Nominalists are not saying that regularlities of behavior are limited to one particular object. — Terrapin Station

I still do not understand how there can be any predictable regularities/consistencies among particulars that have nothing real in common. If everything is particular, then why should we expect one rock/chair/diamond to behave the same as any other under any circumstances, no matter how "similar"? If every rock/chair/diamond has its own unique collection of properties, then why would they not all behave differently?

By the way, it's become increasingly clear that in your view universalism is ONLY about laws of nature. That's not at all what the traditional issue is about. — Terrapin Station

I am playing around with the idea that all universals - including all properties - are, in fact, laws of nature. It is indeed an alternative to the more traditional view, or perhaps an attempt at reframing it.

I don't know why you keep stressing this, because no one is denying it. — Terrapin Station

Yeah, I was getting rather repetitive; sorry about that. However, my impression is that nominalists do deny the reality of anything that is not actual - such as the subjunctive conditionals that I have been posing. Am I mistaken?

Is the issue perhaps that the realist wants to say that there is something about rocks/chairs/diamonds that causes them to behave similarly, while the nominalist wants to say that we call things rocks/chairs/diamonds because they behave similarly?

Why, in your view, (a) would information theory be a waste of time, (b) would technology based on information theory not be possible, (c) would computation not exist, and (d) would virtual reality be impossible just in case concepts/abstractions are purely mental? — Terrapin Station

If abstractions were purely mental (whatever you might mean by that) then they could not be instantiated in physical reality by physical objects like DNA molecules.

Food is not real, it is only an abstraction that many different things are edible.

If abstractions were purely mental (whatever you might mean by that) then they could not be instantiated in physical reality by physical objects like DNA molecules. — tom

Abstractions/concepts are particular, concrete phenomena in brains. Mentality is simply specific dynamic brain states.

Abstractions/concepts are particular, concrete phenomena in brains. — Terrapin Station

Concepts are particular? My impression is that nominalists agree with realists that all of our knowledge is only of generals; the disagreement is over whether any of them are real vs. mere names. Again, am I mistaken?

Abstractions are concrete? Given the usual definitions of the two terms, that is a direct contradiction; and in any case, I would suggest instead that abstractions are mental representations of real relations.

Abstractions/concepts are particular, concrete phenomena in brains. Mentality is simply specific dynamic brain states. — Terrapin Station

Despite being surrounded by abstractions instantiated in all sorts of physical systems, from DNA to computers, you simply deny this and assert that the only physical system of instantiating abstractions is the (human) brain.

Denial is always an option.

Re your earlier post, too, there are a number of things I should clear up. And I should have cleared all of this up a few days ago. I overlooked it as I was concentrating on responding to you from under the umbrella of my own views.

* Nominalists do not necessarily reject that there are real abstracts. The only real requirement for nominalism is that nominalists believe that only particulars exist. Hence, for a nominalist who accepts that there are real abstracts, they believe that real abstracts are particulars.

* Nominalism doesn't imply physicalism. In fact, a nominalist could be an idealist, even. If so, they'd simply believe that ideal objects are particulars only.

* So nominalists do not necessarily reject that there are physical laws either. Again, if there are physical laws in a nominalist's opinion, those physical laws would be particulars. Objects that aren't physical laws would operate per physical laws through whatever interactive system one buys. The only requirement for it to remain nominalistic is that the physical laws aren't identically instantiated in both a real abstract and a particular that's not the physical law.

I don't buy that there are real abstracts however. And I'm not a realist on physical laws either. So that's why I was responding in that context.

Concepts are particular? My impression is that nominalists agree with realists that all of our knowledge is only of generals; the disagreement is over whether any of them are real vs. mere names. Again, am I mistaken? — aletheist

The "just names" thing is pretty much limited to an expression of nominalism in Scholastic philosophy, and the consensus is that no one meant just names (and not concepts, for example) literally.

Functionally, concepts are abstractions--and that exhausts what abstractions are. In a nutshell, concepts are originated simply by noting similarities (which are not logical identities), grouping together like items while effectively ignoring differences, and "siphoning off" what one considers to be the most pertinent necessary and sufficient features of those like items--that happens via what one cares about or is concerned with or interested in re those items, tempered by what one notices, and so on. That forms the concept. This is a concrete particular ontologically, because it's a specific set of dynamic brain states in a specific individual. So that's why abstractions are concrete. Abstraction is what it is functionally. Concrete is part of its ontological status.

