, economic policy, and businesses. You cannot escape it, it is forced upon you lest you die. The pessimist rebels against this and does not accept it. He sees it for what it is, the manipulation. Group think right now works in the way of preserving it.

I don't think we can say one way or another about happiness ingrained in biology. — schopenhauer1

I may have been misunderstood. I said man would always choose pleasantness as opposed to unpleasantness. I think it can very well be pinpointed to a biological process because we want our dopamine reserves replete at all points of time. The brain demands to be happy NOW. Now the means exercised to obtain that happiness may differ depending on how a man is conditioned.

A pessimist would not necessarily try to discourage trying to maximize your preferences. What they might do is say that there is a pattern in our own psychology whereby we cannot simply "be" but only becoming, where we must find some goal in the distance that we think needs to overcome to give us something to cling to. They may recognize the absurdity of the repetition of even the goods of life (relationships, pleasure, beauty, humor, etc.). They may recognize that we are all in this together. So if there were a lot of pessimists, a communal pessimism, there may be a feeling of brotherhood in our rebellion against that which puts us in this position. In a way, there is a positivity in this shared recognition. — schopenhauer1

I think, pessimism (or any other -ism for that matter) is merely the brain's tendency to cling to an ideal. A man says, "I am a pessimist". What he's really implying is that he has been, through his social milieu, exposed to certain ideologies and he has been taught to choose one of the ideologies. A brain wants an ideal (pessimism in your case) because without it it's empty, hollow. Without it he feels he's worth nothing. His ideal feeds his ego. His ideal makes him reject other ideals. I think, a man needs freedom from his conditioning to truly understand what it is all about. But, man refuses to do that because man is scared to lose that which feeds his ego, that which makes his image. Man does not understand that it's merely a projection he's taking on from the OUTSIDE.

Man, in the truest sense, is nothing. And so he takes refuge in a 'collective' because there he feels safe. He feels secure. But is he really? I think, a man is truly secure if and only if he takes on no projection from outside and attaches himself to no group or ideology.

They may recognize the absurdity of the repetition of even the goods of life (relationships, pleasure, beauty, humor, etc.). — schopenhauer1

I think repetition can be looked at differently. Can not a man live in a way that his memory does not come in way of his experiencing? Why should I be thinking about my sexual experiences with my ex-girlfriend when I am making love to my girlfriend. Those two experiences are by no way same. This point can be discussed more elaborately.

Secondly, as I was stating, philosophy has to be purpose oriented. If I say, so and so philosophers were pessimists and I like their views and feel a connection with their views and so I am also a pessimist, that implies I am second hand.

I think repetition can be looked at differently. Can not a man live in a way that his memory does not come in way of his experiencing? Why should I be thinking about my sexual experiences with my ex-girlfriend when I am making love to my girlfriend. Those two experiences are by no way same. This point can be discussed more elaborately. — Zeus

I never said you had to deny pleasure in the moment to go all contemplative if you didn't want to. Rather, it is just an overall understanding. I understand that we are still here and we still have to make it through however way gets us by with the least suffering. Pursuing goods is also not frowned upon. It is more of of an aesthetic understanding. It is about the need for need and what this entails.

I never said you had to deny pleasure in the moment to go all contemplative if you didn't want to. Rather, it is just an overall understanding. I understand that we are still here and we still have to make it through however way gets us by with the least suffering. Pursuing goods is also not frowned upon. It is more of of an aesthetic understanding. It is about the need for need and what this entails. — schopenhauer1

I am interested in knowing, holding such a world-view, where is one emotion-wise? I think, if one is really honest with oneself and if one's (even if he himself is leading a relatively comfortable life) opinions encompass a big enough sample space of human beings, then he would be deceiving himself if he calls himself anything other than a pessimist. So, then where is one then emotionally? Can this question be answered objectively?

Secondly, to further your point on the apparent routine of everyday life, is there something, anything, in this world that doesn't follow a routine? I think there is one thing, and it's art. In expression there is tremendous possibility. Kafka gave so much to the world but, he too was plagued by repetitiveness. But, his works suggest anything but. L. S. Lowry, the great English artist, found through his art a respite from the routine. Krishnamurti said, whatever we can think about, is mechanical. Everyday life is routine because it is a by-product of thought. Art frees one to go beyond this plane. Also, there is beauty. The beauty of the river, the sea, the meadows, the sky. It might be a cliche but we don't really LOOK. Would you agree?

I am completely for your pessimism argument. But, don't you think there is something beyond earthly pleasures? Something beyond the routine?

I am interested in knowing, holding such a world-view, where is one emotion-wise? I think, if one is really honest with oneself and if one's (even if he himself is leading a relatively comfortable life) opinions encompass a big enough sample space of human beings, then he would be deceiving himself if he calls himself anything other than a pessimist. So, then where is one then emotionally? Can this question be answered objectively? — Zeus

I don't get what you are asking really.

