Logical pragmatism is the view that our basic beliefs are a know-how, and that this know-how
is logical – that is, that it is necessary to our making sense. — Moyal-Sharrock
'Bedrock beliefs' are 'what everyone knows,' with the important twist of this 'knowledge' being primarily tacit. It's doing/saying the 'right thing' in the context of a world with others. We can, with effort, articulate some of this tacit know-how. — path
Welcome path. I agree with much of what you said. However, would you call this "tacit know-how" a belief (or set of beliefs), like @Sam26 does? — Luke
I have a belief that the pub is at the end of the road means I have a tendency to act as if the pub were at the end of the road. My cat believes the floor is solid means my cat has a tendency to act as if the floor were solid. — Isaac
It also brings out that knowledge-how is not JTB. — Luke
When we look at the structure of belief statements and expect prelinguistic belief to somehow have the same structure, we're thinking in the exact reverse fashion that evolutionary progression can possibly allow. — creativesoul
The idea that only humans have concepts because we're the only language users is a bit anthropomorphic. — Marchesk
Strange balls... — creativesoul
Yes, to me it makes sense that certain animals have something like concepts. — path
John Watkins addresses all-and-some; I think it's in Science and Skepticism, characterising them as an existential quantification inside a universal quantification.
An existential statement can be verified: "There is at least one black cat" is verified by presenting a black cat. But it cannot be falsified - my not having a cat to hand does not show that there are no black cats.
A universal statement on the other hand can be falsified, but not verified. "All cats are black" is shown false by presenting a non-black cat; but looking around and not finding a non-black cat does not mean that there are none, unless you look everywhere.
Now if you put one in the scope of the other, you get something that is neither provable nor disprovable. — Banno
...a belief as a relation between an agent and a proposition such that the agent holds the proposition to be true. — Banno
How can a language less creature believe that a proposition is true, unless - at the very least - that creature understands the proposition?
Cat's do not understand that "the floor is solid" is a proposition, let alone whether or not it is true. — creativesoul
What? He doesn't understand that "The floor is solid" is true. The would require language.
He understands that the floor is solid. — Banno
In the old story, it would seem the crows have a belief about how many hunters are behind the blind, suggesting that you don't need language to form the equivalent of propositional content. — Marchesk
Are you suggesting that propositions somehow exist prior to language? — creativesoul
Are you suggesting that propositions somehow exist prior to language?
— creativesoul
I'm suggesting there's more to belief than being able to express it in language. — Marchesk
The sticking point is what such belief is... what it consists of. — creativesoul
What does cogntive science say about animal intelligence? Would it be the same for us, plus the linguistic ability where we translate beliefs to language? Or do we internalize the language as beliefs? — Marchesk
What does cogntive science say about animal intelligence? Would it be the same for us, plus the linguistic ability where we translate beliefs to language? Or do we internalize the language as beliefs? — Marchesk
The very language of the (impossible) 'radical skeptic' or 'solipsist' deploys a know-how that cannot intelligibly be doubted. In this sense language 'presupposes' a world with others, though it's important to stress that this 'presupposition' need not be conceptual or verba — path
Replace "presupposes" with "is existentially dependent upon", and "presupposition" with "existential dependency" and we are in complete agreement on this aspect. — creativesoul
It seems the counter argument is that concepts can only be lnquistic, and language is an external, public thing. But there has to be something in human brains that forms language. And why would that be entirely novel in the animal kingdom? Also, why must concepts be only expressible in words? Do images not count? — Marchesk
Nice. I'm not attached to 'presupposition.' We can say that language is existentially dependent upon the world, but the world-for-humans is existentially dependent on language too. It all comes in a single clump ('equiprimordial'). This 'holism' is maybe what various 'idealisms' have pointed at more or less awkwardly. We inherit world-and-language as a system, it seems to me. — path
What I'm getting at is that there is no clean break between the 'mental' and the 'physical' — path
Yes. I'm reminded of Heidegger. — creativesoul
Indeed. Especially when we're reporting upon that which consists of and/or is existentially dependent upon both. Thought, belief, truth, and meaning are such things. — creativesoul
Perhaps you would be better served to simply say 'those which are expressed linguistically and those which are not".There are two kinds of belief. Linguistic and non linguistic. — creativesoul
Of course I want to avoid getting swallowed by the jargon of any particular thinker, especially because I find the same basic idea in quite a few philosophers, for instance Hegel. — path
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