What seems clear to me is that the mental world is somewhat more extensive than mere thoughts and is closely associated with brain activities that can be approximately located and even measured in some cases in the form of electrochemical impulses. — David Mo

The foundational difficulty with all such neuroscientific views, is that inferring what neurological data are or mean, is itself an act of judgement. And you won’t find ‘an act of judgement’ in any kind of data. Certainly you can measure and infer what these data mean, but that act of inference is the very thing you’re purporting to explain with reference to the data. There’s a vicious circularity in that which I don’t think can be overcome even in principle.

Once the thought is formed a qualia arises. — Pop

It may be a question of terminology, but this does not seem right to me. You can have sensations (called in philosophy impressions or qualia) whether you think about something or not. Not only the reception of sensations, but the formation of perceptions is a spontaneous procedure that can precede or follow the formation of a thought based on them. A simple example: you bite into the fruit, feel a strange taste and at the time or later you think "This cherry is over-ripe". Of course, what there is not is first a thought and then an impression/qualia.

Our holistic, referential world of significance is what is most basic for Heidegger. It is does not involve awareness, thought, or subject-object duality. This is the same type of holism described by panpsychists. — Mickey

Not that I know much about Heidegger, but the concept of holism does not appear in the texts I have consulted. Neither his nor his interpreters. On the other hand, I would like us to focus on something other than Heidegger because I do not think he is a clear thinker. As far as I know, moreover, the idea that the Being of Heidegger is something like a soul or a mind seems to me incompatible with what I know about him.
Spending time on clearing up confusion is not always productive.

I would like you to defend the idea that the mind is like a spiritual or mental entity, which is what I think panpsychism stands for. That is hard enough for me to find traces of a mind in some of the recent US presidents, but even less so in a volcano or a supernova explosion. I don't see them emitting thoughts, or speaking, or expressing emotions, or any of the properties that are usually considered in a mind.

The idea of a platform I don't know that makes things better. A platform that complains about the futility of life or how much it costs to pour lava through the crater? I don't see it, honestly.

But if the universe doesn't do anything of the things that a consciousness do, why do you call it a "consciousness"?

There’s a vicious circularity in that which I don’t think can be overcome even in principle. — Wayfarer

An empirical inference is not logically included in the data that serve as a premise. It is a knowledge that advances synthetically on those data by providing new knowledge. Because we are not talking about a judgment that proves itself true, but a reasoning based on experience that produces a conclusion where before there was a hypothesis. That synthesis is the discovery of unity from diversity, so to speak.

From the data that we have about the functioning of the brain, we can infer that the mind is its product. Whether this inference is more or less solid is a matter for debate.

I would like you to defend the idea that the mind is like a spiritual or mental entity, which is what I think panpsychism stands for. That is hard enough for me to find traces of a mind in some of the recent US presidents, but even less so in a volcano or a supernova explosion. I don't see them emitting thoughts, or speaking, or expressing emotions, or any of the properties that are usually considered in a mind.

The idea of a platform I don't know that makes things better. A platform that complains about the futility of life or how much it costs to pour lava through the crater? I don't see it, honestly.

But if the universe doesn't do anything of the things that a consciousness do, why do you call it a "consciousness"? — David Mo

It depends on what you mean by mind. If you limit mind to intelligent behavior and abstract thinking, then it is clear that panpsychism is an untenable position. However, if you treat them simply as forms of awareness that are continuous with not only a multitude of forms of awareness but being/existence as well, and you don't assume that the type of reality you experience as most internal, let us call it pure awareness without content, is only internal, then it is possible to see something that appears internal and something that appears external merely as different forms of awareness appearing within the same underlying substratum, a substratum which we tend to assume is hidden within our brain somewhere looking out into the world through the screen of our senses.