Secondly, to further your point on the apparent routine of everyday life, is there something, anything, in this world that doesn't follow a routine? I think there is one thing, and it's art. In expression there is tremendous possibility. Kafka gave so much to the world but, he too was plagued by repetitiveness. But, his works suggest anything but. L. S. Lowry, the great English artist, found through his art a respite from the routine. Krishnamurti said, whatever we can think about, is mechanical. Everyday life is routine because it is a by-product of thought. Art frees one to go beyond this plane. Also, there is beauty. The beauty of the river, the sea, the meadows, the sky. It might be a cliche but we don't really LOOK. Would you agree? — Zeus

Well, as you probably note, pessimists like Schopenhauer had a high regard for art as a way to get oneself out of one's own will. It was a way of seeing the Ideas without mediation through time-space (or so he thought). Thus, sort of an inverse of Plato- art was closer to the Ideas and not derivative of the real or something like that. The beauty of nature and art and especially music put oneself in a weird way out of time. I'm not sure if the metaphysics adds up, but the subjective experience of the sublime in aesthetic experience, does seem to be what he's getting at.

I am completely for your pessimism argument. But, don't you think there is something beyond earthly pleasures? Something beyond the routine? — Zeus

I don't think it's worth bringing more people in the world to chase after this. If the Buddhists (and Schopenhauer) is right, almost everything is indeed chasing after something. Let's say you get a sublime feeling of aesthetic pleasure from a view from a mountain or creating a painting of some tragedy and meaning, or reading a great piece of literature, or composing or just listening to a great piece of music...then what? It's over, you try to get that feeling back. You are still chasing after it, trying to maintain it, etc. And then what after that? You still have everyday situations- survival, comforts, and entertainments to pursue. You have contingent harms to contend with (e.g. disease, disasters, other people, emotional anguish, anxiety, annoyances of all kinds). So as I've said many times before, I agree that there are about a handful of "goods of life". That isn't denied. It is rather the general dissatisfactions that characterize the human life in general that pessimism understands well and keeps in mind. It doesn't let the temptation of the goods (pace Emil Cioran's Temptation to Exist), overtake the perspective as if just because something is "good" or that good things exist, thus existence itself is a necessary, positive, worthwhile endeavor that should be perpetuated in perpetuity to progeny and future generations over and over.

You mention repetition. That is exactly what is being replicated. The repetition of ordinary life AND the repetition of chasing after the (well known billions of times over) "goods" of life. Most of life is what I call "dealing with". Dealing with survival, maintenance, entertainment-seeking- essentially dealing with oneself. Dealing with requires coping often. Often the repetitive, tedious nature of these three categories lead to needing some sort of mental strategy.. trying to ignore the bad, trying to deny it, trying to accept it, trying to sublimate it, etc. This is what Stoicism tries to do along with modern cognitive-behavioral techniques. I think they are all just band-aids to the very fact that there is something wrong (the "dealing with") to begin with.

Let's say you get a sublime feeling of aesthetic pleasure from a view from a mountain or creating a painting of some tragedy and meaning, or reading a great piece of literature, or composing or just listening to a great piece of music...then what? It's over, you try to get that feeling back. — schopenhauer1

https://youtu.be/OeOS5seSl_I

Do listen to this dialog.

Do listen to this dialog. — Zeus

Yeah similar themes.

I have some ideas I’d like you to consider:

Regarding antinatalism, couldn’t it be argued that attempting to prohibit people from having children creates additional suffering on those of us who would prefer or enjoy having a child? It see to me that the suffering that two people that want to be parents would experience potentially could be greater than the suffering one person could potentially experience as a result of being born, because the total amount of suffering would have to include the sum of the two people that want children (and perhaps the suffering of people who want grandchildren, nieces/nephews, etc.). I know that people that learn they are infertile, as well as expectant parents that have had miscarriages, can go to some pretty grim places emotionally and mentally as a result of not being able to have children or losing them. Also, it seems that antinatalism disregards the pleasure that one person can provide to several other people.

Regarding pessimism, it seems that the entire philosophy is predicated on the fact that life is absurd due to the repetition of chasing goals to temporarily alleviate our suffering, such as you have described. I don’t dispute this, but have you considered whether or not life would be better or worse if our needs for survival, maintenance, and entertainment were completely and permanently satiated? I think this scenario would be even less tolerable, because then we wouldn’t even possess the absurd repetition that we claim is so bad. Also, doesn’t the pleasure of chasing things count for something? Therefore isn’t it better to accept fate, a la Nietzsche, and will both the pleasures and sufferings that life necessarily consists of?

