I'm becoming increasingly confident that some here have not actually tried to understand "existence precedes essence" in context.

For Sartre, existence does not precede essence in the case of a computer.

I know. That's why it's not a temporal point. In terms of meaning or idenity, a human at a given point is no different.

Banno as a waiter does not preceed or be without Banno's existence (choice) as a waiter. Just like X as computer does not preceed or be without the existence of such a computer.

I intend to drive some nails. I make a hammer accordingly. The final cause of the hammer is not achieved until I actually drive the nails with it - after I have made it. — aletheist

The final cause of the hammer is your intent to drive nails. How could you actually driving nails, be the cause of the hammer? The hammer already exists at this time? Final cause is "the reason why", and the reason why the hammer exists is that you intended to drive nails. What about if you intended to drive nails, so you made the hammer, but never got around to driving nails? The hammer exists, and there's a reason why it exists, so it has a final cause, but it never drives any nails.

The final cause of teeth is biting and chewing food. — aletheist

I agree that there is final cause, intent behind the creation of teeth, that they were created for this purpose, like I also believe there is intent, or purpose, behind the dam which the beaver builds, but many people don't agree with this, so it is a contentious issue. So I actually agree with you that there is final cause in things other than human actions, I think final cause can be found in the actions of living things in general, including the growing of teeth. But you and I have a slightly different idea of what final cause actually is.

The final cause of the hammer is your intent to drive nails. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it is the driving of nails - something that is in the future when the hammer is made, not the present or the past. That is why we call it the final cause, or the end. It is the result; it comes last in the temporal sequence.

I agree that there is final cause, intent behind the creation of teeth, that they were created for this purpose ... — Metaphysician Undercover

That is not what I said. The final cause of teeth is biting and chewing food, period. It makes no difference whether they were created intentionally for that purpose or evolved naturally with that function.

Do you now agree that force simultaneously causes acceleration?

No, it is the driving of nails - something that is in the future when the hammer is made, not the present or the past. That is why we call it the final cause, or the end. It is the result; it comes last in the temporal sequence. — aletheist

I don't agree. I think you misunderstand "final cause". It is contradictory to think that the cause of something is posterior in time to that thing. That is contrary to the definition of "cause", so this is clearly not what Aristotle refers to in his description of final cause. It is called "final" cause because we are referring to the desired "end", having the nails pounded. The efficient causes, which are the act of making the hammer, and hitting the nails, are the means to that end.

Do you now agree that force simultaneously causes acceleration? — aletheist

No, I don't think force causes anything. "Force" refers to the power which one thing exerts on another thing. It is conceptual. Concepts only play a causal role in the case of final cause, the way I understand final cause, not the way you understand final cause. But in the case of acceleration, we are not talking about final cause, we are talking about efficient cause, so to say that force is a cause would be a category error. One thing causes the acceleration of another thing, and we refer to the power which the one exerts on the other during this causal process, as force.

Ah, so just its properties, or "what it is." I'd agree with that, but I wouldn't call that something's meaning or essence. With respect to essence, this is because what something is is the totality of its properties, where there are no "accidental" properties, and where those properties aren't universals. Meaning and essence, per conventional, "functional" usage, are rather specific ways that individuals think about the world.

This is why I agree with "existence precedes essence." Because given what essence actually is--a specific way of thinking about the world (namely in this case, an individual's necessary and sufficient criteria for considering some x a particular concept and for bestowing a particular name on x), that arrives not only after various things exist, but after the individual in question exists and develops to a point where they're formulating concepts and so on.

Also re Banno, this wouldn't result in a distinction for humans. They're the totality of their non-universal properties as well.

It is called "final" cause because we are referring to the desired "end", having the nails pounded. — Metaphysician Undercover

But isn't that what he said--that the final cause of a hammer is driving nails?

(In my case, though, I'd add, "Just in case the person who created the hammer in question had that goal in mind.")

