Kind of a weak appeal to authority. — Xtrix

If you don't mind being alone in the face of danger, go ahead. But Gary Cooper only wins in the movies.

He does not believe the latter is "wrong" -- but rather that an essential thing has been overlooked — Xtrix

Of course, you don't read what I write.

Or maybe Heidegger thinks Plato and Aristotle and Descartes and Kant are all completely "wrong. — Xtrix

Of course, you don't read what I write. Or you're manipulating what I say. That "completely" is an addition from you.

He doesn't say "get rid of," he says we must "free ourselves" from — Xtrix

From Cambridge dictionary of English:
Synonym of free from/of sth. : removing and getting rid of things.

This is my dictionary, what is your dictionary? I'm afraid it's not an English dictionary.

I don't think you're saying that necessarily...but think about it: if they're all "wrong" in their interpretation of being and beings and of time, then what value do they have? — Xtrix

I think I've explained this, but here we go.

If they have any, it will not be as paths to the truth of Being, guides of the thinker. They will be partial and secondary successes. In the main they are wrong. That's not I who say this. Heidegger repeatedly says it, as anyone who's read only one of his books can be aware.

Heidegger spoke of death as a "possibility of being". So it's better to exist objectively, and it's subjectively better to exist if you have good karma. If we have a cauldron of evil people, to them the world is evil but the real world smiles at their predicament. Fixing karma is a B

From what I've read Heidegger wasn't a Buddhist. However, my knowledge of Buddhism is not superior to that of other religions that I have not personally endured. I mean, I'm not really interested.

Anyway, best wishes.

Xtrix,

There is nothing I equate "Being" with because that would be to predicate upon the form of predication. Neither can the form or idea of predication be intransitive. It is a passive verb, or, at most, a part of a middle voice, not an active agent in the real. "Being" is not a pronoun! By 'better', I simply mean more meaningful. or even more what meaning, and worth, is. The only agency in reality is a departure that has no "da" unless what remains is burdened with a responsibility that the worth of the departed be recognized. That departure is the only act of being, and that response is what love really is. There can be no anticipating it or finding it in time, because it is not being there at all. And what does "da" mean? For one thing, it really is neither here nor there, and if context determines for us what we think it means it can hardly be objective. The plain fact of the matter is the more we map our whereabouts the less present we are there. Proximally and for the most part, if I may, all systems of navigation are quite explicitly a means of passing through and leaving, not of being there at all. And if you mean to leave you are not really there. "Da" is intrinsically vague and ambiguous, and vagueness and ambiguity is what "Being" is. The capitalization does not give it agency.

The term "Aletheia" came up at some point. Fact is, Lethe is the river all souls must drink from entering Hades, for forgetfulness. A-letheia, therefore, means, simply, the unforgotten or un-forgetfulness. Scholars are in general agreement that Heidegger's grasp of Greek is bogus. Living language is spoken, not written. As I've said, the written word is the deliberate murder of language, and poetry is its embalming fluid. Everything we utter is unique. There is no repetition possible of the meaning most intimately shared between us. Even if we simply reiterate the same, there is a difference that intimates the fullest meaning of what is said, and the written word steals this meaning from us. Moreover, there is no past to refer to to authenticate that intimation. There is no impending future to appeal to for interpreting it. Every utterance is perfectly itself or it is nothing at all. And every response burdened with responsibility that the worth of that unique intimation be recognized breaks through all the boundaries any before and after could put upon it. That is, language is only inauthentically historical. What is intimated between us is always new and unprecedented. And what comes of this is completely devoid of landmark. It is how we know ourselves and each other. What is not a whole new creation is intrinsically vague and ambiguous. And what would have a future in reference to this is not there at all.

Sorry if I'm not getting through to you, but I am quite certain the fault is not wholly mine.

If you want to say that Heidegger's words against metaphysical Western tradition (degenerated, deteriorate, concealing, dogmatic, etc.) are not negative I think we have different dictionaries. And so it is impossible any serious discussion.
— David Mo

Not different -- he just never applies it in the way you're saying. As I've gone over with you several times now, there's a distinction to be drawn between translations and the entirety of Western thought. He does not believe the latter is "wrong" -- but rather that an essential thing has been overlooked: that all of our various ways of interpreting being has been on the basis of the present -- and that perhaps it's time to go to the "things themselves" (the cry of phenomenology) by understanding and overthrowing this tradition. — Xtrix

This, along with every other substantive comment I've made, naturally gets ignored in favor of:

Kind of a weak appeal to authority.
— Xtrix
If you don't mind being alone in the face of danger, go ahead. But Gary Cooper only wins in the movies. — David Mo

He doesn't say "get rid of," he says we must "free ourselves" from
— Xtrix

From Cambridge dictionary of English:
Synonym of free from/of sth. : removing and getting rid of things.

This is my dictionary, what is your dictionary? I'm afraid it's not an English dictionary. — David Mo

So now you've apparently been reduced to appeals to authority and, as I've discussed elsewhere, appeals to dictionaries. Pity.

You won't find any negativity in Heidegger beyond perhaps harsh critiques of translations -- and rarely at that. Your own projections are exactly that: your own. This "true/false", "good/bad," "right/wrong" way of analyzing history and philosophy is childish and, more importantly, completely misses Heidegger's point. I suggest going back to the drawing board on that one.

But again it's worth pointing out that this is a trivial issue. One you happen to be wrong about and can't bring yourself to admit to, but since you evidently have nothing left to contribute beyond that you carry on anyway. Well, carry on some more if you must.

I don't think you're saying that necessarily...but think about it: if they're all "wrong" in their interpretation of being and beings and of time, then what value do they have?
— Xtrix
I think I've explained this, but here we go.

If they have any, it will not be as paths to the truth of Being, guides of the thinker. They will be partial and secondary successes. In the main they are wrong. That's not I who say this. Heidegger repeatedly says it, as anyone who's read only one of his books can be aware. — David Mo

No, he doesn't. Why? Because "paths to the truth of Being" is meaningless, for anyone who's read Heidegger. Openness of being is the truth, and thus we all possess it, in a "pre-ontological understanding." Being is not an object.

Secondly, "wrong" is never said in Heidegger when referring to the interpretation of being, as I have shown. Never. Not once. Ever. That's your fantasy. I'll repeat once again, for the now perhaps tenth time, so you can selectively leave it out of your quotations: Heidegger offers no interpretation of being. He's talking about the history of the interpretation, the meaning, of being, and the asking of the question of the meaning of being. The early Greeks did ask that question, and it has since become trivialized and concealed. The interpretation of being has been through-and-through Greek, as presence, but has gone through many variations, from the Christian to the modern age. These interpretations are not "wrong," which is why Heidegger never says that, but they do indeed forget the asking of the question and so, at their core, take up a thoroughly Greek intepretation: namely, ousia -- presence.

"In the main they are wrong." You simply don't know what you're talking about. Mainly due to the fact that you want to paint a picture of Heidegger as a person with a god-complex who wants to position himself as a savior of some kind. With that picture in mind, yes I'm sure it's very easy to project onto his writings something like "All of Western philosophy is wrong, in the main." But it's utter nonsense.

Perhaps read Heidegger for longer than a couple weeks.

