What they're saying is that the claim that there isn't a difference is wrong because there is a difference, — Michael
They're simply pointing out that the person is making a conflation, because that's all there seems to be to it. — Terrapin Station
But Berkeley's claim is that they are the same thing, not different things, and so the conflation is justified. — Michael
His very argument is that the set of sensations is the object itself. — Michael
To answer his claim by saying that they aren't the same thing isn't to refute his position but to just deny it. — Michael
And if you're trying to prove that his position is wrong — Michael
Sure. But that doesn't make saying that someone is making a conflation an example of question-begging. That's a fortiori the case if the person saying that it's a conflation isn't forwarding an argument. Question-begging only obtains in the context of an argument. That's my only point here, that it's not question-begging. I'm fine with saying that it's not a refutation or an argument. That means that it's not question-begging. — Terrapin Station
His very argument is that the set of sensations is the object itself — Michael
Isn't this something that's immediately obvious? What arguments could you raise against this? — hunterkf5732
It wouldn't have to be a formal argument. For one, I don't think it's immediately obvious because it sure doesn't seem to be the case. When I perceive something, what I'm perceiving doesn't seem to be a "set of sensations," it seems to be a computer screen, or a building across the street, or whatever. That seems rather obvious to me instead. So I'd need what I consider a good reason to believe otherwise. — Terrapin Station
Yeah, if it is just a set of sensations, but it doesn't seem to be, and there's no good reason in my view to believe that it is.If a computer screen just is a set of sensations then that you see a computer screen isn't that you don't see a set of sensations. — Michael
So it needs to be obvious that the computer screen you see isn't just a set of sensations. — Michael
How can there be anything in the image of a thing that isn't a type of visual sensation? — Michael
I'm not talking about the perception per se (presumably what we're talking about re "the image of a thing"), but what the perception is of. — Terrapin Station
"the perception is identical to what's perceived" then there's no grounds for even saying that it's a perception in the first place.
Then you're saying something akin to "The Persistence of Memory is a painting of clocks, not a painting of paint". That doesn't change the fact that the clocks are just paint. — Michael
You need to do more than just talk about what the perception is of — Michael
how can seeing a computer screen show you that there's more to the computer screen than visual sensations? — Michael
If the painting is identical to what is painted then there's no grounds for even saying that it's a painting in the first place? — Michael
Well, except that I don't think that perception works like painting. The representationalist view is that it works like painitng, where we can only know the painting, and where we have no way of knowing whether the painting is photorealist, surrealist, Fauvist, etc. I don't think that view is well-supported at all. — Terrapin Station
Need to for what?
I wouldn't phrase that as "more to it," it's rather that it's simply not identical to the visual sensations, otherwise it would be "visual sensations" and not a computer screen in the first place.
First, in order to say that it's a painting, you'd have to have some point of distinction to that. You'd not even know what a painting was if that's all that you could experience, all you could know. You're saying that it's a painting because you're mentally bracketing it off from things that are not paintings. Paintings are a type of thing, but not the only thing, in the world. Well, if we change that, so that at least epistemically, that's all there is to the world, there's nothing to bracket it off from. It would simply be that clock, it wouldn't be "this is a painting of a clock." What could make it a painting to someone who only knows the painting? So a computer screen would appear, not a visual experience of computer screen. It's just a computer screen if we're saying they're identical. To say it's a visual experience of a computer screen, you need to bracket off visual experiences from computer screens.
The point is that it's not enough to say "it's a perception of a computer, not a perception of visual sensations". You also have to say "the computer I see isn't just visual sensations". So all this talk about what perception is of is a red herring. — Michael
But the question remains; if a painting of a clock cannot show us that the clock that's painted is something other than the paint that makes up the painting then how can the perception of a clock show us that the clock that's perceived is something other than the sensory qualities that make up the perception? — Michael
I can say that this is a painting of a clock and that the clock is just paint. — Michael
In my opinion that's ridiculous. If someone says "it's a perception of a computer, not a perception of visual sensations," then obviously they don't believe that the first clause is visual sensations. Because otherwise their sentence would make no sense. — Terrapin Station
What you're seeing isn't mental stuff, you're seeing the clock (where the clock isn't mental stuff obviously). You're claiming that you're only seeing mental stuff. That claim isn't supported.
The mental stuff is the act of seeing, but it's not what you're seeing.
In a thought experiment, let's say that there's only a painting--that's the whole world. So obviously you can't know anything else.
Now, in that hypothetical world, how can we get to a point of saying that the clock in the painting is a painting? How would we know that it's a painting?
Compare with "it's a painting of a unicorn, not a painting of paint". But the unicorn is just paint. Or "it's a story about the battle of Hogwarts, not a story about a story". But the battle of Hogwarts is just a story. — Michael
But the unicorn is still just the paint, not some painting-independent thing. — Michael
You're conflating intentionality and ontology. — Michael
That's one view. It's not like someone has to be saying that just because it's your view. — Terrapin Station
If someone said either one of those, would you read them as saying that the unicorn is just paint or that Hogwarts is just a story respectively? Or would they need to spell that out for you to understand that they're not saying that a unicorn is just paint or that Hogwarts isn't just a story?
You're conflating perception and what the perception is of--not "about." "Aboutness" would imply that we're just talking about mental stuff still. I'm saying that what the perception is of is not mental stuff. You know that because you perceive stuff that isn't mental. You're looking at something that isn't mental. The mental part, again, is the act of perceiving the stuff in question. It's not a matter of intentionality.
