He said the world is made up of facts or states-of-affairs. A true proposition is one that pictures states-of-affairs in the world. All propositions, whether they are known or unknown, true or false, imaginary or not, represent pictures, and we can understand them because they are pictures.

Of course what is unknown is part of reality, unless you're referring to that which is outside the world, the metaphysical, this goes beyond the world, or beyond what can be said. However, there is that which is unknown in the world, and this can be pictured too. All the facts in the world, known or unknown, are what we can talk about. Wittgenstein mapped out what can be talked about (at least in theory).

He said the world is made up of facts or states-of-affairs. — Sam26

Yes, that is the problem I'm referring to, the opening statements of the book, how he defines "the world". There is actually more to the world than states-of-affairs, there is also activity, change, what the ancients called "becoming". As Aristotle demonstrated change, or becoming, is incompatible with "states of affairs", what Parmenides called "being".

Suppose at one time there is X states-of-affairs, and at a slightly later time there is a different set of states-of-affairs, Y. This implies change. So we must account for what occurs between X and Y, the change, as a real part of the world. We could posit another set of states-of-affairs, Z, and say that Z is what the world consists of in the change between X and Y. However, we now need to account for the change between X and Z, and the change between Z and Y. Suppose we posit the set of states-of-affairs A, to account for the change between X and Z, and B to account for the change between Z and Y. What we have here is an infinite regress, and no way of describing the activity which accounts for the change between static states-of-affairs.

To say that the world is made up of states-of-affairs is to say that the world is made up of static things. This cannot be the entirety of the world, as we commonly use "the world", because our world also consists of changes in the relations which are described as states-of-affairs. These changes in the relation are categorical different from the relations themselves.

Of course what is unknown is part of reality, unless you're referring to that which is outside the world, the metaphysical, this goes beyond the world, or beyond what can be said. However, there is that which is unknown in the world, and this can be pictured too. All the facts in the world, known or unknown, are what we can talk about. Wittgenstein mapped out what can be talked about (at least in theory). — Sam26

I think it is a mistake to assert that change is something which cannot be spoken about, just because we have to use expressions which are other than statements of states-of-affairs, to talk about what change is. Can't we use the concept of "difference" to talk about this part of the world? The difference between the two states-of-affairs X and Y, cannot be expressed as a state-of-affairs, but it is something which can still be spoken about. It's just that we need to use other forms of expression. Wittgenstein seems to have come to this realization by the time he wrote much of the material in PI.

Then read more! Consider: the reason you don't know what I mean is the same reason you take the Tractatus to be so original: ignorance of the history of philosophy. If you knew what the empiricists had said for example, you'd never think that the tactic of treating philosophers' statements as meaningless rather than wrong, due to them misunderstanding how language works, was original to Wittgenstein.

In general, we tend to think great figures are more original than they are, because we read them in isolation. Once we read more widely, this illusion disappears. — Snakes Alive

I remember that some years ago, I made the connection between what Wittgenstein was saying in the Tractatus, and previous thinkers before him like Hume, Kant, Plato and others. Hume, with his is-ought problem and the fact/value distinction, Kant with his antinomies, and Plato/Socrates with his problem of definitions, but for sure there are others as well I am not aware of. Everything seemed to me to be the same, or very similar at least. However, I doubt that these thinkers placed the real problem on language and its misunderstanding, well maybe except Plato, and if they did, they did so polemically, as in to show and prove that their 'adversaries' misunderstood language, and that they themselves were able to understand it properly and use it effectively.

But Wittgenstein in the Tractatus doesn't say this, he says that language is completely ineffective in addressing certain problems - all those not in the natural sciences. That there is nothing really wrong with language, but that it is not suitable for doing philosophy as people thought it would, like having a hex key for unscrewing a slotted screw, the bloody thing just won't do. Or trying to swim in a sea of cement, there is nothing wrong with cement or with swimming, but you cannot do this as advertised. This, I think, is the "misunderstanding of language" he meant. Philosophers misunderstood language/they didn't understand the logic of language, because they took language to be something that was not. In fact, they didn't understand a lot of things, logic for one, then they misunderstood language, and thus their "logic of language" was completely off. Wittgenstein is not here to teach philosophers or people how to think logically, because this is something that everybody does, there is no such thing as "illogical thinking". He just wants to show the correct way to philosophize, as well as what logic really is, the limits of language, and of course he most famously insists on quietism.

Now, can you tell me what all this has to do with thinkers before him, who of his predecessors and where in their work, said this same thing?

