Huh? Is it not possible to doubt it is true? Is it not possible to believe it is true?

That it is impossible to know it is true is what is accepted. And from there, we move on to a more achievable ambition. Why bang your head on a brick wall? — apokrisis

Do you know that "...it is impossible to know it is true"? Since you have what you call a pragmatic criterion for truth, you must realize that it's self-refuting.

Not so. People were logical before Aristotle developed formal logic. However, that doesn't mean the principles of logic were different before and after Aristotle. — TheMadFool

Exactly. So having knowledge does not depend on having a criterion of knowledge. Knowledge must be self-validating.

A newborn infant cries as a reflex. At some point, however, it learns that crying summons its mother. Now it knows that crying equals summoning mother. So instead of just crying automatically, it can choose to cry. So what its knowledge has done is endow it with the power of choice, i.e. will. So the fundamental criterion of knowledge is its successful application. Which is essentially pragmatic I suppose. The infant does not need to know anything about its own knowledge in order to have that knowledge. That would be "meta-knowledge". Which is really what epistemology boils down to.

What? I propose that as a belief and thus it is open to doubt. And you yourself have only provided reasons that would confirm.

If you can show it is not impossible to know after all, then my position might be in trouble.

Exactly. So having knowledge does not depend on having a criterion of knowledge. — Pantagruel

That's not what I said. There was, had to be, a criterion. How else would you know a proposition is true/false? We just didn't make that explicit for reasons that are obvious - nobody was bothered by it.

What? I propose that as a belief and thus it is open to doubt. And you yourself have only provided reasons that would confirm.

If you can show it is not impossible to know after all, then my position might be in trouble. — apokrisis

The Problem Of The Criterion does the exact opposite I'm afraid - show you that it's impossible to know. That's where things get a little hairy - for you can only know that nothing can be known only when you know what The Problem Of The Criterion is and what it entails. I can't know that I can't know anything. :chin:

Do you know that "...it is impossible to know it is true"? — TheMadFool

The Problem Of The Criterion does the exact opposite I'm afraid - show you that it's impossible to know. — TheMadFool

Time for you to decide which of these two statements you believe.

@apokrisis@Pantagruel

First things first. The three of us are operating under some criterion of knowledge/truth and I daresay it is exactly the same criterion as the vast majority of us are working under.

1. All three of us (even everybody) agree(s) that we know what The Probelm Of The Criterion is and what it entails.

2. The Problem Of The Criterion entails that we can't know anything at all

Ergo (from 2)

3. We can't know The Problem Of The Criterion and what it entails

4. 1 and 3 contradict each other

5. The source of the contradiction in 4 is the criterion all of us, including the three of us, are using

6. This criterion, whatever it is, that we're using must be a flawed/faulty criterion because it leads to a contradiction

My question is, what's the criterion all three of us are using? There's something wrong with it. Why the contradiction?

Time for you to decide which of these two statements you believe — apokrisis

See above.

Well try this. Every time you are tempted to put the word “know” in my mouth, instead replace it with “I believe I have no reason to doubt it”. Should work a charm.

Well try this. Every time you are tempted to put the word “know” in my mouth, instead replace it with “I believe I have no reason to doubt it”. Should work a charm. — apokrisis

Please read this

That's not what I said. There was, had to be, a criterion. How else would you know a proposition is true/false? We just didn't make that explicit for reasons that are obvious - nobody was bothered by it. — TheMadFool

Propositional knowledge is a particular subset of knowledge and not its primary form for organic beings. All kinds of creatures "know" things. So saying that a special feature of propositional knowledge "knowing that it meets a criterion" is a limitation on knowledge per se is invalid. It is like saying that all matter must be wet because water is wet. The "criterion" of knowledge in its most general form is its successful application, as I suggested.

If A knows X then X has some practical ramifications, such that acting in concert with the knowledge X will have different (and intended) consequences versus acting without the knowledge X.

Don’t you realise that you are conflating two usages of “know”. To know what the problem is said to be, and to accept the problem as a true one, are different things.

Hi @TheMadFool just to simplify a few things for those who haven't been following closely or are otherwise pleasantly dizzy, few questions or statements that anyone can derive one from.