Right. I think this draws on Husserl’s understanding of ‘umwelt’ and ‘lebenswelt’ which are likewise very basic or foundational and for that reason very difficult to discern. And why? Because ‘to discern’ is to bring into focus, to make of it the figure against a background, where the lebenswelt is the background against which we discern particulars. So in that sense, to speak of it is already to misunderstand it. — Wayfarer

There is a logical flaw with Husseri's statement.
If you cannot discern the difference of two materials then you cannot say they are different.
If you know them to be different, then you already posses that knowledge, so there is no need to discern.

Please engage with my consciousness proposition and point out the flaws.

Once the thought is formed a qualia arises.
— Pop

It may be a question of terminology, but this does not seem right to me. You can have sensations (called in philosophy impressions or qualia) whether you think about something or not. Not only the reception of sensations, but the formation of perceptions is a spontaneous procedure that can precede or follow the formation of a thought based on them. A simple example: you bite into the fruit, feel a strange taste and at the time or later you think "This cherry is over-ripe". Of course, what there is not is first a thought and then an impression/qualia. — David Mo

Consciousness = thought + emotion - this I take to be the prevailing understanding. The details, and permutations of how this might work are numerous indeed! There are difficulties and problems for sure.

However, I believe the below statement is true and defendable. On its own it says quite a lot:

Consciousness arises at the same time as a thought is formed, and this is the fundamental first step of all thinking.

Sense input can be substituted for thinking, and this fills our consciousness from the moment we wake. There seems to be many modes of consciusness - environmental awarenes and at the same time focus , and multi focus. There is a difference in individuals - its not all regular. Some people do not posses an internal dialogue, or inner vision. They project their thoughts - they see diagrams and lists, they must speak their thoughts to themselves.

From the data that we have about the functioning of the brain, we can infer that the mind is its product. Whether this inference is more or less solid is a matter for debate. — David Mo

The term 'product' is what concerns me. It is the fundamental assumption of philosophical materialism - that 'mind is a product of brain'. What I'm arguing is that all such arguments rely on the process of reasoned inference, as does all science. You can't put aside, or stand outside, reason and observe it 'from the outside', so to speak. When you're looking at neurological data and interpreting the meaning, then you're using the very faculty you're trying to explain. And that faculty operates on the symbolic and logical level, the level of logical necessity. So consider that a physicalist argument is saying - it’s conflating the physical relations between synapses, with the logical relations between terms. If you think about that, you should be able to see the fallacy.

There is a logical flaw with Husseri's statement. — Pop

It wasn’t really Husserl’s statement, it was my riffing on what I thought might be the connection between Husserl’s ‘Lebeswelt’ and Heiddegger’s ‘dasien’. But I’ll be the first to admit I haven’t done the hard work yet of reading Being and Time. (Although the Wiki article on the lifeworld seems to me a useful starting point, but it seems to be saying that Heidegger influenced Husserl in this matter, where I’d assumed the opposite.)

Anyway, as regards your assertion, what I was driving at was nothing about ‘materials’. Ideas such as lebenswelt and dasien are not referring to any kind of philosophical substance or even to a concept as such. They’re primarily observations about the human condition, and of being situated in a particular cultural (and even biological) milieu, and how that situatedness determines the way we understand things.

As far as ‘theories of consciousness’ are concerned - that’s really what we’re talking about here - I think we need to situate the whole discussion in relation to some school, approach or domain of discourse, rather than trying to develop an entire system de novo.

In my experience on this forum, the prevailing view of the ‘mind-matter’ question is still largely shaped by Cartesian dualism and its consequences. But I think many of the implications of that have been absorbed by our culture, and therefore by us, without us being necessarily aware of what they mean.

I am a materialist — Vladimir Krymchakov

For those materialists out there, how did consciousness emerge from a piece of wood?

Probably never did, although pieces of wood are super useful for beating consciousness out of things.

LOL :up:

As far as ‘theories of consciousness’ are concerned - that’s really what we’re talking about here - I think we need to situate the whole discussion in relation to some school, approach or domain of discourse, rather than trying to develop an entire system de novo. — Wayfarer

Thats no fun at all!

Re Husseri - fair enough.

I believe the below statement is true and defendable. On its own it says quite a lot:

Consciousness arises at the same time as a thought is formed, and this is the fundamental first step of all thinking.

Believe is different to know.
It requires rigorous scrutiny.
Pls point out your concerns and Ill try to answer them.

It depends on what you mean by mind. — Mickey

This -more or less:
The mind is the set of thinking faculties including cognitive aspects such as consciousness, imagination, perception, thinking, judgement, language and memory, as well as noncognitive aspects such as emotion.

let us call it pure awareness without content, — Mickey

I call this empty substrate that you speak of "consciousness" and it consists simply of realizing my position in the world. I can only directly capture my consciousness and infer other consciousnesses because their attitude is similar to mine. (Some philosophers say that this capture of other subjects like me is immediate. I won't argue with that, if it's not necessary for your argument). If I have to infer a consciousness of the universe it will have to be because the universe acts in a similar way to mine. This is absurd for two reasons:

Because the universe does not have a body similar to mine and cannot gesture its consciousness, as other consciousnesses in the world do.
Because to claim that the universe can realize its position in the universe is a contradiction. It would be like realizing the position I hold within my "I". This proposition is impossible because a position with respect to oneself is an identity and consciousness is a relational term, that is, it establishes a relationship between two types of entity.

it’s conflating the physical relations between synapses, with the logical relations between terms. — Wayfarer

I don't think I'm conflating synapses with logic. I'm applying one of the basic forms of inductive logic. If x never occurs when y is missing, y must be the cause or part of the cause of x. That applies with obvious success to a lot of natural events. I don't see why it doesn't apply to the relationship between the brain - or an area of the brain - and the act of talking or getting excited. It would be a similar relationship as when the application of a nerve stimulus produces the movement of the frog's leg. Much more complicated, of course, but the same stimulus-response relationship.

Honestly, I don't see the contradiction.

In my experience on this forum, the prevailing view of the ‘mind-matter’ question is still largely shaped by Cartesian dualism and its consequences. But I think many of the implications of that have been absorbed by our culture, and therefore by us, without us being necessarily aware of what they mean. — Wayfarer

Point taken, I do not wish to upset anybody. but it is a philosophy forum.
What I state aligns with Integrated Information Theory, and Global workspace Theory - these are fairly mainstream today.
Look at the world around you - do you really think Cartesian dualism / materialism is worth defending?

As far as ‘theories of consciousness’ are concerned - that’s really what we’re talking about here - I think we need to situate the whole discussion in relation to some school, approach or domain of discourse, rather than trying to develop an entire system de novo. — Wayfarer

The method is good for high-level discussions, but in a forum like this it may lead to muddled discussions about whether a certain John Doe really said this. In my experience, it is common in this type of forum for someone to read a web page about John Doe and misinterpret his theories. To avoid these problems it is better to keep what one thinks here. The discussion is more direct and frank.

In my discussions with philosophers (including professionals) I have found that it is not uncommon for them to be baffled if one refuses to speak about what Husserl, Kant or John Doe said and asks them to defend their personal position. I had a rather ironic teacher who said that this happens because today's philosophers are not philosophers but members of Toledo School of Translators (he was a specialist in medieval philosophy, of course).

The mind is the set of thinking faculties including cognitive aspects such as consciousness, imagination, perception, thinking, judgement, language and memory, as well as noncognitive aspects such as emotion.

let us call it pure awareness without content,
— Mickey
I call this empty substrate that you speak of "consciousness" and it consists simply of realizing my position in the world. I can only directly capture my consciousness and infer other consciousnesses because their attitude is similar to mine. (Some philosophers say that this capture of other subjects like me is immediate. I won't argue with that, if it's not necessary for your argument). If I have to infer a consciousness of the universe it will have to be because the universe acts in a similar way to mine. This is absurd for two reasons:

Because the universe does not have a body similar to mine and cannot gesture its consciousness, as other consciousnesses in the world do.
Because to claim that the universe can realize its position in the universe is a contradiction. It would be like realizing the position I hold within my "I". This proposition is impossible because a position with respect to oneself is an identity and consciousness is a relational term, that is, it establishes a relationship between two types of entity. — David Mo

What I'm saying is that an assumption is being made about things being internal and external based on the way they appear, and that it is possible that these are merely forms of appearance which differ in form not kind. That there is an identity between the seer and what is seen.

