Prima facie, a compelling argument based on the premise that if a certain type of thing, x, interacts with some other thing, y, then the thing y must of the same type as x.

Basically, if matter interacts with something then that something is matter.

The question then is this: [are there] some things that matter interacts with [but] are not matter?

Light? Radio? EM radiation in general? — TheMadFool

Matter is coagulated energy. Could we then say that everything is energy?

If consciousness is not strictly materialist in origin- being nothing more than a complex product of chemical reactions and electrical impulses of cells, then why can we completely alter the state of consciousness/our experience with chemicals, drugs or neurotransmitters.

I understand that this is a reductive way of thinking regarding one of the most complicated phenomena in existence but it just strikes me that if I add Chemical A to experience B I get an altered experience - C. Such effects made by mood enhancers, antidepressants, mood stabilizers or anesthetics, tranquilizers and painkillers.

How do you reconcile these observed medical qualities with ideas such as pan-psychism consciousness is a fundamental force of nature, or inherent to all matter, or that it is something beyond and larger than the brain or part of gods mind or an illusion? — Benj96

Or..... maybe something simpler than implying the existence of gods and the supernatural. What if everything was information? Information changes when interacting with other information.

The thing that seems to make minds a different type of information compared to say, a rock formation, is that the mind is a kind of information feedback loop between the body and the environment. In this sense, it might be something "beyond the brain", as a relationship between (meaning, it would consist of) the body and it's immediate environment.

Matter is coagulated energy. Could we then say that everything is energy? — Harry Hindu

Why not? The only problem I see is that there is no "energy" version of neurotransmitters, neuroleptics, psychotropics, mood enhancers, anesthetics, etc. I know of. The OP claims that the interaction between these various psychotropics and the mind demonstrates the mind's material nature and for that he draws a necessary connection between the possibility of interaction between matter and anything and the material nature of that thing matter interacts. I was simply trying to determine if that bridge is strong enough for us to cross.

The only problem I see is that there is no "energy" version of neurotransmitters, neuroleptics, psychotropics, mood enhancers, anesthetics, etc. I know of. — TheMadFool

Those are all chemicals, made of molecules made of atoms made of other particles that are just excitations of energy fields.

Those are all chemicals, made of molecules made of atoms made of other particles that are just excitations of energy fields. — Pfhorrest

:up:

The question then is this: [are there] some things that matter interacts with [but] are not matter? — TheMadFool

Well the irony of such a question is that in order to create/ define/distinguish anything - a phenomenon, a material object, a concept... one must say twi things; 1). Yes this thing is that. 2). No those things are NOT that. Ie does matter interact with that which is not matter, of course it has to interact by the mere fact that we can qualify what matter is at all. Its relative to the empty space around it.

Matter could only never interact with that which it is not if the entire universe was composed of matter of a set kind. Any distinction results in a border and borders are where interactions occur.

The question then is this: [are there] some things that matter interacts with [but] are not matter?

Light? Radio? EM radiation in general?
— TheMadFool

Matter is coagulated energy. Could we then say that everything is energy? — Harry Hindu

Considering how hard it is to understand what such things as "matter" or "energy" are, maybe we should just call it "stuff"...

They're two different problems.

Quite so, some people on these boards think that mind equates to consciousness, or visa versa.

Reflex acts of the body are independent of the conscious mind,

So you are including in mind everything the brain does, is it confined to the brain?

I don't know if you want to reduce the mind to the conscious.

For me the mind is what the brain does in relation to the person, or the self, the acting being.

"Living" seems to me a very ambiguous term to define consciousness.

Not at all, it can have a precise definition if we can bring ourselves to defining it as cellular life. Also it could have caveat that there do seem to be a few more simple forms of life, but these are outliers.

A paramecium is also living.

And conscious, being closely related to us. The main difference being that we are each a colony of cells.

Well the irony of such a question is that in order to create/ define/distinguish anything - a phenomenon, a material object, a concept... one must say twi things; 1). Yes this thing is that. 2). No those things are NOT that. Ie does matter interact with that which is not matter, of course it has to interact by the mere fact that we can qualify what matter is at all. Its relative to the empty space around it.