Criterion? Sounds like some super hero who instead of saving the town and beating up the bad guys just makes everyone take an annoying test instead. Criteria, basically? Standards for something ie. a logical/factual floor to stand on? A reference point that is "true" or rather more likely to be true than false and more likely to produce something useful (neither including nor excluding the idea of "pragmatism").

My question would be how sure are you that semantics don't play a role here? Do you believe every word open to interpretation in Chisholm statements were interpreted by you in the manner as they were written or intended? Knowledge may or may not be absolute. Basically, an "absolute truth" or something- anything- that is simply less false than another view can constitute knowledge.

Propositional knowledge is a particular subset of knowledge and not its primary form for organic beings. All kinds of creatures "know" things. So saying that a special feature of propositional knowledge "knowing that it meets a criterion" is a limitation on knowledge per se is invalid. It is like saying that all matter must be wet because water is wet. The "criterion" of knowledge in its most general form is its successful application, as I suggested. — Pantagruel

Well, I'm only guessing here but if you must talk about animals, notice that what they know we can know in terms of propositions e.g. wildebeest know where a watering hole is and just like that animal knowing is expressible in propositional form.

This is beside the point thought. What I'm actually interested in is what the criterion for knowledge/truth we're using in this conversation is.

Don’t you realise that you are conflating two usages of “know”. To know what the problem is said to be, and to accept the problem as a true one, are different things. — apokrisis

There is no conflation. To know The Problem Of The Criterion is to know the truth of the propositions that constitute it or are entailed by it.

If you don't mind telling me, what criterion of truth are we using here to know what The Problem Of The Criterion is?

My question would be how sure are you that semantics don't play a role here? Do you believe every word open to interpretation in Chisholm statements were interpreted by you in the manner as they were written or intended? — Outlander

It's possible that I've misunderstood. I'm interested in knowing where exactly I or others could've misconstrued Chisholm?

1. What do we know? or What is the extent of our knowledge?

2. How do we know? or What is the criterion for deciding whether we have knowledge in any particular case? — TheMadFool

(1) Which propositions are true?

(2) How can we tell which propositions are true? — TheMadFool

Which parts of the above questions are likely to be misinterpreted?

I wonder what this leads to? Any ideas? — TheMadFool

Knowledge and truth are judgements - they need a criterion. — TheMadFool

The latter would have been my idea as well, with the antecedent indicating criteria themselves imply a system in which they serve as operative conditions. Ultimately, such system must relieve the self-contradiction inherent in the PC, because without at least a logical proof that knowledge is indeed possible, we are left with nothing but mere sophisms which hold no profit whatsoever. Mathematics provides sufficient reason for claiming proof that knowledge is possible, and from that, a system arises in which the criteria for all judgements, both a priori and a posteriori, follow necessarily.

Nevertheless, it remains an unavoidable scandal for the human condition in general, that there is no absolute unconditional proof of anything, including knowledge itself, derived from a system conjured solely by the possessor of it, because that possessor is himself a condition for the system.

So......metaphysical reductionism asks, is the validity and purposefulness of knowledge, its reality being tacitly given, worth neglecting the intrinsic circularity involved in justifying its very possibility. If worth neglecting, the PC falls; if not worth neglecting, the PC may or may not fall but the system itself does. Hence, the inevitable and altogether irreconcilable sophisms.

This is beside the point thought. What I'm actually interested in is what the criterion for knowledge/truth we're using in this conversation is. — TheMadFool

Then a generalized criterion of validity for propositional knowledge would be that it is (potentially) capable of self-validation. So depending on the nature of the proposition, it would fit within a larger scientific-coherent framework, a la Karl Popper.

Mathematics provides sufficient reason for claiming proof that knowledge is possible, and from that, a system arises in which the criteria for all judgements, both a priori and a posteriori, follow necessarily. — Mww

This is what's intriguing because in math there's complete freedom - there is no necessity except that of logic - and we may begin with axioms that contradict each other as long as they're put in differenf systems a la Euclid's parallel postulates.

This implies that the 1st question is not as important as the 2nd question in The Problem Of The Criterion. It doesn't matter what is true as much as it matters how/why they're true. This understanding is reflected in non-Euclidean geometry. Can we extend this to philosophical matters as well? Indeed we can - people do say things like, "suppose what you say is true".