Regarding antinatalism, couldn’t it be argued that attempting to prohibit people from having children creates additional suffering on those of us who would prefer or enjoy having a child? It see to me that the suffering that two people that want to be parents would experience potentially could be greater than the suffering one person could potentially experience as a result of being born, because the total amount of suffering would have to include the sum of the two people that want children (and perhaps the suffering of people who want grandchildren, nieces/nephews, etc.). I know that people that learn they are infertile, as well as expectant parents that have had miscarriages, can go to some pretty grim places emotionally and mentally as a result of not being able to have children or losing them. Also, it seems that antinatalism disregards the pleasure that one person can provide to several other people. — Pinprick

1) I've definitely heard this argument before and my general response is that if it causes other people's suffering, one that will continually appear throughout possibly 80+ years of another person's life, then this consideration overrides one's own suffering for not being able to do an action that causes someone else's suffering.

2) Also, all things being considered, if you cannot get consent (like the situation prior to birth), then the least harm one causes for another person would be the optimal choice. No actual person is losing out on not existing.

What this all comes down to is that when you are doing something to someone else that leads to inevitable and unnecessary suffering, then any other consideration for one's own reasons for doing this are secondary or should not even be in the equation.

Regarding pessimism, it seems that the entire philosophy is predicated on the fact that life is absurd due to the repetition of chasing goals to temporarily alleviate our suffering, such as you have described. I don’t dispute this, but have you considered whether or not life would be better or worse if our needs for survival, maintenance, and entertainment were completely and permanently satiated? I think this scenario would be even less tolerable, because then we wouldn’t even possess the absurd repetition that we claim is so bad. — Pinprick

Yes, this is the boredom Schopenhauer discussed- he thought there was a pendulum between the human need for goals and boredom. And he makes a great point that if living itself satisfied us, we would be happy just being and not wanting. Clearly, due to survival, comfort, and entertainment needs (as I like to parse out our desires), we cannot do this, even in principle.

Therefore isn’t it better to accept fate, a la Nietzsche, and will both the pleasures and sufferings that life necessarily consists of? — Pinprick

No, if there is anything I'm definitely opposed to it is the philosophies of acceptance. That is about every major philosophy's goal- to accept this situation. I say rebel. We can rebel communally. We all know we are in this situation, and we all agree to stop it for future generations. This may also translate to more compassion in regards to how our demands cause each other to labor and not be free. It can never be different, but at least we will know it.

1) I've definitely heard this argument before and my general response is that if it causes other people's suffering, one that will continually appear throughout possibly 80+ years of another person's life, then this consideration overrides one's own suffering for not being able to do an action that causes someone else's suffering. — schopenhauer1

Ok, but I’m just not convinced that the intermittent suffering of the child for 80+ years would be greater than the intermittent suffering of two people (both parents) for, let’s say 50-60 years. And to me I think it is at least conceivable that two people who desperately want to have children but can’t would intermittently suffer for the remainder of their lives as a consequence.

What this all comes down to is that when you are doing something to someone else that leads to inevitable and unnecessary suffering, then any other consideration for one's own reasons for doing this are secondary or should not even be in the equation. — schopenhauer1

A couple things regarding this.

1. This checks out fine if you are only practicing this in your personal life, but if you are advocating for, or in any way trying to prevent other people who want to have children from doing so, then you are causing them to needlessly suffer. I’m not saying you are or aren’t trying to do this, I don’t know.

2. This seems like a moral argument since it pertains to how people should conduct their life. However, morality itself is aimed at determining what type of life is good, among other things. Antinatalism seems to entail the denial of morality since it denies that life itself is good. Therefore it appears contradictory for a moral nihilist(?) to proceed to make moral arguments. IOW, if you do not value life, or think that life has any value, then how can you logically make an argument that appeals to values at all? If you do not value life, then how can you say you care how people are treated?

I say rebel. We can rebel communally. We all know we are in this situation, and we all agree to stop it for future generations. — schopenhauer1

If you consider Antinatalism to be rebellion, then aren’t you throwing the baby out with the bath water? Your solution to living a life of suffering is to end life?

Don't have much to say regarding the antinatalism debate itself here, but due to the virus situation I decided to finally read through all of Sartre's Being and Nothingness front to finish (had only read certain chapters before, and many years ago). I live in NYC, so things have been pretty crazy here, as you all probably know. I also know Heideggerians bristle at Sartre's book, but it really is a damn beautiful piece of philosophy and I'm enjoying it immensely.

Of what I've read so far (and which might be tangentially useful to the present discussion), one of the most interesting existentialist reversals is that death is no longer the arrival of nothingness, as we might normally think of it. The common fear is that when we die, we become nothing. Death, in other words, is nothingness. But under existentialism as Sartre has it, conscious life (the for-itself) is itself negation, and only life brings nothingness into the world. Only while we are alive can nothingness be present; this is the basis of freedom (and also our failure to achieve it). When we finally die, we return to the domain of the in-itself, of full coincidence with ourselves, of A=A and the night when all cows are black. Our corpse is our corpse and our past our past in the same sense that this table is a table, yet the for-itself that is writing this post and finds its Being thereby could equally just as well be a for-itself pouring itself another glass of whiskey.