There is nothing I equate "Being" with because that would be to predicate upon the form of predication. Neither can the form or idea of predication be intransitive. It is a passive verb, or, at most, a part of a middle voice, not an active agent in the real. "Being" is not a pronoun! By 'better', I simply mean more meaningful. or even more what meaning, and worth, is. The only agency in reality is a departure that has no "da" unless what remains is burdened with a responsibility that the worth of the departed be recognized. That departure is the only act of being, and that response is what love really is. There can be no anticipating it or finding it in time, because it is not being there at all. And what does "da" mean? For one thing, it really is neither here nor there, and if context determines for us what we think it means it can hardly be objective. The plain fact of the matter is the more we map our whereabouts the less present we are there. Proximally and for the most part, if I may, all systems of navigation are quite explicitly a means of passing through and leaving, not of being there at all. And if you mean to leave you are not really there. "Da" is intrinsically vague and ambiguous, and vagueness and ambiguity is what "Being" is. The capitalization does not give it agency. — Gary M Washburn

I never once mentioned agency.
I never once mentioned "love."

"Vagueness and ambiguity is what 'being' is" is more nonsense, so I assume one of your "original" thoughts.

Learn to use the "quote" feature so people know what the hell you're talking about. Otherwise you're a massive bore.

The term "Aletheia" came up at some point. Fact is, Lethe is the river all souls must drink from entering Hades, for forgetfulness. A-letheia, therefore, means, simply, the unforgotten or un-forgetfulness. — Gary M Washburn

So far the only coherent (and accurate) thing you've said.

Scholars are in general agreement that Heidegger's grasp of Greek is bogus. — Gary M Washburn

What scholars? Provide reference to these scholars.

Sorry if I'm not getting through to you, but I am quite certain the fault is not wholly mine. — Gary M Washburn

No, I'm quite certain it is. You keep rambling off topic, and it's boring. If you simply want to hear yourself talk, let me know so I can ignore you. By adding "Xtrix" at the beginning of your post, I assume it's related to me somehow. So far that really hasn't been the case, as you've simply meandered into irrelevancies. You remind me of Harding from One Flew Over the Cuckoos Nest.

Re-read what I wrote and try again.

"In the main they are wrong." You simply don't know what you're talking about. — Xtrix

I think this is exactly your case:

You're a good disciple of Heidegger: you've decided that words don't mean what they usually mean but what you want them to mean. That's why you don't care what the dictionaries and everyone who has studied Heidegger say. Of course, the criterion of authority is not an argument in itself, but there are times when it is useful. It's useful in the face of a question we don't know. When talking about nuclear physics, most human beings have no choice but to trust what the scientists say. When all the experts on Heidegger say one thing contrary to what you say you would do well to meditate a little on your position. Especially when you are not able to present a single text that supports your position and you say it because you want to.



And your whole excuse is that "free from something" is a "technical" term whose meaning only you know. Don't make me laugh. Where did you get your knowledge? If you don't back up your interpretation with commentators' texts or Heidegger's, where does your interpretation come from? Is it a metaphysical intuition?

I got tired of providing you with Heidegger's negative terms regarding the western metaphysical tradition, his interpretation of Haraclitus' and Parmenides' philosophy - which had correctly raised the question of Being ("the way the question of Being is formulated"). I think I must have put here a dozen examples taken from Heidegger's own books. I repeat some of them to refresh your memory, which seems to be somewhat weak.

Deteriorating, collapsing, falling down, inadequately formulated, forgotten, distortions, taken over dogmatically, concealments, baleful prejudice, failed to determine, falsified, misses its sense entirely, falsified from the bottom up, degeneration, blocked, forgotten, erroneous

Wow, there were more than a dozen of them. These are all terms Heidegger uses in his usual sense. They are not his own concepts that require an explanation (if they have one), as it would be the Dasein, to be thrown, clear of being and others. All of them constitute a "radical" criticism, that is to say, in its root, to the western metaphysics, which, according to Heidegger has undertaken a wrong way of which it is necessary to get rid of. Of course, according to your metaphysical intuition they do not mean "wrong". They're just for show.

But you just respond like a litany (mantra, if you like) that they don't mean what they obviously say. But you cannot present a single text in your favour. So this debate is not a real debate. It is pure stubbornness on your part.Probably because you presented yourself as someone who knew Heidegger's work well and this is not true. If you have read one or two texts that you did not understand or did not want to understand. There's not much to present you as an authority on the subject.


That Heidegger did not have a concrete answer to the question of Being, he recognizes that himself. He takes refuge in vague and metaphorical terms like "shepherd of Being", "clear of Being", "truth of Being". But in spite of not knowing what he is talking about, he dedicates himself to disqualifying all the previous metaphysics with the qualifiers that I have collected above. All of them imply that this metaphysical tradition was mistaken in the "question of Being". That this is inconsistent with being unable, after twenty years, as he says in Letter on Humanism, to say anything really concrete about Being is one of the problems of Heidegger's reading, which sometimes has really comical effects.


You started this thread by saying:

I want to be clear that I consider Heidegger to be a great thinker and teacher, and that I've learned a great deal from his writings and interviews — Xtrix

You don't look like you've demonstrated that much knowledge of Heidegger to me. Actually, almost nothing. I think the two months I've been reviewing Heidegger has been more productive than your whole life as a Heideggerian. I've presented at least ten times more Heidegger's texts here than you have. A clear indication.

Heidegger offers no interpretation of being — Xtrix

If you mean he doesn't offer any coherent interpretation, fine. But that doesn't stop him from attributing to Being a number of powers that go beyond the natural. That has nothing to do with the pre-conscious understanding of being that he says we have. If that comprehension were enough to understand what being is, Heidegger would not have written the amazing amount of pages he did. As he says in Being and Time, Being must be explained beyond the intuition, because the existing explanations have hidden the truth of Being. It seems that he devoted his whole life to that. With very little success, as he himself admits. In that I give him the reason. His interpretation is just talk. Or bad poetry, at best.

Xtrix,

Not off topic at all. Just not within the limits you arbitrarily set. Agency is the issue. And love is the discipline needed to find the answer. Good and evil and just neutral change come into the world through us. But we cannot be permitted to know this because it is not real at all unless our being departed it invests others with responsibility that what worth that departure is lost to them is recognizable. That responsibility is what love is. It cannot be unilateral. It cannot be alone, or even the one it would be if “Being” were “world historical”. But if the structure of the act of being and the response of love cannot be known or possessed, and so not received any reward for what worth that act is, this bereavement of possession of our “ownmost being in the world” (or some such) also spares us knowing what evil or mediocrity we bring to it either. And so we invent and promote ontologies and metaphysics that ratify our being spared responsibility. And so sparing ourselves that participation in the changing of the world, we erect structures promoting and sustaining the suppression of the dialectical participation between the act of being departure is and the response of the worth of time love is. That suppression is the essence of elitism. And “Being” is its most persistent and most weaponized term.