It must be noted here that when we claim Euclid's parallel postulate is true in Euclidean geometry AND Euclid's parallel postulate is false in non-Euclidean geometry we're using two different [contradictory] propositions (what's true is not the same) but logic to decide truth (the criterion for truth is identical).

What say you?

Then a generalized criterion of validity for propositional knowledge would be that it is (potentially) capable of self-validation. So depending on the nature of the proposition, it would fit within a larger scientific-coherent framework, a la Karl Popper. — Pantagruel

Self-validation. Ok. I can go with that but what I want to know is does The Problem Of The Criterion make sense to you? It can only make sense to you if you know what it is but that's impossible because The Problem Of The Criterion says that you can't know anything at all, including The Problem Of The Criterion itself. So, if you know The Problem Of The Criterion then you can't know it - contradiction. What led to this contradiction? The Criterion which allowed us to make sense of (know) The Problem Of The Criterion. Something's off...

Know/knowledge and criterion. We all "know" (right?) what these words mean. But they can hold meanings some support and others think are either overly-complex or even oversimplified. Or you can just be lazy and call it splitting hairs.

1. What do we know? or What is the extent of our knowledge? — TheMadFool

We "know" what we're told. Empiricism apparently. Fire- hot. Snow-cold. Pain-bad (at least for the individual) and so on and so forth. Let's call these common sense for now, from which I believe the term was derived from. The extent of our knowledge is simple- or rather can be determined simply. What you can and cannot answer and if answering can point to sufficient and logical enough reason. ...even if that "reason" is "cuz someone told me so" lol. Or I suppose the ultimate "I saw it (at least) once."

Self-validation. Ok. I can go with that but what I want to know is does The Problem Of The Criterion make sense to you? It can only make sense to you if you know what it is but that's impossible because The Problem Of The Criterion says that you can't know anything at all, including The Problem Of The Criterion itself. So, if you know The Problem Of The Criterion then you can't know it - contradiction. What led to this contradiction? The Criterion which allowed us to make sense of (know) The Problem Of The Criterion. Something's off... — TheMadFool

Yes, I think that the problem of the criterion arises from comparing knowledge in two different senses, what we know (which is always specific) and how we know it (which is a question about knowledge in general, at the meta-level). So the second question, "How am I capable of having knowledge at all" is really a red herring. I do have knowledge; you have knowledge; my do has knowledge.

Maybe we cannot account for how we know, any more than we can account for how we think. It is just a faculty. To me, it makes more sense to investigate the causes of error....

Know/knowledge and criterion. We all "know" (right?) what these words mean. But they can hold meanings some support and others think are either overly-complex or even oversimplified. Or you can just be lazy and call it splitting hairs. — Outlander

Yes. Go on...

What say you? — TheMadFool

I say....pretty much agreeable, with the exception that in math there is not complete freedom, insofar as any mathematical structure must adhere to the principles of universality and necessity. But I understand you to mean we are free in our development of different mathematical structures, consistent with the paradigms to which they might apply. The usefulness of Schrodinger's Equation is itself predicated on Nicomachus‘ arithmetic, among others of course.
————

To follow up:

What is the extent of our knowledge? — TheMadFool

Experience a posteriori, understanding a priori.

What is the criterion for deciding whether we have knowledge... — TheMadFool

Judgement pursuant to the categories of modality. To know anything whatsoever, it must first be possible, then it must exist, and from those, the necessity of it is given.

Ehhhhhh........or not. Lotsa things can only be assumed in philosophy, right?

Yes, I think that the problem of the criterion arises from comparing knowledge in two different senses, what we know (which is always specific) and how we know it (which is a question about knowledge in general, at the meta-level). So the second question, "How am I capable of having knowledge at all" is really a red herring. I do have knowledge; you have knowledge; my do has knowledge.

Maybe we cannot account for how we know, any more than we can account for how we think. It is just a faculty. To me, it makes more sense to investigate the causes of error.... — Pantagruel

1. What is the criterion of knowledge/truth you/we are using here?

2. Does The Problem Of The Criterion make sense to you?


Let me have a go...

Setting aside the matter of truth, the criterion of knowledge at play here is justification as a must-have item. Why else are we arguing? We are arguing, right?