There is thus a strange optimism here. In other words, it is in death that we achieve that which we are always striving for, and while alive only evanescentally attain: being in-itself, full positivity, full coincidence with who and what one is/has been. However, this is not necessarily to say death is preferable, even if it is inevitable, and even if the for-itself as a project is always a failure. Without wanting to sound like a self-help book, it is also true in the existentialist sense that it is only within the experience of failure that we also find the real seeds of success, of transfiguration, of being something while also not being that something after all.

Ok, but I’m just not convinced that the intermittent suffering of the child for 80+ years would be greater than the intermittent suffering of two people (both parents) for, let’s say 50-60 years. And to me I think it is at least conceivable that two people who desperately want to have children but can’t would intermittently suffer for the remainder of their lives as a consequence. — Pinprick

No, but that's not my argument, which suffering will be greater. My argument is that the parents' suffering is irrelevant as it is causing suffering for someone else. This is no longer about one's own pain, but causing someone else pain.

1. This checks out fine if you are only practicing this in your personal life, but if you are advocating for, or in any way trying to prevent other people who want to have children from doing so, then you are causing them to needlessly suffer. I’m not saying you are or aren’t trying to do this, I don’t know. — Pinprick

Well, I'm not. I'm advocating that people don't cause the conditions for other people to suffer. I am not forcing them to do so. And again, the "needless suffering" of unrequited parenting is irrelevant when it is tied to causing the conditions for someone else's suffering.

This seems like a moral argument since it pertains to how people should conduct their life. However, morality itself is aimed at determining what type of life is good, among other things. Antinatalism seems to entail the denial of morality since it denies that life itself is good. Therefore it appears contradictory for a moral nihilist(?) to proceed to make moral arguments. IOW, if you do not value life, or think that life has any value, then how can you logically make an argument that appeals to values at all? If you do not value life, then how can you say you care how people are treated? — Pinprick

You're characterization that antinatalism is considered moral nihilism is a wrong premise. Antinatalism isn't indifferent to morality. Rather, antinatalism values prevention of needless suffering for other people, especially in the case of birth, as there is no downside of an actual person losing out on the goods of life (as no one existed prior to birth to be deprived of this). It is true that procreation is the necessary condition for people to suffer. It is true that all lives have some suffering. It is true that prevention of birth will prevent suffering from occurring which is always a good thing since, preventing "good" experiences from occurring is only instrumental- that is to say, it only matters if the person was already born to be deprived of said goods. This is only the case after someone is born, not prior. Thus it is always best to not procreate. And again, the suffering of the parents is irrelevant as their suffering is tied to creating the conditions for someone else's suffering. I can do a thought experiment or scenario on this, but I'm sure you can think of examples yourself where someone gets joy that is contingent on the inevitable suffering of others. Again, I am not saying the parents are malicious, as they simply don't see it that way. But most things that drive certain beliefs are based on perspectives, perhaps that are not fully considered or only informed by what is prominent in the culture (and the belief to have children is highly enculturated in all societies).

There is thus a strange optimism here. In other words, it is in death that we achieve that which we are always striving for, and while alive only evanescentally attain: being in-itself, full positivity, full coincidence with who and what one is/has been. However, this is not necessarily to say death is preferable, even if it is inevitable, and even if the for-itself as a project is always a failure. Without wanting to sound like a self-help book, it is also true in the existentialist sense that it is only within the experience of failure that we also find the real seeds of success, of transfiguration, of being something while also not being that something after all. — Umbra

I've never read Being and Nothingness, but have read snippets and the novel Nausea by Sartre. I'm aware mainly of his ideas of "radical freedom" and have posted about it several times. The existentialism I am interested in most is the idea of Sisyphus condemned to push the rock endlessly. It is the repetitious absurd nature of our human condition of being motivated by survival, comfort, and entertainment and then how this condition leads to the epiphenomena of political-economic systems. I said earlier:

1) The sun goes up and down, round and round.
2) You go to bed and get up again and again.
3) You eat and shit over and over.
4) You read your book, watch your movie, do your exercise, talk to your friend, again, again, again
5) You make it a point to travel to "new" (to you) places again and again and again
6) You seek out relationships over and over and over
7) You go to work each day again and again and again
8) You do stuff for maintenance like laundry, dishes, over and over
9) You take that millionth walk/run around the block or on your treadmill

It doesn't matter how many "novel" things you do to stay ahead of the curb, it's all repetitive actions to fulfill our primal motivations of survival, comfort-seeking, entertainment. But this is just repetitive actions that fill time and provide the absurdity I talk about. It's all been done to the umpteenth time by billions and billions of people over and over. There is no need to keep repeating the repetition again and again and again... — schopenhauer1

