So this whole thing relies on a false notion of what Benatar holds. The logic is wrong because there's a missing premise around 1 and 2 there. The premise is:
The presence of pain is bad.
The presence of pleasure is good.
The absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone.
The absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation.
Your missing mainly that last one in your calculation. THAT is the asymmetry. Absence of pain is an absolute good that no one actually suffers. It is ONLY bad to not have pleasure if there is somebody who exists for which this would be a deprivation. — schopenhauer1
I believe, however, that the cycle of procreation is symbiotic.
We are born into this world of pain and pleasure. As living, conscious beings, we strive to avoid pain, and indulge in pleasure (note: avoiding pain is fundamental, indulging in pleasure is a byproduct). In order to minimize pain, we build society, but society can only be sustained with new generations. So it is essential that we bear new generations and then those new generations will live to experience pain and pleasure, but in a society that shields the pain from them and provides pleasure for them to indulge in.
This isn't a Ponzi scheme. We aren't using new generations merely as means to an end. It's the circle of life. — QuixoticAgnostic
To say no one has been deprived of pleasure doesn't make sense if you claim there's no one who's suffering (by being nonexistent). Look at it this way: nonexistence simply means that you're not alive. Being alive doesn't involve only pain; you have both pleasure and pain. Ergo, it must be that nonexistence, not being alive, involves not being in pain but also not experiencing pleasure. — TheMadFool
Absence of pain is an absolute good (the state of affairs that no one actually suffers). — schopenhauer1
But you only restated the Ponzi scheme and then said, "that's life"! — schopenhauer1
Well yes, he thinks that if one generation is using the other, then we should stop doing this to the new generation. There is no downside for the next generation that doesn't exist. — schopenhauer1
If you point back that the downside is that parents feel bad, then you are reiterating his exact point that the parents feel bad, and thus use the children to feel better, but inadvertently keep the suffering scheme going in the process. Thus, to be benevolant, they should put their personal feelings aside to prevent a new generation from suffering. — schopenhauer1
First of all, yes, there is no downside to non-existence. The downside is for people that do already exist. And part of my solution for alleviating those downsides is to produce new generations. — QuixoticAgnostic
We aren't using the next generation, the same way I don't use the waiter to get my food. — QuixoticAgnostic
he symbiotic relationship between us and the next generation is that we, as living beings, need continuing generations to uphold the workforce, economy, hospitals, etc. so that, up until death, we can remain living pleasurable lives, maybe in a nursing home taken care of by young caregivers. And, in return, we use the society we have built to raise the children we need and give them fulfilling lives, outweighing the bad they may experience with the good. — QuixoticAgnostic
I'm not advocating that people have children merely because they want to, and it'll make them, personally, feel good to have children. I'm making the point that it is a societal necessity to continue making children, for the good of all living people. — QuixoticAgnostic
1. The presence of pain is bad.
2. The presence of pleasure is good.
3. The absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone.
4. The absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation.
— wikipedia
In 3, Benatar claims nonexistent (unborn) people are the beneficiaries of an absence of pain.
In 4, Benatar claims nonexistent (unborn) people are not deprived of pleasure; that's why the absence of pleasure isn't bad. — TheMadFool
Statement 8 contradicts statement 5; statement 5 is Benatar himself and 8 follows from Benatar. — TheMadFool
One of Benatar's thought experiments is this :
There are no aliens having children on Mars to experience the joys of life. Does that make you sad, empathetic, or grief-stricken? The answer is probably no. No one intuitively seems to care whether "no one" is enjoying life. In fact a whole planet of no people enjoying life doesn't seem to bother us at all. That doesn't seem a moral obligation (that people must be born/exist to enjoy life).
If there were Martians having children on Mars and you knew they were suffering greatly, would that make you sad, empathetic, or feel bad in some way? It probably would to some degree.
There seems to be a difference in how we perceive "pleasure not happening" vs. "pain not happening" in the absence of an actual person. This leads to different conclusions for obligations to bring pleasure and prevent pain in the scenario when a parent has the potential to procreate and can prevent it. — schopenhauer1
Being born is being used, period.
We are born for our parents, and with the inevitable enculturation process, this means for society's means to be used for labor.
Anyways, procreating more people so that they can be used, is not good, period. The ends here, don't justify the means, when, someone didn't need to be born to experience any harm in the first place, and no actual person prior to birth exists to be deprived.
Even so, there is built in systemic suffering not related to the usual contingent (read common) notions of suffering. There is the subtle suffering of the human psyche of desire, which is simply inbuilt.