If so consider the argument contained in The Problem Of The Criterion. It entails, for reasons you already know, the fact that nothing can be known. Basically, The Problem Of The Criterion justifies the inadequacy of any and all logical justification i.e. knowledge is impossible but it all hinged on you having knowledge of The Problem Of Induction. In other words, logic isn't self-validating as you would've liked. In fact it's self-refuting in this context.

Vague

Vague — TheMadFool

‘S-ok. I’m not here to teach, so......as long as I can’t be proven wrong, I’m happy enough.

If so consider the argument contained in The Problem Of The Criterion. It entails, for reasons you already know, the fact that nothing can be known. Basically, The Problem Of The Criterion justifies the inadequacy of any and all logical justification i.e. knowledge is impossible but it all hinged on you having knowledge of The Problem Of Induction. In other words, logic isn't self-validating as you would've liked. In fact it's self-refuting in this context. — TheMadFool

Ok, every thing that thinks has some knowledge, right? Everyone on this board knows something. I know my name. If a being is able to survive, it must have knowledge. If a being is able to communicate, it must have knowledge. So knowledge is possible. Ergo the "problem of the criterion," whatever it does establish (if anything) does not refute the possibility of knowledge. Like I said, it's confusing knowledge simpliciter with knowledge about knowledge.

Well good luck to you.
— Srap Tasmaner

Thanks but I suppose you were being sarcastic. — TheMadFool

Poor choice of words on my part. Just bowing out of the discussion.

Actually, I'll make one little point on my way out.

I think the Problem of the Criterion is slightly more interesting than the Church-Fitch paradox or the Münchhausen trilemma because it invites solution, and possible solutions have something interesting in common. Robert Stalnaker, at the beginning of his Locke lectures, put it this way: that the right place to begin philosophy is not at the beginning, but in the middle.

@Mww@Pantagruel@apokrisis@Outlander

For your kind consideration:

The father of taxonomy Carl Linnaeus may have something to offer by way of a solution; after all the issue is about how to classify propositions - whether they're knowledge or not.

When Carl Linnaeus classifed animals into mammals, bird, reptiles, amphibians, etc. it wasn't the case that he knew, beforehand, what these various classes of animals were - he began by collecting specimens, studying them, looking at anatomical characteristics that were similar or dissimilar and these classes of animals emerged from that study. Carl Linnaeus didn't possess a criterion for the various classes of animals before he classified them - the criterion emerged from his studies of animals.

The Linnaean version of The Problem Of The Criterion:

1. What are mammals/birds/reptiles/amphibians?

2. How do we know what are mammals/birds/reptiles/amphibians?

The Linnaen Problem Of The Criterion would have us think that we can't know what are mammals/birds/reptiles/amphibians without having a criterion that allows us to make that classification but we can't have a criterion for doing that without knowing some mammals/birds/reptiles/amphibians beforehand.

Carl Linnaeus developed his criterion for the various classes of animals not because he knew beforehand what mammals or birds or reptiles or amphibians are but from his study of animals and noting similarities and dissimilarities among them. The classificatory criterion was then developed from these notes. This goes to show that having a classificatory system doesn't imply preknowledge of the classes.

Likewise, concerning the epistemic Problem Of The Criterion, constructing a criterion for truth/knowledge doesn't imply that we must already know which propositions are true/not. In Linnaean fashion, what was/is/should be done is get our hands on a list of propositions, note similarities and dissimilarities and, automatically, classes/categories will emerge from that list. One possible outcome from such a study will be, given any list of propositions, two categories of propositions: one category that consists of, say, justified, true beliefs and another category of propositions that lack any or all these features. We then decide to call the first category consisting of justified, true beliefs, knowledge and the second category made up of propositions lacking some or all these features, non-knowledge.

What's important to note here is that we didn't have a criterion when/before we sorted/classified the list of propositions - we simply classified them based on observed similarities and differences - and that the criterion was developed from/after the list was sorted. The Problem Of The Criterion is averted because we didn't use a criterion to sort/classify propositions. The propositions simply fell into different categories based on how they were alike and how they were unlike. This was followed by the development of a criterion based on the sorted/classified list of propositions. The sorted/classified list of what counts and doesn't count as knowledge didn't depend on there being a criterion beforehand although the criterion for knowledge is based on that list. :chin: