The statements that are true are the true ones. "p" is true iff p. That's pretty much all there is to say about them. — Banno
it's not a bad idea to set aside such uses in order to draw useful distinctions, — Banno
Or is the utility only philosophical taxonomy (which would be fine, of course - I don't mean 'only' in a pejorative sense). — Isaac
the role of 'truth' seemed more about the assertion that an epistemic peer would agree — Isaac
part of this analysis would be to ensure that we can track when we are talking about a statement being a shared belief and when we are talking about it being true per se. — Banno
I have a question, how would we classify a belief, or any belief at all to be true? — IP060903
Are you asking how we justify our beliefs? — Banno
I have a question, how would we classify a belief, or any belief at all to be true? — IP060903
Are you asking how we justify our beliefs? — Banno
Yes, that is indeed what I am asking. — IP060903
Notice that how we justify our beliefs is a different question to which statements are true? — Banno
Here's the leaf - I show it to you. Yes, that bit is perhaps ineffable in that there is no rule here, nothing to be said appart from my showing you the leaf and your using the word "green" for it. — Banno
I'm thinking of our standard practices in these situations. I present you a leaf and say "the leaf is green", you say "that's not 'true', it's yellow". I'd take it into better light, ask others, put it in a spectrometer, compare it to a green swatch... and say "no, look at this evidence I've gathered, it really is green, it's 'true'". — Isaac
My understanding about truth comes from the same analysis - what it is we're doing when we compare the proposition in question with other propositions in the bin marked 'true propositions', we're recalling the set of properties those propositions had in common. — Isaac
I'm thinking that you put the statement in the "true" bin if and only if the leaf is green. — Banno
all they have in common is that they are true and nothing more. — Banno
Well then the label becomes arbitrary. — Isaac
That is, sometimes our beliefs are wrong. — Banno
The statement does not go in the "true" bin if we think it true; it goes in if it is indeed true. — Banno
Green leaves are available for inspection. Boxed beetles, not. — Banno
You keep asking what justifies a belief, but putting it in terms of how to tell if something is true. — Banno
Is truth objective or subjective? — Maya
You think there's utility to separating some property of propositions from some property of a person — Isaac
Truth is vastly over-rated. the analysis of truth I've given here shows that. Belief is far more interesting. — Banno
The truth is massively overrated. — Isaac
Describing "the leaf is green" as a useful fiction is deceptive. The leaf is green. Sure, both '"the leaf is green" is true' and 'Fred believes that the leaf is green' have the similarity of being part of our language. That does not make them the same. — Banno
To your second point: you already know the difference between use and mention, so I'm puzzled that you haven't applied it here:
"the leaf is green" is true iff the leaf is green
On the left of the "iff" is a statement that is being mentioned. On the right is a statement that is being used. — Banno
that the sentence "the leaf is green" is used to say that the leaf is green is indeed a social convention. But that the leaf is green - not so much. The world is always, inescapably, already interpreted by our language; the world is all that is the case.
But, that does not mean that we can talk about our interpretation without also talking about the world. Remember Stove's gem; that we must interpret the world in order to talk about it does not imply that there is no world, only the interpretation. " The world is all that is the case" does not say that all there is, is statements; it does not replace the world with language. — Banno
The proposition "the leaf is green" can't have any general properties because it is either sound-waves, electrical signal or a sequence of neural states...whatever part of our known world you want to ascribe it to, it certainly doesn't exist in it's own right. — Isaac
4. So the way in which I see 'truth' being deflated is that X is Y iff c is d (and c is d iff {e,f,g,h} is {J,K,L,M}), then X is Y iff c is {J,K,L,M}. — Isaac
The point is, we haven't had to get as far as the ineffible to recognise that both 'leaf' and 'green' are social conventions, we haven't even had to get close. — Isaac
"The leaf is green" is true if the leaf fits the criteria the society of language users have assigned for 'leafness' and 'greenness'. — Isaac
Language that is just convention is an engine with the gears disengaged. It has to be implemented. — Banno
It seems to me that the difference between our positions has to do with the directness of our realism — Isaac
How is it that we agree? — Banno
On a first read it is actually very disappointing. — Banno
I'll come back to it tomorrow. — Banno
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