So this whole thing relies on a false notion of what Benatar holds. The logic is wrong because there's a missing premise around 1 and 2 there. The premise is:

The presence of pain is bad.
The presence of pleasure is good.
The absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone.
The absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation.

Your missing mainly that last one in your calculation. THAT is the asymmetry. Absence of pain is an absolute good that no one actually suffers. It is ONLY bad to not have pleasure if there is somebody who exists for which this would be a deprivation. — schopenhauer1

Potential to experience pleasure is as equally important as the potential to experience pain.

When I deny existence to a person, by, say, not having a child, I deprive this potential being of pain, yes, but, also of pleasure.

To say no one has been deprived of pleasure doesn't make sense if you claim there's no one who's suffering (by being nonexistent). Look at it this way: nonexistence simply means that you're not alive. Being alive doesn't involve only pain; you have both pleasure and pain. Ergo, it must be that nonexistence, not being alive, involves not being in pain but also not experiencing pleasure.

I believe, however, that the cycle of procreation is symbiotic.

We are born into this world of pain and pleasure. As living, conscious beings, we strive to avoid pain, and indulge in pleasure (note: avoiding pain is fundamental, indulging in pleasure is a byproduct). In order to minimize pain, we build society, but society can only be sustained with new generations. So it is essential that we bear new generations and then those new generations will live to experience pain and pleasure, but in a society that shields the pain from them and provides pleasure for them to indulge in.

This isn't a Ponzi scheme. We aren't using new generations merely as means to an end. It's the circle of life. — QuixoticAgnostic

But you only restated the Ponzi scheme and then said, "that's life"! Well yes, he thinks that if one generation is using the other, then we should stop doing this to the new generation. There is no downside for the next generation that doesn't exist. If you point back that the downside is that parents feel bad, then you are reiterating his exact point that the parents feel bad, and thus use the children to feel better, but inadvertently keep the suffering scheme going in the process. Thus, to be benevolant, they should put their personal feelings aside to prevent a new generation from suffering.

To say no one has been deprived of pleasure doesn't make sense if you claim there's no one who's suffering (by being nonexistent). Look at it this way: nonexistence simply means that you're not alive. Being alive doesn't involve only pain; you have both pleasure and pain. Ergo, it must be that nonexistence, not being alive, involves not being in pain but also not experiencing pleasure. — TheMadFool

Again, you're missing the argument. It is in respect to the absence of a person (who could exist, let's say). In the absence of a person, suffering does not take place. This is good. In the absence of a person, pleasure/benefits do not take place. However, this is ONLY BAD if there is a person for whom this would be a deprivation.

In other words, read closely what I said earlier about absolute good:

Absence of pain is an absolute good (the state of affairs that no one actually suffers). — schopenhauer1

Benatar sees pain and pleasure as qualitatively different (asymmetrical). The state of affairs of "no pain" is ABSOLUTELY GOOD. It is good no matter what. It is always good in every situation, even one where no people exist in the universe that the state of affairs of "no pain" takes place. However, the state of affairs of "no pleasure" is INSTRUMENTALLY BAD. It is ONLY bad in cases where someone actually exists and realizes they are deprived of good. It is not bad in all states of affairs, such as in the situation where no people exist in the universe and the state of affairs of "no pleasure/benefits" takes place.

But you only restated the Ponzi scheme and then said, "that's life"! — schopenhauer1

What I intended to do was view his "Ponzi scheme" from a different perspective, and hopefully show how my perspective actually describes a healthy existence. In his perspective, it's about people suffering and procreating to prevent suffering, only to bring suffering people into the world. In my perspective, it's about people avoiding suffering (not already suffering) and procreating to prevent further suffering, while bringing people into a world built to shield them from suffering, while providing pleasure.

Maybe the two scenarios I'm describing are functionally the same, but a glass half-full and a glass half-empty are functionally the same, it just depends how you look at it. But like I said, I don't think it's merely a difference in perspective nor do I think they are functionally the same. For further clarification, read on.

Well yes, he thinks that if one generation is using the other, then we should stop doing this to the new generation. There is no downside for the next generation that doesn't exist. — schopenhauer1

First of all, yes, there is no downside to non-existence. The downside is for people that do already exist. And part of my solution for alleviating those downsides is to produce new generations.

