Yes some statements or propositions, if you like, are false; which is to say that they are non-factual. — John

Right, so on your view, "false proposition" is a synonym for "non-fact."

And you'd say that "true proposition" is a synonym for "fact," right?

No, I suspect you're trying to tendentiously distort what I have said.

On my view 'false proposition' is synonymous with 'non-factual proposition', and the obverse for ' true proposition'.

I have answered your questions in good faith, but you always seem to avoid answering mine. I have seen several other posters pointing this out to you, to no apparent avail.

Earlier I wrote this:
"Did I say anything about non-factuality "obtaining ontologically"? Can you explain what 'obtaining ontologically' means?"

How about answering the questions I posed there?

The post after you asked that question was an explanation of what that referred to.

Okay, so false propositions and non-factual propositions are synonyms on your view, and then presumably true propositions and factual propositions are synonyms.

What would you say the relation of true/factual propositions is to facts?

The post after you asked that question was an explanation of what that referred to. — Terrapin Station

Bullshit, you wrote this there:

You said "There can be non-factuality."

How can there be non-factuality, exactly?

Take something that you'd say is false. For example, "All websites are exclusively hosted on a Commodore 64." So presumably you'd say that there is a nonfactuality that's somehow all websites exclusively hosted on a Commodore 64. Well, how is there such a thing, exactly? — Terrapin Station

Explain to me exactly how you think that answers the question as to what "obtaining ontologically" means? The question obviously refers to what it would mean for factuality to obtain ontologically. Instead of answering my question, all you're doing is asking me to answer more of your questions.

I asked you:

How would you say that non-factuality obtains ontologically — Terrapin Station

You responded as if you were unfamiliar with that terminology. So I worded it differently for you, which was the post in question.

You said "There can be non-factuality."

How can there be non-factuality, exactly?

Take something that you'd say is false. For example, "All websites are exclusively hosted on a Commodore 64." So presumably you'd say that there is a nonfactuality that's somehow all websites exclusively hosted on a Commodore 64. Well, how is there such a thing, exactly? — Terrapin Station

That was the whole point of that post. It was a rewording/slightly more in-depth explanation of what I was asking you.

The post after you asked that question was an explanation of what that referred to. — Terrapin Station

Bullshit, you wrote this there:

You said "There can be non-factuality."

How can there be non-factuality, exactly?

Take something that you'd say is false. For example, "All websites are exclusively hosted on a Commodore 64." So presumably you'd say that there is a nonfactuality that's somehow all websites exclusively hosted on a Commodore 64. Well, how is there such a thing, exactly? — Terrapin Station

It is obvious that my question refers to what it would mean for factuality to obtain ontologically. Explain to me exactly how you think that answers the question about what it means to obtain ontologically.

When I ask you how non-factuality obtains ontologically, I'm asking you how can there be non-factuality, how is there such a thing, in what manner does it occur or is it present, etc.

You really are either a very poor reader or deliberately and dishonestly evasive. I've already pointed out that I haven't claimed that anything "obtains ontologically". That's your term and, apparently, your claim. So I'm asking you about factuality exactly the questions you are unjustifiably asking me about non-factuality.

Now, to preempt your answer, if all you are going to tell me is something along the lines of ' 'X' obtains when there is X", I will reply that in your own terms then ' 'Not-X' obtains when there is no X'. 'X' is the factuality of X, and 'not X' is the non-factuality or counterfactuality of X.

I've already pointed out that I haven't claimed that anything "obtains ontologically". That's your term — John

No one said it was your term. What you said was: "There can be non-factuality."

I was asking you how there can be non-factuality.

I've explained that if there can be factuality then in those same terms there can be non-factuality.

It remains for you to show how there can be factuality in a way (presumably " obtaining ontologically" although you apparently cannot explain what that means) in which there cannot be non-factuality. If you can't explain that then you have no argument. But this what it always seems to come down to with your apparently poorly thought out 'position'. I have seen this many times with your 'interactions' with others as well, and seen them express the same frustration when they realize you have nothing to back up your claims. Apparently you just like the sound of your own voice and have no intention of participating in discussions with an attitude of good faith. :-}

I don't agree with Terrapin's way of looking at things, but in this discussion it seems to me he is right - although he's terrible at explaining things and seems rather uninterested in making you understand. What he means by how non-factuality obtains ontologically is as follows: since facts represent those states of affairs which ARE, non-facts clearly represent inexistant states of affairs. So in what sense can you say non-facts are? That's like saying non-existent things exist, ie absurd.

It remains for you to show how there can be factuality in a way (presumably " obtaining ontologically" although you apparently cannot explain what that means) in which there cannot be non-factuality. — John

Well, facts, or "factuality" if you like, are states of affairs. So non-facts, or "non-factuality" would be, what--"non-states of affairs"?

