Well but this just begs the question: what attributes of good do we "see", in whatever way you propose we can, in reality?

Those attributes which coincide with/are perceptible by, our bodies. Natural philosophy and science have described them quite well.

Punshhh exists, therefore theism.

That's not what I said. I said therefore God exists.

That's not what I said. I said therefore God exists. — Punshhh

So... that's supposed to be better? I think there might be a few unstated assumptions...

Yet your response goes ahead and presupposes "Him" anyway. :confused:

looks like you're putting words in my mouth. I'm not saying God exists, but rather we can't answer the question using philosophy.

Using intellect? † Let's also go by evidence.

I am referring to the intellect in the way it is used to answer unanswerable questions. Regarding the evidence, how does one distinguish evidence from that which is not evidence? As I said to Enai De A Lucil, the fact that I exist is evidence of the existence of God. How could I possibly exist without God bringing me into existence?

So... that's supposed to be better? I think there might be a few missing assumptions...

Possibly, I might not be aware what hidden assumptions I'm making. I noticed you referred to baggage, I agree about that.

Those attributes which coincide with/are perceptible by, our bodies. Natural philosophy and science have described them quite well. — Punshhh

For example?

For example?

The creation/provision of a world for me to live in.

The creation/provision of a world for me to live in. — Punshhh

How is that an attribute?

it is a general feature of mathematics that whatever we find things in reality to be doing, we can always invent a mathematical structure that behaves exactly, indistinguishably like that, and so say that the things in reality are identical to that mathematical structure. — Pfhorrest

In principle yes, but here you are only talking about contingent things. I'm still having great difficulty seeing how there can only be abstractions 'turtles all the way down'. Suppose you have an abstract mathematical idea. Where does that idea exist? In your mind. But is your mind an abstraction? Even in a computer you can't have abstraction only. You have to go the the shop and buy a substantial computer if you want to compute.

But a perfectly detailed, perfectly accurate map of any territory at 1:1 scale is just an exact replica of that territory, and so is itself a territory in its own right, — Pfhorrest

That begs the question; you can grow cabbages on the real territory but not on the map, so there's a difference.

But whatever model it is that would perfectly map reality in every detail, that would be identical to reality itself. — Pfhorrest

See last answer.

Your need for invisible friends is a piece of personal psychology, and not philosophy. — Banno

This is psychoanalysis. Once you go down that road you can make anything true. Like they say Reality is what your shrink tells you it is.

Regarding the evidence, how does one distinguish evidence from that which is not evidence? — Punshhh

Evidence could be anything. You show, we take a look. (And we may also try to differentiate.)

As I said to Enai De A Lucil, the fact that I exist is evidence of the existence of God. — Punshhh

Evidence of ... what exactly?

How could I possibly exist without God bringing me into existence? — Punshhh

http://encyclopedia.kids.net.au/page/lo/Logical_fallacy___Lack_of_imagination

Evidence could be anything. You show, we take a look. — jorndoe

Exactly. Russell said there was not 'enough evidence' for God's existence. But everything is evidence. Every dust mote, every star, planet and galaxy. The question is 'What is it evidence for?. "Evidence for" is subjective. It is how we interpret the evidence.

"Evidence for" is subjective. It is how we interpret the evidence. — EnPassant

Yet the claim is that this God of yours exists entirely independently of us and our interpretations, yes?
Incidentally, also mentioned something about this (reality and such).
Our interpretations are the adjustable parts.
Mentioned something about how we typically differentiate a few times by now. How might we differentiate?

If you cannot differentiate whether, say, Shiva or Yahweh are fictional or real, then why insist (and preach indoctrinate proselytize) that they're real in the first place? (If pressed, I might take this a step further, and say that some such activities converge on fraud or deception.)

How is that an attribute?

It is the ability to bring me and/or the world in which I live, into existence.

Evidence could be anything. You show, we take a look.

I gave you my evidence in my last reply to you.

Evidence of ... what exactly?

You may have noticed by now, I am saying that we as human minds can't determine what exactly, with any philosophical rigour.

How could I possibly exist without God bringing me into existence?
— Punshhh

This was a question, not an assertion, or an assumption. Care to answer it?

Yet the claim is that this God of yours exists entirely independently of us and our interpretations, yes?
Incidentally — jorndoe

Not entirely. God can be known as a person. That is not total knowledge of God, it is an aspect of God that God wants the individual to understand.

It is the ability to bring me and/or the world in which I live, into existence. — Punshhh

Ok, but there is an implicit assumption here: That "God" is the creator, and not some other player in the world. That's not something you got from observing the world. That's you defining a term.

This was a question, not an assertion, or an assumption. Care to answer it? — Punshhh

Yet there is an assertion implicit in the question, "God", which I've inquired about for a bit now.

Here are some more word tricks, FYI:
• Have you stopped beating your spouse? (either way suggests you've been beating them)
• Is the king of France bald or not? (either way suggests there is a king of France)
Implicit presuppositional failure. ⚡

(You could at least have posted "God is the all-creator, hence the answer to my question follows.") ;)

Anyways, what exactly are you asking, then, if not about "life, the universe, and everything"? (I'll assume responding "my parents" will trigger a number of other questions, diallelus style.)

You miss a relevant point — it's not about whatever I don't know, it's about the claims of those that pretend they do, without which a good lot such discussions wouldn't have come about in the first place.

how might we differentiate whether (fictional) characters, (imaginary) beings, (hallucinatory) claims are real or not?

Not entirely. God can be known as a person. That is not total knowledge of God, it is an aspect of God that God wants the individual to understand. — EnPassant

Not quite what I meant, apologies for being unclear. You're apparently referring to whatever you (claim to) know, i.e. epistemic, whereas (I think) was referring to the truth of the matter, so more ontological. In other words, by your claim, the mere existence of this God of yours is entirely independent of any/all of us and our beliefs, interpretations, daily lives, etc, right? Whatever we may or may not believe has no bearing on the mere existence of your God (according to your claim)?

I know a few persons, presumably you do as well. You also claim to know a person you label God. Would this be Knowing by Acquaintance?
The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy article also lists Knowledge-That, Knowledge-Wh, and Knowing-How, by the way.
Offhand, I'll venture to guess "no", at least not in any way that lends itself to answer ...

how might we differentiate whether (fictional) characters, (imaginary) beings, (hallucinatory) claims are real or not?

... like most other acquaintance. (Also check here and here.)

Even in a computer you can't have abstraction only. You have to go the the shop and buy a substantial computer if you want to compute. — EnPassant

Sure, but that computer is made of stuff that can be described perfectly by more mathematical abstractions... such that the computer itself might be a simulation inside another computer, which itself might be a simulation, inside another computer, that might be a simulation, etc. That’s alternating between getting down to a perfect mathematical description of the thing in question, and then supposing that that structure is implemented atop another structure, of which we can give another perfect abstract description, before supposing that that is implemented atop yet another structure, and so on. Why stop at the “and there’s some other structure this is implemented on top of, no deeper details of which can ever possible be known” step, instead of the “and here is the most perfect abstract description of things, which is not implemented atop any deeper structure” step?

That begs the question; you can grow cabbages on the real territory but not on the map, so there's a difference. — EnPassant

If you can’t do something with the “perfect” map that you can do with the territory, then its not really a perfect map.

Theism = the position/belief that God exists. So, yeah, that's what you said. And that wasn't the part that was a problem, obviously.

this God of yours is entirely independent of any/all of us and our beliefs, interpretations, daily lives, etc, right? — jorndoe

Our beliefs about God tell us something about God. They may be simple compared to the reality of God but they provide a context in which to comprehend God. George Harrison said "God is not a man with a beard in the clouds - but He is if you want Him to be" In other words, it does not really matter what images we have of God (so long as they are reasonable). What matters is our religious imagery is good enough to form a context into which God can enter.

I know a few persons, presumably you do as well. You also claim to know a person you label God. Would this be Knowing by Acquaintance? — jorndoe

Yes. God can be present in whatever form is acceptable to the witness.

how might we differentiate whether (fictional) characters, (imaginary) beings, (hallucinatory) claims are real or not?

In much the same way as you would discriminate between dreams and reality. There is no clear answer. How do you know you are not dreaming right now? Probably because your present state is similar to all other non dreaming states. You are familiar with reality and can tell you are not dreaming. Likewise with questions about the difference between hallucination and vivid reality. It is not possible to give an exact test between the two but one knows in more subtle ways. The reality of mind and thought is more real than physical tables and chairs. Thought is the source of the world and of matter.