The elderly often find themselves strangers to their world. This is not because they have not kept up with technology. It goes much deeper than techno-babel ever could. It is because they have spent a lifetime taking part in the nuanced changes in all the terms of everyday life. And yet, if the language so produced, or at least re-calibrated, is to be real at all, and really intimate the meaning of our lives as much as we are able to share in this, we must be kept from knowing our part in it so that the world can be free to respond with its burden of responsibility that the loss we are to it, upon our departure, be recognizable of its worth. That is, as loss. Loss and love is the central dialectic of the real. Yup. Really. And I can prove it. But not in your feeble terms. But, you see, nostalgia for a lost greatness or purity is just a specter or shade of the only completeness time is as that dialectical dynamic between loss and love is. Heidegger is hardly original in his style of wrecking love. It has been the favored ploy of unjust elites from time-immemorial. That is, they use something like “Being” to absolve themselves of responsibility and to turn their backs on the worth of what is lost to the world that is not of their own doing.

@Gary M Washburn I'm fascinated with this concept of elites trying to ruin love with the concept of being. I myself agree with this idea.
In a non heideggerian context how would you explain
your idea?

"In the main they are wrong." You simply don't know what you're talking about.
— Xtrix

I think this is exactly your case:

You're a good disciple of Heidegger: you've decided that words don't mean what they usually mean but what you want them to mean. That's why you don't care what the dictionaries and everyone who has studied Heidegger say. — David Mo

"Everyone who has studied Heidegger." First of all, I've studied Heidegger. I care about my own reading of him, yes. More so than secondary sources. If they have evidence, I'll gladly hear it. You certainly have not provided it. Secondly, "everyone" is a sweeping generalization with no basis in fact. Dreyfus, Carmen, Blattner, Kelley, etc. etc., hardly agree with your assessment.

Of course, the criterion of authority is not an argument in itself, but there are times when it is useful. It's useful in the face of a question we don't know. When talking about nuclear physics, most human beings have no choice but to trust what the scientists say. When all the experts on Heidegger say one thing contrary to what you say you would do well to meditate a little on your position. Especially when you are not able to present a single text that supports your position and you say it because you want to. — David Mo

Again, see above regarding "all the experts." But not only does the text not support your assertion, neither do the experts.

And I've quoted MULTIPLE texts that demonstrate exactly the opposite of what you're saying. I even linked you a video from Heidegger's own mouth about how he "does not mean by that anything negative." I suppose that was ignored, which isn't surprising.

And your whole excuse is that "free from something" is a "technical" term whose meaning only you know. Don't make me laugh. Where did you get your knowledge? If you don't back up your interpretation with commentators' texts or Heidegger's, where does your interpretation come from? Is it a metaphysical intuition? — David Mo

It comes from Heidegger's text, which I've quoted dozens of times. Of course he's arguing we should free ourselves from the tradition. That's not in question. What's in question is your taking that to mean the history of philosophy is somehow "wrong" in Heidegger's eyes, and yet haven't "presented a single text that supports your position," not surprisingly -- because he never says it. Your "deducing" it from the text is your own business. I've provided plenty of explanation as to why that's not the case -- which you've (also not surprisingly) ignored. That's also your business, not mine. If you care to learn, then learn to listen. If you care to pretend to be an expert out of ego, then do it elsewhere.

I got tired of providing you with Heidegger's negative terms regarding the western metaphysical tradition, — David Mo

And I get tired repeatedly telling you that these terms pertain to translations of Greek words, not to what you're claiming. If you still don't understand that, that's also your problem, not mine.

I think I must have put here a dozen examples taken from Heidegger's own books. I repeat some of them to refresh your memory, which seems to be somewhat weak.

Deteriorating, collapsing, falling down, inadequately formulated, forgotten, distortions, taken over dogmatically, concealments, baleful prejudice, failed to determine, falsified, misses its sense entirely, falsified from the bottom up, degeneration, blocked, forgotten, erroneous — David Mo

Yes, and which ones are referring to "Western philosophy", exactly? Don't bother, I already know. See above.

If you want to believe that listing a bunch of words, without context, lends credence to your claims that Heidegger believes the Western interpretations of being have been "wrong," you're welcome to.

"Firstly I have to correct the question with regard to the way in which you talked about the 'downfall of Being'. For that is not meant in a negative manner. I do not speak about a 'downfall' of Being, but rather about the fate of Being insofar as it hides itself more and more in comparison to the Openness of Being with the Greeks." -- Martin Heidegger

Again, the above quotation is Heidegger, not me. What do you make of it? Is he simply confused? True, maybe you, in your extensive study, understand Heidegger better than me -- and better than Heidegger.

All of them constitute a "radical" criticism, that is to say, in its root, to the western metaphysics, which, according to Heidegger has undertaken a wrong way of which it is necessary to get rid of. Of course, according to your metaphysical intuition they do not mean "wrong". They're just for show. — David Mo

Let me try this way. If Western metaphysics is "wrong" -- then what's "right"? Parmenides and Heraclitus? What were their interpretations of being? They certainly asked the question -- but so did Plato and Aristotle. Where is the textual support for this assertion, if in fact this is what you believe?

But you just respond like a litany (mantra, if you like) that they don't mean what they obviously say. But you cannot present a single text in your favour. — David Mo

I have provide multiple texts in my favor. But if I were using your method, I'd simply pick "positive" words from Being and Time and make a list of them, context-free.

So far all you've proven is that you can list words that Heidegger uses. You've had several opportunities to show where he says the interpretations of being are "wrong." Where? I'll give you another shot. But I won't hold my breath, because there are none. You've taken other words, like "falsified from the bottom up" (pertaining to translations, as I've repeatedly 100 times), and claimed it as proof that the tradition is "wrong," which is never said. That's all you've done.

So this debate is not a real debate. It is pure stubbornness on your part. — David Mo

The stubbornness is with you. I've said from the beginning it was a nit-picking point, said numerous things which are far more substantial (and even re-posted them to get it back on track), and yet you've focused, laser-like, on this one narrow and boring issue. The fact that you refuse to understand it, "stubbornly," is your own issue. The fact that I won't let it slide, even something as trivial as this, is what's truly bothering you -- but I do so repeatedly because it's simply incorrect. You should be adult enough to see it. But you won't, because you want to believe you're an expert in something you're not. As I've been very honest about: I know Heidegger better than you. It's not because I'm smarter, it's because I've spent more time reading him. You refuse to accept this and learn from me. That's also your business.

Probably because you presented yourself as someone who knew Heidegger's work well and this is not true. If you have read one or two texts that you did not understand or did not want to understand. There's not much to present you as an authority on the subject. — David Mo

I never said I was an authority. But do I understand Heidegger better than you? Yes, and it's clear to me. It'd be clear to Heidegger scholars as well.

You started this thread by saying:
I want to be clear that I consider Heidegger to be a great thinker and teacher, and that I've learned a great deal from his writings and interviews
— Xtrix

You don't look like you've demonstrated that much knowledge of Heidegger to me. Actually, almost nothing. I think the two months I've been reviewing Heidegger has been more productive than your whole life as a Heideggerian. I've presented at least ten times more Heidegger's texts here than you have. A clear indication. — David Mo

Not my whole life. The spring of last year until the present I've been carefully and seriously reading Heidegger. I have well over a dozen books. I've listened to many lectures as well.

You don't really think that, and you know it. Your ego is just getting the best of you, and now you're regressing into a childlike tantrum. Carry on if you must, but I suggest not letting emotion get the better of you.

It's also ironic that the person accusing me of not understanding Heidegger has admittedly read far less, and has very explicitly started from an approach of debunking/refuting rather than attempting to understand (which has consistently lead to false, speculative, and unsubstantiated claims, both about what Heidegger says and about his character).

_________

To recap. Your claim is that (1) Heidegger believes Western philosophy (since at least Parmenides and Heraclitus), in the sense of its interpretations of being (since ousia), is "wrong" ("in the main").

It's a simple claim, and it's simply wrong. Heidegger does not say this, nor does he believe it. In fact, as I've quoted above, goes out of his way to say there is nothing negative meant in his assessment. These interpretations are not inaccurate or incorrect -- in fact these terms don't even apply. They are simply historical facts (as he sees it). What you've given as examples are related to translations, mainly of Greek words (e.g., aletheia, logos, phusis, doxa, etc), which Heidegger indeed believes are wrong, inaccurate, and incorrect. You take these and conflate them with (1) above. That's simply not the case.

Here's an example of why you go awry (emphasis mine):

"There are various ways in which phenomena can be covered up. In the first place, a phenomenon can be covered up in the sense that is is still quite undiscovered. It is neither known nor unknown. Moreover, a phenomenon can be buried over. This means that is has at some time been discovered but has deteriorated [verfiel] to the point of getting covered up again. This covering-up can become complete; or rather--and as a rule-- what has been discovered earlier may still be visible, though only as a semblance. Yet so much semblance, so much 'Being.' This covering-up as a 'disguising' is both the most frequent and the most dangerous, for here the possibilities of deceiving and misleading are especially stubborn." -- B&T, p. 60

So there you go -- I've highlighted a bunch of "negative" words for you. If you truly believe, given what he's talking about here, that it relates to what you're claiming -- as I anticipate you will -- then you're completely off track.

But carry on.

Heidegger offers no interpretation of being
— Xtrix

If you mean he doesn't offer any coherent interpretation, fine. But that doesn't stop him from attributing to Being a number of powers that go beyond the natural. — David Mo

No, he offers no interpretation period.

As for "attributing to being a number of powers that go beyond the natural," what are you referring to? There's no way Heidegger "attributes" anything to Being, because being HAS NO attributes. It has no properties. It has no traits. It is not even an "it." Being is not a being. It is not an object. It is not an entity.

This is elementary in Heidegger. But feel free to explain. What, in your opinion, is he "attributing" to being?

As he says in Being and Time, Being must be explained beyond the intuition, because the existing explanations have hidden the truth of Being. — David Mo

"Being must be explained beyond intuition." Again, this really goes against everything Heidegger writes.

Being is interpreted as presence in the Western tradition. That has become self-evident and unquestioned. Heidegger wants to re-awaken the question again, through phenomenology (basically the analysis of what's "hidden") of our existence and through the "deconstruction" of the history of Western thought. Where do attributes and explanations come into play?

Xtrix,

Not off topic at all. Just not within the limits you arbitrarily set. — Gary M Washburn

The limits I set is that this thread is about Martin Heidegger's philosophy. That's not arbitrary, it's the topic I chose. Are we free to talk about life on Mars? Sure. But that's off topic. Likewise, nearly everything you've said is off-topic -- and both incoherent and boring, to boot.

I'll skip the rest.

As I've been very honest about: I know Heidegger better than you. It's not because I'm smarter, it's because I've spent more time reading him. — Xtrix

What a pity! What a waste of time!

And I've quoted MULTIPLE texts that demonstrate exactly the opposite of what you're saying. — Xtrix

I had the patience to seek out your contributions to the debate. You have quoted Heidegger 11 times (including a Youtube). I have quoted Heidegger 32 times. Your quotes are generally short (two lines) and do not relate to the question. My quotes are usually larger (several lines) and ever centred. You say I made a list of words out of context. You see that's not true. I made the list as a summary. My quotes are presented in full, not like yours. And at least they refer to the subject, which is not the case with yours, as I will explain below.

Again, the above quotation is Heidegger, not me. — Xtrix

[

I even linked you a video from Heidegger's own mouth about how he "does not mean by that anything negative." — Xtrix

In this quote your lack of understanding and inexperience about Heidegger are simply obvious. You quote a Youtube, a short interview with Heidegger. Someone who knows Heidegger would have presented other texts by Heidegger where he deals with the subject more deeply. Here he limits himself to a few unclear words.
Nowhere in the interview does Heidegger talk about the topic we are discussing. You are not aware of this. Therefore, his quote refers to the fall of Being. But we are talking about the failure of Western metaphysics. Not of Being.

Let me try this way. If Western metaphysics is "wrong" -- then what's "right"? Parmenides and Heraclitus? What were their interpretations of being? — Xtrix

You've taken other words, like "falsified from the bottom up" (pertaining to translations, — Xtrix

I don't think Heidegger said anywhere that the "interpretations" of Parmenides and Heraclitus were correct. I believe that what he says is that the correct approach to Being was made by Parmenides and Heraclitus. One can say that they were in the right direction or that they unraveled the root of the problem. "Interpretation" is not the right word, I think.What was wrong was the interpretation of its key expressions by the later tradition. You put the question of translation on the back burner. No, not at all. Language is the "house of being" for Heidegger (Letter on Humanism p. 253,.) Any concealing or downgraded translation of Heraclitus and Parmenides in terms of substantia meant the loss of the right way of understanding Being. And this is what Plato and Aristotle did first, and the Western metaphysical tradition after them. That's why they falsified the whole (bottom up) question of Being. And this is the context.

As for "attributing to being a number of powers that go beyond the natural," what are you referring to? There's no way Heidegger "attributes" anything to Being, because being HAS NO attributes. It has no properties. It has no traits. It is not even an "it." — Xtrix

That is why Heidegger says that it is destiny, the key to being saved, that it is revealed or hidden, that it dwells in the languge, that is the truth, etc., etc. Of course, that's not having properties. I suppose Heidegger calls it something else, proclaims it to be the "true" meaning and is so calm. Privileges of quackery jargon.

I, however, think that when someone attributes a property to something, he is talking about property. Of course I speak everybody's language and Heidegger is far above humanity.

So there you go -- I've highlighted a bunch of "negative" words for you. — Xtrix

Leaving aside the fact that here another subject is raised that is not Western metaphysics. the text you quote would work against your argument! Or is being dangerous not negative?

Asif,

Heidegger thought he had cracked the enigma of induction. The problem of how we achieve or receive completed thoughts and terms when mind operates entirely by reduction. That is, by taken as given a concept or term that we then derive further inferences from by slicing away what does not belong to it. The problem with the solution of “Being” is that it requires a special heritage that cannot be regained once lost. It also obligates its future to its past. That is, the only trajectory of this mode of “induction” is the revival of something “originary”. But in reality, the future must be so unbeholden to its past that emancipation from it is the only presence. This, of course, is enough in itself to refute the entire project Heidegger has undertaken. He obviously knew this, that is why he kept cropping up with new spellings. No doubt, had he lived, there would be “Byong” “Byung”, “Bying” and “Byang”! The fact is his thesis boils down to a reduction of being to the universal quantifier, 'the oneness of it all'. But reason still operates reductively, by the enumeration of that oneness into its parts. But even if “Being” is the prime enumerator, as it were, this still leaves us with the question: how many is it? How many is one? May seem an impertinent question, but it underscores the enigma between one and many that philosophy has been tripping over since Thales. And only Socrates and Plato had anything really to offer. But their solution requires us to value the personal character of our changing convictions and their terms, and philosophy, especially in the Christian Era, is dead set against this. I could go on, but I fear Xtrix would fiercely object. I will just suggest that money was invented to put an end to human investment in each other. Once the fee is paid and the transaction complete, we need pay no more heed to each other. Money does this by quantifying human effort and dehumanizing value. Prior to this people engaged in exchanges that were never complete, and so kept its participants in an endless revaluation of each other and what of value is outstanding. Put an end to that and societies inevitably diverge, segregate, and suffer disparities of valuation, disparities ratified and secured by the motive any government has to protect its currency. That is. The quantifier in exchanges makes the public sector shill to private avarice. I could go on, but it might be more appropriate to take this elsewhere. I've never opened a topic, but if you would like to just give me a heads up, I don't go online regularly.

