Even thoughts take up space some where... — BrendanCount

(Anticipating @tim wood...hope he doesn’t mind)

Depends on your definitions. Historical precedent for those definitions will certainly falsify your assertions. But then.....maybe you’re right and the precedents are not.

The stars are hotter than I am, so what? — Kenosha Kid

All this talk about human lives being meaningless because of the vastness and indiference of the universe is just wrong footed in my opinion. I don't see how the meaning of our lives depends in any way on whether this universe is large or small, its stars hot or cold or whatever.

Astronomers study the universe for very human reasons: it's an interesting job if you can get it.

. As Richard Feynman said, understanding something on another level only increases its beauty. — Kenosha Kid

And that is exactly what I am saying: one cannot logically use reason to dismiss reason, but one can use it to explain how useful and beautiful it is.

What I am trying to say is: a scientific theory cannot contradict itself and still be worthy of the name "scientific". — Olivier5

Ahhhhh okay, sorry. Sure! Science is a mode of reason.

All this talk about human lives being meaningless because of the vastness and indiference of the universe is just wrong footed in my opinion. I don't see how the meaning of our lives depends in any way on whether this universe is large or small, its stars hot or cold or whatever.

Astronomers study the universe for very human reasons: it's an interesting job if you can get it. — Olivier5

Absolutely! As the editor of New Scientist once said: "We think science is interesting, and if you don't agree you can *&!# off!" :rofl:

But none of that makes an iota of difference to the fact that we're a fleeting fizz at a tiny dot in a mundane part of a giant cosmos. It's an artefact of our biology that our word revolves around us. But it is great being a fizz, so make the most it :)

And that is exactly what I am saying: one cannot logically use reason to dismiss reason, but one can use it to explain how useful and beautiful it is. — Olivier5

Agreed, with the caveat that beauty is not a property of a thing but a feature of our interaction with it. My point was just that scientists are not "dismissing" reason by understanding it as emergent behaviour any more than non-materialist philosophers who describe it as immaterial. In fact, I'd say scientists would be taking it far more seriously. The immaterial world is a vague dumping ground for things not yet understood, which is back to what I said before: if someone had a meaningful non-materialist explanation for consciousness, that would be something to consider. But it seems to me the root if the conflict is not incompatible descriptions of consciousness but rather a matter of taste: "Out of bounds, science!"

Indeed food for thought:

As soon as you say, “I understand what a triangle is”, you’ve already brought up a mental image of one, otherwise you would have no means to justify such a claim.

Why can't I justify my claim to understand what a triangle is by drawing one? Why do I need to bring up a mental image, rather than a physical one on paper?

Also, how do you see this:
"images are the schemata of our representations."
tallying with this, emphasis added:
"In truth, it is not images of objects, but schemata, which lie at the foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions"
?
On one reading this is simply denying that schemata are images, which of courses raises the question of what schemata are, but it seems that one can accept schemata are involved in all representations and conceptions without accepting that mental imagery is.
I appreciate that the second quotation is lifted out of a very complex work, so perhaps there is somewhere in Kant an argument to show that whilst schemata are not images, they depend on them?

A scientific answer is an answer the requires, in principle, only understanding consistent with current or future established empirically-verified scientific models of reality. I'm anticipating the question "What is a scientific model in this context?" whose answer will yield another "What is a scientific X in this context?".

Well yes, if you continue to drop the adjective "scientific" into your definitions of what you mean, in specific cases, by the use of that adjective, then you are inviting all those questions, and maybe more.
A: A scientific answer is an answer the requires, in principle, only understanding consistent with current or future established empirically-verified scientific models of reality.

B: A scientific answer is an answer the requires, in principle, only understanding consistent with current or future established empirically-verified models of reality.

Is there some important difference between A and B?

we're a fleeting fizz at a tiny dot in a mundane part of a giant cosmos. It's an artefact of our biology that our word revolves around us. But it is great being a fizz, so make the most it — Kenosha Kid

Thanks for the advice. Personally I wouldn't trade my present condition with that of, say, a galaxy. I'm just finishing making some appricot jam, not the best I've ever done, but better than hydrogen and helium still...