Also related, is because of our demands we force others to labor, and they force us to labor. This forces coordination, control, etc. Doing otherwise is not even an option, but just because this is our condition, does not mean it is good. A world with hospitals, doctors, and experts in disease prevention is a good thing. A world with certain technologies alleviates certain discomforts, safety, and increases survival. Even in hunting-gathering societies, the group relies on the talents and demands of the others, to make things work. However, this relying on other people creates the conditions that one must labor in the first place. It is a catch-22. There is no way out of the need for labor, but labor is what is needed due to our individual demands combining (into social institutions). Thus our individual demands makes us pawns in a greater system that arises from the agreements needed to coordinate them.

Antinatalism is the ultimate rebellion against being used as a pawn. Prevention of birth is preventing people from controlling others and being controlled- which is inevitable in society and birth and the demands of being human. If it is inevitable, it is also preventable- simply don't have future people born into this situation to begin with. The freedom from being enslaved by the demands of others- of being a point of "added value" to a third-party system (the economy). One is commodified, but one cannot be anything else. There is no political system that "frees" one out of this situation. The only way out was to never enter (not be born).

What is interesting is the idea of "communal pessimism". Maybe the virus will teach us that life brings about more suffering than people realize. Maybe the virus will teach us that we are pawns in a game much greater than ourselves, and unnecessarily and unwittingly are playing it. The game is our own "wills" (our needs for survival, comforts, and entertainments), which causes us to be "pawns" (the epiphenomenal institutions that arise because of our needs) that make us data points and laborers in a third-party system. We can walk hand-in-hand to prevent future people from being thrown into the human and social conditions. They will not experience the absurd repetition of surviving, needing to be more comfortable, find entertainment/meaning. In essence, they will be prevented from dissatisfaction that is the core of human nature. We cannot just be happy being, as our survival, comfort, and boredom drives us to pursue what we pursue. In other words, our dissatisfaction drives us.

No, but that's not my argument, which suffering will be greater. My argument is that the parents' suffering is irrelevant as it is causing suffering for someone else. This is no longer about one's own pain, but causing someone else pain. — schopenhauer1

Well, I'm not. I'm advocating that people don't cause the conditions for other people to suffer. I am not forcing them to do so. And again, the "needless suffering" of unrequited parenting is irrelevant when it is tied to causing the conditions for someone else's suffering. — schopenhauer1

I get that my suffering is irrelevant if I, as someone contemplating parenthood, choose to not have children on the basis of Antinatalism. However, if I adopt Antinatalism as an ideology, it seems to entail that I believe that people should not have children. Meaning other people. This is where I get stuck on how you can actually hold Antinatalism as an ideology without implying to the rest of the world that they shouldn’t have children. I know people who have chosen to not have children, and their reasons are whatever they are. It is a personal choice, and as such, remains private. But by making your personal choice public and espousing it as an ideology, it is implied that you judge other’s choices to have or not have children as either “good” or “bad.” In this way, suppose you are successful in convincing me that I shouldn’t have children even though I want to. Wouldn’t you at least be partly responsible for whatever suffering I endure as a result of this decision?

Rather, antinatalism values prevention of needless suffering for other people, especially in the case of birth, as there is no downside of an actual person losing out on the goods of life (as no one existed prior to birth to be deprived of this). — schopenhauer1

I agree with this.

It is true that procreation is the necessary condition for people to suffer. — schopenhauer1

I also agree with this, but it’s also true that procreation is necessary for morality itself to continue. Therefore, to be against procreation entails being against morality, at least as a side effect. IOW’s if the moral statement “Thou shalt not procreate” is applied universally via Kant’s Categorical Imperative, then the elimination of morality will logically follow in time.

I get that my suffering is irrelevant if I, as someone contemplating parenthood, choose to not have children on the basis of Antinatalism. However, if I adopt Antinatalism as an ideology, it seems to entail that I believe that people should not have children. Meaning other people. This is where I get stuck on how you can actually hold Antinatalism as an ideology without implying to the rest of the world that they shouldn’t have children. I know people who have chosen to not have children, and their reasons are whatever they are. It is a personal choice, and as such, remains private. But by making your personal choice public and espousing it as an ideology, it is implied that you judge other’s choices to have or not have children as either “good” or “bad.” In this way, suppose you are successful in convincing me that I shouldn’t have children even though I want to. Wouldn’t you at least be partly responsible for whatever suffering I endure as a result of this decision? — Pinprick

Yes, it is like veganism. It is a choice, and one can convince others of its merits. But the point is that it is not forced, just influencing and making a case. The other person can see the merit in the argument and follow it or not.