Xtrix,

I think a lot of readers would say it was Heidegger who is from another planet. But, no, he was part of a tradition which he both parasited upon and abused. If you do not know the difference between induction and reduction you don't know enough philosophy to read any of it at all. Mind is far vaster place than you seem comfortable with. Whatever.

I gave you a statement: “Every utterance is unique.” What do you not understand in this? I must confess, I mean “unique” in the strict sense. If “Being” is as Heidegger claims, what is unique is either what “Being” is, or it is nothing at all. As Goethe claimed, you can't be hammer and anvil too. But if presence is a future emancipated from its past, then the unique is the emancipator that is the only presence. Presence, that is, because the future can only remembrance that unique act in contrariety to the stricture of its past in recognition of the value that emancipation is to it. It's a simple enough question, then, do you understand what uniqueness really is, and why it is conclusive proof Heidegger made a hash of everything he turned his mind to?

"Being must be explained beyond intuition." Again, this really goes against everything Heidegger writes. — Xtrix

Again, you don't know Heidegger well :

Thirdly, it is held that 'Being' is of all concepts the one that is self­ evident. Whenever one cognizes anything or makes an assertion, whenever one comports oneself towards entities, even towards oneself, some use is made of 'Being'; and this expression is held to be intelligible 'without further ado', just as everyone understands "The sky is blue', 'I am merry', and the like. But here we have an average kind of intelligibility, which merely demonstrates that this is unintelligible. It makes manifest that in any way of comporting oneself towards entities as entities-even in any Being towards entities as entities-there lies a priori an enigma.The very fact that we already live in an understanding of Being and that the mean­ing of Being is still veiled in darkness proves that it is necessary in principle to raise this question again. — Heidegger: B&T, p. 4/27

As for "attributing to being a number of powers that go beyond the natural," what are you referring to? — Xtrix

For example:

Despite Heidegger’s own protestations against identifying Being with ‘the Supreme Being’ of metaphysical theology and against seeing it as in any way ‘personal’ like the theistic God, Löwith argued that it was virtually impossible not to compare Heidegger’s Being with the Judaeo-Christian God, periodically revealing Himself to mortals for purposes that are both inscrutable and, as yet, unfulfilled. Whereas in Being and Time, Being ‘is’ only as long as Dasein is, Dasein itself now exists only by the grace and favour of Being. — Pattison: The Late Heidegger, p. 195

And:

The human being is rather "thrown" by being itself into the truth of being, so that ek-sisting in this fashion he might guard the truth of being, in order that beings might appear in the light of being as the beings they are. Human being do not decide whether and how beings appear, whether and how God and the gods or history and nature come forward into the clearing of being, come to presence and depart. The advent of beings lies in the destiny of being. — Heidegger: Letter on Humanism, Op. Cit. p. 252

Any concealing or downgraded translation of Heraclitus and Parmenides in terms of substantia meant the loss of the right way of understanding Being. — David Mo

The "right way." It's almost laughable to put it like this.

Your thesis: Parmenides and Heraclitus had it "right" (though we're not sure what the "it" refers to), and those after them have it "wrong." Excellent analysis. But not once in Heidegger. Which is why in all of your 32 references it's not once claimed.

As for "attributing to being a number of powers that go beyond the natural," what are you referring to? There's no way Heidegger "attributes" anything to Being, because being HAS NO attributes. It has no properties. It has no traits. It is not even an "it."
— Xtrix

That is why Heidegger says that it is destiny, the key to being saved, that it is revealed or hidden, that it dwells in the languge, that is the truth, etc., etc. Of course, that's not having properties. I suppose Heidegger calls it something else, proclaims it to be the "true" meaning and is so calm. Privileges of quackery jargon. — David Mo

You don't have a clue about what you're talking about. Again. Quite boring.

Now it's simply "quackery jargon," which you believed from the beginning, prior to your very thorough and open-minded two-week investigation into Heidegger. Again, excellent analysis.

"The Being of entities 'is' not itself an entity." -- B/T, p. 26

Objects and substances (beings) have properties. Being has no properties. What you referred to above is ridiculous -- he never refers to being as a "destiny" as though this a property of some kind, that's competely meaningless. You're confusing being and beings. Beings are revealed or hidden. Heidegger discusses this a lot. Of course, you have to read him first.

So there you go -- I've highlighted a bunch of "negative" words for you.
— Xtrix
Leaving aside the fact that here another subject is raised that is not Western metaphysics. the text you quote would work against your argument! Or is being dangerous not negative? — David Mo

I anticipated this, and even said so:

So there you go -- I've highlighted a bunch of "negative" words for you. If you truly believe, given what he's talking about here, that it relates to what you're claiming -- as I anticipate you will -- then you're completely off track. — Xtrix

Kind of funny. Thanks for proving my point.

Xtrix,

I think a lot of readers would say it was Heidegger who is from another planet. But, no, he was part of a tradition which he both parasited upon and abused. If you do not know the difference between induction and reduction you don't know enough philosophy to read any of it at all. Mind is far vaster place than you seem comfortable with. Whatever.

I gave you a statement: “Every utterance is unique.” What do you not understand in this? I must confess, I mean “unique” in the strict sense. If “Being” is as Heidegger claims, what is unique is either what “Being” is, or it is nothing at all. As Goethe claimed, you can't be hammer and anvil too. But if presence is a future emancipated from its past, then the unique is the emancipator that is the only presence. Presence, that is, because the future can only remembrance that unique act in contrariety to the stricture of its past in recognition of the value that emancipation is to it. It's a simple enough question, then, do you understand what uniqueness really is, and why it is conclusive proof Heidegger made a hash of everything he turned his mind to? — Gary M Washburn

You really do live in your own world, don't you? I haven't come across someone so delusional on this forum yet, so thank you for providing that experience.

