What they're saying is that the claim that there isn't a difference is wrong because there is a difference, — Michael

No they're not, unless they explicitly say that. They're simply pointing out that the person is making a conflation, because that's all there seems to be to it. It's like when someone walks out of the bathroom with toilet paper on their shoe. You're just pointing out that they have toilet paper stuck to their shoe. You're not arguing that they have toilet paper stuck to their shoe because they have toilet paper stuck to their shoe, as if the because clause is a needed explanatory justification of saying "You've got toilet paper stuck to your shoe." The situation is different if you learn that the toilet paper is there because they wanted it to be there.

They're simply pointing out that the person is making a conflation, because that's all there seems to be to it. — Terrapin Station

But Berkeley's claim is that they are the same thing, not different things, and so the conflation is justified. His very argument is that the set of sensations is the object itself. To answer his claim by saying that they aren't the same thing isn't to refute his position but to just deny it. And if you're trying to prove that his position is wrong, to simply assert that it's wrong is to beg the question.

But Berkeley's claim is that they are the same thing, not different things, and so the conflation is justified. — Michael

Okay, as I noted, I can't at all recall Berkeley's argument, if any, for this. It's been ages since I've read him.

His very argument is that the set of sensations is the object itself. — Michael

That's not actually an argument, it's just a claim. But yeah, maybe he had some argument to support that claim.

To answer his claim by saying that they aren't the same thing isn't to refute his position but to just deny it. — Michael

Sure. But that doesn't make saying that someone is making a conflation an example of question-begging. That's a fortiori the case if the person saying that it's a conflation isn't forwarding an argument. Question-begging only obtains in the context of an argument. That's my only point here, that it's not question-begging. I'm fine with saying that it's not a refutation or an argument. That means that it's not question-begging.

And if you're trying to prove that his position is wrong — Michael

I don't know why anyone would even be doing that. We're talking about empirical claims for one. They're not provable, and I wouldn't say they're really falsifiable, either, a la Duhem-Quine.

Well, he believed in that too - just not objects outside of any set of ideas.

Sure. But that doesn't make saying that someone is making a conflation an example of question-begging. That's a fortiori the case if the person saying that it's a conflation isn't forwarding an argument. Question-begging only obtains in the context of an argument. That's my only point here, that it's not question-begging. I'm fine with saying that it's not a refutation or an argument. That means that it's not question-begging. — Terrapin Station

Right, but my comments were directed at mosesquine who claimed that this accusation of conflation was a refutation of Berkeley.

Okay--that could be. I wasn't paying much attention to what mosesquine said. I was speaking more generally.

His very argument is that the set of sensations is the object itself — Michael

Isn't this something that's immediately obvious? What arguments could you raise against this?

Wittgenstein and Sartre are in the running.

Isn't this something that's immediately obvious? What arguments could you raise against this? — hunterkf5732

Maybe:

P1. The object exists even when it isn't seen
P2. A set of sensations cannot exist when it isn't seen
C. Therefore, the object is not a set of sensations

It wouldn't have to be a formal argument. For one, I don't think it's immediately obvious because it sure doesn't seem to be the case. When I perceive something, what I'm perceiving doesn't seem to be a "set of sensations," it seems to be a computer screen, or a building across the street, or whatever. That seems rather obvious to me instead. So I'd need what I consider a good reason to believe otherwise.

It wouldn't have to be a formal argument. For one, I don't think it's immediately obvious because it sure doesn't seem to be the case. When I perceive something, what I'm perceiving doesn't seem to be a "set of sensations," it seems to be a computer screen, or a building across the street, or whatever. That seems rather obvious to me instead. So I'd need what I consider a good reason to believe otherwise. — Terrapin Station

If a computer screen just is a set of sensations then that you see a computer screen isn't that you don't see a set of sensations.

So it needs to be obvious that the computer screen you see isn't just a set of sensations. It needs to be obvious that there's more to the computer screen you see than colour and degree of brightness (as contrasted with the colours and degrees of brightness surrounding it). But according to Berkeley this isn't the case, and it might even be impossible. How can there be anything in the image of a thing that isn't a sensory quality?

If a computer screen just is a set of sensations then that you see a computer screen isn't that you don't see a set of sensations. — Michael

Yeah, if it is just a set of sensations, but it doesn't seem to be, and there's no good reason in my view to believe that it is.