Obviously, if they think that the case is relevant enough to follow-through with it, they believe they are indeed causing someone else's lifetime of possible instances of suffering if they procreated. Clearly, they agree and follow the antinatalist argument, they think it is more important to prevent suffering than to cause conditions of suffering for another (even if it seems against their own initial wants).

At the end of the day, if you are caused pain by not causing (the conditions for) pain in someone else, the other person's right not to be caused suffering wins out. A very extreme example of this is a sociopath who gets joy from causing others pain. Should he be accommodated because his pain is so great by suppressing his true passions? Of course not. Let's make it less stark. Should a religious nut who thinks causing suffering and death for others is the righteous thing to do be allowed to act on those impulses because not doing so causes them the suffering of not being able to do those acts? Of course not.

I also agree with this, but it’s also true that procreation is necessary for morality itself to continue. Therefore, to be against procreation entails being against morality, at least as a side effect. IOW’s if the moral statement “Thou shalt not procreate” is applied universally via Kant’s Categorical Imperative, then the elimination of morality will logically follow in time. — Pinprick

If no one is around to suffer, then morality doesn't matter. Morality only matters for those already existing. I don't see anything contradictory there. Humans don't exist to keep morality going, morality exists only when multiple humans and sentient life comes in the picture.

Yes, it is like veganism. It is a choice, and one can convince others of its merits. — schopenhauer1

Yes one can, but only by convincing them that it is “good.” But “good” only makes sense in the paradigm of morality. The issue is that the statement “Antinatalism is good” destroys the only context in which “good” makes sense. Antinatalism only exists within the context of morality, but Antinatalism entails the ending of human life if carried out across the board, which then entails the end of morality, which is the very scaffolding holding up Antinatalism in the first place. It’s a snake swallowing it’s own tail.

Obviously, if they think that the case is relevant enough to follow-through with it, they believe they are indeed causing someone else's lifetime of possible instances of suffering if they procreated. Clearly, they agree and follow the antinatalist argument, they think it is more important to prevent suffering than to cause conditions of suffering for another (even if it seems against their own initial wants). — schopenhauer1

But to prevent suffering by preventing life defeats the purpose of Antinatalism. If Antinatalism is a type of morality, then it necessarily includes the premise that life is worth living. If not, then how can it purport to answer the question “What is the good life?”? If it is stating that one cannot live a good life, because there’s no such thing as a good life due to the inevitable experience of suffering, then it is essentially Nihilistic. It denies morality. Therefore, it cannot validly make moral claims about what is good, or how we should live.

A very extreme example of this is a sociopath who gets joy from causing others pain. Should he be accommodated because his pain is so great by suppressing his true passions? Of course not. Let's make it less stark. Should a religious nut who thinks causing suffering and death for others is the righteous thing to do be allowed to act on those impulses because not doing so causes them the suffering of not being able to do those acts? Of course not. — schopenhauer1

I can agree with this, but if Antinatalism’s premise is that causing suffering for someone else is always bad, then that entails much more than preventing birth. It would also entail being against many different medical procedures; vaccines/shots, foul tasting medicine, exams that cause discomfort, etc. Or does it hold the position that it is ok to directly cause suffering if by doing so more intense suffering is prevented or lessened?

If no one is around to suffer, then morality doesn't matter. Morality only matters for those already existing. I don't see anything contradictory there. Humans don't exist to keep morality going, morality exists only when multiple humans and sentient life comes in the picture. — schopenhauer1

Holding a moral view that results in ending morality seems contradictory. The justification for the view directly appeals to morality, but also indirectly destroys the preconditions for morality.

Antinatalism only exists within the context of morality, but Antinatalism entails the ending of human life if carried out across the board, which then entails the end of morality, which is the very scaffolding holding up Antinatalism in the first place. It’s a snake swallowing it’s own tail. — Pinprick

Again, I see no problem. No humans = no need for morality. Humans are not around to see that morality gets enacted. Morality is enacted when humans are around.

But to prevent suffering by preventing life defeats the purpose of Antinatalism. If Antinatalism is a type of morality, then it necessarily includes the premise that life is worth living. — Pinprick

No that is not entailed in morality. Morality can be a set of many things that are regarded to how humans should act and treat each other. This argument states that it is wrong to create suffering on behalf of another person who will suffer throughout their whole life in unknown but often predictable ways. It also realizes that good is indeed a benefit, but only for people who already exist. It matters not for people who don't exist. What does matter is suffering is not occurring where it could have (see negative utilitarianism).

If it is stating that one cannot live a good life, because there’s no such thing as a good life due to the inevitable experience of suffering, then it is essentially Nihilistic. It denies morality. Therefore, it cannot validly make moral claims about what is good, or how we should live. — Pinprick

No, it does not deny morality. Unlike nihilism (which does not believe in any values), pessimism/antinatalism puts a premium on prevention of unnecessary suffering which is actually a compassionate stance. In the case of procreation, the least suffering you can cause for a future person is to not have that possible future person.