But here's the key distinction:

We aren't using the next generation, the same way I don't use the waiter to get my food. This is where the symbiosis comes in. The waiter is providing me a service to get food, and in return, I treat them with respect and give them a tip. Society (and life in general) is predicated on these mutually beneficial relationships. The symbiotic relationship between us and the next generation is that we, as living beings, need continuing generations to uphold the workforce, economy, hospitals, etc. so that, up until death, we can remain living pleasurable lives, maybe in a nursing home taken care of by young caregivers. And, in return, we use the society we have built to raise the children we need and give them fulfilling lives, outweighing the bad they may experience with the good.

Notice, then, that this reasoning is not at all relevant to the reasons you give for having children:

If you point back that the downside is that parents feel bad, then you are reiterating his exact point that the parents feel bad, and thus use the children to feel better, but inadvertently keep the suffering scheme going in the process. Thus, to be benevolant, they should put their personal feelings aside to prevent a new generation from suffering. — schopenhauer1

I was trying to figure out whether or not you were making my point, or making the point you actually did make, which is highlighted by the bolded portion.

I'm not advocating that people have children merely because they want to, and it'll make them, personally, feel good to have children. I'm making the point that it is a societal necessity to continue making children, for the good of all living people.

First of all, yes, there is no downside to non-existence. The downside is for people that do already exist. And part of my solution for alleviating those downsides is to produce new generations. — QuixoticAgnostic

An extreme example of this kind of logic is- a sociopath gets pleasure from killing and is quite depressed when not doing so. Should he relieve his own suffering? Of course not.

Now there are certainly differences here (the parent isn't doing this in the hopes of suffering hopefully). However, the focus here is on the fact that once doing harm to another person is in the equation, then it is no longer about only how you feel. In fact, in the case of a non-existent person (that could exist though), the parents' feeling should have no consideration as it is purely now about the outcome of the future person who is the one whose whole life is affected by the decision made not by their own doing.

We aren't using the next generation, the same way I don't use the waiter to get my food. — QuixoticAgnostic

You exist. The waiter exists. Presumably the waiter does this on his own volition to get paid. The child doesn't have the choice to be born of course. However, interestingly, in a VERY indirect way, this makes my case too.. Maybe the waiter hates his job and wishes he wasn't there, but is de facto forced into it temporarily until something better might happen (if it does). The point is the waiter can't help his own survival situation due to being born. So perhaps it is more examples of being forced into situations of some harm (unwanted need to survive, let's say and the form it takes in an industrialized economy for this particular fellow).

he symbiotic relationship between us and the next generation is that we, as living beings, need continuing generations to uphold the workforce, economy, hospitals, etc. so that, up until death, we can remain living pleasurable lives, maybe in a nursing home taken care of by young caregivers. And, in return, we use the society we have built to raise the children we need and give them fulfilling lives, outweighing the bad they may experience with the good. — QuixoticAgnostic

I had a WHOLE threads about how this exact way of thinking is unethical. Please see the OPs on these threads (and discussions that follow if you want) here:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/8014/coronavirus-meaning-existentialism-pessimism-and-everything/p1

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/8117/social-control-and-social-goals/p1

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/7735/is-society-itself-an-ideology/p1

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/7092/what-justifies-a-positive-ethics-as-opposed-to-a-negative-one/p1

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/7122/procreation-is-using-people-via-experimentation/p1

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/6805/if-a-condition-of-life-is-inescapable-does-that-automatically-make-it-acceptable-and-good/p1

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/6032/ethics-subjectivity-and-forcing-workchallenges-for-other-people

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/4121/reproduction-is-a-political-act

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/2415/why-we-sacrifice-individuals-in-the-name-of-culturesocial-institutions

I'm not advocating that people have children merely because they want to, and it'll make them, personally, feel good to have children. I'm making the point that it is a societal necessity to continue making children, for the good of all living people. — QuixoticAgnostic

See the OPs on all the links provided as I've actually brought this issue of society using people up very often, starting many threads on this theme. So you are touching upon issues that I am quite familiar with :).

Let's review Benatar's claims:

1. The presence of pain is bad.

2. The presence of pleasure is good.

3. The absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone.

4. The absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation.
— wikipedia

3 and 4 are the meat of Benatar's argument.

In 3, Benatar claims nonexistent (unborn) people are the beneficiaries of an absence of pain.

In 4, Benatar claims nonexistent (unborn) people are not deprived of pleasure; that's why the absence of pleasure isn't bad.