It is contradictory to think that the cause of something is posterior in time to that thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

This begs the question; what we are discussing is precisely whether a cause must always be temporally prior to its effect. You cannot just resolve the debate by stipulating a definition of "cause" that requires it to precede its effect.

It is called "final" cause because we are referring to the desired "end", having the nails pounded. — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly. My whole point is to call attention to the fact that when I make the hammer, its final cause is something in the future, not the present or the past.

No, I don't think force causes anything. "Force" refers to the power which one thing exerts on another thing. It is conceptual. — Metaphysician Undercover

Fair enough; force is a concept that we have created to represent the phenomenon that results in acceleration of a mass.

One thing causes the acceleration of another thing ... — Metaphysician Undercover

And this happens instantaneously. There is no gap in time between the action of the first thing and the acceleration of the second thing. The cause and its effect are simultaneous.

But isn't that what he said--that the final cause of a hammer is driving nails? — Terrapin Station

Exactly. My whole point is to call attention to the fact that when I make the hammer, its final cause is something in the future, not the present or the past. — aletheist

Did you not read "the desired 'end'"? The final cause of the hammer is not the act of driving nails, it is the desire to drive nails. If you really think that the final cause of the hammer is the act of driving nails, then explain to me how the act of driving nails could possibly cause the existence of the hammer. That makes no sense. It does make sense though, to say that the desire to drive nails causes the existence of the hammer.

This concept of final cause is integral to the concept of free will, the will acts as a final cause, and is free from efficient causation. But understanding final cause in that way, your way, leaves free will incomprehensible, as it renders the will as an efficient cause, rather than a final cause and this denies freedom to the will. The act of willing, which brings the hammer into existence is the final cause of the hammer. It is a freely willed act because it is free from efficient causation.

And this happens instantaneously — aletheist

It's not instantaneous though, that's why there is a need for the concept of "acceleration". The motion of one object is not instantaneously transferred to the other object.

Here are some definitions of "Final cause:"

"Final Cause: the end/goal of the object, or what the object is good for."
---http://www.uvm.edu/~jbailly/courses/Aristotle/notes/AristotleCausesNotes.html
That page, by the way, begins by noting: "First off, Aristotle's 4 "causes" are not all causes in the way that most modern English speakers think of causes."

“[something may be called a cause] in the sense of an end (telos), namely, what something is for; for example, health [is a cause] of walking.”
---https://faculty.washington.edu/smcohen/320/4causes.htm

"End or purpose: a change or movement's final "cause", is that for the sake of which a thing is what it is. For a seed, it might be an adult plant. For a sailboat, it might be sailing. For a ball at the top of a ramp, it might be coming to rest at the bottom."
---https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_causes

"The final cause: “the end, that for the sake of which a thing is done”, e.g., health is the end of walking, losing weight, purging, drugs, and surgical tools."
---https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-causality/#FouCau


So the final cause of a hammer is to drive nails. The final cause is not the desire to drive nails. That's not the end or goal of a hammer--it's not as if a hammer is made so that it can result in having something to do with desire. The end or goal or the sake of which a hammer is made is to drive nails (assuming that was indeed the goal of creating a hammer in a given case).

(Also, I'm not a fan of Aristotle's four causes analysis, by the way, but if we're going to talk about it, let's at least be able to tackle the conventional understanding of it.)

... explain to me how the act of driving nails could possibly cause the existence of the hammer. — Metaphysician Undercover

The reason why I made the hammer was so that I could drive the nails. That future outcome - not my mere desire for it - is the final cause of the hammer. See also what just posted.

This concept of final cause is integral to the concept of free will ... — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the will has nothing to do with it. Again, the final cause of teeth is biting and chewing food; do all animals with teeth have free will? The final cause of a dropped object is coming to rest on the ground.

It's not instantaneous though, that's why there is a need for the concept of "acceleration". The motion of one object is not instantaneously transferred to the other object. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are conflating motion (or velocity) with acceleration. The velocity is zero when the first thing acts with constant force on the second thing, but the instantaneous acceleration - the rate of change of the velocity - is not.

You really should read Aristotle because I can see that you completely misunderstand the nature of final cause. Here's what he says, Physics 194b:

" 'Why is he walking about ?' we say. 'To be healty', and having said that, we think we have assigned the cause."

Notice that the cause of him walking about is "to be healthy". It is not the case, as aletheist claims, that when he has actually come to be healthy, this is the cause of his walking in the past. It is the case that right now when he is walking, the end, the goal, or objective, "to be healthy", was the cause of him walking.

Here's that full passage:

Again (4) in the sense of end or 'that for the sake of which' a thing is done, e.g. health is the cause of walking about. ('Why is he walking about?' we say. 'To be healthy', and, having said that, we think we have assigned the cause.) The same is true also of all the intermediate steps which are brought about through the action of something else as means towards the end, e.g. reduction of flesh, purging, drugs, or surgical instruments are means towards health. All these things are 'for the sake of' the end, though they differ from one another in that some are activities, others instruments. — Aristotle, Phys. 194b 33 - 195a 3

So again, in the case of a hammer, "Why have we made a hammer?" "To drive in nails." We haven't made a hammer to desire to drive in nails. "To drive in nails" is the final cause.

When will he be healthy if he walks about right now? In the future - not instantaneously, and certainly not in the past. The final cause (being healthy) is subsequent to the effect (walking about).

Edit: Of course, "effect" implies efficient causation, and thus is a bit of a misnomer when talking about a final cause. Perhaps it would be clearer to say instead that the end (being healthy) is subsequent to the means (walking about).

So again, in the case of a hammer, "Why have we made a hammer?" "To drive in nails." We haven't made a hammer to desire to drive in nails. "To drive in nails" is the final cause. — Terrapin Station

Right, "to drive nails" is the final cause. Intent is implicit in the phrase "to...". "I intend to...". So we haven't made a hammer to desire to drive nails, we've made a hammer from the desire to drive nails. Remember, the intent to drive nails is the cause, not the effect. Now explain that to aletheist. Aletheist thinks that the act of driving nails is the cause of the hammer .

Now explain that to aletheist. Aletheist thinks that the act of driving nails is the cause of the hammer. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have suggested that driving nails is the final cause of the hammer, the end for the sake of which the hammer exists, which is subsequent to the making of the hammer as a means to that end. Final causes cannot be confined to human desires or intentions, because things that have nothing to do with humans have them - teeth, seeds, balls, etc. - and they are likewise subsequent to the coming-into-existence of those things.

I have suggested that driving nails is the final cause of the hammer, the end for the sake of which the hammer exists, which is subsequent to the making of the hammer as a means to that end. — aletheist

"End" in this sense means "the thing one seeks to attain".

Final causes cannot be confined to human desires or intentions, because things that have nothing to do with humans have them - teeth, seeds, balls, etc. - and they are likewise subsequent to the coming-into-existence of those things. — aletheist

Don't jump ahead of yourself, first obtain a strong grasp of what final cause really means, then move to see how it relates to all these other things. Don't dissuade yourself from understanding by referring to preconceived notions that may or may not be relevant.

In any case, final causes are not limited to human intentions. Why would you think that the seed does not seek to attain being a plant? And why would you limit intention to human beings? Do you realize that anything done for a purpose is done with intention? The birds and the bees are building their nests for a purpose, and this is final cause in action. But there are different ways in which intention relates to things. The hammer is driving the nails, but the intent is not in the hammer, it is in the one swinging the hammer. Likewise, the components in my computer are performing functions, they are acting for a purpose with respect to the whole, and this implies intention. We don't find the intention in the computer though, but in the one who built it.

"End" in this sense means "the thing one seeks to attain". — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it means "that for the sake of which the hammer comes into existence."

Don't dissuade yourself from understanding by referring to preconceived notions that may or may not be relevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

Good advice - for both of us.