I can agree with this, but if Antinatalism’s premise is that causing suffering for someone else is always bad, then that entails much more than preventing birth. It would also entail being against many different medical procedures; vaccines/shots, foul tasting medicine, exams that cause discomfort, etc. Or does it hold the position that it is ok to directly cause suffering if by doing so more intense suffering is prevented or lessened? — Pinprick

Yes, the second one. ONCE BORN, then things change. The whole logic changes actually. The decision prior to someone's birth is an asymmetry in respect to preventing suffering for a future person (which is always a good thing), and preventing good experiences for a future person (which is neither good nor bad because there is no actual person to be deprived of the good experiences). The asymmetry here always is skewed towards the prevention of suffering, meaning non-birth of the future person.

Holding a moral view that results in ending morality seems contradictory. The justification for the view directly appeals to morality, but also indirectly destroys the preconditions for morality. — Pinprick

I addressed this above. The preconditions for morality only hold when people exist. If no people exist, no morality needs to exist either. Once there are enough people for morality to matter, then it comes into effect. In other words, the minute a person can affect another person to cause them suffering, then this rule would matter. In a world where no one is ever tortured ever, the rule "do not torture people" might not matter. Once there is a world where torture takes place, this rule matters. If people never suffered, this rule would not matter as well. As long as suffering exists, this rule matters. If it doesn't, like in the case of no people, this rule would not matter.

Again, I see no problem. No humans = no need for morality. — schopenhauer1

If Antinatalism entails “no humans” then it also entails no need for morality. Agree? If that is the case, then why make moral statements and judgements? Your argument for me to refrain from procreating is based on the belief that doing so is good. However, your argument also entails that morality is pointless or unnecessary. Therefore, what you consider to be good is irrelevant because morality is pointless or unnecessary. Put simply, you can’t tell me to behave morally and then go on to say that morality is unnecessary. I have no reason to behave morally if morality doesn’t matter.

No that is not entailed in morality. Morality can be a set of many things that are regarded to how humans should act and treat each other. — schopenhauer1

Yes, but behavior is only a means to the end, which is life being good or tolerable. Life is what gives meaning to behavior.

This argument states that it is wrong to create suffering on behalf of another person who will suffer throughout their whole life in unknown but often predictable ways. — schopenhauer1

Why is this wrong? If the justification for this includes the goal of making life better in some way, then ending life refutes the justification. Having no life at all doesn’t make life better.

No, it does not deny morality. Unlike nihilism (which does not believe in any values), pessimism/antinatalism puts a premium on prevention of unnecessary suffering which is actually a compassionate stance. In the case of procreation, the least suffering you can cause for a future person is to not have that possible future person. — schopenhauer1

It’s nihilistic in the sense that it’s consequence results in morality ceasing to exist. I understand that Antinatalists have values. But their values are irrelevant because they result in morality becoming extinct.

Yes, the second one. ONCE BORN, then things change. The whole logic changes actually. The decision prior to someone's birth is an asymmetry in respect to preventing suffering for a future person (which is always a good thing), and preventing good experiences for a future person (which is neither good nor bad because there is no actual person to be deprived of the good experiences). The asymmetry here always is skewed towards the prevention of suffering, meaning non-birth of the future person. — schopenhauer1

:up:

If Antinatalism entails “no humans” then it also entails no need for morality. Agree? If that is the case, then why make moral statements and judgements? Your argument for me to refrain from procreating is based on the belief that doing so is good. However, your argument also entails that morality is pointless or unnecessary. Therefore, what you consider to be good is irrelevant because morality is pointless or unnecessary. Put simply, you can’t tell me to behave morally and then go on to say that morality is unnecessary. I have no reason to behave morally if morality doesn’t matter. — Pinprick

Your little logic doesn't apply to what I'm saying, so I will not repeat myself. Morality is not pointless or unnecessary if there are humans around. The very basis of morality relies on being alive. If we are not here, then there is no basis for morality. That does not entail that we must be alive so morality can come into play. It just means when humans are around the logic: "Do not procreate" applies. End of story.

If a: Humans are around
then b: Humans should not procreate

Yes, but behavior is only a means to the end, which is life being good or tolerable. Life is what gives meaning to behavior. — Pinprick

The sentence "Life is what gives meaning to behavior" is vague and practically nonsensical. Antinatalism is about a specific applied ethical case- procreation. It has as its basis of value the asymmetry between suffering and good for something that can possibly exist but currently does not.

Why is this wrong? If the justification for this includes the goal of making life better in some way, then ending life refutes the justification. Having no life at all doesn’t make life better. — Pinprick

If someone does not exist, only in hypothetical, that hypothetical person literally needs NOTHING. However, it is the case that in time and state X, no new person (that could) is suffering. In other words, if no person exists, they don't need to exist to make their life better. In fact, they don't need anything. In fact, in most Buddhist and Schopenhaerian conceptions, suffering exists due to the very nature of our needs and desires (like being in a "better" state). Thus, no procreating people who need to be in a better state, solves or bypasses this. At the least, even without Buddhist/Schopenhauerian conceptions, you are preventing the need for someone to need in the first place.

It’s nihilistic in the sense that it’s consequence results in morality ceasing to exist. I understand that Antinatalists have values. But their values are irrelevant because they result in morality becoming extinct. — Pinprick

I don't know why you have this notion but humans don't exist so that morality can exist. Morality exists because humans exist. That is a huge difference. Humans don't owe any principle/idea/conception/rule of morality anything. To think so seems bizarre. To be crude, we are not some third-party, abstract principle's bitch.

That does not entail that we must be alive so morality can come into play. — schopenhauer1

I’m not making the claim that morality must endure no matter what, as if it is some purpose or meaning of life. I’m just not seeing how Antinatalism can justify its claim by appealing to morality when that very claim seems to refute morality, albeit indirectly, due to the end of human life being a direct consequence of its claim.

1) Antinatalism’s claim that one should not procreate is a moral claim.

2) As such, it’s justification is entirely dependent on the existence of morality itself.

3) The purpose of making moral claims is to increase moral behavior.

4) Antinatalism’s logical conclusion results in the ending of human life.

5) This results in the end of morality.

6) Therefore, Antinatalism’s goal of increasing moral behavior becomes impossible, as neither people nor morality will continue to exist if Antinatalism is adhered to.

It’s similar to coaching a team to do its best, but then not keeping score of the game. Doing your best becomes pointless, because the purpose of doing your best is to win the game.

3) The purpose of making moral claims is to increase moral behavior. — Pinprick

That doesn't seem right. The purpose of moral claims is to define what is moral. Increasing moral behavior is not entailed in all moral claims. Anyways, in this case an increase in moral behavior is a decrease in births.

6) Therefore, Antinatalism’s goal of increasing moral behavior becomes impossible, as neither people nor morality will continue to exist if Antinatalism is adhered to. — Pinprick

Again, this does not matter, because as you stated:

I’m not making the claim that morality must endure no matter what, as if it is some purpose or meaning of life. — Pinprick

So.. I don't know what you're getting at honestly.

It’s similar to coaching a team to do its best, but then not keeping score of the game. Doing your best becomes pointless, because the purpose of doing your best is to win the game. — Pinprick

Winning the game would be preventing all suffering. If no one existed, no one suffers.

3. The whole economic bread and circuses was just that, an illusion. This system is as fragile as it's ever been. The economic system is for the elites' GDP, not ours.

3. The whole economic bread and circuses was just that, an illusion. This system is as fragile as it's ever been. The economic system is for the elites' GDP, not ours. — h060tu

I have said just recently:

to go ahead and procreate more people is to feed the necessary human system that needs more people in a population to be inculcated on an individual scale in enough quantities to be able to form the habits to produce and consume to keep the round-and-round absurdity going on an aggregate scale. Why be cosponsors of this kind of absurd perpetuation at the cost of making a new sufferer (a person who can experience suffering) in the first place?

I am intrigued by the idea of "communal pessimism". Perhaps COVID will initiate a communal philosophical pessimism of sorts where we agree that our own very natures as humans (through our dissatisfaction state), and through Nature itself (via things like devastating pandemics and disasters), we can all agree that this is not worth the enterprise and happily prevent future progeny and generations from experiencing it. Why keep the absurdity going?

So.. I don't know what you're getting at honestly. — schopenhauer1

I’m saying that if Antinatalism is to be considered a type of morality, then it must seek to maintain morality. Otherwise it seeks it’s own demise by destroying the basis for morality (human life). I’m not saying anyone should or should not do anything. I’m just saying that all types of morality seek to increase moral behavior so that life is “good” or “better” in some way. Antinatalism, by seeking the extinction of humans, cannot actually increase moral behavior, or make life better in any way. Suppose I want to become the world’s greatest football player. If in order to achieve my goal I kill every other football player so that by default I would be the best football player alive, I still haven’t achieved my goal, because if there are no other football players, then it is impossible to actually play football. I’ve eliminated the game itself. I see Antinatalism doing this in regards to its relationship with morality.

Therefore, this

Winning the game would be preventing all suffering. If no one existed, no one suffers. — schopenhauer1

isn’t true. You’ve eliminated the game itself, so you can’t even play it.

isn’t true. You’ve eliminated the game itself, so you can’t even play it. — Pinprick

That's the point. There is nothing to "play". Just prevent suffering, period. If there's no one to prevent suffering anymore, then so what?