So his point is like - truth and falsity can both have being, because they represent the relationship between meaning and states of affairs. A false meaning is still a meaning, albeit one which doesn't correspond with the facts of existence. HOWEVER non-facts can't exist. You're mistaking the existence of false meanings to mean the existence of non-facts.

So his point is like - truth and falsity can both have being, because they represent the relationship between meaning and states of affairs. — Agustino

I'm just asking him questions about his view (with the upshot that eventually it would explain so he (and you) could understand why truth and facts are analyzed as they are in analytic philosophy).

In any event, you're saying that the being of truth and falsehood is the relationship between a proposition and states of affairs?

In any event, you're saying that the being of truth and falsehood is the relationship between a proposition and states of affairs? — Terrapin Station

Yes, it would be, after a correspondence theory of truth at least, the relationship between a proposition and states of affairs. Propositions which describe possible but not actual states of affairs are false (in other words the proposition relates in such a way with the states of affairs present, in this case by not matching them) and propositions which describe actual states of affairs would be true (because the propositions match the states of affairs existing).

You realize that what I said above was that truth and falsehood are (judgments of) the relation of a proposition to states of affairs (on correspondence theory), right?

You realize that what I said above was that truth and falsehood are (judgments of) the relation of a proposition to states of affairs (on correspondence theory), right? — Terrapin Station

What would be the judgement except becoming aware of the relation between a proposition and states of affairs? I don't get to choose what the relation between a proposition and states of affairs is, do I?

Could you answer first if you realize that that's what I said above?

Could you answer first if you realize that that's what I said above? — Terrapin Station

Above where? I realised that's what you said in our conversation, not in your conversation with John. But I don't agree with it.

Where--in this thread.

Okay, so the only difference between what I wrote and what you wrote is the parenthetical "(judgment of)", right?

Okay, so the only difference between what I wrote and what you wrote is the parenthetical "(judgment of)", right? — Terrapin Station

Yes, but I don't understand why you're asking this. My judgement can be wrong if I don't know the facts for whatever reason, but think I do. For example I have a hallucination, and thus think there's a tiger in front of me. "There's a tiger in front of me" is false, but I judge it to be true, because I don't correctly understand the fact that I'm having a hallucination and am not actually perceiving a real tiger.

Yes, but I don't understand why you're asking this. — Agustino

I'm asking it because you're turning out to say that truth and falsehood are the same thing I said they were vis-a-vis being a relation between propositions and states of affairs (on correspondence theory).

But initially, you were arguing that truth and fact refer to the same thing--or at least that they can. And John was also arguing about facts/non-facts. (You actually shifted the discussion back to truth/falsehood above.)

I'm asking it because you're turning out to say that truth and falsehood are the same thing I said they were vis-a-vis being a relation between propositions and states of affairs (on correspondence theory).

But initially, you were arguing that truth and fact refer to the same thing--or at least that they can. — Terrapin Station

I said I don't agree with your point of view but it's consistent, so now I understand it at least. As in, I understand why someone could think that. The reason why I don't agree is that I don't think everything that is referred to as truth could be placed within those bounds. For example, spiritual truths would have no place under your framework, would they? Yet I have reason to think such truths exist, and therefore the framework we're using to judge is wrong.

I think you are mistaken about that.

To say that facts

represent those states of affairs which ARE, — Agustino

is not to say that facts exist. That is a category error, which is what I have been tying to point out to Terrapin.

Truths also "represent those states of affairs which ARE", so to say that facts exist is essentially no different than to say that truths exist.

For example, spiritual truths would have no place under your framework, would they? — Agustino

Are spiritual truths truths by virtue of being a relationship between a proposition and states of affairs under your framework?

But facts do exist, it's part and parcel of what being a fact is - to exist. It's not a category error at all. At best, it could be a tautology, but I wouldn't agree at all that it is one.

Wait, why on your view is it a category error to say that facts exist?

How do facts exist? What is the difference between factuality and actuality?

Are spiritual truths truths by virtue of being a relationship between a proposition and states of affairs under your framework? — Terrapin Station

No - because there are no "facts" in the spiritual realm the same way there are "facts" in the empirical realm. So yes, it is the relationship between a proposition and a spiritual reality, which "facts" don't adequately describe, possibly because the participant is also always involved in what the spiritual reality is. If facts are snow flakes, then that which describes spiritual reality would be alike drops of water. The liquidity of the latter cannot be captured by the rigidity and solidity of the former - and the former are ultimately a derivative of the latter.

How do facts exist? What is the difference between factuality and actuality? — John

Fact is defined in relationship with actuality. Fact is part of what is actual. It belongs to their essence to exist :-O like God!