Matter could only never interact with that which it is not if the entire universe was composed of matter of a set kind. Any distinction results in a border and borders are where interactions occur. — Benj96

Non sequitur.

A possible explanation. The foundation of organic consciousness can be termed "phenomenality" and is divided into features internal or external to the brain. Sense organs perceive properties of aggregate, relatively macroscopic mass such as size, object motion, or additive wavelength in photons, a functionality tailored by evolutionary selection pressures for increasing the efficiency of reaction to a limited array of phenomena that are especially salient for survival of the body, such as an object hurtling towards the head, a growl, scalding hotness, etc., but this apparatus is of course extremely subtle and versatilely reconfigurable.

Qualia are a separate dynamic from what the sense organs do, arising as some kind of additive superpositioning and quantum entanglement of particles (vibrating energy concentrations in motion). The physiological synchronizing, amplifying, orchestrating of qualia is what produces qualitative mental states in organic lifeforms, but this qualitativity as the basis of consciousness is not restricted to biochemical structure, for it can be present in all kinds of matter, both internal and external to bodies. Qualia are a basic feature of matter like size, shape, photon-generated color, and consciousness arises from these qualia being structurally organized in various ways, with organic consciousness only one possible form among many, hence the plausibility of panpsychism (though excessively vague for my taste).

So qualia are an intrinsic feature of particles, including drugs, neurotransmitters, all chemicals, and these substances acquire their relatively mechanistic role in the body by way of effects on the type of emergent qualitativity peculiar to neuromaterial tissues, brains, organic systems, performing molecular functions which may be directly responsible for the substance of phenomenality in many cases, but not necessarily. Particle behavior can be both qualitative and mechanistic, or merely mechanistic. But whether we can ever comprehensively theorize mechanism such that determinism proves to be a cogent concept is in doubt.

Non sequitur — TheMadFool

yeah I digress. Me off on a tangent... sorry it happens sometimes

This makes a lot of sense.

For me the mind is what the brain does in relation to the person, or the self, the acting being. — Punshhh

So you are including in mind everything the brain does, is it confined to the brain? — Punshhh

I would prefer to distinguish consciousness ( awareness ) from mind, but these words are used the same in this forum and I preferred not to launch semantic wars.

It seems that the concept of human mind includes some functions of the body, but I will not say so.

Of course, if life=consciousness a paramecium has consciousness. And every cell in our body. Then we are composed of millions of tiny consciousnesses. Why not?

Obviously, because it's not like that when we talk about consciousness.

Qualia are a separate dynamic from what the sense organs do, arising as some kind of additive superpositioning and quantum entanglement of particles (vibrating energy concentrations in motion). — Enrique

This is purely imaginative. If you didn't use scientific words it would be like a fairy tale. Where did you get the idea?

I would prefer to distinguish consciousness ( awareness ) from mind,

Likewise.

It seems that the concept of human mind includes some functions of the body, but I will not say so.

I think it is reasonable to distinguish between the management of the bodily functions by the brain and the intellect.

Of course, if life=consciousness a paramecium has consciousness. And every cell in our body. Then we are composed of millions of tiny consciousnesses. Why not?

Yes, but have we established that a human is not millions of tiny consciousnesses?
Consider a wave in the ocean, is it constituted of millions of tiny microscopic waves?

Obviously, because it's not like that when we talk about consciousness.

So when we talk about consciousness, we know what we're talking about?
I doubt it, we are merely talking about what human discourse has established (informed by science). Which is based around biology, which is reductionist, hence it is deemed to be the attribute of awareness.
But what about what philosophy has to say about it, is idealism nonsense? Or is consciousness just some robotic post modernism?

yeah I digress. Me off on a tangent... sorry it happens sometimes — Benj96

No problem. Join the club.

we are discussing is whether you can talk about science as rational knowledge

When Kant speaks of metaphysics he adds the term ‘pure’ reason because it claims to be the science of the a priori. But it does not occur to anyone to say that empirical science is not rational. It's just not pure.

Though that’s the very point. The pure or the formal is contrasted, thus not being equivalent, with the empirical, as apriori is contrasted with aposteriori. So that if it’s empirical, it isn’t either purely or formally rational; the latter pertaining to what’s apriori, the former to what’s aposteriori.

This is why scientists can’t claim to have obtained anything absolute; hence, Lawrence Krauss states, “In science, we don’t... claim to know the absolute truth.” He’s also stated, “Not knowing is fine. In fact, it is a central part of science,... nor do you claim to have absolute knowledge.” Richard Feynman, the famed physicist, as well has stated, “All scientific knowledge is uncertain.”

Yet the apriori assertion that “a part isn’t greater than the whole of which it is one” is absolute or certain, for it’s rationally rather than empirically based. Thus “scientific reasoning” is a misnomer, no matter who uses it or in what article, whereby the term “reasoning” should be replaced with “conjectures,” “inferences.” “assertions,” “judgements” or “statements”; that is to say, what’s contingent upon experience rather than what’s based on reason absolutely, either purely or formally.

Possibility/impossibility is absolutely meaningless without relation to the agency to which they apply. Which means that which is possible/impossible, from the empirical and rational world alike, is determined by that agency, for that agency. — Mww

If possibility & impossibility, both in empirical & intellectual intuition, are determined by our agency, then why can’t their bounds be changed or altered by this very same determination of agency ours? Why can’t we then, either in empirical or intellectual intuition, change the fact of a square circle, or X = -X, being an impossibility, for example? I fail to see how possibilities & impossibilities are determined by us, when we work within their bounds & not versa, i.e., their bounds aren’t set by us.

I think that your claim, which is what’s possible/impossible is determined by our agency, misses a major point... there are different types of causes, e.g., material or formal as opposed to efficient causes. Yeah, we may be the efficient cause of a change, i.e., that which fulfills an actual change, yet, what change is possible, or impossible, in the material or the form upon which we purse to fulfill a change isn’t caused by us, as it’s precisely what allows us, in the first place, to fulfill whatever change that we actually have; in other words, to realize a possibility isn’t what caused the possibility (which is the ground of its realization).

So this is how we’re to view the form of reason or logic, that is to say, the boundary of its form isn’t set, i.e, determined or caused, by the realization of our ideas, but it’s the very ground of them apriori, i.e., through which they’re possible.

I refer you to the categories, for which you should have already taken account. The categories determine for us, not the possibilities/impossibilities the sensible world contains, but rather the possibility or impossibility of us cognizing what they are. — Mww

Right, exactly, the logical categories or pure concepts determine, as you’ve just said, “FOR US,” not vice versa; that is, we don’t determine or cause their bounds but are forced to work within them. This is exactly what I’m saying about rational or logical form.

How do these propositions not contradict each other? — Mww

They don’t contradict each other because the apriori form of reason isn’t something that we’ve created aposteriori, or at all; in other words, we don’t have a say on how it imposes form onto things. So that’s what was meant, that our volition isn’t what creates the given materials of our aposteriori constructions; unlike a pegasus or a unicorn which it does, with such given materials, according to the form of reason.

Correct, iff reason is a fundamental human condition, a metaphysical notion used in an attempt to logically thwart infinite regress.

Wherein lay the intrinsic circularity of the human rational system: we can only talk about reason using the very thing we’re talking about, and the very purpose of speculative epistemological philosophy is to not make it catastrophically fubar. — Mww

If the form of reason is taken as an axiom, rather than what’s both derived & presumed, from whence arises the circularity? As we’re not deriving the conclusion from any premise, & then subsequently using, in turn, the former to explain the latter (& so on cyclically).

Yes, but have we established that a human is not millions of tiny consciousnesses? — Punshhh

But what about what philosophy has to say about it, is idealism nonsense? — Punshhh

Trillions of self-conscious cells? What a scandal! It would be worse than a session of the British parliament.

So that if it’s empirical, it isn’t either purely or formally rational; the latter pertaining to what’s apriori, the former to what’s aposteriori. — aRealidealist

Excuse me. If metaphysics were merely formal, it wouldn't be a scandal for Kant. The problem with it is that it pretends to be both pure and synthetic. I'm with Kant on this. The only synthetic source of reason is experience. But that doesn't make it any less rational. In fact, the concept of science as a fundamental part of Reason is typical of the Enlightenment, which Kant culminates. A reason that combines the analytical with the synthetic.

This is why scientists can’t claim to have obtained anything absolute; hence, Lawrence Krauss states, “In science, we don’t... claim to know the absolute truth. — aRealidealist

Nowhere is it written that rational knowledge has to be absolute and synthetic. Logical principles are absolute as long as they are kept to pure formality. When they are applied to experience they may have to transform even their axioms. For example those damned particles that are in several places at the same time or that are and are not wavy.

What modern relativists (Feynman?) mean is that systemic reason cannot reach absolute truth unless it loses all real content. And this does not mean anything in favor of irrationality, but rather of epistemological caution.
When they are applied to experience they may have to transform even their axioms. For example those damned particles that are in several places at the same time or that are and are not wavy.


The advantage of rationality over irrationality is that it is subject to rules that produce results and strategies that allow open confrontation of points of view. A philosophy that does not allow this becomes irrational and dangerous since the first of the conditions of rationality prevents superstition and the second condition of scholastic totalitarianism. These are two important things.

Logical systems are only good as long as we stick to one way of thinking. The syllogism is only valid for thoughts that are organized around the subject-predicate relationship, the logic of predicates only in terms of individuals and attributes, the logic of propositions for thought that uses veritative functions, etc. Not counting the various forms of inductive logic. There is nothing incongruous in assuming that a world with rational beings that organize their experience in another way could have a different logical system.

Excuse me. If metaphysics were merely formal, it wouldn't be a scandal for Kant. The problem with it is that it pretends to be both pure and synthetic. I'm with Kant on this. The only synthetic source of reason is experience. — David Mo

You must bear in mind that all syntheses aren’t apriori, as synthesis can be aposteriori too; & the latter is what Kant had in mind when referencing either what’s empirical or dependent on experience. Hence, he states, “There are synthetic a posteriori judgements of EMPIRICAL origin, but there are also others which are certain a priori, and which spring from PURE UNDERSTANDING AND REASON.” Thus synthetic apriori truths are based on pure understanding & reason, not experience or what’s empirical. Therefore, in principle, metaphysics is purely formal (although the TOTALITY of our knowledge isn’t), & is independent of the material(s) of experience.

Nowhere is it written that rational knowledge has to be absolute and synthetic. — David Mo

Yet if it wasn’t, that is, wasn’t absolute, then it wouldn’t be rational. I’m going to further inquire about your claim here, in what I ask you in response to what I quote next of your post.

Logical principles are absolute as long as they are kept to pure formality. — David Mo

Can you give me an example of a logical principle that isn’t a pure formality, i.e., that isn’t independent of particular materials altogether?

What modern relativists (Feynman?) mean is that systemic reason cannot reach absolute truth unless it loses all real content. — David Mo

Right, unless we lose all real content; that is, unless we don’t refer to any of the materials of experience. In other words, unless we don’t refer to experience at all; hence, experience is inherently contingent & not absolute.

There is nothing incongruous in assuming that a world with rational beings that organize their experience in another way could have a different logical system. — David Mo

On the contrary, this is precisely my objection... assuming that a logical system can be, in principle, i.e., in regards to form & not the particular material(s) employed, constructed in a way which is different from how we can possibly form our own, is exactly to oppose the very principle upon which a logic or reason is conceivable; hence, such an assumption is inconceivable & therefore can’t even be thought, let alone assumed.

Quantum entanglement has been found in photosynthetic reaction centers, tunneling has been suggested by multiple experiments as a mechanism for active site behavior in enzymes, atoms in organic molecules existing in multiple mutating superpositioned phase states simultaneously is the best currently available explanation for apparent rate of intracellular evolution at the beginning of Earth's biological history, etc. Quantum phenomena will probably be identified with most of the life processes that happen too fast or efficiently to be accounted for by thermodynamic chemistry as occurs in the lab within extremely simple macroscopic solutions of bulk aggregate mass.

My hypothesis is that qualia are an emergent property of additive superposition amongst particle entanglements in the brain and body's tissues, a kind of extremely complex quantum resonance. This possibly explains mental images, sounds, touch sensations, all kinds of perceptual phenomena, which might vary according to differentiations in cell type and biochemical composition. The qualitative mind could be a sort of macroscopic coherence field generated by diverse quantum resonance (entangled superpositions) instantiated in matter, measured as standing waves.