I wouldn't state it that they are the "beneficiaries". There is no they. It is just "good" that no new person is suffering (presumably when there could have been). — schopenhauer1
No, because of what I stated above. No one is a beneficiary. It is just "good" (in an absolute sense it just "is good") that no one is alive to be harmed (presumably when there could have been).
On the other hand, it is not just "bad" (in any absolute sense) to not experience good. It is neutral. It is only bad if there actually was someone in existence to be deprived of the good.
He gives example of this intuition of suffering being absolutely bad (and prevention of being absolutely good) and pleasure/benefits being instrumentally good (and prevention of being instrumentally bad) here: — schopenhauer1
I finally got what's wrong with Benatar's argument.
In 3, he keeps nonexistence: nonexistence is relevant - it's not bad because of nonexistence
In 4, he discards nonexistence: nonexistence is not relevant - it's good, not because of, but despite, nonexistence
Benatar flip-flops between nonexistence being important (relevant) to nonexistence being not important (not relevant) . Benatar is being inconsistent in the way he uses nonexistence. — TheMadFool
No that's not what's wrong with the argument. It's not like he overlooked that. It's a feature of his argument. He explains in his book that not suffering is an absolute good and not enjoying good is instrumentally good. If you look at my last post, I give one of his examples of why he thinks this is so. — schopenhauer1
Yes, in a way, we are being used; society is what keeps human life healthy and flourishing, and in order to maintain society, we all must play a role, but the reason I don't find fault in this is because (1) I think procreation is a necessity for the good of current human life and (2) the existence of goods in life justifies the creation of new humans that will inevitably experience at least some suffering.
Notice, I might (strong might) agree that, if procreation wasn't necessary for the good of current life, then bringing in new life, even if they'd experience more good than bad, wouldn't be justified. Another thing to note, the necessity of new life is for a similar reason that anti-natalists don't promote suicide or active methods of removing human existence: because for the people that are living, we should still minimize suffering, in some sense. New life is necessary for this reason because, like it's been mentioned before, if we imagine a world where we stop procreating, even if its not all simultaneous, eventually our social structures preventing suffering will degrade and cause suffering to the final generations. Is this not indirectly an action we are taking that causes suffering?
I mentioned that I think there is good in life which allows us to comfortably procreate despite the inevitability of suffering. On this, you say:
Even so, there is built in systemic suffering not related to the usual contingent (read common) notions of suffering. There is the subtle suffering of the human psyche of desire, which is simply inbuilt.
I'm not sure how to respond to this as of yet. Although I agree that the pursuit of life is not to pursue happiness (for happiness is never achieved, as we continually desire something new), I believe that this state of mind may be fixed with a change in internal attitude. In general, I'm not convinced that if suffering merely exists, life isn't worth living, as you seem to claim. That is, that if there is any form of suffering, even suffering that ultimately leads to a greater good, then that's bad and no one should have to experience that at all. Perhaps you can argue why any suffering at all is bad? I'd like to also get into a discussion on some of these terms, because I think a lot of the terms like suffering and society are rather lofty and could do with a more precise and fundamentally rooted understanding. — QuixoticAgnostic
This feature of Benatar's argument is what's wrong with it.
3. The absence of pain is good [even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone] implies that the absence of pain is good "even though" (despite) nonexistence. Benatar is concerned about something other than nonexistence.
4. The absence of pleasure is not bad [unless there is someboy for whom the absence is a deprivation] implies that the absence of pleasure is not bad because of nonexistence. Benatar is directly concerned with nonexistence.
5. I love L unless nonexistence
6. I love L even though nonexistence
In 5. nonexistence changes my emotional attitude towards L depending on whether nonexist — TheMadFool
Yes again, that is the difference here between absolute and instrumental, thus causing the asymmetry. Not experiencing pain is always good, even if there was no person around to know this. The absence of pleasure is not good, but it is not bad either, unless there is a person around. It is an absolute good to not suffer. It is not an absolute good to not feel happiness. Again, please re-read the thought experiment about the aliens on Mars. That is pretty much the kind of intuition that is his basis for this. — schopenhauer1
One of Benatar's thought experiments is this :
There are no aliens having children on Mars to experience the joys of life. Does that make you sad, empathetic, or grief-stricken? The answer is probably no. No one intuitively seems to care whether "no one" is enjoying life. In fact a whole planet of no people enjoying life doesn't seem to bother us at all. That doesn't seem a moral obligation (that people must be born/exist to enjoy life).
If there were Martians having children on Mars and you knew they were suffering greatly, would that make you sad, empathetic, or feel bad in some way? It probably would to some degree.