In 3,

5. Nonexistent (unborn) people can be benefitted (no pain is good).

In 4,

6. Nonexistent (unborn) people can't be harmed (no pleasure is not bad).

But notice that in 5, the nonexistent (unborn) people are being benefitted in a way that suggests they can be objects of harm and benefit but in 6, the nonexistent (unborn) people can't be harmed because they're beyond such considerations (harm and benefit applied to them amounts to a category error) by virtue of being nonexistent.

If, as in 5, the nonexistent state can be benefitted then:

7. the nonexistent state accrues the benefit of being born to experience pleasure

If, as in 6, the nonexistent state can't be harmed then:

8. the nonexistent state doesn't accrue the benefit of not being born to experience pain

Statement 8 contradicts statement 5; statement 5 is Benatar himself and 8 follows from Benatar.

In 3, Benatar claims nonexistent (unborn) people are the beneficiaries of an absence of pain.

In 4, Benatar claims nonexistent (unborn) people are not deprived of pleasure; that's why the absence of pleasure isn't bad. — TheMadFool

I wouldn't state it that they are the "beneficiaries". There is no they. It is just "good" that no new person is suffering (presumably when there could have been).

Statement 8 contradicts statement 5; statement 5 is Benatar himself and 8 follows from Benatar. — TheMadFool

No, because of what I stated above. No one is a beneficiary. It is just "good" (in an absolute sense it just "is good") that no one is alive to be harmed (presumably when there could have been).

On the other hand, it is not just "bad" (in any absolute sense) to not experience good. It is neutral. It is only bad if there actually was someone in existence to be deprived of the good.

He gives example of this intuition of suffering being absolutely bad (and prevention of being absolutely good) and pleasure/benefits being instrumentally good (and prevention of being instrumentally bad) here:

One of Benatar's thought experiments is this :

There are no aliens having children on Mars to experience the joys of life. Does that make you sad, empathetic, or grief-stricken? The answer is probably no. No one intuitively seems to care whether "no one" is enjoying life. In fact a whole planet of no people enjoying life doesn't seem to bother us at all. That doesn't seem a moral obligation (that people must be born/exist to enjoy life).

If there were Martians having children on Mars and you knew they were suffering greatly, would that make you sad, empathetic, or feel bad in some way? It probably would to some degree.

There seems to be a difference in how we perceive "pleasure not happening" vs. "pain not happening" in the absence of an actual person. This leads to different conclusions for obligations to bring pleasure and prevent pain in the scenario when a parent has the potential to procreate and can prevent it. — schopenhauer1

You'll have to forgive me as I've given myself an existential headache reading up on the pessimist views of Benatar, Schopenhauer, and yourself, so I probably won't do the best job responding/clarifying your position (but in retrospect, I think I did a pretty good job actually).

I think I gleamed the most of your position from the thread It is life itself that we can all unite against (which, by the way, wasn't even one of the links you gave me :wink:), particularly this post.

On the unborn being used, you say:

Being born is being used, period.

We are born for our parents, and with the inevitable enculturation process, this means for society's means to be used for labor.

Anyways, procreating more people so that they can be used, is not good, period. The ends here, don't justify the means, when, someone didn't need to be born to experience any harm in the first place, and no actual person prior to birth exists to be deprived.

I may agree that being born is being used, but like I said, we are not merely used. Nor do I think we are merely being used for labor. Yes, in a way, we are being used; society is what keeps human life healthy and flourishing, and in order to maintain society, we all must play a role, but the reason I don't find fault in this is because (1) I think procreation is a necessity for the good of current human life and (2) the existence of goods in life justifies the creation of new humans that will inevitably experience at least some suffering.

Notice, I might (strong might) agree that, if procreation wasn't necessary for the good of current life, then bringing in new life, even if they'd experience more good than bad, wouldn't be justified. Another thing to note, the necessity of new life is for a similar reason that anti-natalists don't promote suicide or active methods of removing human existence: because for the people that are living, we should still minimize suffering, in some sense. New life is necessary for this reason because, like it's been mentioned before, if we imagine a world where we stop procreating, even if its not all simultaneous, eventually our social structures preventing suffering will degrade and cause suffering to the final generations. Is this not indirectly an action we are taking that causes suffering?

I mentioned that I think there is good in life which allows us to comfortably procreate despite the inevitability of suffering. On this, you say:

Even so, there is built in systemic suffering not related to the usual contingent (read common) notions of suffering. There is the subtle suffering of the human psyche of desire, which is simply inbuilt.

