I respond that, on the contrary, metaphysical explanations and justifications for determinism instead rely on the empirical fact that the balls fell to the floor ninety-nine times. — Kenosha Kid

You do understand that these same empirical facts can be used to justify systems of causality that are not causally deterministic. For instance, to justify a causal system of indeterminism-based compatibilitism (as Hume can be argued to have upheld), this in contrast to a determinism-based compatibilism (as compatibilism is generally understood nowadays).

One's presumption of causal determinism - just as with one's presumption of physicalism - will be fully metaphysical, rather than empirical.

Then again, there's more to life and existence than balls dropping. Intentions serve as one example.

How do empirical observations of balls and such determine that our intentions - which always intend, and are driven by, some goal - are in fact not teleological (and this without the use of metaphysical considerations and conclusions)?

One's presumption of causal determinism - just as with one's presumption of physicalism - will be fully metaphysical, rather than empirical. — javra

Not at all. In fact, we are biased the other way. We see patterns in empirical data because we are pattern-recognition machines. We see them erroneously because we are necessarily imperfect pattern-recognition machines. It takes mental effort to dismiss an apparent pattern due to knowledge that seeming regularity has an underlying indeterminism. Don't believe me? Grab a randomer on the street and explain quantum mechanics to them. Chances are they don't even know what metaphysics is.

How do empirical observations of balls and such determine that our intentions - which always intend, and are driven by, some goal - are in fact not teleological (and this without the use of metaphysical considerations and conclusions)? — javra

The above answers this also.

Not at all. In fact, we are biased the other way. — Kenosha Kid

Really, we're innately biased (as machines, no less) to be causally deterministic? Then how is it that most people hold onto the bias of being endowed with some form and degree of free will?

The above answers this also. — Kenosha Kid

It doesn't answer why one set of innate biases ought to be accepted on face value while another form of communal bias ought not.

Really, we're innately biased (as machines, no less) to be causally deterministic? Then how is it that most people hold onto the bias of being endowed with some form and degree of free will? — javra

I didn't say we were biased to be deterministic per se, although Kant would agree, just that we're biased to establish patterns, often when they're not there. As for free will, the incompatibilist argument has never struck me as particularly intelligent, but if you want a more thorough description, see this thread: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/8130/simple-argument-for-the-soul-from-free-will/p1

It doesn't answer why one set of innate biases ought to be accepted on face value while another form of communal bias ought not. — javra

Who said anything about "ought"? You've presumably come across optical illusions such as this one below, in which the two labelled squares have the same shade of grey but appear to have different shades of grey.



Do you ask the question why you ought to see them as two different shades, beyond an explanation of a) how you see them as two different colours and b) why that process would be useful in most cases, if erroneous in this case? To that extent, you can explain why you "ought" to model the world in a causal way. But nature has use for your oughts. Any biases she gives you, she gives you because it helped your ancestors survive and procreate.

Your reply is in relation to things I do not disagree with - and I'm tempted to believe is instead a strawman.

The pattern-recognition you reference has nothing to do with whether physicalism, idealism, or some other ontological system is true - or else with what types of causality (efficient, teleological, formal, material as just some examples) are true - or else with the nature of time (e.g., presentist, eternalist, or what not) - or else with what laws of thought (law of identity, of noncontradiction, of excluded middle) are true - or else with the nature of self as that which is conscious of (e.g., it being a machine or not).

May I be corrected if wrong on this count.

For improved clarity of my position: That we have historically established a set of metaphysical beliefs X which have been used to engage in the modern empirical sciences we have; which, in turn, have empirically evidenced themselves to be fruitful in innumerable (but by no means all) ways; does not negate the fact that today's empirical sciences are necessarily founded on metaphysical beliefs X - this in the plural. These metaphysical beliefs have historically included that of physicalism, of efficient causation as defined by Hume at the expense of teleological causation and with a negation of free will as illusion, of block time, often enough of the self being a complex epiphenomenal automaton, i.e. machine, and till recently, a fervent belief in causal determinism.