So it needs to be obvious that the computer screen you see isn't just a set of sensations. — Michael

Well, I don't know if it needs to be, but as I mentioned in the post you're responding to, that does seem obvious to me. ("That seems rather obvious to me instead.")

How can there be anything in the image of a thing that isn't a type of visual sensation? — Michael

I'm not talking about the perception per se (presumably what we're talking about re "the image of a thing"), but what the perception is of.

Another point of this, by the way, that I've brought up before, is that if we get to "the perception is identical to what's perceived" then there's no grounds for even saying that it's a perception in the first place. There'd be no ground for saying that there's not just a computer monitor, and it's not a perception at all. To talk about it in terms of a perception is to already assume the realist view. But if you don't do that, and you just have the computer monitor where it's not a perception, then we're back to realism anyway.

I'm not talking about the perception per se (presumably what we're talking about re "the image of a thing"), but what the perception is of. — Terrapin Station

Then you're saying something akin to "The Persistence of Memory is a painting of clocks, not a painting of paint". That doesn't change the fact that the clocks are just paint. So saying that "the perception is of a computer screen, not of sensations" doesn't say anything about whether or not the computer screen is just a set of sensations.

You need to do more than just talk about what the perception is of. You need to talk about the ontological nature of that intentional object.

Your perception is of a computer screen, but that computer screen is a set of sensations (according to Berkeley).

Just as a painting of a clock can't show you that there's more to the clock than the paint, how can seeing a computer screen show you that there's more to the computer screen than visual sensations?

"the perception is identical to what's perceived" then there's no grounds for even saying that it's a perception in the first place.

If the painting is identical to what is painted then there's no grounds for even saying that it's a painting in the first place? I don't think so. The Persistence of Memory is a painting (of clocks), even though there's nothing more to those clocks than the paint itself. So my perception is a perception (of a computer screen) even though there's nothing more to that computer screen than the visual sensation itself.

Then you're saying something akin to "The Persistence of Memory is a painting of clocks, not a painting of paint". That doesn't change the fact that the clocks are just paint. — Michael

Well, except that I don't think that perception works like painting. The representationalist view is that it works like painitng, where we can only know the painting, and where we have no way of knowing whether the painting is photorealist, surrealist, Fauvist, etc. I don't think that view is well-supported at all.

You need to do more than just talk about what the perception is of — Michael

Need to for what?

how can seeing a computer screen show you that there's more to the computer screen than visual sensations? — Michael

I wouldn't phrase that as "more to it," it's rather that it's simply not identical to the visual sensations, otherwise it would be "visual sensations" and not a computer screen in the first place.

If the painting is identical to what is painted then there's no grounds for even saying that it's a painting in the first place? — Michael

First, in order to say that it's a painting, you'd have to have some point of distinction to that. You'd not even know what a painting was if that's all that you could experience, all you could know. You're saying that it's a painting because you're mentally bracketing it off from things that are not paintings. Paintings are a type of thing, but not the only thing, in the world. Well, if we change that, so that at least epistemically, that's all there is to the world, there's nothing to bracket it off from. It would simply be that clock, it wouldn't be "this is a painting of a clock." What could make it a painting to someone who only knows the painting? So a computer screen would appear, not a visual experience of computer screen. It's just a computer screen if we're saying they're identical. To say it's a visual experience of a computer screen, you need to bracket off visual experiences from computer screens.

Well, except that I don't think that perception works like painting. The representationalist view is that it works like painitng, where we can only know the painting, and where we have no way of knowing whether the painting is photorealist, surrealist, Fauvist, etc. I don't think that view is well-supported at all. — Terrapin Station

The point is that it's not enough to say "it's a perception of a computer, not a perception of visual sensations". You also have to say "the computer I see isn't just visual sensations". So all this talk about what perception is of is a red herring.

Need to for what?

If you want to make a claim that isn't consistent with idealism you need to do more than just say "the perception is of the computer". You also need to say "the computer I see isn't just visual sensations".

I wouldn't phrase that as "more to it," it's rather that it's simply not identical to the visual sensations, otherwise it would be "visual sensations" and not a computer screen in the first place.