What era does your realidealism come from?

What would be your primary referential text?

To what end does your realidealism point?

I need something to study in order to figure out where you come up with this stuff, because my understandings and my reference materials are apparently not up to the task.

Trillions of self-conscious cells? What a scandal! It would be worse than a session of the British parliament.

I hope you are not going to view me as schizophrenic now. lol

In fact, the concept of science as a fundamental part of Reason is typical of the Enlightenment, which Kant culminates. A reason that combines the analytical with the synthetic.

This is all fine for a philosopher, but it still doesn't have the capability to explain consciousness, or mind. This is because we don't know the basis of the world of existence we find ourselves in. As I said, we need legs then feet and a rock to stand on, to make any progress.

My point is you, or any philosopher, can't deny that the human brain is a host for a being which is as yet beyond the preview of science, or our understanding. You can call it fantasy, or something, but that would just be name calling. Hence idealism.

Even idealism becomes a straight jacket, because it entertains the immaterial, whatever that is.

You have some interesting ideas there, but until science finds out something, we won't be able to confirm or deny any of it.

Thus synthetic apriori truths are based on pure understanding & reason, not experience or what’s empirical. Therefore, in principle, metaphysics is purely formal — aRealidealist

Sure, but Kant here has introduced a Copernican twist, as he says. Classical metaphysics has sought to find synthetic principles a priori about things. Kantian metaphysics dispenses with things and explains synthetic a priori principles as conditions of a priori knowledge. For example, mathematics is based on a priori synthetic principles because it does not speak about things, but about the a priori conditions of sensibility, space and time. The same happens with logic, which deals with the a priori conditions of understanding, categories and judgements. Only on the condition that it becomes epistemology does metaphysics become a science. "Formal", as you say.

The only thing that Kant did not justify is that mathematics or logic are absolutely a priori. There are various mathematical and logical systems and this calls into question his theory. And that is why I said that, in my opinion, the only synthetic knowledge, that is to say, that informs something outside of itself, is that of experience. If something else was understood, I apologize.

Can you give me an example of a logical principle that isn’t a pure formality, i.e., that isn’t independent of particular materials altogether? — aRealidealist

When logic is applied within a hypothetical deductive system or in ordinary life.

hence, such an assumption is inconceivable & therefore can’t even be thought, let alone assumed. — aRealidealist

The inconceivable is not the impossible. Kant demonstrated that the principles of logic are indissolubly associated with the forms of our intellect. But we cannot be so proud to think that our intellect is the only one possible in all possible universes. Any day an artificial superintelligence can give us a hard time. In any case, Kant believed that the only possible logic for our understanding was Aristotelic. Modern formal logic contradicts him. There are other possible logics. In my previous comment I quoted some of them to you.

My point is you, or any philosopher, can't deny that the human brain is a host for a being which is as yet beyond the preview of science, or our understanding. — Punshhh

What I am saying is that the discourses on the mind and those on the brain run parallel paths many times. That doesn't mean they're different realities. There are well-documented indications that what we call mind is a product of the brain. I have no evidence that there is a thing inside my brain that science can never discover. It's my brain doing its own thing. Some of it I'm aware of. Some I don't. And that's it.

Agreed. On a materialism thread some folk say that there is nothing apart from the material known to us and science and its effects, products. I usually point out that there might be other materials that we, or science are not aware of.
Nice joke about the British parliament being billions of cells all arguing with each other.

Kant believed that the only possible logic for our understanding was Aristotelic. — David Mo

Just as it is not given from our intellectual system that there can be no other kind, so too is it not given that the Aristotelian logic our understanding uses, in accordance with the Kantian theoretical exposition, that there can be no other kind.

The common misunderstanding is from the fact he said, “...is apparent from the fact that, since Aristotle, it (logic) has been unable to advance a step and, thus, to all appearance has reached its completion....”, but without considering he might have not have said that, or at least might have re-phrased it, given the kinds of logic in use today. Modern formal logic doesn’t contradict him any more than Einstein didn’t contradict Newton......you know that story.
—————

The inconceivable is not the impossible. — David Mo

Under what conditions would this not be true?