~P = if there were not minds in our actual world
then
~Q = there would not be truths in our actual world

Is the inverse of

P = If there are minds in the actual world
then
Q = there are truths in the actual world

But this part in particular is self refuting in my view
"There are no truths".
I can make no sense of the notion that it can be true that there are no truths.
I can make sense of this as false.

I can make no sense of the notion that it can be true that there are no truths. — m-theory

Because you're ignoring context.

From world y, it's true that there are no truths in world x.

At time T2, it's true that there are no truths at time T1.

You're ignoring context.

I am done with worlds.

I will simply have to take your word for it.

Well, I definitely agree that "In world x, it's true that there is no truth in world x" is contradictory. But that's not what's being said.

As I suggested long ago, substitute the word "judgment" for truth, and this should be far less confusing to you.

"In my judgment in 2016, there were no judgments made on Earth 4.3 billion years ago."

That doesn't seem contradictory to you, does it?

But this part in particular is self refuting in my view
"There are no truths". — m-theory

That would indeed be self-refuting ... but it is not what I said. My statement did not assert anything about what actually is the case, but rather about what would be the case under a certain condition - IF there were no minds, THEN there would be no truths. There is simply no way to construe this as self-contradictory.

No I don't agree with that view.

The argument is the combination of both statements
~P--->~Q
And not Q is still self refuting

Why should we have to substitute these terms if they are equivalent?

Why should we have to substitute these terms if they are equivalent? — m-theory

For purposes of understanding on your part. The word "truth" is confusing you.

And you're not answering the question:

"In my judgment in 2016, there were no judgments made on Earth 4.3 billion years ago."

That doesn't seem contradictory to you, does it?

You changed the statement. We agree that "there are no truths" is self-refuting. The statement was, "If there were no minds, then there would be no truths." Here the consequent, "there would be no truths," is NOT self-refuting. Consider this statement:

If there were no truths, then there would be no truths.

This is necessarily true - if P, then P - and thus obviously not self-contradictory.

Sure that seems reasonable, if it were that judgments and truths were the same thing.

I still see that as self refuting because would not be true that there were no truths

Sure that seems reasonable, if it were that judgments and truths were the same thing. — m-theory

Okay, but understanding that on my view, truth values are simply judgments, when we put the word "truth" back into the statement, I'm saying the exact same thing. So that's why it's not contradictory on my view.

This is necessarily true - if P, then P - and thus obviously not self-contradictory. — aletheist

No the argument is not if P then P

The argument is if ~P then ~Q
where p if there is there are minds
and q then there are truths

Yes except it is contradictory to say it would be true that there would be no truths for example.
In logic at least that is contradictory in the sense that it is self refuting.

Yes except it is contradictory to say it would be true that there would be no truths for example. — m-theory

That is certainly the case when the context isn't different between "it's true" and "there are no truths."

However, ALL that I'm saying is that it's my judgment that there are no judgments in some particular context--some other time, some possible world, etc.

I have clearly been wasting my time. Cheers.

That is fine.
I just don't agree with the logical form of the argument you used to get there.

P therefor P is a circular argument.
To my understanding circular arguments are not regarded as valid justification of claims.

i don't think that you're disagreeing with logical form. I think you're disagreeing, at least intuitively, with what "truth" denotes. You don't buy that truth is just a judgment that particular individuals make, and you're having trouble reading "truth" so that it would denote that and only that. You're intuitively thinking that there are going to be things true or false in worlds where no persons are around to make judgments.

Well actually that is why I was discussing the argument with aletheist in symbolic form.

But we can't even agree what the argument being made is.

If you wanted to discuss the argument in logical form I would be happy to do that.

Would there be any actuality; that is, would anything at all be the case in a world that contained no percipients?

Obviously I'm not any sort of ontological idealist.

Thats not an answer to the question.

In other words, why would I believe that the only means of there being something in a world is via there being creatures to have perceptions?

Now you are countering a question with a question. Why don't you just give an honest answer to the question instead of bullshitting around?

I gave an honest answer in the first place. If you want a particular (kind of) answer, either specify your limitations better or just have a conversation with yourself (since you'd be supplying the answer anyway).

It was a straightforward question that could be answered 'yes' or 'no' and you did not answer it. And I suspect I know very well why you didn't answer it

It was a straightforward question that could be answered 'yes' or 'no' and you did not answer it. And I suspect I know very well why you didn't answer it — John

Actually, your comment above made me realize I misread your question (because at first I was like "It was a yes or no question? Wha??) I read your question as

Why would there be any actuality; that is, why would anything at all be the case in a world that contained no percipients? — John

Re the simple yes/no question you actually asked, my answer is "Yes." The reason why I think that is that obviously I'm not an idealist. I'm a realist. I don't believe that the existence of anything but a very unusual possible world would depend on the existence of persons.

OK, no problem. So what then, according to you, is the difference in a mind-empty world between it being the case that X, and it being true that X?

"It is the case that" denotes a fact. Facts are states of affairs. "Ways the world is" in other words.

Truth-value is a judgment about the relationship of a proposition to something else--the something else being dependent on just what truth theory someone subscribes to. It could be correspondence (so that truth-value is a judgment about the relationship of a proposition to facts), it could be coherence (so that truth-value is a judgment about the relationship of a proposition to the rest of the propositions the person assigns "T" to), it could be consensus (so that truth-value is a judgment about the relationship of a proposition to propositions that are assigned "T" by consensus of relevant populations), and so on.