If you can’t do something with the “perfect” map that you can do with the territory, then its not really a perfect map. — Pfhorrest

Ok, I'm getting your drift. If the world is really a 'mathematical' abstraction then how is it possible to construct such a world from the atoms and primitive axioms of mathematics?
For example how does 1 + 1 = 2 become 'substantial' enough to evolve into higher and more sophisticated mathematical entities, like group theory etc? Because if mathematics can become something like substance the very atoms of it must also be capable of becoming such. But I don't see how 1 + 1 = 2 can have any reality at all unless it exists in a mind. Abstractions might seem very potent to us but that is because our minds animate them and give them a kind of reality. It seems to me that mind is required to give mathematics any degree of potency. So mind must first exist if abstractions are to exist.

The short answer is that numbers aren't the basic elements of math; sets are. Numbers are made of them, as are all other mathematical objects. For the long answer...

First we define a series of sets, starting with the empty set, and then a set that only contains that one empty set, and then a set that only contains those two preceding sets, and then a set that contains only those three preceding sets, and so on, at each step of the series defining the next set as the union of the previous set and a set containing only that previous set. We can then define some set operations (which I won't detail here) that relate those sets in that series to each other in the same way that the arithmetic operations of addition and multiplication relate natural numbers to each other. We could name those sets and those operations however we like, but if we name the series of sets "zero", "one", "two", "three", and so on, and name those operations "addition" and "multiplication", then when we talk about those operations on that series of sets, there is no way to tell if we are just talking about some made-up operations on a made-up series of sets, or if we were talking about actual addition and multiplication on actual natural numbers: all of the same things would be necessarily true in both cases, e.g. doing the set operation we called "addition" on the set we called "two" and another copy of that set called "two" creates the set that we called "four". Because these sets and these operations on them are fundamentally indistinguishable from addition and multiplication on numbers, they are functionally identical: those operations on those sets just are the same thing as addition and multiplication on the natural numbers.

All kinds of mathematical structures, by which I don't just mean a whole lot of different mathematical structures but literally every mathematical structure studied in mathematics today, can be built up out of sets this way. The integers, or whole numbers, can be built out of the natural numbers (which are built out of sets) as equivalence classes (a kind of set) of ordered pairs (a kind of set) of natural numbers, meaning in short that each integer is identical to some set of equivalent sets of two natural numbers in order, those sets of two natural numbers in order that are equal when one is subtracted from the other: the integers are all the things you can get by subtracting one natural number from another. Similarly, the rational numbers can be defined as equivalence classes of ordered pairs of integers in a way that means that the rationals are the things you can get by dividing one integer by another. The real numbers, including irrational numbers like pi and the square root of 2, can be constructed out of sets of rational numbers in a process too complicated to detail here (something called a Dedekind-complete ordered field, where a field is itself a kind of set). The complex numbers, including things like the square root of negative one, can be constructed out of ordered pairs of real numbers; and further hypercomplex numbers, including things called quaternions and octonions, can be built out of larger ordered sets of real numbers, which are built out of complicated sets of rational numbers, which are built out of sets of integers, which are built out of sets of natural numbers, which are built out of sets built out of sets of just the empty set. So from nothing but the empty set, we can build up to all complicated manner of fancy numbers.

But it is not just numbers that can be built out of sets. For example, all manner of geometric objects are also built out of sets as well. All abstract geometric objects can be reduced to sets of abstract geometric points, and a kind of function called a coordinate system maps such sets of points onto sets of numbers in a one-to-one manner, which is hence reversible: a coordinate system can be seen as turning sets of numbers into sets of points as well. For example, the set of real numbers can be mapped onto the usual kind of straight, continuous line considered in elementary geometry, and so the real numbers can be considered to form such a line; similarly, the complex numbers can be considered to form a flat, continuous plane. Different coordinate systems can map different numbers to different points without changing any features of the resulting geometric object, so the points, of which all geometric objects are built, can be considered the equivalence classes (a kind of set) of all the numbers (also made of sets) that any possible coordinate system could map to them. Things like lines and planes are examples of the more general type of object called a space. Spaces can be very different in nature depending on exactly how they are constructed, but a space that locally resembles the usual kind of straight and flat spaces we intuitively speak of (called Euclidian spaces) is an object called a manifold, and such a space that, like the real number line and the complex number plane, is continuous in the way required to do calculus on it, is called a differentiable manifold. Such a differentiable manifold is basically just a slight generalization of the usual kind of flat, continuous space we intuitively think of space as being, and it, as shown, can be built entirely out of sets of sets of ultimately empty sets.