I'm not sure how to respond to this as of yet. Although I agree that the pursuit of life is not to pursue happiness (for happiness is never achieved, as we continually desire something new), I believe that this state of mind may be fixed with a change in internal attitude. In general, I'm not convinced that if suffering merely exists, life isn't worth living, as you seem to claim. That is, that if there is any form of suffering, even suffering that ultimately leads to a greater good, then that's bad and no one should have to experience that at all. Perhaps you can argue why any suffering at all is bad? I'd like to also get into a discussion on some of these terms, because I think a lot of the terms like suffering and society are rather lofty and could do with a more precise and fundamentally rooted understanding.

I wouldn't state it that they are the "beneficiaries". There is no they. It is just "good" that no new person is suffering (presumably when there could have been). — schopenhauer1

No, because of what I stated above. No one is a beneficiary. It is just "good" (in an absolute sense it just "is good") that no one is alive to be harmed (presumably when there could have been).

On the other hand, it is not just "bad" (in any absolute sense) to not experience good. It is neutral. It is only bad if there actually was someone in existence to be deprived of the good.

He gives example of this intuition of suffering being absolutely bad (and prevention of being absolutely good) and pleasure/benefits being instrumentally good (and prevention of being instrumentally bad) here: — schopenhauer1

Benatar:

1. Presence of pleasure is good
2. Presence of pain is bad
3. Absence of pleasure is not bad [unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation]
4. Absence of pain is good [even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone]

I finally got what's wrong with Benatar's argument.

In 3, he keeps nonexistence: nonexistence is relevant - it's not bad because of nonexistence

In 4, he discards nonexistence: nonexistence is not relevant - it's good, not because of, but despite, nonexistence

Benatar flip-flops between nonexistence being important (relevant) to nonexistence being not important (not relevant) . Benatar is being inconsistent in the way he uses nonexistence.

I finally got what's wrong with Benatar's argument.

In 3, he keeps nonexistence: nonexistence is relevant - it's not bad because of nonexistence

In 4, he discards nonexistence: nonexistence is not relevant - it's good, not because of, but despite, nonexistence

Benatar flip-flops between nonexistence being important (relevant) to nonexistence being not important (not relevant) . Benatar is being inconsistent in the way he uses nonexistence. — TheMadFool

No that's not what's wrong with the argument. It's not like he overlooked that. It's a feature of his argument. He explains in his book that not suffering is an absolute good and not enjoying good is instrumentally good. If you look at my last post, I give one of his examples of why he thinks this is so.

No that's not what's wrong with the argument. It's not like he overlooked that. It's a feature of his argument. He explains in his book that not suffering is an absolute good and not enjoying good is instrumentally good. If you look at my last post, I give one of his examples of why he thinks this is so. — schopenhauer1

This feature of Benatar's argument is what's wrong with it.

3. The absence of pain is good [even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone] implies that the absence of pain is good "even though" (despite) nonexistence. Benatar is concerned about something other than nonexistence.

4. The absence of pleasure is not bad [unless there is someboy for whom the absence is a deprivation] implies that the absence of pleasure is not bad because of nonexistence. Benatar is directly concerned with nonexistence.

5. I love L unless nonexistence
6. I love L even though nonexistence

In 5. nonexistence changes my emotional attitude towards L depending on whether nonexistence or not. In 6. nonexistence has no effect on my emotional attitude towards L. See?

Yes, in a way, we are being used; society is what keeps human life healthy and flourishing, and in order to maintain society, we all must play a role, but the reason I don't find fault in this is because (1) I think procreation is a necessity for the good of current human life and (2) the existence of goods in life justifies the creation of new humans that will inevitably experience at least some suffering.

Notice, I might (strong might) agree that, if procreation wasn't necessary for the good of current life, then bringing in new life, even if they'd experience more good than bad, wouldn't be justified. Another thing to note, the necessity of new life is for a similar reason that anti-natalists don't promote suicide or active methods of removing human existence: because for the people that are living, we should still minimize suffering, in some sense. New life is necessary for this reason because, like it's been mentioned before, if we imagine a world where we stop procreating, even if its not all simultaneous, eventually our social structures preventing suffering will degrade and cause suffering to the final generations. Is this not indirectly an action we are taking that causes suffering?

I mentioned that I think there is good in life which allows us to comfortably procreate despite the inevitability of suffering. On this, you say:

Even so, there is built in systemic suffering not related to the usual contingent (read common) notions of suffering. There is the subtle suffering of the human psyche of desire, which is simply inbuilt.

I'm not sure how to respond to this as of yet. Although I agree that the pursuit of life is not to pursue happiness (for happiness is never achieved, as we continually desire something new), I believe that this state of mind may be fixed with a change in internal attitude. In general, I'm not convinced that if suffering merely exists, life isn't worth living, as you seem to claim. That is, that if there is any form of suffering, even suffering that ultimately leads to a greater good, then that's bad and no one should have to experience that at all. Perhaps you can argue why any suffering at all is bad? I'd like to also get into a discussion on some of these terms, because I think a lot of the terms like suffering and society are rather lofty and could do with a more precise and fundamentally rooted understanding. — QuixoticAgnostic

Yeah so this just goes to premises. I don't think it is fair to future people by using them to maintain civilization in general. At the procreational decision-making level, any consideration beyond harm to the future person would simply be overlooking the individual for some larger scheme. I find this ethical view untenable if we don't want to use people for some third-party ends (by third party I mean, some grand vision, or principle). I also would not use people for personal ends (I need someone to take care of me when I'm old). No one's future suffering is worth it for "humanity" or "because I'm going to get old". If Benatar did say this was a Ponzi scheme, then this idea is exactly justified. In order to alleviate X current suffering, you are going to create Y future suffering. Let's be more creative for the people still alive then. There is no reason to create suffering, and to use people, to impose survival, comfort-seeking, and entertainment-seeking needs onto another person who has to navigate and be enculturated into society.

I've also written many posts and threads about why the "inventory of goods of life" are not worth starting a whole "dealing with" in the first place. Look, I could kidnap you and force you into a game which maybe you will come to identify with as I look on amused that I brought you happiness by kidnapping you into this game. I see life as a bigger version of this. Much of these goods are unequally distributed (some have more than others). Also, I believe there is necessary suffering- suffering not contingent on circumstances. As Benatar points out. Not suffering is absolutely good. Not enjoying things is an instrumental bad. It's neutral in the situation of no person. Yes, once born you will want to try to maximize benefits of life, but at the cost of our own dissatisfaction, constant lack unfulfilled nature (what I call necessary suffering or Schopenhaueran suffering or Eastern philosophy versions of suffering) and will come with much contingent suffering (more utilitarian, "common" forms of a time and place like disease, mental illness, disaster, frustrations, every daily tedious event). All things trying to overcome the suffering is just coping mechanisms that come post-facto (after the fact), since we could have avoided it altogether, or rather we can prevent it altogether for a future person. But to create situations of "lack" and deprivation for another person, so they can overcome it and see the "joys" of life, I just don't buy that as a good ethical claim and am trying to show others this as well.

This feature of Benatar's argument is what's wrong with it.

3. The absence of pain is good [even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone] implies that the absence of pain is good "even though" (despite) nonexistence. Benatar is concerned about something other than nonexistence.

4. The absence of pleasure is not bad [unless there is someboy for whom the absence is a deprivation] implies that the absence of pleasure is not bad because of nonexistence. Benatar is directly concerned with nonexistence.

5. I love L unless nonexistence
6. I love L even though nonexistence

In 5. nonexistence changes my emotional attitude towards L depending on whether nonexist — TheMadFool

Yes again, that is the difference here between absolute and instrumental, thus causing the asymmetry. Not experiencing pain is always good, even if there was no person around to know this. The absence of pleasure is not good, but it is not bad either, unless there is a person around. It is an absolute good to not suffer. It is not an absolute good to not feel happiness. Again, please re-read the thought experiment about the aliens on Mars. That is pretty much the kind of intuition that is his basis for this.

Yes again, that is the difference here between absolute and instrumental, thus causing the asymmetry. Not experiencing pain is always good, even if there was no person around to know this. The absence of pleasure is not good, but it is not bad either, unless there is a person around. It is an absolute good to not suffer. It is not an absolute good to not feel happiness. Again, please re-read the thought experiment about the aliens on Mars. That is pretty much the kind of intuition that is his basis for this. — schopenhauer1

One of Benatar's thought experiments is this :

There are no aliens having children on Mars to experience the joys of life. Does that make you sad, empathetic, or grief-stricken? The answer is probably no. No one intuitively seems to care whether "no one" is enjoying life. In fact a whole planet of no people enjoying life doesn't seem to bother us at all. That doesn't seem a moral obligation (that people must be born/exist to enjoy life).

If there were Martians having children on Mars and you knew they were suffering greatly, would that make you sad, empathetic, or feel bad in some way? It probably would to some degree.

There seems to be a difference in how we perceive "pleasure not happening" vs. "pain not happening" in the absence of an actual person. This leads to different conclusions for obligations to bring pleasure and prevent pain in the scenario when a parent has the potential to procreate and can prevent it. — schopenhauer1

I would disagree with the implications of Benatar's thought experiment. Consider an exquisitely beautiful landscape you have the good fortune of beholding and also imagine you're the last surviving person in the world. Wouldn't it pain you to know that no one after your demise would ever set eyes upon it? It would, right?

I would like you to reconsider my point regarding Benatar's propositions.

3. Absence of pain is good [even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone]
4. Absence of pleasure is not bad [unless there is somebody for whom the absence is a deprivation]

The following are simplified versions of 3 and 4

3a. Absence of pain is good even if nonexistence

4a. Absence of pleasure is not bad unless existence

It follows then that:

For 3a, Benatar is saying your existence/nonexistence doesn't matter for absence of pain to be good.

For 4a, Benatar is saying your existence/nonexistence matters for absence of pleasure to be not bad.


It follows then that if 3 and 4 are Benatar's premises then it amounts to stating a contradition viz. that existence/nonexistence matters AND existence/nonexistence doesn't matter.

[note: I made a mistake in my last post. Sorry]

I would disagree with the implications of Benatar's thought experiment. Consider an exquisitely beautiful landscape you have the good fortune of beholding and also imagine you're the last surviving person in the world. Wouldn't it pain you to know that no one after your demise would ever set eyes upon it? It would, right? — TheMadFool

Maybe. The exquisite most beautiful landscape might be so beautiful I would want someone else to see. However, this seems less impactful than let's say people dying horribly from a mass epidemic on the landscape. That would be a terrible fate to have happen...Certainly, the gravitas of suffering seems of more importance in some way than not experiencing happiness. And obviously I think he has that asymmetry right.

I would like you to reconsider my point regarding Benatar's propositions.

3. Absence of pain is good [even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone]
4. Absence of pleasure is not bad [unless there is somebody for whom the absence is a deprivation]

The following are simplified versions of 3 and 4

3a. Absence of pain is good even if nonexistence

4a. Absence of pleasure is not bad unless existence

It follows then that:

For 3a, Benatar is saying your existence/nonexistence doesn't matter for absence of pain to be good.

For 4a, Benatar is saying your existence/nonexistence matters for absence of pleasure to be not bad. — TheMadFool

Yes I think that is a good interpretation.

taking the asymmetry into account, the lack of joy or pleasure isn't inherently bad. You may disagree with this premise.

I suppose the presence of suffering isn’t inherently bad either. Running a marathon or getting a tattoo aren't necessarily pleasurable experiences.

Either way one cannot prevent the suffering of those not born like he cannot prevent the suffering of those who are dead—they do not exist.

@JacobPhilosophy@schopenhauer1@QuixoticAgnostic

The justification for antinatalism seems logical to me, but where I would like more input is why antinatalists value the negation of suffering more than life itself. Suffering is only relevant if life exists. Antinatalists seem to promote the end of life (extinction), which implies that they do not value life. But if you don’t value life, I don’t see how you can justify any valuation of suffering whatsoever. The only reason you would make any valuation of suffering is because of its affect on life.

To me meaning is more important than pleasure and I don't value meaningless pain or meaningless pleasure.

I think that just mindlessly pursuing pleasure or pain minimisation is problematic. And indeed trying to minimise pain has led some to an extinctionist position because there is so much of it to tackle that it seems to outweigh pleasure.

Pleasure is not synonymous with good and can be insatiable and destructive.

I think the only circumstance I might create a child in is if life was provably deeply meaningful.

The justification for antinatalism seems logical to me, but where I would like more input is why antinatalists value the negation of suffering more than life itself. Suffering is only relevant if life exists. Antinatalists seem to promote the end of life (extinction), which implies that they do not value life. But if you don’t value life, I don’t see how you can justify any valuation of suffering whatsoever. The only reason you would make any valuation of suffering is because of its affect on life. — Pinprick

So Pinprick.. in the case of procreation, you have a chance to prevent all suffering. The Benatar Asymmetry is saying that suffering seems to have more gravitas than happiness. Where it is always good for state of affairs of no suffering. It is only instrumentally good in the state of affairs of no happiness.