Personally I wouldn't trade my present condition with that of, say, a galaxy. I'm just finishing some appricot jam, not the best I've ever done, but better than hydrogen and helium still... — Olivier5

I'm screaming out some tunes at the recording studio to no obvious purpose :)

Why can't I justify my claim to understand what a triangle is by drawing one? — jkg20

You can, but the question remains....what informed you as to what to draw?
————-

how do you see this:
"images are the schemata of our representations."
tallying with this, emphasis added:
"In truth, it is not images of objects, but schemata, which lie at the foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions"? — jkg20

What he means is, objects are not the source of our mental imagery. Without going through all the yaddayaddayadda, objects belong to sensibility, conceptions belong to understanding, therefore, if images are the foundation of conceptions, they cannot have anything to do with objects. In short, the imagery of conceptions is how objects are understood, not how objects are perceived.

Part of the problem lays in common sense, which wants us to think objects are just as we perceive them to be, but common sense takes no account of the methodology for arriving there, which is the mistake Hume made. The power of common sense boils down to nothing but time, in that it takes no noticeable, appreciable, time for us to go from perceiving an object, and knowing or not knowing what it is, which is certainly the case. But it does take time, and common sense makes no claim as to how the time is being used.

Another part of the problem lays in the unavailability of a suitable explanation for how images, or schemata, come about. Speculative metaphysics promotes spontaneity in order to alleviate infinite regress, which is entirely sufficient if not entirely satisfying, and science doesn’t have a clue so rejects them as unscientific, which is proper given the predicates of its doctrine.

OK? Make any sense at all?

It's not a tautology, it's a redundancy. To say ‘rational reasoning’ is a redundancy

“Redundancy,” “tautology,” ultimately end up meaning the same thing (this is a mere quibble with words), which is insignificance due to repetition. ‘Tautology’ literally means “repeating what has been said,” while ‘redundancy’ means, in the context of discourse, what’s useless, superfluous, or doesn’t add any meaning, because it’s been said before. Either way, you admit that your term (“rational reasoning”) is redundant, right, &, so, useless? This was basically my point; modifying the term “reasoning” with the adjective of “rational” is insignificant, for the former term is already qualified as such &, therefore, cannot be otherwise without invalidating the usage of the word altogether.

... because every argument we want to make for or against something will use reason in one way or another.

Yet my original point was that one can’t make an argument against reason, in general, without already presupposing its validity; such that their argument would be inherently self-defeating.

Reason is not a method of justifying anything. It is not the method of proving that the current pandemic is caused by a virus.

Yet in my view, it is a method, or rather the principle of a method, for justification, namely that which is analyzed apriori; although when experience is concerned, such as the particular aposteriori cause of a pandemic, reason is insufficient, & we must have recourse to observation or perception for obtaining what’s true.

Aristotle does not distinguish between logic and reason because these two terms are alien to his terminology.

Sure, their contemporary rendering may be alien to his terminology, but the etymological root of both of them, i.e., “logos,” definitely isn’t; which denotes (what in English means) “reason, idea, word.” So this proves my point that a distinction between them is ultimately flawed, because the root of “reason,” which is the Latin “ratio,” derives from the Greek “logos”; & therefore these terms originally have one and the same thing, so that a distinction between them is inadmissible.

As scientific methods have proved very effective in similar cases. And we call those methods and other similar ways of thinking rational or ‘reason’ for short.

Only in colloquial terms can the method of ‘science’ be called “rational,” as its mode of investigation isn’t apriori but aposteriori. Here “rational” can only simply or casually mean something like “prudent” or “judicious.” To call the method of science “rational,” in the formal sense, is a misnomer.

... he does distinguish between the study of the forms of argumentation and categorization (which would be roughly equivalent to today's logic) and the sciences (which would be equivalent to today's reason).

“Reason,” in the original or truest sense of the word, is in no way equivalent with the sciences (as was stated, in my previous paragraph, about the term “rational” [i.e., that which pertains to ‘reason’]), if we understand that etymologically it means “to reckon, think.” Thus science, either currently or in the past, can’t be equated with “reason” or what’s “rational,” since it’s not based purely on reckoning or thought (this would be an awful mischaracterization of it).

This is actually affirmed by Aristotle, in the beginning of his “Metaphysics,” when he states that, “But in fact science and art come to men through experience.” Science, according to Aristotle, is thus derived from experience, & isn’t equivalent either with “today’s reason,” as you’ve put it, or reason in the past, i.e., “logos.”

Now, I agree that Aristotle distinguishes between forms of argumentation/categorization & the sciences; but I want to respond to this point, & some others, in what comes next, after I quote other parts of your post.

Logic is therefore a method of deduction that allows us to move from premises to conclusions, from some statements to others. You can call that a method of ‘formation’ of statements, but not hide that this formation is a deductive procedure of passing from some statements to others.

This misses that statements themselves are made up of components, which aren’t themselves statements; hence, in the “Categories,” Aristotle asserts, “None of these terms (‘substance’ or ‘quantity’ or ‘quality’ or ‘relationship’ or ‘the doing of something’ or ‘the undergoing of something’) is used on its own in any statement, but it is through their combination with one another that statement COMES INTO BEING.” Now these components are what any statement, let alone the passage of one statement to another, depend on to come about (as was just noted); & the being of these components themselves are subject to a certain principle, without which they couldn’t be formed. This principle is the primary principle of logic or reason, in general, & not only a rule on how to pass from one statement to another; for, again, it’s what allows for the possibility of an initial statement, as to the components of a statement, in the first place.

Thus Aristotle states, in book IV of his “Metaphysics,” “It is clear, then, that such a principle is the most certain of all and we can formulate it thus: ‘It is impossible for the same thing at the same time to belong and not to belong to the same thing and in the same respect’”, “It is for this reason that all who carry out a demonstration rest it on this...; for this is naturally a beginning also of all other axioms.” In other words, demonstration, in general, is based on this principle, i.e., it’s the beginning of it & all other axioms; & therefore the principle of logic or reason doesn’t solely concern the passage of statements to other statements, i.e., premises to conclusions, but it’s the basis of the formation of an initial statement, & its components, altogether.

Now, considering all of this, I fail to see how logic & reason are distinguishable? Since your equating the sciences with “today’s reason” is inadmissible on the grounds that, according to Aristotle, science is derived from experience (“Metaphysics,” Book I), while all demonstration is based on a fundamentally presupposed principle. So, sure, Aristotle distinguishes between forms of argumentation/categorization & the sciences, but no such a distinction is expressed between logic & reason. Also, & again, as your equating of the sciences with “today’s reason” is inadmissible, I’m still convinced that you haven’t actually distinguished between logic & reason, but you’ve only pretended to.

“Therefore, to say that there is ‘one’ logic (please, note this ‘one’) is an abstraction that we use in ordinary language to talk about or group the different logics. A logician will always specify the branch of logic in which he works.”

Try to distinguish between different types of logic without having recourse to their different objects of consideration; the inability to do so will show that logic itself isn’t distinguishable, but only the objects to which it’s applied are. Aristotle even states this about science; that is, science doesn’t differ in general, the various types of science only being distinguished by their particular objects of consideration: “But all these sciences have marked out for themselves some particular thing that is, some particular class of objects, and concern themselves with that.” (“Metaphysics, Book IV)

I follow the current philosophy that makes a clear distinction between logic and reason, considering logic a part or instrument of rational procedures of thinking. Simply put, the concept of reason is broader than that of logic.

Yet if “today’s reason” isn’t equivalent with the sciences, or experience, as by their etymological definition “reason” & “experience” can’t be synonymous, I fail to see how you’ve distinguished between logic & reason, except by having “reason” to mean “experience,” i.e., except by a word-game? & if we don’t allow reason to mean experience (the latter being what the sciences are derived from), how then are logic & reason different? Well, if we don’t allow this linguistic exception, then it’s evident that they aren’t.

A “principle” is to be understood as one understands the word “law.” So the principle of reason is just another way of saying the law of reason — in other words, that by which it governs or determines either the identity or formation of objects or percepts.

So I don’t see what’s so hard to grasp about the term “principle of reason”? I think that it’s because you claim that “ALL principles are given from reason.” Yet, this seems to put the cart before the horse, so to speak, as reason itself must have a form by which it can possibly give principles, PRIOR TO actually doing so; this form thus IS the principle or law of reason. Which, moreover, isn’t a redundant term (no more than the term the “principle of inertia” would be); for it emphasizes that reason isn’t an object or a percept per se, but a condition for them altogether (as the “principle of inertia” isn’t an object or a percept per se, but a condition for them altogether).

Reason needs to justify the bounds of its proper employment

Again, since reason has an intrinsic form, it doesn’t need to go on to justify the bounds of its employment, for the bounds of its possible employment are self-evident in its form already; such that the only thing which needs to be justified is what’s maintained to be bounded in its actual employment, that is, whether such things are in accord or discord with it.