For the last part, I'm not going to pay any attention to anything except for how you'd know that it's not a painting, because I'm interested in your thinking about that and responding to it. I'm not going to just slide with not thinking about it/not answering the question. I can just keep asking if you don't want to think about it and answer it, but you want to keep responding to it obliquely.
So you're saying that if I show you a painting of a unicorn then you'd say that the painted unicorn is made of something other than paint? — Michael
I don't understand what you're asking here. — Michael
I'm simply explaining that there's no contradiction in saying "I'm reading about a magical war, not about a story, but this magical war is just a story". And there's no contradiction in saying "this is a painting of a unicorn, not of paint, but this unicorn is just paint". — Michael
The "aboutness" is irrelevant. — Michael
You can see cats and cups and clocks and any number of things, but in terms of ontology, it's all just various patterns of colours and whatever other sensory qualities are involved (according to Berkeley). — Michael
Of course, you're also changing this to "what is the painted unicorn made out of" above. — Terrapin Station
You mentioned intentionality. If intentionality was irrelevant, then I don't know what you're saying re the conflation you claimed.
Thats one view. It's not a view I share. As I said, I disagree that the painting analogy works. I already said that, so i don't know why I'm having to repeat it.It was the original point all along. The painted unicorn is made out of paint. The perceived chair is made out of mental stuff. — Michael
The point is that you can't go from "the painted unicorn is made out of paint" to "the painting isn't of a unicorn" — Michael
So "i see a chair" doesn't entail materialism and doesn't exclude idealism. — Michael
You were saying that because the perception isn't of mental stuff then idealism fails. — Michael
There's nothing contradictory about any of this. — Michael
What? No, I didn't say anything like that. It seems to me that you're maybe reading statements of alternate views as necessarily being arguments (and more or less formal logical arguments at that) that are claiming to refute the view they're presented in contradistinction to. I don't know why you'd be reading comments that way, but it seems like maybe that's what you're doing. — Terrapin Station
I wasn't saying there was anything contradictory about anything.
That isn't what I said earlier. I said that if someone were to say that a painting of a unicorn and a unicorn (what the painting is of) are not the same thing, then they shouldn't have to additionally spell out for you that in their view, a unicorn isn't made of paint. You should be able to deduce that simply from them saying that a painting of a unicorn and a unicorn aren't the same thing. That's very different than someone saying that the painting isn't of a unicorn.
Thats one view. It's not a view I share. As I said, I disagree that the painting analogy works. I already said that, so i don't know why I'm having to repeat it.
I understood this as you saying that because the perception is (obviously) of a chair then you don't have a good reason to believe in idealism. — Michael
So you seem to be saying that it's a contradiction to say . . . — Michael
I've seen interpretations that talk about "Being" as that which makes meaning possible or, alternatively, as a sort of invisible or receding framework in which or through which beings are disclosed. I roughly associate a sort of anti-metaphysical insight here with an idiosyncratic understanding of ordinary language philosophy. To speak intelligibly, we seem to depend on a "background" of practices that we cannot get perfectly clear about. But this anti-metaphysical insight is arguably obliterated (the medium defeating the message) when expressed in "grandiose" or highly technical ways. — R-13
his is a strong point. I personally don't feel that alienation and dehumanization are becoming more widespread. I can't identify with such a gloomy view. Sure, the world refuses to conform to individual desires, but this strikes me as nothing new. — R-13
Finally, I'd be curious to see how you might elaborate on your own interpretation of Heidegger, especially on the being issue and its relevance. — R-13
I don't think it's absurd. And this is how I've understood Heidegger's "ethical" appeal. I think Nietzsche was right when he suggested that we look the ethics of a philosophy to see its core. Everything radiates outward from the kind of "hero" the philosopher takes himself to be. I'd split philosophers as a first approximation into 2 groups. The first group counsels the community as a whole (perhaps saving it from a self-destructive or degrading forgetfulness of being or perhaps the belief in God or perhaps from its atheism). The second group counsels individuals. Nietzsche himself switches back and forth. The grandiose fantasy (which is admittedly tempting!) of being a "world historical" thinker requires one to play the first role. As far as the second role goes, it's hard to improve upon Epicurus, Epictetus, etc. The "atomized" or Hellenistic philosopher accepts and affirms the loss of the community. The social or world-historical philosopher is basically "running for election."here may be something uniquely threatening about our modern condition, in which all beings, including humans, are reduced to the one-dimensional level of exploitable resource. This experiment seems to be getting beyond our control, and nothing less than a radical shift in our understanding of Being can save us from this danger. I honestly don't think this insight of Heidegger's is as far-fetched or absurd as it sounds. — Erik
I would tentatively say that I see Heidegger as someone who tries to infuse our existence with a (re)new(ed) sense of wonder, the sort which seems to have shaped the greatness of the ancient Greek world (at least in art, philosophy, and a few other areas) but that's largely non-existent these days. I think this is a worthy goal. I also appreciate his attempt to displace human existence from our current sense of imperious subjectivity, while simultaneously giving us an even more profound sense of dignity through our relatedness to something much 'greater' than ourselves, to Being. His is a nuanced position, I think: it's more concerned with asking difficult questions than with giving easy answers; it sees the material world as radiating a profound sense of 'spiritual' significance; it's very this-worldly without being reductionist; it finds the extraordinary in the ordinary; it's revolutionary while also being respectful of the tradition. In other words, this is a unique perspective which isn't easy to categorize according to standard oppositions like religious/atheistic, progressive/reactionary, etc. All of this resonates with me a great deal and has influenced my thinking on a variety of topics. — Erik
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