As I said before, this is shown in the thought experiment about no life on Mars. Mars has no life. No one has any strong emotional reaction to this. But if Mars had life that was suffering greatly, I am sure we would at least react with some sympathy, sadness, and regret for the aliens. These are the kind of intuitions that would make it seem that indeed, suffering is NOT symmetrical in respect to benefits/happiness/goods. It is always good to not have pain, but not bad or good (neutral) if no one experienced pleasure/happiness/benefits/goods.

So Pinprick.. in the case of procreation, you have a chance to prevent all suffering. — schopenhauer1

Yeah, but why would you want to prevent suffering? Why do you value preventing suffering? Presumably it would be because you believe suffering has a negative affect on those that exist. Therefore, the point of preventing suffering would be to make life better, but ending life doesn’t make life better. The solution to preventing suffering defeats the purpose of ending suffering.

Yeah, but why would you want to prevent suffering? Why do you value preventing suffering? Presumably it would be because you believe suffering has a negative affect on those that exist. Therefore, the point of preventing suffering would be to make life better, but ending life doesn’t make life better. The solution to preventing suffering defeats the purpose of ending suffering. — Pinprick

No, replace preventing with simply "not suffering" if that helps. Not suffering is ALWAYS good, and this is NOT relative to whether there are people around to know this. Not happiness is only RELATIVELY bad in relation to if someone exists. If there were no one around to not experience happiness, that is NOT BAD.

in the case of procreation, you have a chance to prevent all suffering. — schopenhauer1

'Not procreating' does not "prevent all suffering" because this abstinence does not prevent the suffering of the already born (for most of whom, 'denying' the biological programming to procreate will increase their suffering). Extinction, like suicide, doesn't compensate for suffering already endured and is a reductio "solution" to 'preventing future suffering' by preventing life as if the fundamental problem, or illness, is living and suffering is only a symptom, when, in fact, they are independent variables. Do No Harm to the living denotes moral concern for extant potential sufferers (i.e. facts-of-the-matter) and not merely abstract "suffering"(i.e a hypothetical state-of-affairs).

'Not procreating' does not "prevent all suffering" because this abstinence does not prevent the suffering of the already born — 180 Proof

Red herring, as I've explained before.. when accounting for causing the conditions of suffering for others one's own suffering for not causing the conditions of suffering for others does not matter in the equation.

Extinction, like suicide, doesn't compensate for suffering already endured and is a reductio "solution" to 'preventing future suffering' by preventing life as if the fundamental problem, or illness, is living and suffering is only a symptom, when, in fact, they are independent variables. Do No Harm to the living denotes moral concern for extant potential sufferers (i.e. facts-of-the-matter) and not merely abstract "suffering"(i.e a hypothetical state-of-affairs). — 180 Proof

Well, sorry but living 99.999% of the time will entail some suffering, whether you define it as intrinsic to living (i.e. Buddhism, Schopenhauerean) or contingent to living ("common" notions of sickness, frustrations, or any negative experience one encounters in life).

I actually think we can come together on antinatalism.. it can be a sort of rallying cry for the living. 1) Recognize the situation of suffering we live in and 2) do something about it together by not breeding.

An example of this is that some people think that workers are getting exploited. Often times the workers themselves might not recognize this and even align politically against the view that would prevent exploitation. The job then of the person who believes the worker is being exploited is to explain how it is that they are exploited in the hopes that he will join the cause against the exploitation :D.

I actually think we can come together on antinatalism.. it can be a sort of rallying cry for the living. 1) Recognize the situation of suffering we live in and 2) do something about it together by not breeding. — schopenhauer1

Assuming that, through some kind of argumentative miracle, we could convince all of humanity of negative utilitarianism and antinatalism, what would you actually want us to do? Humans stopping breeding is at best going to eliminate but a small portion of global suffering, and I wouldn't exactly be surprised if it ended up increasing it instead.

Assuming that, through some kind of argumentative miracle, we could convince all of humanity of negative utilitarianism and antinatalism, what would you actually want us to do? Humans stopping breeding is at best going to eliminate but a small portion of global suffering, and I wouldn't exactly be surprised if it ended up increasing it instead. — zookeeper

It's not about utilitiarian in the "greatest good for the greatest benefit" sense (in fact antinatalism doesn't have to rely on any utilitarian principle, though it does rely on cost/benefit analysis of benefits and harms in respect to the absence of a person vs. the presence of a person for sure). It is about not promoting suffering for each new person. It is individual-based.