What would be objective, physical evidence of DNA or a computer, or detail of a computer, that's an abstraction? What would you point to so that you're pointing at an instantiated abstraction in DNA or a computer?

... there are a number of things I should clear up. — Terrapin Station

I appreciate it, along with your patience throughout the discussion.

The only real requirement for nominalism is that nominalists believe that only particulars exist. — Terrapin Station

I apologize for nitpicking, but moderate realists agree that only particulars exist - i.e., react with other like things in the environment. I assume you meant to say that nominalists believe that only particulars are real.

The only requirement for it to remain nominalistic is that the physical laws aren't identically instantiated in both a real abstract and a particular that's not the physical law. — Terrapin Station

Realism does not hold that a physical law is "instantiated" in (or even as) a real abstract. Instantiation properly applies only when and where the law governs actual particulars. The issue is whether the law is just as real at times and places when and where it is not, at that particular instant and location, being actually instantiated. This is what I have been trying to get at with subjunctive conditionals.

That forms the concept. This is a concrete particular ontologically, because it's a specific set of dynamic brain states in a specific individual. — Terrapin Station

Can the object of a conception - i.e., its content - be a concrete particular, and thus absolutely determinate in every conceivable respect? Or is some degree of generality unavoidable, as the scholastics on both sides seem to have agreed?

I apologize for nitpicking, but moderate realists agree that only particulars exist - i.e., react with other like things in the environment. I assume you meant to say that nominalists believe that only particulars are real. — aletheist

More, "If you were to inventory everything there is, you'd have only particulars on your list"

That way we avoid whether anything is interacting with anything else, whether it's mental or not, etc. It's just a complete inventory of everything, regardless of any properties it has. To a nominalist, there are no entries in that inventory that are not particulars.

Realism does not hold that a physical law is "instantiated" in (or even as) a real abstract. — aletheist

I don't want to get wrapped up in terminological issues. In other words, nominalists can believe that there are physical laws as real abstracts. Nominalism doesn't imply that that's not the case.

Can the object of a conception - i.e., its content - be a concrete particular, and thus absolutely determinate in every conceivable respect? — aletheist

I don't recall how you're using "determinate." Concrete here simply refers to it being a particular, physical "thing," (Where I'm not using "thing" technically.)

I just don't want to add a "false" layer. Order looks to me like a brute fact. Along the same lines, saying God created Nature doesn't explain the brute fact of Nature's existence. It passes the buck. Why God?
The metaphysician and theologian both tend to dodge brute fact. Somehow there's always a reason offered that itself doesn't require a reason. I prefer to think that human cognition just discovers its own limits here. Reasons are local and relationship. The system of objects must as a logical necessity remain a brute fact, or that's my current position, anyway.

I agree that we look for reasons. But I think eventually crash into brute fact as we seek the most general explanation. As I see it, we link events or objects by postulating necessary relationships. But there's nothing "outside" of everything (the system of related objects we might call nature or reality) to relate this everything to. So as a whole reality looks like a brute fact. I think we want prediction, control, and morale. Metaphysical debates are largely theological or "feel-good" debates. Like Nietzsche, I question the existence of a will to pure truth for its own sake. Metaphysics often looks like an atheistic or agnostic post-theology. Claims to predict and control are pretty easy to evaluate. But claims that appeal to our morale (our sense of beauty, justice, etc.) are more complicated. We have different "irrational" investments that steer even our choice of norms. (We are playing a game where writing the rules of the game is the game. One can't win this game, since there's no stable rule that makes victory possible.)

To a nominalist, there are no entries in that inventory that are not particulars. — Terrapin Station

Got it, thanks.

In other words, nominalists can believe that there are physical laws as real abstracts. — Terrapin Station

To clarify, would they have to be "real abstracts" in particular minds (i.e., concepts), or could they be real abstracts independent of any particular mind?

I don't recall how you're using "determinate." — Terrapin Station

The content of a concept - not the concept itself, but what it represents, what it is about - would be absolutely determinate if and only if it either has or does not have every conceivable predicate. As I understand it - again, I could be mistaken - scholastic nominalists and realists agreed that all objects of finite human cognition are indeterminate (and therefore general) to some degree, since there are infinitely many conceivable predicates of any such object.

I agree that we look for reasons. But I think eventually crash into brute fact as we seek the most general explanation. — R-13

If this were true, then how could we ever know that we have reached the brute fact that has no further explanation? What would be the unmistakable indicator that any further investigation would be a waste of time?