"Being must be explained beyond intuition." Again, this really goes against everything Heidegger writes.
— Xtrix

Again, you don't know Heidegger well :

Thirdly, it is held that 'Being' is of all concepts the one that is self­ evident. Whenever one cognizes anything or makes an assertion, whenever one comports oneself towards entities, even towards oneself, some use is made of 'Being'; and this expression is held to be intelligible 'without further ado', just as everyone understands "The sky is blue', 'I am merry', and the like. But here we have an average kind of intelligibility, which merely demonstrates that this is unintelligible. It makes manifest that in any way of comporting oneself towards entities as entities-even in any Being towards entities as entities-there lies a priori an enigma.The very fact that we already live in an understanding of Being and that the mean­ing of Being is still veiled in darkness proves that it is necessary in principle to raise this question again.
— Heidegger: B&T, p. 4/27 — David Mo

No, you weren't clear. Notice he doesn't once mention "intuition," which is a loaded term. If by "intuition" you're referring to the "pre-ontological understanding of being," then yes -- we shouldn't simply accept that understanding, and should raise the question of the meaning of being again. Fine. Be more clear next time.

As for "attributing to being a number of powers that go beyond the natural," what are you referring to?
— Xtrix
For example: — David Mo

The human being is rather "thrown" by being itself into the truth of being, so that ek-sisting in this fashion he might guard the truth of being, in order that beings might appear in the light of being as the beings they are. Human being do not decide whether and how beings appear, whether and how God and the gods or history and nature come forward into the clearing of being, come to presence and depart. The advent of beings lies in the destiny of being. — Heidegger: Letter on Humanism, Op. Cit. p. 252

Where does he "attribute to being" powers "beyond the natural" here? That's not what this passage says at all.

It's hard to attribute anything to Being, since being "itself" has no attributes. You keep wanting to think it's "God," or a mysterious "force," or something like that. But that's a tired, common reading of Heidegger. Completely untrue, to boot. He says nothing whatever, including in your irrelevant quotation (number 33, congratulations), about "powers of being." Being has no "powers." This is more of your own imagination.

How anyone could think, even after reading the little of Heidegger you have read (haphazardly, with the intention of confirming prior beliefs), that he says that Western metaphysics is "wrong," that the early Greeks were "right," and that being has properties, including "powers beyond nature," is pretty surprising. You've added this on yourself -- again, because you made up your mind a long time ago about Heidegger. It's a pity that this mentality blocks your understanding. I'd say "keep reading," but that's pointless -- and I should have realized that from the beginning.

Let me save you further trouble: Heidegger is a mystic and a charlatan who wanted to be the philosopher-savior of the Western world. And a Nazi to boot. He can rightfully be ignored, especially since he gave up on his project later in life.

There. Now you don't have to further burden yourself with this guy.

Objects and substances (beings) have properties. Being has no properties. — Xtrix

The advent of beings lies in the destiny of being. — Heidegger: Letter on Humanism, Op. Cit. p. 252

A property is nothing more than an attribute, a quality, like the ability to do something. If you say that X is y or that X possesses y, y is the property of X. Although Heidegger denies that Being is an entity like other entities, he attributes certain properties to it. For example: Being comes and Being is destiny. "Advent", which is the expression that Heidegger uses, means to arrive. Advent is an unusual archaism that today is used almost exclusively in the Christian liturgy to speak of the coming of Christ (so much so that my automatic corrector immediately puts a capital letter in front of me: Advent). That advent of Being is the destiny that governs history. Notice that it is not beings that rule that destiny, but Being, which as such is placed as something different and above them. That is, supernatural.

Therefore, despite Heidegger's statement that Being is not God, he speaks of it in such a way that one cannot conclude but that it is a kind of divinity. Perhaps not a personalized god, but an entity of supernatural powers.

Parmenides and Heraclitus had it "right" (though we're not sure what the "it" refers to), and those after them have it "wrong." Excellent analysis. But not once in Heidegger. — Xtrix

When you don't know what to say you resort to the supreme resource of the loser: the word "wrong" or "intuition" is not in the text.
Please, we have already discussed this. I seem to remember that on some occasions he does use that word, but this is not the case. Heidegger does not usually use the word "wrong". He uses at least a dozen words that have the same meaning. And I'm not going to repeat them because that's getting boring. You refuse to accept - I suppose if you understand - that to accuse someone of being blind or corrupting the matter is to be wrong. It really is not my problem and I am not going to go back over it.
And the same goes for intuition.

Any concealing or downgraded translation of Heraclitus and Parmenides in terms of substantia meant the loss of the right way of understanding Being. — David Mo

The "right way." It's almost laughable to put it like this. — Xtrix

Well, you're laughing at Heidegger himself.

The primordial phenomenon of truth has been covered up by Dasein' s very understanding of Being-that understanding which is proximally the one that prevails, and which even today has not been surmounted explicitly and in principle. At the same time, however, we must not overlook the fact that while this way of understanding Being (the way which is closest to us) is one which the Greeks were the first to develop as a branch of knowledge and to master, the primordial understanding of truth was simultaneously alive among them, even if pre-ontologically, and it even held its own against the concealment implicit in their ontology-at least in Aristotle. — Heidegger: Being and Time, Oxford, 2001, p. 225/268

It is clear from this text that the Greeks had a knowledge of truth that was later lost. That knowledge of truth is something like a way or pathway that was blocked. That this path was the right one and to which we must return Heidegger says so until he gets tired. It's absurd to have to repeat it so many times.

The advent of beings lies in the destiny of being.
— Heidegger: Letter on Humanism, Op. Cit. p. 252

A property is nothing more than an attribute, a quality, like the ability to do something. If you say that X is y or that X possesses y, y is the property of X. Although Heidegger denies that Being is an entity like other entities, he attributes certain properties to it. — David Mo

No, he doesn't. Nor does he interpret or define being.

The "destiny of being" is meaningless until the context is provided. To believe Heidegger is treating "being" as an entity, or a being, and attaching a "destiny" to it as a property, is simply a mistake. Thinking being, interpreting being, etc., has a destiny -- Dasein has a destiny, and is historical. This is all related to his idea of time. It has nothing to do with an object with properties, which goes against everything he writes.

That advent of Being is the destiny that governs history. Notice that it is not beings that rule that destiny, but Being, which as such is placed as something different and above them. That is, supernatural. — David Mo

So now being is supernatural, according to you. "Different and above" beings? This makes no sense whatsoever.

Since being is not an object or a being, it is not "different and above" beings. The fact that any being is implies being. Another way to say it: Being (capitalized, for no reason) is the is-ness of any thing (any being) at all. You're continually getting confused about this. There is no set of "things" in the universe or nature and then Being, which is somehow "outside," "above," or "beyond" it all. If this is what comes to mind, it's a mistake.

Therefore, despite Heidegger's statement that Being is not God, he speaks of it in such a way that one cannot conclude but that it is a kind of divinity. Perhaps not a personalized god, but an entity of supernatural powers. — David Mo

Almost laughable. Stop reading secondary sources. If you want to pretend Heidegger is essetnially a crypto-Christian, that's your business.

Heidegger does not usually use the word "wrong". — David Mo

Exactly.

accuse someone of being blind or corrupting the matter is to be wrong. — David Mo

Someone? Who? Descartes? Kant? Aristotle?

Once again: translations have been wrong, or in error -- the way of Greeks understood beings (phusis) has been mistranslated and therefore misunderstood, corrupted, etc. That is far different from saying "the Christians were wrong and Parmenides was right," which is exactly what you want to interpret Heidegger as saying. "In the main." And you're wrong.