Being visual sensations and being a computer screen isn't necessarily mutually exclusive. If idealism is the case then even if it's visual sensations it's still a computer screen. So simply saying that it's a computer screen doesn't address the issue at all.

But the question remains; if a painting of a clock cannot show us that the clock that's painted is something other than the paint that makes up the painting then how can the perception of a clock show us that the clock that's perceived is something other than the sensory qualities that make up the perception?

First, in order to say that it's a painting, you'd have to have some point of distinction to that. You'd not even know what a painting was if that's all that you could experience, all you could know. You're saying that it's a painting because you're mentally bracketing it off from things that are not paintings. Paintings are a type of thing, but not the only thing, in the world. Well, if we change that, so that at least epistemically, that's all there is to the world, there's nothing to bracket it off from. It would simply be that clock, it wouldn't be "this is a painting of a clock." What could make it a painting to someone who only knows the painting? So a computer screen would appear, not a visual experience of computer screen. It's just a computer screen if we're saying they're identical. To say it's a visual experience of a computer screen, you need to bracket off visual experiences from computer screens.

I don't really understand how this addresses my point. I can say that this is a painting of a clock and that the clock is just paint. So I can say that this is a perception of a clock and that the clock is just sensory qualities. I don't need for the painted clock to be separate from the paint for there to be a painting of a clock and so I don't need for the perceived clock to be separate from the sensory qualities for there to be a perception of a clock.

The point is that it's not enough to say "it's a perception of a computer, not a perception of visual sensations". You also have to say "the computer I see isn't just visual sensations". So all this talk about what perception is of is a red herring. — Michael

In my opinion that's ridiculous. If someone says "it's a perception of a computer, not a perception of visual sensations," then obviously they don't believe that the first clause is visual sensations. Because otherwise their sentence would make no sense.

But the question remains; if a painting of a clock cannot show us that the clock that's painted is something other than the paint that makes up the painting then how can the perception of a clock show us that the clock that's perceived is something other than the sensory qualities that make up the perception? — Michael

What you're seeing isn't mental stuff, you're seeing the clock (where the clock isn't mental stuff obviously). You're claiming that you're only seeing mental stuff. That claim isn't supported.

The mental stuff is the act of seeing, but it's not what you're seeing.

I can say that this is a painting of a clock and that the clock is just paint. — Michael

In a thought experiment, let's say that there's only a painting--that's the whole world. So obviously you can't know anything else.

Now, in that hypothetical world, how can we get to a point of saying that the clock in the painting is a painting? How would we know that it's a painting?

In my opinion that's ridiculous. If someone says "it's a perception of a computer, not a perception of visual sensations," then obviously they don't believe that the first clause is visual sensations. Because otherwise their sentence would make no sense. — Terrapin Station

Compare with "it's a painting of a unicorn, not a painting of paint". But the unicorn is just paint. Or "it's a story about the battle of Hogwarts, not a story about a story". But the battle of Hogwarts is just a story.

What you're seeing isn't mental stuff, you're seeing the clock (where the clock isn't mental stuff obviously). You're claiming that you're only seeing mental stuff. That claim isn't supported.

The mental stuff is the act of seeing, but it's not what you're seeing.

Again, that's like saying that it's a painting of a unicorn, not a painting of paint. But the unicorn is still just the paint, not some painting-independent thing. You're conflating intentionality and ontology.

In a thought experiment, let's say that there's only a painting--that's the whole world. So obviously you can't know anything else.

Now, in that hypothetical world, how can we get to a point of saying that the clock in the painting is a painting? How would we know that it's a painting?

Compare with "there's only matter - that's the whole world; the clock is just matter". The idealist just says that the world is made up of sensory qualities rather than material stuff.

Compare with "it's a painting of a unicorn, not a painting of paint". But the unicorn is just paint. Or "it's a story about the battle of Hogwarts, not a story about a story". But the battle of Hogwarts is just a story. — Michael

If someone said either one of those, would you read them as saying that the unicorn is just paint or that Hogwarts is just a story respectively? Or would they need to spell that out for you to understand that they're not saying that a unicorn is just paint or that Hogwarts isn't just a story?

But the unicorn is still just the paint, not some painting-independent thing. — Michael

That's one view. It's not like someone has to be saying that just because it's your view.