The point is that Wittgenstein's early view of language is not based on observation of how language actually works, but on how it must work if the presuppositions he has hold. You basically just recapitulated that very thought process to me in your post. — Snakes Alive

And you just recapitulated that Wittgenstein was prejudiced. So? Where does this leave us? But regarding prejudice, you don't say something new, cause, truly, one way or the other, every human is prejudiced, or even if they are not, others may make this claim of them. I would agree with you, if you weren't using it to belittle the Tractatus.

In any case, Wittgenstein goes into great lengths to show what language and logic are, it is a work on logic after all, amongst other things. Chapters 4-6 are mainly devoted to this. And so the claim that Wittgenstein just presupposed what logic and language are, would mean that he made everything in the Tractatus, and especially in the aforementioned chapters, to fit with this presupposition, which of course might be true, but we need to examine it closely in order to be sure, or else it is an empty claim.

Regarding the connection of Wittgenstein to Hume, I dunno, let's see what the internets are saying. I will just do a search "Wittgenstein on Hume", and see where that leads to.

First article reads "The Naturalistic Epistemology of Hume and Wittgenstein":

Wittgenstein never read Hume and nowhere is it evident that Hume had any influence on Wittgenstein’s works. Perhaps the only influence Hume had on Wittgenstein is simply being a philosopher of a certain tradition that Wittgenstein primarily sought to question. Wittgenstein like Hume, however, is committed the view that human knowledge, philosophical or otherwise, is ultimately grounded in natural facts about human beings.

Second one, "Skeptical Arguments in Hume and Wittgenstein":

It’s hard to think of two philosophers more distant than David Hume and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein himself is supposed to have said that he ‘couldn’t bear’ to read Hume. It’s easy to see why: in Philosophical Investigations (PI) (Wittgenstein 1968) Wittgenstein ‘trashes’ Hume’s basic tenets. Hume’s thesis that every word expresses an ‘idea’ derived from an ‘impression’ is more noxious to Wittgenstein than Augustine’s idea (quoted at the beginning of PI) that every word is a name. For Hume’s doctrine makes every word a name of a private object, and every language a private language. Also, Wittgenstein has no truck with any absolute notion of a simple idea (a mistaken notion which he traces to Plato’s Theaetetus), yet Hume made ‘simple ideas’ the basis of all knowledge.

And a third, third time's the charm, like the say, "Hume and Wittgenstein":

It is well known that Wittgenstein’s reading of the philosophical classics was patchy. He left unread a large part of the literature which most philosophers would regard as essential to a knowledge of their subject. Wittgenstein gave an interesting reason for his non-reading of Hume. He said that he could not sit down and read Hume, because he knew far too much about the subject of Hume’s writings to find this anything but a torture. In a recent commentary, Peter Hacker has taken this to show that ‘Wittgenstein seems to have despised Hume’. Hume, he adds, ‘made almost every epistemological and metaphysical mistake Wittgenstein could think of’.

And so, it doesn't seem that Wittgenstein is, in essence, "a humean in disguise", but then again, we could be wrong. Nevertheless, it is interesting and somehow odd that W's friend and - most probably - lover, to whom he devoted the Tractatus, David Pinsent, was a descendant of the philosopher David Hume. Did they discuss Hume's philosophy together, is this how Wittgenstein became acquainted with Pinsent's great-great-great grandpa's work? Who knows, it wouldn't make a good bedtime conversation, I don't think!

I am sorry, Gregory, for leaving your questions posed to me unanswered.

And what is this logic of language that makes metaphysics meaingless? I havent seen any particular examples. — Gregory

Metaphysics, for Wittgenstein, is not meaningless, but senseless, it doesn't make sense.

What's a truth that the philosophy of language can prove? — Gregory

For Wittgenstein, philosophy of language, all philosophy basically, is unable to prove anything, any truth. This is because the medium used to do philosophy, language, is ill-suited for proof-making in the philosophical world. But this doesn't necessarily mean that certain "metaphysical truths" do not exist or that they are meaningless, but just that language is inappropriate to talk about and describe these truths, it is the mystical, as Wittgenstein would put it.

He [Wittgenstein] said that he could not sit down and read Hume, because he knew far too much about the subject of Hume’s writings to find this anything but a torture.

I rather like this, It could set a precedent. It means that one does not have to read the works of philosopher's past in order to philosophise, and not just Hume but also, Plato, Aristotle, Kant and so on.

It can even apply to Wittgenstein's works as well; though as I mentioned before the Tractatus is elegantly written.

And the point is that every philosophical work describes a model, or part of a model, of the world, and it is undoubtedly real for the author, but the question is : Is it real for anybody else?

Just because in Tractatus Wittgenstein claims " that is the case" does not mean that it is the case for anyone else. Internal self-consistency is not sufficient reason for others to accept it, it also requires the work to fit in with their own model of the world.