Any concealing or downgraded translation of Heraclitus and Parmenides in terms of substantia meant the loss of the right way of understanding Being. — David Mo

The "right way." It's almost laughable to put it like this.
— Xtrix
Well, you're laughing at Heidegger himself. — David Mo

Before even reading your quote, based on past behavior, I can predict that it will not contain anything like what you wrote above. Let's see...

The primordial phenomenon of truth has been covered up by Dasein' s very understanding of Being-that understanding which is proximally the one that prevails, and which even today has not been surmounted explicitly and in principle. At the same time, however, we must not overlook the fact that while this way of understanding Being (the way which is closest to us) is one which the Greeks were the first to develop as a branch of knowledge and to master, the primordial understanding of truth was simultaneously alive among them, even if pre-ontologically, and it even held its own against the concealment implicit in their ontology-at least in Aristotle. — Heidegger: Being and Time, Oxford, 2001, p. 225/268

Exactly.

It is clear from this text that the Greeks had a knowledge of truth that was later lost. That knowledge of truth is something like a way or pathway that was blocked. That this path was the right one and to which we must return Heidegger says so until he gets tired. It's absurd to have to repeat it so many times. — David Mo

It's absurd that you misinterpret this in such a way.

Here he is talking about truth as aletheia, which the early Greeks had and which we've lost. Why? Because our understanding of truth is much different, and phenomena get interpreted as something present-at-hand (one line above the cited passage).

The Greeks did not have "knowledge of the truth" as if there's truth "out there" to be known. Truth is unconcealment, an emerging (phusis). Later it becomes a matter of logos as assertion, as correct propositions and correspondence of that which is present-at-hand. None of this has anything to do what your claim that the Greeks had the "right way of understanding Being." Being is not even mentioned here -- the issue is truth and the analysis of the "traditional conception of truth" and its derivatives.

interpret — Xtrix

He does interpret it, but he doesn't Interpret it. :wink:

That's funny.

I really wish I could read it all in German!

The Greeks did not have "knowledge of the truth" as if there's truth "out there" to be known. — Xtrix

Later it becomes a matter of logos as assertion, as correct propositions and correspondence of that which is present-at-hand. — Xtrix

Let us see:

At the same time, however, we must not overlook the fact that while this way of understanding Being (the way which is closest to us) is one which the Greeks were the first to develop as a branch of knowledge and to master, the primordial understanding of truth was simultaneously alive among them, even if pre-ontologically, and it even held its own against the concealment implicit in their ontology-at least in Aristotle. — Heidegger: Being and Time, Oxford, 2001, p. 225/268

(I have highlighted in bold letter some words that may help you understand what you seem unable to understand).

For Heidegger (except in his last phase of his life, which is not that of the text we are commenting) truth is revelation (aletheia). And the opposite of truth is concealment. The primordial truth is the truth of Being. That “primordial” means Heidegger's idea that Being can only be understood through what is everyday and "close" to us. That is not a subjective truth. It is the knowledge of something that is there. As the text clearly states, the early Greeks had an understanding of that truth in contrast to those who began to hide their ontology. Aristotle is mentioned in the text, although elsewhere Heidegger situates Plato as the first to begin the concealment. In this sense, the Aristotelian metaphysics and its consequences in all the western metaphysics are blind to the truth of Being.


Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task. (Being and Time p. 11/31; italics by Heidegger)

And that's why I asked you what it means to be blind to one thing. How can a philosophy that's blind to the most fundamental be "correct"? What the hell do you think it means to be blind?

I wish, instead of beating around the bush, you'd answer this. And if you bring up your famous contexts, to explain what context might be there that makes being blind “correct”.

For a person who has spent many years studying Heidegger, you make primary mistakes. According Heidegger, present-at-hand is a deficient or secondary mode of knowledge. To put it as an example of “correct” knowledge is a macroscopic error on your part.

Xtrix,

Unsurprisingly, you did not respond to my question. Uniqueness cannot exist in a Heideggerian world. Does an anomaly mean anything at all? Not alone, surely, but if other anomalies also tend to undermine the prevailing pattern, then either alterations emerge in that pattern as it tries to preserve itself, or they mount against it to eventually overthrow it against whatever forces are arrayed around that attempted preservation. But if each anomaly is really such, unique, then no pattern can ever emerge to sustain the changes it brings to “Being”. How, then, do anomalies to that pattern energize the production of changes in the pattern? A contrariety between unique beings as contrary to each other as to the prevailing ways “Being” presents itself is not only opportune to the recognition of the uniqueness of each, but to the continuous and revolving alterations of “Being” such that the community in contrariety against the dominance of “Being” over our perceptions becomes the language of our knowing reality. Only the trees are real, the forest is a construct, largely arbitrary, that each tree in the forest participates in generating by falsifying it. Or, again, a friendship is what it is precisely because each participant in it is actively determined itself not what that friendship is. That departure is uniqueness, the kind of uniqueness that generates all that is real. The patterns of “Being” that would be “originary” to it are a complete and utter fraud in the face of such reality. The most powerfully real “presence” is responsibility of recognition departure, the act of being not in any sense 'present', is left us with.

“Care” is arbitrary. It is not only that there is no 'why?' to it, but that in taking it up as the locus or motive of “Being” it is quite deliberately suppressed any possible recognition of the worth that is far more real, and the only possible meaning to the question.

We are a community in contrariety. You might have to explore rather more philosophy to know what that means. There is a context to Heidegger's work. If you deny all context to his words you cripple your reading of him. No author is clairvoyant. He retains meaning he is not necessarily conscious of, and derives his meaning from his wider context, not necessarily hidden, but nonetheless not presented to us in his texts. He was a student of Husserl, who had developed an updated version of Hume's patterns of perception, in a structure he called 'epochal'. I use 'intuition' to convey something of this perception, or, as I recall, 'a-perception'. It is, in my view, a necessary amalgam of reason and experience, but riddled with contradiction. Reason and perception do not operate by the same rules, and actually confute each other. Heidegger's 'presence' is a version of this epochal vision. It states that only what persist in being is, or teaches of, what “Being” is. There is no place in it for the uniqueness departure is.

Do you know any biology? An organism is comprised of vast numbers of cells. All the DNA can do is supply a pattern for the replication of proteins. The fact of the matter is that the completeness of the organism is that each cell in it is differentiated, not replicated, its place and role within it. Some cells deliberately die off. Are they being told to do so? Is there some sort of black-balling club that gangs up on them? Or is there something more worthy of them in the opportunity that departure brings to the whole? If every time a cell divides it introduces difference between it and all other cells, difference opportune of further differing for itself and all other cells, then it is not some preexisting pattern or 'originary' plan, but the capacity of each cell to respond with differentiation of its own conducive of a more worthy wholeness that makes it a life. A life most complete and worthy in departure. I could go into quantum, and show this dynamic there, and maybe even cosmology. I certainly can show its dynamic in human societies, but dogmatists like yourself generally deplore anything human in their ideas. But, as ever, the crux is the response not limited to its prior patterns of perception.

The Greeks did not have "knowledge of the truth" as if there's truth "out there" to be known.
— Xtrix

Later it becomes a matter of logos as assertion, as correct propositions and correspondence of that which is present-at-hand.
— Xtrix

Let us see:

At the same time, however, we must not overlook the fact that while this way of understanding Being (the way which is closest to us) is one which the Greeks were the first to develop as a branch of knowledge and to master, the primordial understanding of truth was simultaneously alive among them, even if pre-ontologically, and it even held its own against the concealment implicit in their ontology-at least in Aristotle.
— Heidegger: Being and Time, Oxford, 2001, p. 225/268

(I have highlighted in bold letter some words that may help you understand what you seem unable to understand). — David Mo

Says the person who doesn't understand.

