Yes some statements or propositions, if you like, are false; which is to say that they are non-factual. — John
The post after you asked that question was an explanation of what that referred to. — Terrapin Station
You said "There can be non-factuality."
How can there be non-factuality, exactly?
Take something that you'd say is false. For example, "All websites are exclusively hosted on a Commodore 64." So presumably you'd say that there is a nonfactuality that's somehow all websites exclusively hosted on a Commodore 64. Well, how is there such a thing, exactly? — Terrapin Station
How would you say that non-factuality obtains ontologically — Terrapin Station
You said "There can be non-factuality."
How can there be non-factuality, exactly?
Take something that you'd say is false. For example, "All websites are exclusively hosted on a Commodore 64." So presumably you'd say that there is a nonfactuality that's somehow all websites exclusively hosted on a Commodore 64. Well, how is there such a thing, exactly? — Terrapin Station
The post after you asked that question was an explanation of what that referred to. — Terrapin Station
You said "There can be non-factuality."
How can there be non-factuality, exactly?
Take something that you'd say is false. For example, "All websites are exclusively hosted on a Commodore 64." So presumably you'd say that there is a nonfactuality that's somehow all websites exclusively hosted on a Commodore 64. Well, how is there such a thing, exactly? — Terrapin Station
I've already pointed out that I haven't claimed that anything "obtains ontologically". That's your term — John
It remains for you to show how there can be factuality in a way (presumably " obtaining ontologically" although you apparently cannot explain what that means) in which there cannot be non-factuality. — John
So his point is like - truth and falsity can both have being, because they represent the relationship between meaning and states of affairs. — Agustino
Yes, it would be, after a correspondence theory of truth at least, the relationship between a proposition and states of affairs. Propositions which describe possible but not actual states of affairs are false (in other words the proposition relates in such a way with the states of affairs present, in this case by not matching them) and propositions which describe actual states of affairs would be true (because the propositions match the states of affairs existing).In any event, you're saying that the being of truth and falsehood is the relationship between a proposition and states of affairs? — Terrapin Station
What would be the judgement except becoming aware of the relation between a proposition and states of affairs? I don't get to choose what the relation between a proposition and states of affairs is, do I?You realize that what I said above was that truth and falsehood are (judgments of) the relation of a proposition to states of affairs (on correspondence theory), right? — Terrapin Station
Above where? I realised that's what you said in our conversation, not in your conversation with John. But I don't agree with it.Could you answer first if you realize that that's what I said above? — Terrapin Station
Yes, but I don't understand why you're asking this. My judgement can be wrong if I don't know the facts for whatever reason, but think I do. For example I have a hallucination, and thus think there's a tiger in front of me. "There's a tiger in front of me" is false, but I judge it to be true, because I don't correctly understand the fact that I'm having a hallucination and am not actually perceiving a real tiger.Okay, so the only difference between what I wrote and what you wrote is the parenthetical "(judgment of)", right? — Terrapin Station
Yes, but I don't understand why you're asking this. — Agustino
I said I don't agree with your point of view but it's consistent, so now I understand it at least. As in, I understand why someone could think that. The reason why I don't agree is that I don't think everything that is referred to as truth could be placed within those bounds. For example, spiritual truths would have no place under your framework, would they? Yet I have reason to think such truths exist, and therefore the framework we're using to judge is wrong.I'm asking it because you're turning out to say that truth and falsehood are the same thing I said they were vis-a-vis being a relation between propositions and states of affairs (on correspondence theory).
But initially, you were arguing that truth and fact refer to the same thing--or at least that they can. — Terrapin Station
is not to say that facts exist. That is a category error, which is what I have been tying to point out to Terrapin.represent those states of affairs which ARE, — Agustino
For example, spiritual truths would have no place under your framework, would they? — Agustino
No - because there are no "facts" in the spiritual realm the same way there are "facts" in the empirical realm. So yes, it is the relationship between a proposition and a spiritual reality, which "facts" don't adequately describe, possibly because the participant is also always involved in what the spiritual reality is. If facts are snow flakes, then that which describes spiritual reality would be alike drops of water. The liquidity of the latter cannot be captured by the rigidity and solidity of the former - and the former are ultimately a derivative of the latter.Are spiritual truths truths by virtue of being a relationship between a proposition and states of affairs under your framework? — Terrapin Station
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