You're conflating intentionality and ontology. — Michael

You're conflating perception and what the perception is of--not "about." "Aboutness" would imply that we're just talking about mental stuff still. I'm saying that what the perception is of is not mental stuff. You know that because you perceive stuff that isn't mental. You're looking at something that isn't mental. The mental part, again, is the act of perceiving the stuff in question. It's not a matter of intentionality.

For the last part, I'm not going to pay any attention to anything except for how you'd know that it's not a painting, because I'm interested in your thinking about that and responding to it. I'm not going to just slide with not thinking about it/not answering the question. I can just keep asking if you don't want to think about it and answer it, but you want to keep responding to it obliquely.

That's one view. It's not like someone has to be saying that just because it's your view. — Terrapin Station

So you're saying that if I show you a painting of a unicorn then you'd say that the painted unicorn is made of something other than paint?

If someone said either one of those, would you read them as saying that the unicorn is just paint or that Hogwarts is just a story respectively? Or would they need to spell that out for you to understand that they're not saying that a unicorn is just paint or that Hogwarts isn't just a story?

I don't understand what you're asking here. I'm simply explaining that there's no contradiction in saying "I'm reading about a magical war, not about a story, but this magical war is just a story". And there's no contradiction in saying "this is a painting of a unicorn, not of paint, but this unicorn is just paint".

You're conflating perception and what the perception is of--not "about." "Aboutness" would imply that we're just talking about mental stuff still. I'm saying that what the perception is of is not mental stuff. You know that because you perceive stuff that isn't mental. You're looking at something that isn't mental. The mental part, again, is the act of perceiving the stuff in question. It's not a matter of intentionality.

The "aboutness" is irrelevant. I can read a story about wizards and unicorns and any number of things, but in terms of ontology, it's all just words written on a page. And so the "aboutness" of perception is irrelevant. You can see cats and cups and clocks and any number of things, but in terms of ontology, it's all just various patterns of colours and whatever other sensory qualities are involved (according to Berkeley).

For the last part, I'm not going to pay any attention to anything except for how you'd know that it's not a painting, because I'm interested in your thinking about that and responding to it. I'm not going to just slide with not thinking about it/not answering the question. I can just keep asking if you don't want to think about it and answer it, but you want to keep responding to it obliquely.

Then don't pay attention to it. It's quite clear. I don't see what else there is to say.

So you're saying that if I show you a painting of a unicorn then you'd say that the painted unicorn is made of something other than paint? — Michael

I wasn't talking about myself. What was presented was someone who would say that a painting of a unicorn and a unicorn are different.

Of course, you're also changing this to "what is the painted unicorn made out of" above.

I don't understand what you're asking here. — Michael

Okay . . . I don't know why you'd not understand that, but it would probably be too laborious to try to explain it in other words for something that's not that important.

I'm simply explaining that there's no contradiction in saying "I'm reading about a magical war, not about a story, but this magical war is just a story". And there's no contradiction in saying "this is a painting of a unicorn, not of paint, but this unicorn is just paint". — Michael

I wasn't saying anything about contradictions, just common-sensically being able to understand what people are saying without them having to do excessive hand-holding and redundantly spelling things out.

The "aboutness" is irrelevant. — Michael

You mentioned intentionality. If intentionality was irrelevant, then I don't know what you're saying re the conflation you claimed.

You can see cats and cups and clocks and any number of things, but in terms of ontology, it's all just various patterns of colours and whatever other sensory qualities are involved (according to Berkeley). — Michael

That's a view alright.

Of course, you're also changing this to "what is the painted unicorn made out of" above. — Terrapin Station

It was the original point all along. The painted unicorn is made out of paint. The perceived chair is made out of mental stuff. The point is that you can't go from "the painted unicorn is made out of paint" to "the painting isn't of a unicorn" and so you can't go from "the perceived chair is made out of mental stuff" to "the perception isn't of a chair". And so you can neither go from "the painting is of a unicorn" to "the painted unicorn isn't made out of paint" nor from "the perception is of a chair" to "the perceived chair isn't made out of mental stuff".

So "the perception is of a chair" doesn't entail materialism and doesn't exclude idealism.

You mentioned intentionality. If intentionality was irrelevant, then I don't know what you're saying re the conflation you claimed.