None of these beliefs can be obtained as brute facts via "pattern-recognition" - and will all require metaphysical interpretation to determine what is and what is not the case - for none are universally apprehended as is the optical illusion you've re-posted. And, as beliefs go, these historically foundational metaphysical beliefs might, or might not, be fully accordant to reality.

None of these beliefs can be obtained as brute facts via "pattern-recognition" - and will all require metaphysical interpretation to determine what is and what is not the case — javra

The second half of this proposition is not implied by the first, and so appears to be baseless. That we have what you're calling 'metaphysical' assumptions does not mean that we have some task of establishing them which must preceed their use. It may be that they're hard-wired, it may be that they're learnt unreflectively in early childhood, it may be that they are asymptotic with regards to phenomenal experience...

these historically foundational metaphysical beliefs might, or might not, be fully accordant to reality. — javra

I don't follow how a metaphysical belief as you describe them could be in accordance or not with reality. Accordance with reality has to be measurable (otherwise what form would the discordance take?) as such any discordance would be a scientific consideration. Any purely metaphysical position is, by definition, such that it has no affect whatsoever on reality. If it did we could at least theoretically detect that effect and so model it scientifically.

That we have what you're calling 'metaphysical' assumptions does not mean that we have some task of establishing them which must preceed their use. It may be that they're hard-wired, it may be that they're learnt unreflectively in early childhood, it may be that they are asymptotic with regards to phenomenal experience... — Isaac

Of course, which in turn signifies that they might be wrong. Or not.

I don't follow how a metaphysical belief as you describe them could be in accordance or not with reality. Accordance with reality has to be measurable (otherwise what form would the discordance take?) as such any discordance would be a scientific consideration. Any purely metaphysical position is, by definition, such that it has no affect whatsoever on reality. If it did we could at least theoretically detect that effect and so model it scientifically. — Isaac

Using the standards you've presented, why then all the debates about whether, for one example, physicalism or idealism is true? And if this is to you nonsensical to ask, why then uphold any such or related position as true?

Of course, which in turn signifies that they might be wrong. Or not. — javra

I'm not following; in what sense does this signify that they might be wrong or not?

why then all the debates about whether, for one example, physicalism or idealism is true? — javra

Good question. As far as I'm concerned such debates are meaningless.

if this is to you nonsensical to ask, why then uphold any such or related position as true? — javra

Again, I wouldn't uphold any such position as being true. I think some metaphysical positions are more interesting than others, some more coherent, more elegant, more appealing, more useful, even more moral, but I can't see a way in which any could be more true without their having some consequence, which puts them (at least theoretically) within the remit of scientific investigation.

I'm not following; in what sense does this signify that they might be wrong or not? — Isaac

That we might be genetically hardwired for X (e.g., perception of bent sticks when placed in water), that we have been habituated as kids into upholding X (e.g., for most of us older folks, that Santa Clause is real ... one can substitute an omnipotent deity if one wants), and that some X can be asymptotic to phenomenal data (e.g., one's upholding physicalism rather than idealism or vice versa in relation to some tree or rock), does not of itself then signify that the X addressed is beyond the purview of being correct or wrong. Sticks do not bend in water, Santa Clause is not real, and we do live in a world that can be physicalist, idealist, or other but not all at the same time and in the same respect.

An example: efficient causation as defined by Hume (which is subtly different from Aristotle's in arguably important ways). We were born in a culture that upholds it as fact. People ask questions, such as "how did it all begin". Here, this metaphysical conviction we imprinted via habit into our being does not, of itself, serve to answer the question. Hence, our metaphysical conviction (typically for most) that such efficient causation and only such efficient causation is factual might - or might not - be a fallacy. (We know it is cultural because other former cultures did not live by this belief regarding what is causally real - e.g., teleology was not denied in Aristotle's time)

Changing the metaphysical parameters used then changes the possibilities of addressing this question that most humans have asked themselves at one point or another: as one example that sometimes floats about, what if creation ex nihilo is factual? But this, where it true, would then hold other implications which, for many, are unwarranted (such that, then, logically, anything might be created from nothingness, and by nothingness, at any time and place for no discernable reason whatsoever).