Really, your question relies on what to do for the already living who are already in this situation. Antinatalism does not mean other principles are not also important once already born. I mentioned exploitation. Perhaps antinatalism can show other areas of exploitation (besides being born) like how social systems, and life itself is exploiting people in general (whether it be for their labor, their time, their health, etc.). Perhaps people will be more compassionate, less judgemental. Perhaps people will take life less seriously, and see it as the absurd merry-go-round of needs and states of lack that it is. Perhaps they will incorporate more Eastern ideas of lessening desires in general, but knowing that desire itself is pervasive and the root of human motivations. There can be many things that come out of antinatalism for the already born. One of the biggest ones is understanding the absurdity of things. The absurdity of the deficits to keep oneself alive, comfortable, maintained, and entertained.

Maybe it provides community, one where we can all see each other as fellow-sufferers. A shared value-system can be meaningful. It is unfortunate that the de facto systems of life don't care about values, as much as output. But there's more of the absurdity. In order to keep ourselves alive and maintained, we must make widgets- circuit boards and whatnot.. we need medical equipment and hospitals, and things. We need stuff that is not necessarily edifying in itself, but instrumental in keeping the absurdity of our own deficits (health, boredom, or otherwise) maintained and continuing. So, I guess unforunately, even with a shared sense of community, it is hard to overcome the minutia-mongering necessary to keep industrialized ways-of-life (mostly agreed upon as the best worst situation of economic necessity). But hey, that is part of the pessimism of life in general, that there is no utopianizing our way out of the situation.

Anyways, no one is holding you back from trying to maximize your happiness. It is simply stating not to bring other people unnecessary pain. No one needs happiness, if not born in the first place, but it does seem true that it is absolutely good to wholesale prevent unnecessary pain for others, where one can.

I appreciate the span of your reply, but I believe you misunderstood my question. :grin:

If we humans stop breeding and go extinct, non-human suffering will continue indefinitely, until and unless life on the planet is wiped out by either a cosmic event or a new civilization. Likely, neither is going to happen in a long, long time.

If we consider how long suffering-capable life has existed, humanity is probably just one tiny step away from being able to concoct some kind of technological doomsday solution. Are you sure you want us to stop now, when a couple hundred years more might be all it takes to be able to remove all suffering on Earth permanently (or at least for some hundreds of millions of years it would take for new advanced life to evolve)?

Not suffering is ALWAYS good, and this is NOT relative to whether there are people around to know this. — schopenhauer1

I don’t think this suffices. It seems to me that in order for anything to be good or bad humans must exist in order to experience it. Otherwise why is not suffering always good? That seems like a value you decide based on your experience of life, but you have never experienced nonexistence, so maybe trying to make any claims about what is good or bad for nonexistent people is flawed. I mean, you have an opinion of what is good and bad, but your opinion is entirely dependent on existing. All moral claims necessarily depend on our existence. The nonexistent Martians in your example have no concern or concept of good and bad.

It seems to me that in order for anything to be good or bad humans must exist in order to experience it. Otherwise why is not suffering always good? That seems like a value you decide based on your experience of life, but you have never experienced nonexistence, so maybe trying to make any claims about what is good or bad for nonexistent people is flawed. I mean, you have an opinion of what is good and bad, but your opinion is entirely dependent on existing. All moral claims necessarily depend on our existence. The nonexistent Martians in your example have no concern or concept of good and bad. — Pinprick

It's just the bedrock of the axiom. It would be absurd to say that we should create people so that values exist like good and bad, thus creating the very harm that was better not to have existed in the first place!

It's just the bedrock of the axiom. It would be absurd to say that we should create people so that values exist like good and bad, thus creating the very harm that was better not to have existed in the first place! — schopenhauer1

Well, as you’re well aware, it’s all absurd. I’m not really saying we should procreate in order to continue values. The idea is that it would be better if no one existed, but “better” makes no sense without existence. Better how, and for whom?

Well, as you’re well aware, it’s all absurd. I’m not really saying we should procreate in order to continue values. The idea is that it would be better if no one existed, but “better” makes no sense without existence. Better how, and for whom? — Pinprick

It's simply a better state of affairs. No suffering exists. No one needs to be around to now this is good. People being around or not does not change that fact. For example, say someone came into existence for five minutes and felt excruciating suffering and then was no more. The billions of years of states of affairs before and after that person can be said to be good that suffering is not occurring. That five minutes can be deemed as bad that suffering is occurring.