‘It’ being reason? So you suggest reason could create two mutually contradictory domains? Yeah...no. Not in its pursuit of knowledge as we understand it, and certainly not in the speculative epistemology I favor.

Contingent constructions of reason is possibility. It is irrational to suppose domains using principles for its rules, should operate on possibility, at the exclusion of necessity.

No, I didn’t suggest that reason can create contradictory domains. My point was that your claim that reason “... in and of itself doesn’t have a principle, but rather, constructs them” suggests that, since reason doesn’t have a principle of itself, i.e., a fundamental principle, it should then be able to create ones which contradict each other; for as it has no foundation in itself, there shouldn’t be a SINGLE principle which holds true in all of its constructs. Yet, since it can’t do such a thing, this proves that reason does of itself have a foundation, i.e., a fundamental principle, which pervades or holds true in all of its constructs — contrary to your claim about reason in & of itself.

A square meets these principles, a circle meets those principles, all constructed by reason a priori, which is sufficient for squared circle to be impossible, within the domain reason created: synthetic a priori cognitions.

My point with the square circle goes back to showing that abstracts/concepts can only alter what they’ve created (like being able to alter the features of a pegasus or a unicorn); & if they can’t alter something, it’s precisely because they didn’t create it (such reasoning was to be applied to the principle or law of reason itself). Without sensations, abstracts/concepts couldn’t come to posses any shape, i.e., abstracts/concepts can’t of themselves purely intuit shapes (this admission is enough to satisfy my point). Now, the formation of a square circle can’t take place in any empirical intuition, such that the impossibility of which holds true in abstraction/conception as well & can’t be altered by it; this latter fact shows that abstraction/conception doesn’t determine or create what’s possible or impossible in empirical intuition, but it simply reflect them. So that the same is the case for the principle of reason; in other words, since what’s possible or impossible with reason can’t be determined or altered by abstraction/conception, i.e., abstraction/conception can’t form what’s contradictory, this goes to show that they’re not a creation of abstraction/conception, but it simply reflects them.

My point was just that scientists are not "dismissing" reason by understanding it as emergent behaviour any more than non-materialist philosophers who describe it as immaterial. In fact, I'd say scientists would be taking it far more seriously. The immaterial world is a vague dumping ground for things not yet understood, which is ]back to what I said before: if someone had a meaningful non-materialist explanation for consciousness, that would be something to consider. But it seems to me the root if the conflict is not incompatible descriptions of consciousness but rather a matter of taste: "Out of bounds, science!" — Kenosha Kid

Okay, I agree with you. I am also a materialist in a way, but a compatibilist.

A “principle” is to be understood as one understands the word “law.” — aRealidealist

Not from where I sit. A law, to distinguish itself from a rule or a directive, adheres to the principle of necessity and universality. In that case, law presupposes the principle, whereas rules presuppose only the contingencies which justify them. It is absurd to think mathematics, and logic in general, is governed by mere rules.
————

law of reason — in other words, that by which it governs or determines either the identity or formation of objects or percepts. — aRealidealist

If that is the case, we are at a loss as to how we can be mistaken in identifying an object, or, which is the same thing, not being able to identify some object at all. We are also at a loss to explain how it is we can be irrational, if reason adheres to the universality and absolute necessity of law.

Object and precepts are determined by reason in accordance with a law, but reason is not itself lawful.

But I understand what you’re trying to say, in that reason, to be any real use to us, must act lawfully, must be trustworthy, otherwise....what Can we depend on for our knowledge? Which leads us to the kicker: if reason doesn’t act lawfully, what have we to use to correct it, except reason?
—————-

it should then be able to create ones which contradict each other; for as it has no foundation in itself, there shouldn’t be a SINGLE principle which holds true in all of its constructs. Yet, since it can’t do such a thing — aRealidealist

Oh, but it can, and it does. It is the ground of all the differences in human thought: I think the Mona Lisa is an ugly broad because of the principles by which I judge beauty, you think the Mona Lisa is angelic because of....obviously....a different set of principles by which you judge beauty.

reason itself must have a form by which it can possibly give principles — aRealidealist

Ok, fine. What form does reason have, that isn’t assigned to it by reason? How would reason attain its form? If reason has a form just because it inheres in human subjects, then it is no different than being a condition by which the reality of the human qua human rationality, is possible. Which is exactly what it is. A condition being that which makes what follows from it possible.
——————-

abstracts/concepts can’t of themselves purely intuit shapes (this admission is enough to satisfy my point) — aRealidealist

No argument there:

“....Understanding cannot intuit; intuition cannot think...”
“....Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without conceptions, blind....”

abstracts/concepts can only alter what they’ve created (like being able to alter the features of a pegasus or a unicorn); & if they can’t alter something, it’s precisely because they didn’t create it — aRealidealist

Fine. How? How does a concept alter, regardless of the actual reality of that to which they are applied? Bearing in mind a concept represents a thing or a possible thing. An impossible thing is, of course, inconceivable, that is, has no concepts belonging to it at all. The concept of “dog” (“unicorn”) presupposes the object (possible object) dog (unicorn), otherwise, to what does the concept relate? If the thing is presupposed, how in the hell can a concept create it? Now, a thing can be altered, certainly. A dog with a bushy tail is one thing, a dog with a non-bushy tail in not that thing, merely from the different constituent concepts of “tail”. Obviously, if this is true, but if it is true because concepts themselves are the causality for the altering, then we must admit concepts think. Say wha?!?!?!?

Concepts don’t create, they facilitate and that which is facilitated, is understanding. So if you want to say concepts create understanding, I’ll let that slide, to wit: I can cognize what a unicorn would be, whether or not there is one, merely from the concepts my understanding says it must have in order to even be a unicorn. Understanding being nothing but a part of my reason, in the case of unicorns a priori; in the case of dogs, a posteriori.

As for the rest.....you think idealistically, so kudos for that.

Not from where I sit. A law, to distinguish itself from a rule or a directive, adheres to the principle of necessity and universality. In that case, law presupposes the principle, whereas rules presuppose only the contingencies which justify them. It is absurd to think mathematics, and logic in general, is governed by mere rules.

From an etymological standpoint, in one way or another, “principle,” “law,” & “rule,” aren’t as different as you’re trying to make them seem, & they can be understood to coincide if one looks past nominal trifles.

“Law” is traceable to the old-English word of “lagu,” which means “ordinance, RULE prescribed by authority, REGULATION”; & “rule” is traceable to the old-French word of “riule,” which means “PRINCIPLE or maxim GOVERNING conduct”; while “principle” is traceable to the Latin word “princeps,” which means “RULER or leader” (the Romans thus called Trajan the “optimus princeps,” or the “best ruler”).

Now, in all of these etymological definitions, there’s an obvious commonality (to the point of where, surely enough, each of the terms include one of the other terms in their very etymological definition [thus their meanings are basically identical & interchangeable]), which is the signification of control (for the lack of a better word). So that all three of these terms, when included within a noun phrase, e.g., the rule of integers (thus “rules” can be said to govern mathematics [which isn’t therefore absurd, like you’ve claimed]), the law of identity, or the principle of inertia, signify, in one way or another, the control or governance, i.e., the regulation, of the object(s) or referent(s) of whatever word which they’re used with in a noun phrase.

The only way one can thus differentiate between these terms, or rather between how these terms are themselves used, is in regards to quantification; in other words, whether it (the “rule,” “law” or “principle”) controls or governs all possible & actual members of a set or class, i.e., in a universal sense, or whether it controls some, as opposed to all, possible & actual members of a set or class, i.e., in a limited sense that’s constrained to a subset.

So the distinction between a “law,” “rule” or “principle” in terms of universality is merely nominalistic & can be overcome if each term is quantitatively qualified in either a common or peculiar way (which is quite possible & permissible).

If that is the case, we are at a loss as to how we can be mistaken in identifying an object, or, which is the same thing, not being able to identify some object at all. We are also at a loss to explain how it is we can be irrational, if reason adheres to the universality and absolute necessity of law.

Not in any way are we at a loss as to how we can experience mistaken identity, granted that the principle of reason is a reality; this is explainable in terms of the subject’s confused or erroneous knowledge, which is rationally distinguishable from clear or veritable knowledge. For example, an impersonator; one may think that they’re looking at the real Barack Obama, although they’re actually looking at an impersonator; which if only they knew all of the qualities constituting the real Obama, would reveal to them that they’re looking at an impersonator instead of the real Obama.

Moreover, being “irrational” is explainable or to be explained in merely in a colloquial sense, in the way of impracticality or improbability; like when one says to a heartbroken friend that they’re being “irrational” by thinking that waiting outside their ex’s house will win them back over, as this is highly improbable or impractical. Though I do maintain that ontological irrationality is an impossibility; so there’s no need to seek an explanation of it, since it’s literally impossible.

Object and precepts are determined by reason in accordance with a law, but reason is not itself lawful.

Reason is lawful, that is, recognizable by its law or rule, in the same way the apriori forms of sensibility are; objects being subject to their invariant form. Thus reason is lawful because, like space or time, it determines things under a fixed law, rule or condition (which doesn’t change, like the objects that it subjects may).

But I understand what you’re trying to say, in that reason, to be any real use to us, must act lawfully

Reason itself IS THE LAW by which objects or percepts act lawfully.

Oh, but it can, and it does. It is the ground of all the differences in human thought: I think the Mona Lisa is an ugly broad because of the principles by which I judge beauty, you think the Mona Lisa is angelic because of....obviously....a different set of principles by which you judge beauty.

Apriori, beauty is in the eye of the beholder. So I fail to see (no pun intended) how your example here is proof that rational or logical thought can form constructs which are in disagreement with itself? Since the disagreement of your example here pertains to AESTHETICS, rather than to logic or reason per se.

Ok, fine. What form does reason have, that isn’t assigned to it by reason? How would reason attain its form?

Reason no more attains or is assigned a form than space or time, as its character or form is what it is apriori & isn’t determined aposteriori, i.e., it’s not attained or assigned aposteriori or in time.

If reason has a form just because it inheres in human subjects, then it is no different than being a condition by which the reality of the human qua human rationality, is possible.

Right, as I’ve said in my past replies, it’s the form or condition by which human thought is possible; it being something actual apriori (like the forms of sensibility are), through which the latter (thought) is possible.

Fine. How? How does a concept alter, regardless of the actual reality of that to which they are applied? Bearing in mind a concept represents a thing or a possible thing. An impossible thing is, of course, inconceivable, that is, has no concepts belonging to it at all. The concept of “dog” (“unicorn”) presupposes the object (possible object) dog (unicorn), otherwise, to what does the concept relate? If the thing is presupposed, how in the hell can a concept create it?

Now, a thing can be altered, certainly. A dog with a bushy tail is one thing, a dog with a non-bushy tail in not that thing, merely from the different constituent concepts of “tail”. Obviously, if this is true, but if it is true because concepts themselves are the causality for the altering, then we must admit concepts think. Say wha?!?!?!?

Concepts don’t create, they facilitate and that which is facilitated, is understanding. So if you want to say concepts create understanding, I’ll let that slide, to wit: I can cognize what a unicorn would be, whether or not there is one, merely from the concepts my understanding says it must have in order to even be a unicorn. Understanding being nothing but a part of my reason, in the case of unicorns a priori; in the case of dogs, a posteriori.

It should be noted that the way which I say that one “creates” in conception/abstraction is somewhat similar to how one would “create,” say, a clubhouse. In this way, the materials that are used to create aren’t themselves what are created, but they’re merely assembled, arranged, & joined in a way which they weren’t originally given. So, to be sure, I’m not saying that one’s concepts/abstracts create the materials that they utilize, but that one can create or form artificial objects of thought, such as a pegasus or unicorn, with materials which are already given.

Now, objects that are altogether impossible to form in the sensible world, e.g., a square circle, can’t be created even in abstracts/concepts; & so this impossibility crosses over into abstracts/concepts & can’t be altered by them.

So now the point should be reemphasized: the very fact that one’s abstracts/concepts can only be formed or created in such a way that agrees with what’s possible in the sensible world, & not in a way which disagrees with what’s possible in it, shows that the possibilities & impossibilities of the sensible world aren’t determined by abstracts/concepts; for if they were, then they could be altered by them, like the features of the artificial creations of one’s abstracts/concepts, e.g., a pegasus or unicorn, as that which determines a thing has the power to alter it in some way, e.g., as the relationship of one’s abstracts/concepts have to artificial objects of thought like a pegasus or unicorn. Yet, again, since abstracts/concepts can’t, in any way, alter what’s either possible or impossible in the sensible world, this shows that abstracts/concepts don’t determine them. &, moreover, this same reasoning, is applied to be reason itself; that is to say, as one’s abstracts/concepts can’t alter what’s rationally possible or impossible, e.g., can’t form any contradictory objects, this shows that reason isn’t determined by abstracts/concepts.

As for the rest.....you think idealistically, so kudos for that.

Thanks, friend, I do appreciate the compliment.

The brain mind issue is a problem for materialists. For idealists not so . Whether consciousness arises in the brain or foot, or is a whole body phenomena, will not change what it is. It is enough to know consciousness deals with information in order to build some sort of model of it.

Roger Penrose and Co, seem to be on to something with Cellular microtubules, however finding form and location for the material that creates consciousness, will not explain any individual consciousness, though it might give weight to the integrated information view by nailing consciousness to a particular state of quantum permutation / entanglement, and revealing it to be a body wide phenomena - where brain is an organ of extracellular awareness, whilst Liver , heart, etc would be organs of intracellular awareness. - my speculation / understanding.

This would support a model of consciousness, but not give insight into any particular consciousness.

It seems simpler to say a mind empty of information is not conscious!

Winger won a Nobel, and Von Neumann — Wayfarer

That is not why they are considered eccentric, but because of their interpretation of the problem of observation in quantum theory. Winger didn't get a Nobel Prize for sticking the consciousness of the observer in the middle. As far as I know.

it is nothing substantially speaking, I insist. — David Mo

Modern realism, generally, has the conceit that it can see the world ‘as it really is’, — Wayfarer

I wasn't talking about the reality of the world, but the substance of consciousness.

That’s why there are still so many books about the topic subtitled the ‘battle for the soul of science’ or the ‘battle for reality’. — Wayfarer

The problem is the role of observation, not the human soul. This "soul" thing is a sensationalist headline.

Let's say you are watching something extraordinary like a pig flying, then you accidentally put your finger in boiling water. I doubt you would have any thoughts about it, all your thinking would be occupied with trying to believe that you were really looking at a flying pig. — Punshhh

I don't know if you've noticed that you're describing consciousness all the time in terms of ideas (of a pig), perceptions (of things), and sensations (of pain). If we don't talk about them we can't talk about any consciousness.
I think you confuse the concept of consciousness as nothing with the concept of non-existence. Consciousness exists, but you cannot define it or describe it with consistent properties. That's why I say it's nothing. Perhaps it would be more appropriate to say that it is a void. Choose the word you like best.

The brain mind issue is a problem for materialists. For idealists not so — Pop

I don't know what the problem of materialists is, but the problem of idealists is not to have problems. When they can't explain something, they put a ghost in the machine. Or an invisible dragon, if they're Chinese. And it always works!

A science without problems is suspicious.

I'm screaming out some tunes at the recording studio to no obvious purpose :) — Kenosha Kid

You don't need a purpose to sing a song, but I find it helps going through life... :-)

As I said, the mind is nothing substantial, but a vector, a trend, a project. Of course, without it there would be no project. But it is nothing substantially speaking, I insist. — David Mo

The mind is a mental space, and a space is something.

I don't know if you've noticed that you're describing consciousness all the time in terms of ideas (of a pig), perceptions (of things), and sensations (of pain). If we don't talk about them we can't talk about any consciousness.

I asked you for a thought proven to be true and you mentioned a finger in boiling water, it is you who are confused. My next point was that your body will act independent of your mind and consciousness (something else you use interchangeably).

I think you confuse the concept of consciousness as nothing with the concept of non-existence.

I note that the one attribute you are not prepared to remove in your description of the void of consciousness is the body. So you are secretly relying on it.

Consciousness exists, but you cannot define it or describe it with consistent properties.

You can, it has the property of being alive, it is living. Now prove that things live without being conscious?

That's why I say it's nothing. Perhaps it would be more appropriate to say that it is a void.

This intrigues me, I also have experienced it thus, but I somehow I don't think you mean it the same way.

Choose the word you like best.

Living.

his was basically my point; modifying the term “reasoning” with the adjective of “rational” is insignificant, — aRealidealist

From a logical point of view, yes. From a rhetorical point of view, no, because it emphasizes something that should be taken into account. "The cat was advancing with feline steps." "The argument is rational." All cats' footsteps are feline and every argument is rational. But there are those who haven't realized that and it's worth emphasizing.

Only in colloquial terms can the method of ‘science’ be called “rational,” as its mode of investigation isn’t apriori but aposteriori. — aRealidealist

It's not just colloquially. When Kant speaks of metaphysics he adds the term "pure" reason because it claims to be the science of the a priori. But it does not occur to anyone to say that empirical science is not rational. It's just not pure. In any case, empirical reasoning is the opposite of the irrational, which is what we are talking about, I think.

“Reason,” in the original or truest sense of the word, — aRealidealist

I don't think you've realized that rebutting any argument with Aristotle's authority, or pretending that Kant's terminology is "the real thing," is a bit old-fashioned.
You lose sight of the fact that the problem we are discussing is whether you can talk about science as rational knowledge as opposed to the irrational. And we are not opposing, I am not at least, the rational to the empirical in Kant's way.

About the multitude of articles that talk about "scientific reason"; https://philpapers.org/s/scientific%20reason
That works for you?

The mind is a mental space, and a space is something. — Olivier5

You can say that if you like. But you risk having some conceptual problems. "Is space a thing or a property of things?" Well, I don't want to deflect the discussion.

OK? Make any sense at all?

To an extent, thanks, but I think what I really need to do is go back to CPR and look again at how Kant distinguishes images from schemata.

I asked you for a thought proven to be true and you mentioned a finger in boiling water, it is you who are confused. My next point was that your body will act independent of your mind and consciousness (something else you use interchangeably). — Punshhh

They're two different problems.
Reflex acts of the body are independent of the conscious mind, but there would be a lot of talk about the pre-conscious and the sub-conscious. I don't know if you want to reduce the mind to the conscious.

"Living" seems to me a very ambiguous term to define consciousness. A paramecium is also living.

In mathematics, spaces are a certain form of sets, in which the elements can interact through operations. I believe the mind can be understood as a similar kind of space in which thoughts interact.

If consciousness is not strictly materialist in origin- being nothing more than a complex product of chemical reactions and electrical impulses of cells, then why can we completely alter the state of consciousness/our experience with chemicals, drugs or neurotransmitters.

I understand that this is a reductive way of thinking regarding one of the most complicated phenomena in existence but it just strikes me that if I add Chemical A to experience B I get an altered experience - C. Such effects made by mood enhancers, antidepressants, mood stabilizers or anesthetics, tranquilizers and painkillers.

How do you reconcile these observed medical qualities with ideas such as pan-psychism consciousness is a fundamental force of nature, or inherent to all matter, or that it is something beyond and larger than the brain or part of gods mind or an illusion? — Benj96

Prima facie, a compelling argument based on the premise that if a certain type of thing, x, interacts with some other thing, y, then the thing y must of the same type as x.

Basically, if matter interacts with something then that something is matter.

The question then is this: [are there] some things that matter interacts with [but] are not matter?

Light? Radio? EM radiation in general?

the possibilities & impossibilities of the sensible world aren’t determined by abstracts/concepts; for if they were, then they could be altered by them, like the features of the artificial creations of one’s abstracts/concepts — aRealidealist

C’mon, man. Possibility/impossibility is absolutely meaningless without relation to the agency to which they apply. Which means that which is possible/impossible, from the empirical and rational world alike, is determined by that agency, for that agency. For us to have any idea whatsoever about possibility/impossibility of anything at all, we must relate some occassion for its revelation, to something else already determined as being one or the other.

That there are possibilities/impossibilities contained by the sensible world may be a valid logical premise. Nevertheless, we don’t give a crap THAT there are; we are only interested in WHAT they are, and for the determination of that, reason along with its constituent faculties, is absolutely indispensable, and then, only from deductive principles a priori.

I refer you to the categories, for which you should have already taken account. The categories determine for us, not the possibilities/impossibilities the sensible world contains, but rather the possibility or impossibility of us cognizing what they are. And....guess what? The categories are themselves conceptions.

In addition, I offer James, 1909: “....Abstraction, functioning in this way, becomes a means of arrest far more than a means of advance in thought.....”
————-

materials that are used to create aren’t themselves what are created — aRealidealist

Reason itself IS THE LAW by which objects or percepts act lawfully. — aRealidealist

How do these propositions not contradict each other?
————-

reason isn’t determined by abstracts/concepts. — aRealidealist

Correct, iff reason is a fundamental human condition, a metaphysical notion used in an attempt to logically thwart infinite regress. Reason the cognitive faculty, on the other hand, the bridge between judgement and cognition, in the description of its normal operation, can only be promulgated and understood from the use of conceptions contained in the subject and predicate of explanatory propositions. Wherein lay the intrinsic circularity of the human rational system: we can only talk about reason using the very thing we’re talking about, and the very purpose of speculative epistemological philosophy is to not make it catastrophically fubar.

Let’s work on that, shall we?

Never a bad idea, given enough interest. I’d listen, if you come up with something.