Both the aforementioned perspectives regarding causation are equally metaphysical. Given the principle of noncontradiction, they cannot both be correct at the same time and in the same respect. One or both of these metaphysical positions will, then, be wrong.

(Please do dissociate my own metaphysical beliefs (which are not here the issue) regarding causation from the one example of causation just provided.)

but I can't see a way in which any could be more true without their having some consequence, which puts them (at least theoretically) within the remit of scientific investigation. — Isaac

Are there such things as upheld beliefs that have no psychological impact on the being that upholds them? I can't think of any at the moment. For instance, one's beliefs - be they tacit or explicit - will in part determine how empirical data is interpreted (this without altering the empirical data all can agree on). For example, if one beliefs in ex nihilo creation, one can then believe that a seen rock was created ex nihilo minutes prior to the rock being seen - without negating the presence of the rock as it is seen.

Such psychological impact, being first and foremost present within the mind of the individual, will then be in the purview of the empirical sciences only via empirical data obtained - for one example, via CAT scans*. Which does not give an account of this psychological impact when devoid of preexisting beliefs (and their respective psychological impact) held by sentient observers of the data: e.g., that other sentient observers share some of the core ontological properties of being that one oneself holds will be one such belief (for we are not solipsists - itself a contradiction in terms) - e.g., I'm a conscious being, and so are you.

* For better precision, we may here need to enter into discussions/debates of what the cognitive sciences require. Not yet certain is this is what is intended to be of focus. IMO, it would deviate too much from the topic. All the same, I'm gonna take a breather from debates for the time being.

The only way for science to be necessarily unable to explain consciousness is for consciousness to be proven with apodeitic certainty NOT to be an empirical condition

an empirical condition of what?

You've never read Popper then?

Simply try to imagine the universe without a temporal perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover

What do you mean "without a temporal perspective"? Do you mean try to imagine the world without myself being a temporal entity? Or try to imagine a world without time? Why would I need to do either of those impossible tasks in order to imagine a physical world without humans in it?

You've never read Popper then? — Janus

Have heard. Not read. What does he say that you cannot?

I took a look at Stanford.edu on Popper. Your comment that I am engaged with is, "all science is fallible." Again, how?

He says what I already have; that the common characteristic of all scientific theories is that they are falsifiable. In fact, for him, that is the distinguishing feature of scientific theories.

To be falsifiable just is to be fallibilistic. It puzzles me that you seem to be unable to understand this. Are you claiming that there are some scientific theories which could not possibly turn out to be wrong, or at least not comprehensive or absolutely accurate?

Also bear in mind that a theory does not have to be wrong to be fallible; to be infallible would be the same as to be absolutely correct, comprehensive and accurate.

Why? We're talking about "physical existence" (PE), not perspective or products of imagination. — tim wood

But "physical existence" very clearly is a product of the imagination. What it means to be "physical", and what it means to "exist" are products of the human imagination, created from within the human perspective. To speak of "PE" outside the human perspective is complete nonsense.

It's like saying there's a "now" without a human perspective. Without you and I, or other human being saying this is now, thus determining the present, right now, as now, what time would "now" be? "Now' would be all the time in the complete extension of the universe. Where would any of the objects in the universe be in all this time, but everywhere? And what sense does "physical existence" have if everything is everywhere?

What do you mean "without a temporal perspective"? Do you mean try to imagine the world without myself being a temporal entity? Or try to imagine a world without time? Why would I need to do either of those impossible tasks in order to imagine a physical world without humans in it? — Janus

I mean imagine the universe without a "now", which provides a temporal perspective, as described above. "Physical existence" as we know it, is a description of our temporal position of being at the present, now. Remove the human perspective, and there is no "now", nor is there any such thing as "physical existence" which is a representation of the human perspective. .