Do you realize that anything done for a purpose is done with intention? — Metaphysician Undercover

It depends on exactly what you mean by "purpose" and "intention." I associate both of those terms with intelligent willfulness and agency. In that sense, seeds do not "seek" anything, and birds and bees do not have "purposes" even though their nests and hives indeed have final causes.

Right, "to drive nails" is the final cause. Intent is implicit in the phrase "to...". "I intend to..." — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the final cause is not the intent to do something. The intent to do something is not the end or goal with respect to the hammer.

It seems like you're trying to necessarily read "cause" in the contemporary sense. Aristotle didn't use the idea that narrowly, especially not when it came to the concept of final cause.

No, the final cause is not the intent to do something. The intent to do something is not the end or goal with respect to the hammer. — Terrapin Station

It seems like you're simply ignoring the facts of what Aristotle wrote, to make an unsupported assertion. If you ask me, "why did you make that hammer?", I could answer "to drive nails", or I could answer "I want to drive nails". In the former, intention is implicit, and in the latter, it is explicit. But each phrase refers to the intent to drive nails, I think that is undisputable.

When the hammer is built, there is an intent to do something with it. Aristotle is very explicit on this, and that is the final cause. He expands on a principle described by Plato, the crafts people who use the tool ought to have some say in the production of the tool. You'll find this just before the other passage I quoted, 194a-194b:
"The helmsman knows and prescribes what sort of form a helm should have...".

"In the products of art, however, we make the material with a view to the function, whereas in the products of nature, the matter is there all along.

And this is not the only place where Aristotle describes "that for the sake of which". It is very prominent in the Nicomachean Ethics. He starts by saying that actions aim at some good, "an end". He establishes the difference between an action and a product, and talks about a hierarchy, as products are intrinsically higher than actions, but still, some products are produced for the sake of actions. So there is subordination, some things are designated as for the sake of other actions, and those actions for the sake of producing other things. If this is the case, then we can look for something "which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this)". He then proceeds to question what this is, that which is desired for the sake of itself, and comes to a preliminary conclusion that it could be happiness.

It seems like you're trying to necessarily read "cause" in the contemporary sense. Aristotle didn't use the idea that narrowly, especially not when it came to the concept of final cause. — Terrapin Station

I have full respect for the way that Aristotle used "cause", and understand it quite well. You, on the other hand are trying to assign a meaning to "final cause" which would render it incomprehensible, having the cause of the thing posterior to it in time. But this is natural, because you do not believe in immaterial causes, such as the free will. So until you release this prejudice, final cause will remain inherently incomprehensible, as a cause posterior to the effect.

If you see any evidence that Aristotle is using "that for the sake of which", in some way other than the way I describe, in his physics, then you should bring this to my attention. Until then I'll keep insisting that you are making uneducated assertions, and I'll keep bringing more evidence to support this judgement. And believe me, the evidence is plentiful, because "that for the sake of which" is a common theme in Aristotle.

All that typing and there wasn't one thing in your post that was actually support for a claim that final causes refer to intentions rather than ends themselves.

[ Go ahead, keep your eyes closed shut and exclaim "I can't see it! I can't see it!"

It depends on exactly what you mean by "purpose" and "intention." I associate both of those terms with intelligent willfulness and agency. In that sense, seeds do not "seek" anything, and birds and bees do not have "purposes" even though their nests and hives indeed have final causes. — aletheist

There is no necessary association there. It is habitual usage which has made you believe that purpose is necessarily associated with intelligent willfulness. Clearly the beaver builds a dam with purpose, and the bird builds a nest with purpose. Our habitual usage of "purpose", to associate it only with intelligent willfulness has made us forget that things act with purpose without intelligent willfulness.

Do you believe that everyone else has this wrong, too--for example, the definitions/explanations I quoted re final causes earlier in the thread?

But this is natural, because you do not believe in immaterial causes, such as the free will. So until you release this prejudice, final cause will remain inherently incomprehensible, as a cause posterior to the effect. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do believe in immaterial causes, such as the free will, so that prejudice is not an issue for me. Nevertheless, it seems incontrovertible that the end is always subsequent to the means by which it is achieved - it is a state of affairs in the future. This is really all that I have been trying to point out. As I said before, "effect" implies efficient cause, and I agree with you that an efficient cause cannot be posterior to its effect; however, I still contend that it can be simultaneous.

There is no necessary association there. It is habitual usage which has made you believe that purpose is necessarily associated with intelligent willfulness. — Metaphysician Undercover

Who said anything about "necessary association"? How else do we define a word, except in accordance with its "habitual usage"?

I also believe in free will, I just do not believe that it's immaterial.

I want to find a reasonable critique of Sartre's: ''Existence precedes essence.''

Why is the statement wrong? And could it be proven wrong without using religion? — Kazuma

The essence of something is that which if you took it away, the identity would change to something else. Identity is usually a convention of language. Humans being the only animals with language, we create identity based on certain measurements/distinctions. Once the convention is established as to the definition of a thing, we can then determine at what point a thing is no longer a thing. Interestingly enough, once a thing has been a thing, it's parts can still be referenced to the prior situation of that thing. A smashed table, can still have legs that once were a part of the thing, but are now its own thing. So oddly, the trace of a thing can not be taken away once it has already been established. The thing can have residual existence beyond its presence as a reference.

Definitions come from animals with language, but what are definitions of something? It is a combination of the material/causal/form/final cause. The problem is how general one goes. Most of the time, definitions of essences have to be as general as possible.. A table can have more than four legs, or no legs at all, so that's not it.. Perhaps a table must be simply made of a solid material and be for the purpose of putting things on.

What Sartre was getting at is that, since we are the creators of the language, and have self-awareness, it is hard to actually put an essence to the very thing that creates essences in the first place. We can say that humans have a certain molecular structure, made from so-and-so-stuff, but purpose-wise, it is hard to provide an essence of individuals, beyond perhaps keeping metabolism at a certain rate. However, even that can be questioned in the case of suicide. Therefore, natural things can only be described in terms of causal, material, and formal definitions, but can not include final causes. It is final causes, where I think Sartre was getting at. If we did provide a definition for a final cause, we would have to be extremely general- perhaps the ability to survive and pursue goals.

Do you believe that everyone else has this wrong, too--for example, the definitions/explanations I quoted re final causes earlier in the thread? — Terrapin Station

What are you talking about? The definitions you've provided are all clearly consistent with my interpretation, and inconsistent with aletheist's. Look what is referred to, a "goal", an "end" in the sense of "what one seeks to attain", "that for the sake of which", which must be interpreted in a way which is consistent with Aristotle's usage, which I've already described.

In any case, the first definition refers to "the end/goal", which is consistent with what I said, and not what aletheist says. The second definition refers to "end (telos)" and again is consistent with what I say, "intention". The third definition refers to "end or purpose", and the fourth refers to "the end, that for the sake of which".

Notice how final cause is equated with "end" (what one seeks to attain), "goal", "telos". Final cause is not, as aletheist claimed, the thing which is brought about by the goal. It is the goal itself. And, as I explained in my last post, in the context of Aristotle's writing's, what is referred to by "that for the sake of which", is the goal, the objective, not the thing brought about by the person who has that goal, it refers to the goal directly.

So, I suggest that you are misinterpreting these definitions. Or am I missing something? How do you make words like "goal", "telos", "end", disappear from the definition?

Which comes first in time, the end or the means? I am not referring to any thought about the end, or the desire for the end, or the decision to adopt a particular end as a goal; I am talking about the end itself.

In any case, the first definition refers to "the end/goal", which is consistent with what I said, and not what aletheist says. The second definition refers to "end (telos)" and again is consistent with what I say, "intention". The third definition refers to "end or purpose", and the fourth refers to "the end, that for the sake of which". — Metaphysician Undercover

The end or goal isn't an intention. The end or goal is to drive in nails.