This is obviously not true, since it was you that claimed that truth is "physical" as a way of wriggling out of the conceptual difficulties involved in your position. — John
If not then how could there be a relation between a conceptual thing (the proposition), a relation which is itself conceptual (the truth-relation can't be physical so what else could it be but conceptual?) — John
If that is not an ontological claim then what kind of claim is it? — John
All I am asking for is an explanation as to how truth can be understood to be physical; — John
You always talk about ideas like picturing something as if picturing is identical to what we're picturing. That's a simple conflation, as confused as if you were to say that a painting of a building is identical to the building. You could say, "It's an observation that you can't separate the painting and the building," but that wouldn't make it not a conflation where you simply do not understand that the painting and what it's a painting of are not the same thing. — Terrapin Station
We haven't had enough threads already focused on a general realism vs idealism debate? — Terrapin Station
When someone says "It is a fact that x," they are claiming that states of affairs are such and such. Why would that be nonsense? — Terrapin Station
I'm not saying anything about verification in what you're quoting from me. — Terrapin Station
Facts are the states of affairs. — Terrapin Station
Well, I think you are. — Wayfarer
I think at many points in this post, you claim that there are the facts, X, and here our concept of them, as if facts and our concepts of them are clearly separable. — Wayfarer
These are very similar to the ideas Ayer explores in 'Language Truth and Logic' - — Wayfarer
It's almost as if you can't simply read something and comprehend it for what it is. — Terrapin Station
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If not then how could there be a relation between a conceptual thing (the proposition), a relation which is itself conceptual (the truth-relation can't be physical so what else could it be but conceptual?) — John
So once again, I only mentioned the word "physical" because you brought it up in your post. I was responding to what you typed. My truth analysis has NOTHING to do with whether truth, facts, etc. are physical or not. — Terrapin Station
Concepts are physical. — Terrapin Station
Jesus Christ, dude--learn how to read if you're going to attempt to have a big boy discussion. I wrote this: "in no way hinges on some meta analysis of what it is ontologically in terms of physical versus nonphysical.." You can't just bail on the sentence after you read the word "ontologically." There are six other words there that qualify the term "ontologically." (Not to mention that "meta analysis" qualifies it, too.) — Terrapin Station
This is obviously not true, since it was you that claimed that truth is "physical" as a way of wriggling out of the conceptual difficulties involved in your position. If that is not an ontological claim then what kind of claim is it? All I am asking for is an explanation as to how truth can be understood to be physical; and if you can't offer one then your assertion is as empty as can be. — John
Okay, but that's changing the topic. What does it have to do with whether truth is mind-dependent? I'd rather we didn't keep steering everything to talk about folks' pet topics. Let's try to have some discussions about something different every once in awhile. — Terrapin Station
You quoted me thus and said this — John
Apparently your "big boy" truth analysis has nothing to do with anything at all — John
our "position" is an absolute joke, dude if you not only cannot provide any argument for it, — John
it doesn't matter who mentioned the word "physical' first; — John
When you are asked for an account of how that works, — John
It has nothing to do with pet topics and everything to do with whether truth is mind-dependent in their view. — John
The very reason you can claim there is no truth absent minds is that the truth relation is understandable only as a semantic relation. — John
First: collapse the semantic into the physical; but if you are going to do that you should be able to give a better account of the truth relation than the semantic one. Or second, explain how there can be a relation between the semantic and the non-semantic. — John
f you want to merely claim that concepts and by extension truth are really physical — John
I doubt anyone will take you seriously. — John
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