He says what I already have; that the common characteristic of all scientific theories is that they are falsifiable. — Janus

But that is in fact exactly not what you said. For I think the fourth time:

all science is fallible, — Janus

Please deal with what you wrote and not with what you did not write - and apparently what someone else did not write either. How is science fallible?

But "physical existence" very clearly is a product of the imagination. What it means to be "physical", and what it means to "exist" are products of the human imagination, created from within the human perspective. To speak of "PE" outside the human perspective is complete nonsense. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is this some Kantian-like point you're making? That the ding-an-sicht-selbst is "unknowable"? Or are you just plain denying reality? And if it's the Kantian point, then you do not understand Kant, because he did not deny knowledge qua, but that the knowledge of had to be qualified as to its ground.

In any case, PE is not "clearly" a product of the imagination - actually there are several things wrong with that. And to speak of PE outside of human perspective is clearly not complete nonsense.

I was curious about what professional philosophers think of modern day metaphysics. In particular, is it possible to earn a PhD in the area of metaphysics? A cursory search yields a number of questionable metaphysical institutions awarding doctorates, but very few, if any, major universities. I did come across this, however, from Stanford concerning their Metaphysical Research Laboratory ( I would not have thought such a thing could exist!):

"The goal of metaphysics, therefore, is to develop a formal ontology, i.e., a formally precise systematization of these abstract objects. Such a theory will be compatible with the world view of natural science if the abstract objects postulated by the theory are conceived as patterns of the natural world.

In our research lab, we have developed such a theory: the axiomatic theory of abstract objects and relations. In many ways, this theory is like a machine for detecting abstract objects (hence the name ‘research lab’), for among the recursively enumerable theorems, there are statements which assert the existence of the abstract objects mentioned above.

Moreover, the properties of these abstracta can be formally derived as consequences of the axioms. The theory systematizes ideas of philosophers such as Plato, Leibniz, Frege, Meinong, and Mally. Our results are collated in the document Principia Metaphysica, which is authored by Edward N. Zalta (Ph.D./Philosophy), a Senior Research Scholar at CSLI. An online version of Principia Metaphysica can be found by following the link to The Theory of Abstract Objects (see below). In published work, the theory has been applied to problems in the philosophy of language, intensional logic, the philosophy of mathematics, and the history of philosophy"

I am completely taken by a machine to detect abstract objects! It sounds weirdly like something from a 1920s sci fi movie that detects ectoplasm through an electrical network involving numerous vacuum tubes. Live and learn. :chin:

Are you being purposely obtuse? There is nothing inconsistent in what I have said. I'll explain just one more time: all science is fallible or fallibilistic because all scientific theories are falsifiable. If you think there's an inconsistency there then identify it and explain why you think it is an inconsistency.

I mean imagine the universe without a "now", which provides a temporal perspective, as described above. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is nonsense. According to Special Relativity Theory, physical (spatio-temporal) existence has no general "now", so forget about a "now" being required for physical existence; it is is not even possible!

Sticks do not bend in water, Santa Clause is not real, and we do live in a world that can be physicalist, idealist, or other but not all at the same time and in the same respect. — javra

Yes, this is the part that I found to be unsupported. Sticks do not bend in water (this can be verified by inconsistency), Santa Clause is not real (we can search for him, talk to those who knowingly made him up etc)...but what does it mean to say that we do live in a world which can be physicalist or idealist but not both? This can't ever - even in theory - be checked. I can't make sense of what it would even mean to live in a world which was one or the other. Both would be absolutely identical in every way. They seem therefore to be only ideas, nothing to do with reality.

Are there such things as upheld beliefs that have no psychological impact on the being that upholds them? — javra

I wasn't talking about psychological impact - sorry, my wording was very clumsy. I meant pretty much what I've just said above. Worlds where different metaphysical positions are 'true' would be absolutely identical in every way, it would make no difference whatsoever to each possible world to have one metaphysical theory be true or another. The possible world in which physicalism is 'true' is identical to the one in which idealism is 'true'. The possible world in which platonic forms exist is identical in every way to the one in which they don't. The moment a metaphysical theory would create some difference, we can (at least theoretically) detect that difference and so the theory is scientific, not metaphysical.