You mentioned that the universe does not behave as you internally, immediately do, but how is it that such a relationship (i.e. perception) can exist if there is only difference and no underlying identity grounding the relationship? I think the one who maintains that we represent the world and all its subjective significance internally has a lot of explaining to do. However, if you accept a form of holism with regarding to the things we consider objective and subjective, then it becomes easier to see how it is possible that we merely abstract differences for the sake of thought and so on, and this is reflected within the brains activity, rather than we somehow creating a mental representation and perceived world from within our brains.

I don't see why it doesn't apply to the relationship between the brain - or an area of the brain - and the act of talking or getting excited. — David Mo

It's true that there's a relationship between brain activity and, say, speaking or thinking, insofar as this requires a functioning brain. But it's the philosophical issues involved in making that correlation that are problematical. The reason it seems natural to believe in this correlative relationship, is that it's just assumed that science has an in-principle grasp of the relationship, but if you drill down into the science, it's still just an assumption - the foundational assumption of materialist theory of mind. This is that ‘mind is what brain does’, and that by understanding the neuroscience we’ll understand the nature of mind.

So the argument I’m deploying is that the nature of logical necessity is of a different order to the nature of physical causation, no matter how detailed. In other words, seeking to explain the relationship of ideas, that comprise conscious thought, in terms of the neuroscience, is a category error. Logical causation and physical causation operate on completely different planes.

When you're looking at neurological data and interpreting the meaning, then you're using the very faculty you're trying to explain. And that faculty operates on the symbolic and logical level, the level of logical necessity. — Wayfarer

What a classic! You tell us that you can't use a brain to understand a brain because the faculty cannot analyse itself, and then you proceed to make two assertions about how that faculty works. So what faculty did you use to come up with those two assertions then? What are you using to tell us all about how reason and logic work. It can't be reason and logic because apparently a faculty cannot analyse itself.

So what faculty did you use to come up with those two assertions then? What are you using to tell us all about how reason and logic work. It can't be reason and logic because apparently a faculty cannot analyse itself. — Isaac

Whenever we deploy a reasoned argument, we’re using a faculty that is internal to the nature of reason. And that is not something given in any data, it is deployed to interpret data and to say what it means.

Whenever we deploy a reasoned argument, we’re using a faculty that is internal to the nature of reason. And that is not something given in any data, it is deployed to interpret data and to say what it means. — Wayfarer

The question is, how do you know that this is the case? How did you find this fact about our faculties and how they work?

You say "it [the faculty internal to reason] is deployed to interpret data and to say what it means". But you must have used it [the faculty internal to reason] to discover this fact, to interpret the data of your experiences and say that it means what you claim. You have used the faculty internal to reason to make a statement about the faculty internal to reason.

The question is, how do you know that this is the case? How did you find this fact about our faculties and how they work? — Isaac

Yes, of course I deployed that faculty. The same faculty the Greek philosophers deployed, namely, that of reason. What I’m arguing against is accounting for that faculty in terms of neurological function, as something ‘the brain does’. I’m saying that in order to even begin to explore the neuroscience, you already need to use reason, you need to reason by inference from cause to effect and so on. So in doing that, you’re deploying the very faculty that you are claiming neuroscience can provide an account of. That’s where the circular reasoning or question-begging comes in.

o in doing that, you’re deploying the very faculty that you are claiming neuroscience can provide an account of. — Wayfarer

Indeed. Neither you could investigate the functioning of an eye through your eyes, nor analyze speech using language... etc.

is that it's just assumed that science has an in-principle grasp of the relationship, — Wayfarer

That's not a guess. It is the use of an inductive method that has proven itself millions of times. If you want to say that believing that what has been proven millions of times is true is an assumption, true: a very effective assumption.