Suppose at one time there is X states-of-affairs, and at a slightly later time there is a different set of states-of-affairs, Y. This implies change. So we must account for what occurs between X and Y, the change, as a real part of the world. We could posit another set of states-of-affairs, Z, and say that Z is what the world consists of in the change between X and Y. However, we now need to account for the change between X and Z, and the change between Z and Y. Suppose we posit the set of states-of-affairs A, to account for the change between X and Z, and B to account for the change between Z and Y. What we have here is an infinite regress, and no way of describing the activity which accounts for the change between static states-of-affairs. — Metaphysician Undercover

This, in a constipated fashion, shows the bit of reasoning that seems to be entirely absent from Meta's thinking.

Perhaps Meta was sick on the day they did Limits at his school.

It's odd, because he plainly is an intelligent fellow. How is it that he cannot see that infinite regression has, at least in many cases, been tamed?

And he is not alone. So many threads hereabouts suffer the very same problem.

Just because in Tractatus Wittgenstein claims " that is the case" does not mean that it is the case for anyone else. Internal self-consistency is not sufficient reason for others to accept it, it also requires the work to fit in with their own model of the world. — A Seagull

To be agreeable to everyone you mean? This is never the case, as it seems. After all, a friend to all is a friend to none.

Well done.

I don't think the tractarian 'state of affairs' describes a static state, as you put it. I think it is in fact quite the opposite, well no, badly said, because this implies one or the other, a static and/or a dynamic state. Basically it isn't concerned at all with this distinction, or with change, but with what is pictured, and so you can have a state-of-affairs that pictures a running horse, or another with a still life.

Thanks, I guess! It's nice to see that one's efforts are not completely worthless, and the same should go for everyone here.

To be agreeable to everyone you mean? This is never the case, as it seems. After all, a friend to all is a friend to none. — Pussycat

No I am talking about the work to be 'agreeable' to the reader.

Let me just say here that while one can see the objects of the Tractatus and their forms, either as the fixed platonic forms or ideas in which every object partakes on the one hand, or the "potential" forms of Aristotle that are transformed into "actuality" or at least more "potentiality" on the other, the important difference and discrepancy with these thinkers is that Wittgenstein changes philosophy's focus from those forms, from the "objects", to their combination into situations of objects, the so-called state-of-affairs.

Every object is non-existent, it does not exist outside the states in which it can be found. So it doesn't make sense to talk about the objects themselves, but about all the possible formations and combinations between them. So when a single object is given, along with it are given ALL the other objects with which the first meets. Of course, when all objects are given, then all possible states-of-affairs are given, and then the world is fully described. But in order to know that we have the complete description of the world, we must also know that we have been given all objects. In other words, even if we could somehow get to the full description of the world, we would still not know that we had done so, and continue to look for other objects and states-of-affairs, if we did not know that we had them all.

But a good analogy, I think it is with computer programming, if anyone has dealt with it, like I have, I think programmers will understand it better. In object-oriented programming languages, we are dealing with objects and their properties. If we are given some objects, then we can combine them to make a program. But object-oriented programming language tells us nothing about the programs we can make - what they are. The analogy is as follows: the objects of the Tractatus correspond to the objects of the programming language, and the states of affairs correspond to the programs that can be made.

The old philosophy of Plato and Aristotle is, so to speak, object-oriented, while the new philosophy of Wittgenstein ... is program-oriented. What we need to know about the description of the world is not the objects themselves, but in what situations they can appear. In comparison with computers, "knowing" the objects of the programming language means that we know ALL the programs that can be made with these objects.

This is why it is sometimes said that W. breaks with the deep-rooted philosophical tradition, since he shifts it from objects to states-of-affairs or situations. Philosophy becomes fact-oriented, from object-oriented. Fact-oriented philosophy.

No I am talking about the work to be 'agreeable' to the reader. — A Seagull

Ah to a particular reader you mean? And not to all readers? This would be easier, I guess.

No I am talking about the work to be 'agreeable' to the reader. — A Seagull
Ah to a particular reader you mean? And not to all readers? This would be easier, I guess. — Pussycat

In any communication whether spoken or written there is a communicator and a receiver, a writer and a reader, a speaker and a listener.

Is that so hard to grasp?

If you have something constructive to say then say it.

I don't think the tractarian 'state of affairs' describes a static state, as you put it. — Pussycat

A "state of affairs", "fact", or "what is the case", is something which cannot be changed, otherwise you allow the possibility that things could be other than they are, then a fact might not be a fact. Therefore these things are static, unchanging. In Wittgenstein's premise "the world" is nothing other than a restatement of Parmenides' "being". The totality of reality is "what is", and what is cannot be otherwise, or else what is would be what is not, and this would be contradictory.