You were saying that because the perception isn't of mental stuff then idealism fails. But this confuses intentionality and ontology. What matter is the ontology. The painting might be of a unicorn, but all there is is paint. The story might be of a war, but all there is is words. The perception might be of something that you say isn't mental stuff, but all there is is mental stuff.

There's nothing contradictory about any of this. Which is why all this talk about what the perception is of is irrelevant. It says nothing about the ontology.

It was the original point all along. The painted unicorn is made out of paint. The perceived chair is made out of mental stuff. — Michael

Thats one view. It's not a view I share. As I said, I disagree that the painting analogy works. I already said that, so i don't know why I'm having to repeat it.

The point is that you can't go from "the painted unicorn is made out of paint" to "the painting isn't of a unicorn" — Michael

That isn't what I said earlier. I said that if someone were to say that a painting of a unicorn and a unicorn (what the painting is of) are not the same thing, then they shouldn't have to additionally spell out for you that in their view, a unicorn isn't made of paint. You should be able to deduce that simply from them saying that a painting of a unicorn and a unicorn aren't the same thing. That's very different than someone saying that the painting isn't of a unicorn.

So "i see a chair" doesn't entail materialism and doesn't exclude idealism. — Michael

It's a matter of being able to understand sentences in English. If someone says that a perception of a chair and a chair aren't the same thing, you should be able to figure out that they'd say that the chair isn't just a perception without them having to spell that out to you.

You were saying that because the perception isn't of mental stuff then idealism fails. — Michael

What? No, I didn't say anything like that. It seems to me that you're maybe reading statements of alternate views as necessarily being arguments (and more or less formal logical arguments at that) that are claiming to refute the view they're presented in contradistinction to. I don't know why you'd be reading comments that way, but it seems like maybe that's what you're doing.

There's nothing contradictory about any of this. — Michael

I wasn't saying there was anything contradictory about anything.

What? No, I didn't say anything like that. It seems to me that you're maybe reading statements of alternate views as necessarily being arguments (and more or less formal logical arguments at that) that are claiming to refute the view they're presented in contradistinction to. I don't know why you'd be reading comments that way, but it seems like maybe that's what you're doing. — Terrapin Station

Your exact words were "When I perceive something, what I'm perceiving doesn't seem to be a 'set of sensations,' it seems to be a computer screen, or a building across the street, or whatever. That seems rather obvious to me instead. So I'd need what I consider a good reason to believe otherwise."

I understood this as you saying that because the perception is (obviously) of a chair then you don't have a good reason to believe in idealism. I'm simply pointing out that there's no connection between the perception being of a chair and idealism not being the case. So if I'm misunderstanding you then this is a non sequitur.

I wasn't saying there was anything contradictory about anything.

You said "If someone says 'it's a perception of a computer, not a perception of visual sensations,' then obviously they don't believe that the first clause is visual sensations. Because otherwise their sentence would make no sense." So you seem to be saying that it's a contradiction to say "it's a painting of a unicorn, not a painting of paint, but the painted unicorn is just paint".

That isn't what I said earlier. I said that if someone were to say that a painting of a unicorn and a unicorn (what the painting is of) are not the same thing, then they shouldn't have to additionally spell out for you that in their view, a unicorn isn't made of paint. You should be able to deduce that simply from them saying that a painting of a unicorn and a unicorn aren't the same thing. That's very different than someone saying that the painting isn't of a unicorn.

We'd also say that a story about a war and a war aren't the same thing, but we might still say that the war I'm reading about is just a story.

And so we might say that a perception of a chair and a chair aren't the same thing, but we might still say that the chair I'm seeing is just a set of visual sensations.

Thats one view. It's not a view I share. As I said, I disagree that the painting analogy works. I already said that, so i don't know why I'm having to repeat it.

You don't need to believe it. The point is that in terms of reasoning you can't derive "the painted unicorn isn't paint" from "the painting is of a unicorn", and so you can't derive "the perceived chair isn't a visual sensation" from "the perception is of a chair".

I understood this as you saying that because the perception is (obviously) of a chair then you don't have a good reason to believe in idealism. — Michael

Sure. But how does that at all amount to an argument that idealism fails? "There's no good reason to believe this in my opinion" is very different than "this is an argument for why the alternate view fails."