How exactly you misinterpret this as going against what I was quoted saying above shows you really don't know what you're talking about. My statements stand.

There is no "knowledge of the truth" mentioned, at all. What he's talking about there is a pre-ontological understanding of being, a "primordial understanding of truth," which co-existed with what later evolved as assertion, correctness, etc. That's why he says this understanding "held its own" against the concealment implicit in their ontology. Do you know what that means? I'll give you a hint: it has something to do with time.

For Heidegger (except in his last phase of his life, which is not that of the text we are commenting) truth is revelation (aletheia). And the opposite of truth is concealment. The primordial truth is the truth of Being. — David Mo

Eh. Heidegger never puts it as "truth of being." The truth is unconcealedness, yes. This relates to logos and phusis, as well -- as gathering, emerging, enduring. An openness or disclosure of being.

That “primordial” means Heidegger's idea that Being can only be understood through what is everyday and "close" to us. That is not a subjective truth. It is the knowledge of something that is there. As the text clearly states, the early Greeks had an understanding of that truth in contrast to those who began to hide their ontology. Aristotle is mentioned in the text, although elsewhere Heidegger situates Plato as the first to begin the concealment. In this sense, the Aristotelian metaphysics and its consequences in all the western metaphysics are blind to the truth of Being. — David Mo

He doesn't say "knowledge," he says "understanding." "Knowledge" is also a loaded term, and thus he avoids it. There is a "sense" of a being that's pre-theoretical, pre-ontological, pre-epistemological, that we all have as human beings.

"Blind to the truth of being." No. But the question of being has been forgotten and concealed. In Plato and Aristotle, the question was still very much alive -- but the concealment was beginning to take root. See 'Restriction of Being' chapter of Introduction to Metaphysics.

Regardless, even Parmenides was "presencing." Heidegger wants to acknowledge that and attempt to get beyond it. So while the Greeks asked the question about being, and had a primordial understanding of truth, the seed was always there (necessarily) for concealment. In that sense, Aquinas is just as "wrong" as Parmenides. They both view being as something present-at-hand.

Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task. (Being and Time p. 11/31; italics by Heidegger)

And that's why I asked you what it means to be blind to one thing. How can a philosophy that's blind to the most fundamental be "correct"? What the hell do you think it means to be blind? — David Mo

Here he is talking about ontology, particularly in relation to the sciences. Blind and perverted from its ownmost aim -- yes, that's true. This has nothing to do with your claim. Descartes and others do indeed clarify the meaning of being, but it's just a new variation on the tradition of presence. So "God" or the "res cogitans" are ontological interpretations, but within a tradition that Heidegger wants to get beyond. This doesn't mean they're "wrong" interpretations. Wrong would make no sense in this context. Why? Because there is no "right" way to interpret being. To translate it this way is pure confusion. Hence why he never claims this. There is certainly blind/misguided ways to do ontology, however -- for example, by not even clarifying the meaning of being, or not realizing that this is your "fundamental task." But this is in relation to what ontology's aim is -- which is the question of being. It's not a statement about the various interpretations of being in the history of Western philosophy. And it's certainly not saying they're all "wrong."

I wish, instead of beating around the bush, you'd answer this. And if you bring up your famous contexts, to explain what context might be there that makes being blind “correct”. — David Mo

I'm not saying it's correct. I'm also not saying the entire history of Western philosophy is "correct" either. See above. "Right" and "wrong" simply do not apply in this analysis. This is why he talks so much about hermeneutics -- the emphasis is on questioning, meaning, and interpretations. Not to go through them and point out how they're all "wrong," but to elucidate the various interpretations, how they've changed through time, and where they originated. This would have made up the second part of Being and Time, which was never published. Rather, see "Basic Problems of Phenomenology."

For a person who has spent many years studying Heidegger, you make primary mistakes. According Heidegger, present-at-hand is a deficient or secondary mode of knowledge. To put it as an example of “correct” knowledge is a macroscopic error on your part. — David Mo

I guarantee you that Heidegger never says "deficient." You and your true/false judgments are just childish. He will also NEVER describe it as a "mode of knowledge." This already shows how stuck you are in epistemology and analytic philosophy generally.

Regardless, I never once said that the present-at-hand is "correct" knowledge or anything like that. Yes, it is a founded mode of being. When things break down, etc. First and foremost, we're engaged, coping beings interacting with the world, with equipment and with each other.

Perhaps deign to read before launching accusations about "macroscopic" errors.

Some passages to chew on:

"Because Being cannot be grasped except by taking time into consideration, the answer to the question of Being cannot lie in any proposition that is blind and isolated. The answer is not properly conceived if what it asserts propositionally is just passed along, especially if it gets circulated as a free-floating result, so that we merely get informed about a 'standpoint' which may perhaps differ from the way this has hitherto been treated. Whether the answer is a 'new' one remains quite superficial and is of no importance. Its positive character must lie in its being ancient enough for us to learn to conceive the possibilities which the 'Ancients' have made ready for us. In its ownmost meaning this answer tells us that concrete ontological research must begin with an investigative inquiry which keeps within the horizon we have laid bare; and this is all that is tells us." - B&T p. 19/40

And here is essentially the entire book:

"We have already intimated that Dasein has a pre-ontological Being as its optically constitutive state. Dasein is in such a way as to be something which understands something like Being. Keeping this interconnection firmly in mind, we shall show that whenever Dasein tacitly understands and interprets something like Being, it does so with time as its standpoint. Time must be brought to light -- and genuinely conceived --as the horizon for all understand of Being and for any way of interpreting it. In order for us to discern this, time needs to be explicated primordially as the horizon for the understand of Being, and in terms of temporality as the Being of Dasein, which understands Being." -- p. 17/39

No mention of "right" or "wrong," just a very clear thesis: up to the present day, time has been the horizon (the standpoint) of understanding and interpreting "being." Since the Greeks, this means parousia (presence); "idea" as prototype in Plato and "ousia" in Aristotle.

It's obvious why you want to ignore this and continue on about your childish point of "rightness" and "wrongness" (which is never in Heidegger, but which you want to try cramming in), but if you read this carefully it becomes obvious what's happening.

Or you can keep beleiving Heidegger thinks he's "right" and that almost everything else in Western philosophy is "in the main" simply "wrong." Go on framing it in that way if it helps you. Doesn't mean I have to take it seriously. Especially since you've given no evidence whatsoever that demonstrates it, other than pure misunderstanding of what he's talking about.

Xtrix,

Unsurprisingly, you did not respond to my question. — Gary M Washburn

Okay, I'll make it simple for you:

Uniqueness cannot exist in a Heideggerian world. — Gary M Washburn

No one is talking about "uniqueness." Absolutely no one. It wasn't mentioned here, it's not mentioned in Heidegger, and it has nothing to do with anything.

I didn't read the rest of your post. Learn to say something coherent in the first few lines -- otherwise I'm not interested in wasting my time on utter nonsense.