The pattern-recognition you reference has nothing to do with whether physicalism, idealism, or some other ontological system is true - or else with what types of causality (efficient, teleological, formal, material as just some examples) are true - or else with the nature of time (e.g., presentist, eternalist, or what not) - or else with what laws of thought (law of identity, of noncontradiction, of excluded middle) are true - or else with the nature of self as that which is conscious of (e.g., it being a machine or not). — javra

I have yet to argue that causality is real. I am arguing that science works fine (insofar as it does) whether causality is real or not. It does not need to take a metaphysical stance. Metaphysics categorises science as taking a particular metaphysical position consistent with science, but science doesn't refer to metaphysics at all. That is the argument, so it is your response that is the straw man I'm afraid.

That we have historically established a set of metaphysical beliefs X which have been used to engage in the modern empirical sciences we have; which, in turn, have empirically evidenced themselves to be fruitful in innumerable (but by no means all) ways; does not negate the fact that today's empirical sciences are necessarily founded on metaphysical beliefs X - this in the plural. — javra

Going back to Democritus, yes, the birth of science fell inside metaphysics, because there was no empirical evidence for atoms. It does not follow that science has a metaphysical basis. Science itself is empirical, and empiricism replaces the need for metaphysics such as determinism. We can detect such patterns phenomonologically without adopting a position of belief in such patterns. When empiricism is not consistent with determinism, such as in the measurement problem of quantum mechanics, determinism is not "believed" in because no such pattern is detected. (A different pattern, consistent with probabilism, is detected.)

Is this some Kantian-like point you're making? That the ding-an-sicht-selbst is "unknowable"? Or are you just plain denying reality? And if it's the Kantian point, then you do not understand Kant, because he did not deny knowledge qua, but that the knowledge of had to be qualified as to its ground. — tim wood

No, I'm not Kantian, though Kant's perspective is not so different, and consistent with mine. I'm simply describing reality. And since Kant's perspective is similar, it seems like you are the one denying reality. Look at what you're saying, knowledge has to be qualified as to its ground. Well it's ground according to Kant, is phenomena, appearance, how things appear to people from their particular perspectives. Any attempt to remove that ground (the perspective of the pure intuitions of space and time) leaves your claimed "knowledge" as completely unsupported. What kind of knowledge is that?

This is nonsense. According to Special Relativity Theory, physical (spatio-temporal) existence has no general "now", so forget about a "now" being required for physical existence; it is is not even possible! — Janus

There seems to be a big problem with what you are asserting. We can only measure durations of time at the present, now, as time passes. Any reference to a duration of time in the future, or in the past, not actually as time passes, is just a logical extrapolation through physical analysis, not an actual measurement of time.

You seem to be demonstrating my point very well. The capacity to predict, which relativity theory gives us, does not indicate an understanding of time. You have totally neglected the capacity to measure time, which is an underlying prerequisite to the capacity of prediction. When you can explain the capacity to measure time without requiring a temporal perspective (a now), then you might have something to argue. But I'll tell you now, that I've fully analyzed this already, and it appears to be completely impossible to measure a period of time without an assumed now.

So, it may be true that special relativity has no general now. But that just confirms my claims that the measurement of time is perspective dependent, i.e. dependent on a particular now.. The measurement of time is derived from the now, and all you have done with your reference to special relativity, is supported my argument that any sense of "physical existence" is dependent on perspective.

Are you being purposely obtuse? There is nothing inconsistent in what I have said. I'll explain just one more time: all science is fallible or fallibilistic because all scientific theories are falsifiable. If you think there's an inconsistency there then identify it and explain why you think it is an inconsistency. — Janus

You conceded arithmetic. Let's see if baking will help. I want to make a cake. Per recipe I get flour, milk, eggs, butter, baking soda/power, sugar, etc. In short, I secure everything that both recipe and experience tell me will used correctly make a cake. This is science. Where's the fallibility?