So you seem to be saying that it's a contradiction to say . . . — Michael

If the person says, "'it's a perception of a computer, not a perception of visual sensations," it should be clear to you that they're saying that computers are not visual sensations. Why? Well, because if they were saying that computers were visual sensations, then we could substitute "visual sensations" for "a computer," and the sentence above would turn into: "'it's a perception of visual sensations, not a perception of visual sensations," That would make no sense, right? So if they say, "'it's a perception of a computer, not a perception of visual sensations," then we know that they're saying that "a computer" isn't visual sensations, and they don't have to make that part explicit.

I've seen interpretations that talk about "Being" as that which makes meaning possible or, alternatively, as a sort of invisible or receding framework in which or through which beings are disclosed. I roughly associate a sort of anti-metaphysical insight here with an idiosyncratic understanding of ordinary language philosophy. To speak intelligibly, we seem to depend on a "background" of practices that we cannot get perfectly clear about. But this anti-metaphysical insight is arguably obliterated (the medium defeating the message) when expressed in "grandiose" or highly technical ways. — R-13

I think that's a good assessment. I picked up my copy of Being and Time today and flipped through the section concerning the 'handiness' of equipment, a section which serves as a point of departure from traditional philosophical speculation regarding ideas, objects, sense data, etc. Bringing that framework into awareness seems an extremely difficult task, and I don't feel Heidegger was being intentionally obscure in his attempt to do so. I also agree that there are obvious parallels between this task of his and that of ordinary language philosophers, especially the later Wittgenstein: the form of life in which our use of language is embedded is akin to our pre-theoretical understanding of things within the context of purposeful, engaged activity.

his is a strong point. I personally don't feel that alienation and dehumanization are becoming more widespread. I can't identify with such a gloomy view. Sure, the world refuses to conform to individual desires, but this strikes me as nothing new. — R-13

You may be right about this. I'll admit a penchant for waxing nostalgic about the past, and also for romanticizing possibilities in which human existence shifts from being based primarily upon economic interests to one characterized by a more poetic, reflective and appreciative disposition. But no, I definitely don't feel at home in this fast-paced technological world. I'm particularly disturbed by the narrow understanding of personal 'success' and the pervasive fixation on related things like speed, productivity, and efficiency which characterize our advanced technological civilization. I'd much rather sit at home and read Plato, for instance, than throw myself into the sort of career-oriented and consumerist lifestyle which occupies most people's time and energy these days.

Anyhow, I do think Heidegger is an astute observer of certain ontological trends which have shaped the way we understand of ourselves and our world throughout history, and the subsequent impact these interpretations have had upon the lives of human beings. There may be something uniquely threatening about our modern condition, in which all beings, including humans, are reduced to the one-dimensional level of exploitable resource. This experiment seems to be getting beyond our control, and nothing less than a radical shift in our understanding of Being can save us from this danger. I honestly don't think this insight of Heidegger's is as far-fetched or absurd as it sounds. I mean, Donald Trump is going to be President of the United States. And what he was up against--a globalized consumer paradise run by 'elites' and technocrats--is perhaps an even more monstrous phenomena. But I digress...

Finally, I'd be curious to see how you might elaborate on your own interpretation of Heidegger, especially on the being issue and its relevance. — R-13

I would tentatively say that I see Heidegger as someone who tries to infuse our existence with a (re)new(ed) sense of wonder, the sort which seems to have shaped the greatness of the ancient Greek world (at least in art, philosophy, and a few other areas) but that's largely non-existent these days. I think this is a worthy goal. I also appreciate his attempt to displace human existence from our current sense of imperious subjectivity, while simultaneously giving us an even more profound sense of dignity through our relatedness to something much 'greater' than ourselves, to Being. His is a nuanced position, I think: it's more concerned with asking difficult questions than with giving easy answers; it sees the material world as radiating a profound sense of 'spiritual' significance; it's very this-worldly without being reductionist; it finds the extraordinary in the ordinary; it's revolutionary while also being respectful of the tradition. In other words, this is a unique perspective which isn't easy to categorize according to standard oppositions like religious/atheistic, progressive/reactionary, etc. All of this resonates with me a great deal and has influenced my thinking on a variety of topics.

