Science can explain consciousness, if science discovers empirical principles under which an iteration of consciousness manifests empirically. The only way for science to be necessarily unable to explain consciousness is for consciousness to be proven with apodeitic certainty NOT to be an empirical condition, which, to date, has not been accomplished, at least with peer review. — Mww
My fault, of course — Kenosha Kid
I wasn't strictly saying that Kant fell foul of this fallacy (although I think he did), — Kenosha Kid
:100:typically the above [woo-woo] fallacy: science has not explained consciousness --> science cannot explain consciousness --> consciousness is unphysical. — Kenosha Kid
Perhaps if you’re so inclined, you’d elaborate on how you think he did. — Mww
I think the extent to which a moral claim can be justified at all, it can be justified by knowledge. — Kenosha Kid
Aristotle called Metaphysics "first philosophy". And it was a legitimate field of inquiry in Philosophy, and most religions, especially the Catholic Church, until the advent of empirical Science in the Enlightenment era. Since then, it has been rejected as unscientific reasoning by hard-nosed Materialists, and left to Theologians and Philosophers to argue endlessly about. Today, the term is usually applied to anything spooky & poorly understood. But the concept of something "beyond physical" refuses to go away, and has had a resurgence since Quantum Physics revealed the mushy foundation of materialist Science.When can one define metaphysics? Is it possible to define metaphysics when possible?
I am interested in how one can even begin the process of legitimate metaphysics? — Shawn
Wha....we went from the conflict of consciousness being explainable by materialists or unexplainable by idealists, the fallacy in support of the latter being “science has not explained consciousness --> science cannot explain consciousness --> consciousness is unphysical”, to.......(gasp).....morality?? Can I get a great big fat.....HUH?!?!? — Mww
So....why would Kant run afoul of something by not allowing knowledge to justify morality? — Mww
Kant’s insistence on an a priori method to seek out and establish fundamental moral principles, however, does not always appear to be matched by his own practice. The Metaphysics of Morals, for instance, is meant to be based on a priori rational principles, but many of the specific duties that Kant describes, along with some of the arguments he gives in support of them, rely on general facts about human beings and our circumstances that are known from experience.
Are you saying human consciousness is not dependent on the brain? — jgill
I see metaphysics in parts of mathematics. — jgill
Mathematics proofs are empirical, of course, but mathematical constructions to be proven, are not empirical at all. — Mww
Can you justify the distinction between a fallacious a priori position on consciousness and a valid a priori position on morality, without committing the same fallacy? — Kenosha Kid
The justification for Kant's insistence that moral issues must be treated a priori comes down to God, not an absence of experience. — Kenosha Kid
A mathematical proof of a theorem is a chain of logic. — jgill
Sorry, I’m gonna need some help with that. It’s possible to reconcile a fallacy with a validity, so I’m not sure what I’m being asked. — Mww
attention to proper moral issues require an unconditioned cause within us — Mww
This is why I mentioned that knowledge had nothing to do with it. We already know what we did, in response to some moral issue; what we want to know is why we did what we did. For empirical situations, objects are given to us and we have to figure out what they are; for moral situations, we give the objects in the form of our actions, and we have to figure out where those actions come from. — Mww
The question is how can insisting on a priori understanding of one thing be considered invalid and another thing valid. — Kenosha Kid
attention to proper moral issues require an unconditioned cause within us
— Mww
I disagree. The metaphysical land-grab requires an unconditioned cause within us. Morality can fare perfectly well without it. — Kenosha Kid
Knowledge is providing insight into where those actions come from. — Kenosha Kid
Conditioning, either biological or social, is very much on the table. — Kenosha Kid
Ain’t this fun???? Almost as much fun as watching you argue with noaxioms, but I know better than to participate in that existential free-for-all. — Mww
Understanding is the first and primary conscious activity in humans, so understanding is always evident in any judgement. — Mww
Consciousness and morality are both objects of reason, for they absolutely cannot, in and of themselves, be objects of sense, therefore the understanding of them must always be a priori. — Mww