There seems to be a difference in how we perceive "pleasure not happening" vs. "pain not happening" in the absence of an actual person. This leads to different conclusions for obligations to bring pleasure and prevent pain in the scenario when a parent has the potential to procreate and can prevent it. — schopenhauer1
I would disagree with the implications of Benatar's thought experiment. Consider an exquisitely beautiful landscape you have the good fortune of beholding and also imagine you're the last surviving person in the world. Wouldn't it pain you to know that no one after your demise would ever set eyes upon it? It would, right? — TheMadFool
I would like you to reconsider my point regarding Benatar's propositions.
3. Absence of pain is good [even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone]
4. Absence of pleasure is not bad [unless there is somebody for whom the absence is a deprivation]
The following are simplified versions of 3 and 4
3a. Absence of pain is good even if nonexistence
4a. Absence of pleasure is not bad unless existence
It follows then that:
For 3a, Benatar is saying your existence/nonexistence doesn't matter for absence of pain to be good.
For 4a, Benatar is saying your existence/nonexistence matters for absence of pleasure to be not bad. — TheMadFool
taking the asymmetry into account, the lack of joy or pleasure isn't inherently bad. You may disagree with this premise.
The justification for antinatalism seems logical to me, but where I would like more input is why antinatalists value the negation of suffering more than life itself. Suffering is only relevant if life exists. Antinatalists seem to promote the end of life (extinction), which implies that they do not value life. But if you don’t value life, I don’t see how you can justify any valuation of suffering whatsoever. The only reason you would make any valuation of suffering is because of its affect on life. — Pinprick
So Pinprick.. in the case of procreation, you have a chance to prevent all suffering. — schopenhauer1
Yeah, but why would you want to prevent suffering? Why do you value preventing suffering? Presumably it would be because you believe suffering has a negative affect on those that exist. Therefore, the point of preventing suffering would be to make life better, but ending life doesn’t make life better. The solution to preventing suffering defeats the purpose of ending suffering. — Pinprick
'Not procreating' does not "prevent all suffering" because this abstinence does not prevent the suffering of the already born (for most of whom, 'denying' the biological programming to procreate will increase their suffering). Extinction, like suicide, doesn't compensate for suffering already endured and is a reductio "solution" to 'preventing future suffering' by preventing life as if the fundamental problem, or illness, is living and suffering is only a symptom, when, in fact, they are independent variables. Do No Harm to the living denotes moral concern for extant potential sufferers (i.e. facts-of-the-matter) and not merely abstract "suffering"(i.e a hypothetical state-of-affairs).in the case of procreation, you have a chance to prevent all suffering. — schopenhauer1
'Not procreating' does not "prevent all suffering" because this abstinence does not prevent the suffering of the already born — 180 Proof
Extinction, like suicide, doesn't compensate for suffering already endured and is a reductio "solution" to 'preventing future suffering' by preventing life as if the fundamental problem, or illness, is living and suffering is only a symptom, when, in fact, they are independent variables. Do No Harm to the living denotes moral concern for extant potential sufferers (i.e. facts-of-the-matter) and not merely abstract "suffering"(i.e a hypothetical state-of-affairs). — 180 Proof
I actually think we can come together on antinatalism.. it can be a sort of rallying cry for the living. 1) Recognize the situation of suffering we live in and 2) do something about it together by not breeding. — schopenhauer1
Assuming that, through some kind of argumentative miracle, we could convince all of humanity of negative utilitarianism and antinatalism, what would you actually want us to do? Humans stopping breeding is at best going to eliminate but a small portion of global suffering, and I wouldn't exactly be surprised if it ended up increasing it instead. — zookeeper
Not suffering is ALWAYS good, and this is NOT relative to whether there are people around to know this. — schopenhauer1
It seems to me that in order for anything to be good or bad humans must exist in order to experience it. Otherwise why is not suffering always good? That seems like a value you decide based on your experience of life, but you have never experienced nonexistence, so maybe trying to make any claims about what is good or bad for nonexistent people is flawed. I mean, you have an opinion of what is good and bad, but your opinion is entirely dependent on existing. All moral claims necessarily depend on our existence. The nonexistent Martians in your example have no concern or concept of good and bad. — Pinprick
It's just the bedrock of the axiom. It would be absurd to say that we should create people so that values exist like good and bad, thus creating the very harm that was better not to have existed in the first place! — schopenhauer1
Well, as you’re well aware, it’s all absurd. I’m not really saying we should procreate in order to continue values. The idea is that it would be better if no one existed, but “better” makes no sense without existence. Better how, and for whom? — Pinprick
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