As I see it, we link events or objects by postulating necessary relationships. — R-13

This sounds like the nominalist view - we invent laws of nature that are descriptive; things seem to behave with a certain consistency. The realist, on the other hand, believes that we discover laws of nature that are prescriptive; they really govern things such that they behave with a certain consistency.

To clarify, would they have to be "real abstracts" in particular minds (i.e., concepts), or could they be real abstracts independent of any particular mind? — aletheist

"Real" is mind-independent, extramental, or "outside of minds."

The content of a concept - not the concept itself, but what it represents, what it is about - would be absolutely determinate if and only if it either has or does not have every conceivable predicate. — aletheist

I just have no idea what that would be saying. What would it be for a concept to "have every conceivable predicate"?

"Real" is mind-independent, extramental, or "outside of minds." — Terrapin Station

Okay, I just wanted to make sure that we were using roughly the same definition of "real." I take it that "real abstracts" would then be mind-independent abstract particulars - like tropes or numbers, according to some. (I know that this is not your own view.)

What would it be for a concept to "have every conceivable predicate"? — Terrapin Station

Not the concept, its object. The point is that when I am contemplating a particular rock/chair/diamond - even one that is sitting right in front of me - I am not cognizing every conceivable aspect of it. In fact, I cannot do so, because there are infinitely many of them, especially when we include temporal instants and spatial locations. Consequently, in all my thoughts about that particular rock/chair/diamond - and thus in all my knowledge of it - it is general.

If this were true, then how could we ever know that we have reached the brute fact that has no further explanation? What would be the unmistakable indicator that any further investigation would be a waste of time? — aletheist

For me it's all about the ambiguity of "explanation." Is explanation anything more than increased prediction, control, and the linking of the unfamiliar to the familiar? This looks like explanation as mastery. The apple falls and the planets orbit "because" of gravity. But in this context gravity is a brute fact. Matter is just attracted to matter. If we generalize further so that gravity is a local manifestation of some greater abstraction, then that greater abstraction is the brute fact. If we have a theory of everything, then that TOE is just the way things are. It is the brute fact. In short, I think analyzing the concept of explanation unveils the brute facticity of reality as a whole. Mastery is great, but I think it's conflated with some other, deeper sense of explanation --the kind of explanations humans give for their actions and which theologians found plausible in terms of a personal god.

This sounds like the nominalist view - we invent laws of nature that are descriptive; things seem to behave with a certain consistency. The realist, on the other hand, believes that we discover laws of — aletheist

To me the language doesn't matter. I like pragmatism as the thinking about thinking that liberates the thinker from merely linguistic or terminological problems. What difference in the world does a position on realism or nominalism make? If there are worldly differences, then perhaps they should be at the center of the debate. Anyway, the order becomes "visible" with the right postulation, whether we call it discovery or creation in our inexact inherited language, with this rightness being most persuasively established in terms of prediction and control. We live in this order slowly extended kingdom of order. It's the background of our practices. The realist/nominalist talk is a game for metaphysicians who trust their lives to these regularities every day, despite Hume's very cute problem of induction. We as a species keep building skyscrapers and cellphones and trusting lasers to reshape our corneas, without waiting for the metaphysicians to tell us what is "really" going on. (I'm not trying to hate on the metaphysicians but only to paint a vivid view on the pursuit from something like the outside.)

Is explanation anything more than increased prediction, control, and the linking of the unfamiliar to the familiar? — R-13

Inquiry is the struggle by which we seek to ameliorate the irritation of genuine doubt by achieving the satisfactory fixation of our beliefs - our habits of feeling, action, and thought. If nothing ever surprised us, then there would be no need for explanation.

In short, I think analyzing the concept of explanation unveils the brute facticity of reality as a whole. — R-13

I think the opposite - explanation unveils the rationality of reality as a whole. The more we come to know, the more we want to know.

What difference in the world does a position on realism or nominalism make? — R-13

I suspect that it boils down to a choice between two presuppositions: that reality is fundamentally rational, such that logic and inquiry give us genuine knowledge of it; or that reality is fundamentally brute, such that logic and inquiry are purely conceptual exercises, as you seem to be suggesting.

,

Here is an oversimplified argument for realism that I was contemplating while writing my last few posts:

• All objects of cognition are generals.
• Some objects of cognition are real.
• Therefore, some generals are real.

In order to deny the conclusion, the nominalist who accepts the first premiss has to reject the second, and thus hold that no objects of cognition are real. This amounts to treating reality as consisting entirely of incognizable "things-in-themselves" - i.e., inexplicable brute facts. The only alternative is to claim that all objects of cognition that are real are also absolutely singular - i.e., determinate with respect to every conceivable predicate, including place and time. Again, this seems impossible for a finite human mind. Is this right, or am I missing something?