I go ahead and make the cake. Probably it comes out fine. Maybe it doesn't. If it doesn't, maybe we can figure out why, maybe not. That is, the particular application may be "fallible." The cake itself in science is the theory. A corollary consideration: theory may be close but not exact - that is, it's a theory - and still work.

And another question: what does the "is" mean in your statement? "All science is fallible."

In sum, big difference between "science is fallible," and "scientific theory is fallible." And until you clarify the "is," I have no idea what you mean.

Anther way. I have a tool, a BFH* ( (representing science in this example). Nothing fallible about it at all. And the same cannot be said about my use of it.

And arguably, theory as theory isn't fallible. How could it be? It already professes contingency in being a theory. Science, as producer of theory, explicitly implies "fallibility." But science is not just a producer of theory - that's an output. You can even argue that theory in itself is not science at all, but is instead theory. Argue the fallibility of the fallibility? I'll leave that to you.

And this - "

I'll explain just one more time: all science is fallible or fallibilistic because all scientific theories are falsifiable. — Janus

is not an explanation. It is a sign that you understand neither your topic nor your language, and like any good eighth grader are parroting.

Earlier I offered leaving this discussion - or continuing with some rigor. You have continued without the rigor. Obviously you can leave when you like, but try for some rigor. Start with your proposition, "all science is fallible." Word-by-word, what does it mean?

Last, the word theory is itself interesting, I commend it you for some study of its roots. (I see/seeing the divine order.)

*A kind of hammer. Can you figure out what kind?

No, I'm not Kantian, though Kant's perspective is not so different, and consistent with mine. I'm simply describing reality. And since Kant's perspective is similar, it seems like you are the one denying reality. Look at what you're saying, knowledge has to be qualified as to its ground. Well it's ground according to Kant, is phenomena, — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed, you're not a Kantian. Knowledge in Kant-land is not so easily accounted for, nor so easily grounded. But what I had in mind was (my understanding) of his distinction between pure and practical knowledge. As practical, he knows; as pure, that's a different matter.

If your claim is simply that descriptions of reality start out using descriptors characteristic of human types of perception, no argument here. And you can even - although you should have warned - argue that "reality" itself is such a descriptor, and therefore/thereby in the absence of a describer, does not exist. But you appear to deny the existence of the thing described, which existence is usually called physical existence, and the fact of that usually called reality.

So which reality are you denying?

Here is one direction modern metaphysics is moving. Even as an old mathematician, my eyes glaze over as I try to read it. Those of you more conversant with logic notation might explain it in less technical language. :chin:

Indeed! Axiomatic is just language for "this is what we presuppose as given that we take for granted."

There's an old rule for motorcycle riders: if you do not know how deep the puddle is, do not drive through it! I find adaptions of this rule handy in all kinds of circumstances. In the present case, it means going 'round and looking for the conclusions to see if they make any sense at all. It appears they're trying to develop some sort of brute-force tool. And it looks logic-based. Color me ignorant, but I'm thinking that there are relatively few interesting questions that one can even hope to resolve by brute-force means, even given the means themselves, because of computation time. Nor do I find even a whisper of P v. NP considerations. Perhaps someone can translate into reasonable English.

And does the list of references look peculiar?

I find this online.

https://mally.stanford.edu/Papers/twenty-five.pdf

Twenty-Five Basic Theorems in
Situation and World Theory∗
Edward N. Zalta
Center for the Study of Language and Information
Stanford University

I'm reading it. No comment yet.

Edit: Page 21 ff. are where the twenty-five start. Interesting at least! And even i find some traction with the material.

"The question of whether situations and worlds can peaceably co-exist in the foundations of metaphysics is complicated by the fact that world theorists disagree about what worlds are."

Well, that's off to a good start . . .

The wise take their laughs where and when they can.