From there, the mistake is thinking we must be able to explain consciousness scientifically because the contents of it are derivable from experience, and we must be able to explain morality scientifically because our actions are quite evidently objective. — Mww
You must realize no moral agent ever knows more than what he ought to do. — Mww
Reason provides insight, and it is quite absurd to suggest we require knowledge of our reason, — Mww
But we’re in a metaphysical domain of the individual subject, and even if conditioning is present, he still needs to think for himself to be a rational or moral agent. — Mww
I would define metaphysics as follows: anything left over that won't be explained by more rigorous fields. To the extent that it has value, the field of being and content has been removed from metaphysics by physics, phenomonology, etc. To the extent that it has value, the field of causation and origins has been stolen by science generally and cosmology and evolutionary biology in particular. To the extent that they have value, the constants of nature have been annexed by physics. If any idea in metaphysics is found to have any value, it ceases to be metaphysics and becomes something else. Metaphysics is then all of the ideas that will never be found to have any value. — Kenosha Kid
Therefore, metaphysics cannot be "all of the ideas that will never be found to have any value". — Luke
Therefore, metaphysics cannot be "all of the ideas that will never be found to have any value". — Luke
Of course it can, if the moment it had value it ceases to be metaphysics. — Kenosha Kid
If something that was once part of metaphysics is later found to have value, then you cannot say that metaphysics is "all of the ideas that will never be found to have any value". — Luke
... later found to have value outside of metaphysics, though. — Kenosha Kid
If that were the case, then it would be impossible for the ideas to later be found to have value outside of metaphysics. — Luke
My individual subject is 100% physical, I assure you, — Kenosha Kid
This is metaphysical land-grab yet again. It insists upon itself, then justifies itself by once again insisting upon itself, ad infinitum. — Kenosha Kid
Reason provides insight, and it is quite absurd to suggest we require knowledge of our reason,
— Mww
It is more absurd to attempt to reason without it. — Kenosha Kid
morality is complex and you don't always get a grade at the end or know if the path you chose was right. — Kenosha Kid
If that were the case, then it would be impossible for the ideas to later be found to have value outside of metaphysics.
— Luke
I'm not sure that follows. — Kenosha Kid
If on my 18th birthday I am an adult, and that adult grew out of a child, does it follow a child is an adult? — Kenosha Kid
When Democritus formulated the atom theory, he was starting the ball rolling on science. I'm happy to agree that his was a metaphysical theory that had potential value, and that value underlies parts of physics and chemistry where it was put to good use. However the field of questions that Democritus was answering as broadly met by metaphysics do not inherit the value that scientists later found in atom theory, nor is it obvious that, had Democritus not formulated atom theory back then, science would be unaware of it, i.e. that Democritus' idea was even relevant. My point was simply that, because atom theory has value, its natural home is in the sciences: that's where it is valuable. As a purely metaphysical idea, it is not obviously more valuable than cosmic mind theory. — Kenosha Kid
I am not of the opinion that science cannot explain consciousness: the exact opposite....
Consciousness is a good example. Lumping materialists and physicalists together for the sake of argument, the conflict is between consciousness being a physical state or process and it being unphysical, i.e. undetectable and not a "thing" existing in space. The justification for the latter is typically the above fallacy: science has not explained consciousness --> science cannot explain consciousness --> consciousness is unphysical. — Kenosha Kid
The justification for the latter is typically the above fallacy: science has not explained consciousness --> science cannot explain consciousness --> consciousness is unphysical. — Kenosha Kid
Is 'physical' just a synonym for the shit we can be objective about? Except that it leaves out mathematics? — Yellow Horse
Hence why I bring up those embarrasing discussions about 'mathematical fictionalism' and 'the indispensability argument for mathematics'. The reality of number is an inconvenient truth for naturalism. — Wayfarer
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