That being said, there's quite a bit that I've grown to dislike about Heidegger, and I can try to outline a few of these things if you'd like. It's a cautious appropriation of his work, at least as I understand it and as it relates to the concrete circumstances of my life as being immersed within a much different community than his.

here may be something uniquely threatening about our modern condition, in which all beings, including humans, are reduced to the one-dimensional level of exploitable resource. This experiment seems to be getting beyond our control, and nothing less than a radical shift in our understanding of Being can save us from this danger. I honestly don't think this insight of Heidegger's is as far-fetched or absurd as it sounds. — Erik

I don't think it's absurd. And this is how I've understood Heidegger's "ethical" appeal. I think Nietzsche was right when he suggested that we look the ethics of a philosophy to see its core. Everything radiates outward from the kind of "hero" the philosopher takes himself to be. I'd split philosophers as a first approximation into 2 groups. The first group counsels the community as a whole (perhaps saving it from a self-destructive or degrading forgetfulness of being or perhaps the belief in God or perhaps from its atheism). The second group counsels individuals. Nietzsche himself switches back and forth. The grandiose fantasy (which is admittedly tempting!) of being a "world historical" thinker requires one to play the first role. As far as the second role goes, it's hard to improve upon Epicurus, Epictetus, etc. The "atomized" or Hellenistic philosopher accepts and affirms the loss of the community. The social or world-historical philosopher is basically "running for election."

I would tentatively say that I see Heidegger as someone who tries to infuse our existence with a (re)new(ed) sense of wonder, the sort which seems to have shaped the greatness of the ancient Greek world (at least in art, philosophy, and a few other areas) but that's largely non-existent these days. I think this is a worthy goal. I also appreciate his attempt to displace human existence from our current sense of imperious subjectivity, while simultaneously giving us an even more profound sense of dignity through our relatedness to something much 'greater' than ourselves, to Being. His is a nuanced position, I think: it's more concerned with asking difficult questions than with giving easy answers; it sees the material world as radiating a profound sense of 'spiritual' significance; it's very this-worldly without being reductionist; it finds the extraordinary in the ordinary; it's revolutionary while also being respectful of the tradition. In other words, this is a unique perspective which isn't easy to categorize according to standard oppositions like religious/atheistic, progressive/reactionary, etc. All of this resonates with me a great deal and has influenced my thinking on a variety of topics. — Erik

This is roughly how I understood his intentions as well (largely via secondary sources). And put that way, it sounds great. I see the allure. In my view, however, it's almost impossible to escape "imperious subjectivity." We can view the idea of transcending imperious subjectivity as a rhetorical tool for imperious subjectivity. This is not aimed at you. I very much appreciate your politeness. I also respect your willingness to paraphrase what you value in Heidegger. As I see it, one doesn't understand what one can't paraphrase. And interpretations vary, so we need to see how the other sees in particular. Too often there is just name dropping. But this part of "imperious subjectivity." And someone like Heidegger can used in a game of moral superiority. I see reason as the tool of our irrational human heart, so I guess I subscribe to a (generalized) technical interpretation of thinking. I don't think there's an escape from the lust for power, though the image of power evolves. So there's no real innocence, however innocent the surface may appear. I think humans will always look at beings in terms of resources with, however, beautiful moments of wonder ---lulls in the fundamental rapaciousness. Wisdom, from this perspective, is just ataraxia or self-possession as the sweetest form of power.

From this perspective, there is something utopian in Heidegger. Rorty writes of his "nostalgia." (Rorty too is running for election, so I focus on his anti-metaphysical rhetoric.) Admittedly, this is largely a matter of temperament. I've lost faith in politics and social-level solutions without losing faith in life. It was, however, a painful transition from what in retrospect I'd call idealism or utopianism.

I'm not trying to correct you or say that I am right. I'm just presenting some context for my view, to see how you might react. I respect what you have written and look forward to see what you might add.

Slavoj Zizek
Ayn Rand
Heidegger

DO NOT argue with realists about idealism. Just don't do it. They LITERALLY are incapable of comprehending.

I remember you saying that you liked Zizek before, but his political opinions are given wide public attention and they're often really ill-thought out (the past few years have been particularly embarassing). I get the sense that once "some" intellectuals become public stars, they start to get lazy.

I liked him when I was first reading philosophy (so about 7 years ago now), and over time my good opinion of him has faded.