So the argument I’m deploying is that the nature of logical necessity — Wayfarer

I don't know any materialists who think they base their theory on logical necessity. It's more based on inductive arguments. It is another thing to try to disarm inconsistencies in the dualistic or spiritualistic position.

Of course I do not believe that spiritualism can be demonstrated with logical necessity. I'd like to know how this is done.

I’m saying that in order to even begin to explore the neuroscience, you already need to use reason, you need to reason by inference from cause to effect and so on. So in doing that, you’re deploying the very faculty that you are claiming neuroscience can provide an account of. That’s where the circular reasoning or question-begging comes in. — Wayfarer

Yes, I get that. You're doing exactly the same thing. You're saying that it's a problem that we use reason (applied to the evidence from neuroscience) to draw conclusions about the nature of reason. Yet you've waxed lyrical about the nature of reason. And what faculty have you used to draw those conclusions?... Reason.

The very conclusion that reason cannot analyse itself is a property of the faculty 'reason'. How did you discover this property if one cannot use reason to analyse itself.

the use of an inductive method that has proven itself millions of times. If you want to say that believing that what has been proven millions of times is true is an assumption, true: a very effective assumption. — David Mo

But in this case, there’s a fundamental difference between the subject of the analysis, and the subjects that have been examined ‘millions of times’. This is that scientific method presumes an objective reality, or an object of analysis, whereas in this particular case, we’re dealing with something that is not only not objective, but which underlies the very ability to decide what is objective. In that sense it’s a misapplication of scientific method.

I use a metal detector successfully to find millions of pieces of metal. But then, I wouldn’t say that only metal things are of value, simply on the basis of that this is what the metal detector is able to find.

The very conclusion that reason cannot analyse itself is a property of the faculty 'reason'. How did you discover this property if one cannot use reason to analyse itself. — Isaac

You’re still not seeing the point. If you’re claiming that the mind is explicable in terms of neurological data, then you have to show how the brain causes or gives rise to the activities of thinking, such as reasoning, etc. You analyse vast amounts of neurological data - and the brain is the most complex phenomenon known to natural science, with more neural connections than stars in the sky. But to make the inference that the data shows or means that ‘the brain does this’, then you have to use the faculty which you’re wishing to explain. I mean, you can’t actually see ‘reason’ or ‘inference’ in neural data, like you can see traces of hormones in the blood. So you can’t stand outside the faculty of reason, or put it to one side, and demonstrate that it exists literally in the data. It’s only ever ‘there’ by inference.

I’m only arguing against a specific idea, namely, the idea that ‘mind is what brain does’. I’m not arguing against science, or against neuroscience, but a specific philosophical claim, not a scientific theory.

Of course I do not believe that spiritualism can be demonstrated with logical necessity. I'd like to know how this is done. — David Mo

Now why on earth do you feel the need to introduce ‘spiritualism’ to the conversation? ‘Spiritualism’ is Victorian gentlemen in suits listing to table-rapping. The argument I’m advocating is purely philosophical, but the fact that it rings those particular bells might be significant.

Yes, I get your argument against using reason to explain reason. I really do. What I'm asking you is how you are not committing exactly the same fallacy when you declare certain properties of the faculty 'reason' (such as the fact that it must be used to interpret neurological data, or the fact that you can't stand outside of it - these are both properties of the faculty 'reason; which you claim to be the case). What I'm asking you is - what faculty did you use to discover that 'reason' has these properties? If the answer is "I used Reason" . Then you have committed exactly the same fallacy, you've used reason to explain something about reason.

No, because I’m not arguing from the supposedly objective facts of neurological data. I’m not arguing for neurological reductionism. The burden of disproving my argument falls on the neurological reductionist. If you look at the top quotation on this page - that is the subject of the criticism. That is the context in which my argument is deployed.