Basically it isn't concerned at all with this distinction, or with change, but with what is pictured, and so you can have a state-of-affairs that pictures a running horse, or another with a still life. — Pussycat

Right, that's why it's deficient. It misses a large part of the world in it's definition of "the world", then comes to the conclusion that we cannot say anything about this part of the world, because it's not part of the world according to the definition of the world. But that's an unsound conclusion derived from that false premise which is the faulty definition of "the world".

If you have something constructive to say then say it. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do, and I do.

You have a fascinating capacity to not quite understand something. Repeatedly and loudly.

Here's another:

A "state of affairs", "fact", or "what is the case", is something which cannot be changed, — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, no, it isn't. Except to you.

And you just recapitulated that Wittgenstein was prejudiced. So? Where does this leave us? — Pussycat

You'd probably have to read the empiricists on language.

You don't have to read a philosopher to have your work be descended from them. Their thoughts permeate your culture and your professional milieu; most of what you think, in fact, is just because someone you don't even know about said it before.

How much do you know about the Christian Fathers, for example? Yet if you were to read them, you'd find half of what your civilization thinks there, in those books.

Wittgenstein was famously ignorant of the history of philosophy – but this is part of the reason that he did recapitulate so much of it thoughtlessly, not part of the reason he couldn't.

What did you make of the article @unenlightened cited? It might clarify why associating Wittgenstein with Hume is off the mark.

Well, no, it isn't. Except to you. — Banno

Do you really believe that a fact is something which can change? Let's take an example. Let's assume that at a particular time, a particular identified person is infected with coronavirus. That is a fact, a state of affairs. How could that fact ever change?

Do you really believe that a fact is something which can change? — Metaphysician Undercover

But you take this as implying that change can never occur.

And now you will accuse me of constructing a straw man of you; but there it is, in the quote which I will repeat here:

Suppose at one time there is X states-of-affairs, and at a slightly later time there is a different set of states-of-affairs, Y. This implies change. So we must account for what occurs between X and Y, the change, as a real part of the world. We could posit another set of states-of-affairs, Z, and say that Z is what the world consists of in the change between X and Y. However, we now need to account for the change between X and Z, and the change between Z and Y. Suppose we posit the set of states-of-affairs A, to account for the change between X and Z, and B to account for the change between Z and Y. What we have here is an infinite regress, and no way of describing the activity which accounts for the change between static states-of-affairs. — Metaphysician Undercover

So let me ask you a question. Do you accept that one can find the instantaneous velocity of an accelerating body? Because the argument you presented above seems to say otherwise.

Right! The question here is whether you are into dialogue, if you even know what this means, or into monologuing. I can tell ya, polyloguing is the best!

But you take this as implying that change can never occur. — Banno

No I don't imply that. I argued that change is incompatible with fact. That's the argument I presented. And before that I said that if the world consist only of facts, then change is not part of the world. But that's not how we understand the world, and use "the world". We include change as part of the world. So this definition of "the world" is faulty.

Do you accept that one can find the instantaneous velocity of an accelerating body? — Banno

No, of course not, that's completely illogical. There is no such thing as "instantaneous velocity", that would be oxymoronic. No time passes in an instant, so nothing can move or have any velocity at an instant.

What about? I'm not interested in banging my head against the wall of disciples of a philosopher. The true believers believe, I leave them to it.

I am not sure, but most probably you are thinking of a state-of-affairs as a snapsnot of the world, like for example a picture/snapshot we capture with our phones, something static that is, some picture where time is stopped. This was shown by Zeno to be problematic, most ptobably this concept has helped us to evolve in someway, but here we are talking about something else. But I doubt that Wittgenstein thought of a state-of-affairs like this. A tractarian state-of-affairs could be a horse running from A to B. Think of the tractarian world of what everything happens in the world.

Then why does Wittgenstein talk about pictures?

No, of course not, that's completely illogical. — Metaphysician Undercover

...And there we have it. The mathematical basis of the physical sciences rejected.

Why should anyone take whatever else you say with any degree of seriousness?

Ah, you make me search now. Wasn't it you that said those things:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/394275

I think this survives in the way 'western civilization' in general seems to simply value talking, even to no end.There is some bizarre idea that no matter what is being discussed, and no matter to what end, discussion is a kind of good in of itself. We're always 'having conversations,' and 'democracy' is sacrosanct even beyond any material benefits it might provide or fail to provide.

And so Wittgenstein says that talking about certain things, philosophical things, just won't do, due to the nature of talking, the nature of language. What to tell you, I would think that you, apart from everyone else, would embrace it, or relate to it, or at least take it seriously, or otherwise see it critically. But obviously you didn't do any of these things, but you outright ridicule and discard it. I dunno, but I think that there is something wrong here.

I mean, he gives what you want, isn't it, why you won't just take it?