Meanwhile, a special type of set defined such that any two elements in it can be combined through some operation to produce a third element of it, in a way obeying a few rules that I won't detail here, constitutes a mathematical object called a group. A differentiable manifold, being a set, can also be a group, if it follows the rules that define a group, and when it does, that is called a Lie group. Also meanwhile, another special kind of set whose members can be sorted into a two-dimensional array constitutes a mathematical object called a matrix, which can be treated in many ways like a fancy kind of number that can be added, multiplied, etc. A square matrix (one with its dimensions being of equal length) of complex numbers that obeys some other rules that I once again won't detail here is called a unitary matrix. Matrices can be the "numbers" that make up a geometric space, including a differentiable manifold, including a Lie group, and when a Lie group is made of unitary matrices, it constitutes a unitary group. And lastly, a unitary group that obeys another rule I won't bother detailing here is called a special unitary group. This makes a special unitary group essentially a space of the kind we would intuitively expect a space to be like — locally flat-ish, smooth and continuous, etc — but where every point in that space is a particular kind of square matrix of complex numbers, that all obey certain rules under certain operations on them, with different kinds of special unitary groups being made of matrices of different sizes.

That special unitary group is considered by contemporary theories of physics to be the fundamental kind of thing that the most elementary physical objects, quantum fields, are literally made of. Excitations of those quantum fields, which is to say particular states of those special unitary groups, constitute the fundamental particles of physics, which combine to make atoms, molecules, stars, planets, living cells, and organisms, including us. So in a very distant way we can be said to be made of empty sets.

(And as all of the truth functions, and so all the set operations, and all the other functions built out of set operations, can be built out of just joint denial, and the objects they act upon are built up out of empty sets, everything can in a sense be said to be made out of negations of nothing)

God does exist but the idea of God is minute when compared to more accurate maxims, such as: a theory of a universe-creator who's character was less fantastical, and more scientific.

God, seems as if it's a story written by love-foolishness, instead of with self-control, who would've expanded on the original idea.

I agree with notions such as:
1. God watches us.
2. God is just.
3. God created the universe.
4. God is super-powerful, more probably by way of a super-computer; and less probably by way of super-computational super-power.

I don't agree with notions such as:
1. God agrees with the bible.
2. God is Christian.
3. God loves us.
4. God is a superhero.

Ok, but there is an implicit assumption here: That "God" is the creator, and not some other player in the world. That's not something you got from observing the world. That's you defining a term.

Can you give me your reasoning that God can't be both the creator and some other player in the world? It isn't an assumption I have made.

You miss a relevant point — it's not about whatever I don't know, it's about the claims of those that pretend they do, without which a good lot such discussions wouldn't have come about in the first place.

This is a possible weakness in my position, but actually my position is quite different to what one might expect here. My position is, as I stated initially, that anything a human mind, or a number of human minds in discussion may say, or conclude on this issue is irrelevant to the reality of our situation. The reality is unknown, when I say God I am referring to any real God which was/is involved.

Or another way to view it is, on the assumption that we don't know, or are unable to determine if we can know, the means of our origins (so all bets are off). What can we say about the real, or actual means of our origins? Is there a G/god involved, or if not, what is the alternative?

Theism = the position/belief that God exists. So, yeah, that's what you said. And that wasn't the part that was a problem, obviously.

But I'm not adopting those positions, I'm saying that were there evidence of a God, myself, or "the world" I inhabit is an excellent piece of evidence of that reality.

Indeed it is such a strong piece of evidence that I would require a thorough explanation of my origins coming about by some other means, for me to change my mind on this.

The short answer is that numbers aren't the basic elements of math; sets are. Numbers are made of them, as are all other mathematical objects. — Pfhorrest

I know but it doesn't matter how you define these things the question still remains,
how can {0} U {0} = {{0},{0}} have an existence unless it exists in a mind? And if the fundamentals can't 'self-exist' how can the more sophisticated mathematical objects be built on them?

My position is that the fundamentals can self-exist, because we necessarily have no way of knowing whether the mathematical structure that is identical to our physical universe is dependent on any deeper fundamentally inaccessible structure, so as far as we can tell it does self-exist, and if it can self-exist, there's no reason to suppose that all other mathematical structures don't as well. We can "discover" these other structures by "inventing" them (discovery and invention of ideas being not really different on my account), because our minds, like everything, are necessarily limited by the same logical possibilities as those structures, so something that we can think of is necessarily something that can exist, and if everything that can exist does exist...

I can't decide if I'm being trolled or not. You said: "My evidence for the existence of God is my existence". I interpreted this to mean that you believe God exists, and your evidence for this belief is your own existence. You're saying now that this not what you intended by this sentence (i.e. "I'm not adopting those positions") and that I've misinterpreted you somehow here? Care to clarify, if that's so?