Your terminology feels very awkward to me, but that's simply because you're heavily rooted in Peirce's work, and Peirce was so idiosyncratic, whereas I'm not that familiar with Peirce's work--in fact, it's often impenetrable to me at this point, and I'm so rooted in 20th century and contemporary analytic phil, and I'm also a highly idiosyncratic and fairly iconoclastic philosopher with respect to that (as I am with respect to philosophy in general).

Anyway, I wouldn't expect that any contemporary nominalist would accept the first premise. I don't accept the first premise either. I'd also add that what "generals" are in the first place are concepts, and concepts are particular, concrete abstractions that we subjectively create. So "knowing a general" is actually knowing a particular--namely, the particular that is the siphoning off of necessary and sufficient similar properties we require in order to call some x an F. That's called "abstraction," and it's what concepts are, but it's a particular set of dynamic brain states at a particular set of temporal points in a particular brain. In other words, ontologically, everything is a particular (or a "specific" I suppose you'd say), including concepts. It's just that some of those particulars are a "game" for calling two different things by the "same" name (the name isn't literally the same ontologically on two different occurrences, by the way)--that "game" is what a concept is.

So what I'd say is that you can't know anything that's ontologically general, because there are no such things. That's what makes me a nominalist in the first place.

Anyway, so I don't think it would make any sense for a nominalist to accept your first premise. They'd be saying that they can only know universals--so why, if they were to believe that, would they be nominalists? They'd be saying, "I can only know universals. Nevertheless, I have this theory that no universals are real (or that no universals exist, as many of us who call ourselves nominalists would say)." What could possibly be the impetus for them to say something so crazy? Usually an epistemological x-ist is not going to be other than an agnostic on ontological non x-ism. And that's to be expected. Their position is that they can't know not-x, so why would they assert that ontologically, not-x? Why would they assert that there is something that they can't even know?

And for that matter, if you believe that you can only know universals, how in the world could you say that you can know there are any particulars?

Re the "determinate with respect to every conceivable predicate," when you perceive something, say, you perceive particular properties from a particular reference point.

More food for thought, thanks. You are right that I am immersed in Peirce at this point; since philosophy is a hobby for me, my interests tend to run narrow and deep.

Anyway, I wouldn't expect that any contemporary nominalist would accept the first premise. — Terrapin Station

But whenever we think about something - i.e., conceive it, not merely perceive it - we always do so in general terms: "heavy stone," "green chair," "hard diamond," etc. We do not cognize anything as singular; in fact, we cannot cognize anything as singular. The best we can do is use some sort of index - pointing, a demonstrative pronoun, a proper name - to pick out individuals; and when we do so, we are still thinking about them in general terms.

So "knowing a general" is actually knowing a particular--namely, the particular that is the siphoning off of necessary and sufficient similar properties we require in order to call some x an F. — Terrapin Station

The alleged "similarity" is then an arbitrary construct of an individual mind, right? There is nothing real about the x that makes it an F - or that makes it really similar to other Fs, because then similarity itself would be a real general. Instead, every instance of someone calling something an F is just that person's subjective mental classification. In that case, how is it that different people manage to agree on most such judgments?

Why would they assert that there is something that they can't even know? — Terrapin Station

Isn't this precisely Kant's position regarding the noumenon or "thing-in-itself"?

And for that matter, if you believe that you can only know universals, how in the world could you say that you can know there are any particulars? — Terrapin Station

The point is that nothing is absolutely particular; everything is general to some degree, including individuals that persist over time.

To a nominalist, there are no entries in that inventory [of everything there is] that are not particulars. — Terrapin Station

It occurs to me that even if this were true, then particularity itself would be a real general - something that all things really have in common. Therefore, nominalism is effectively self-refuting. 8-)

It occurs to me that even if this were true, then particularity itself would be a real general - something that all things really have in common. Therefore, nominalism is effectively self-refuting. 8-) — aletheist

I still need to answer your other post, by the way, which I'll do when I'm not on a mobile device as I am now.

Anyway, particularity isn't a property that things have, it's not something identical that's instantiated in multiple things.

Anyway, particularity isn't a property that things have, it's not something identical that's instantiated in multiple things. — Terrapin Station

Why not? How can you claim that all real things are particulars, and then deny that particularity is something that they really have in common? It certainly fits the colloquial sense of "property" (or "quality" or "characteristic") that you explicitly endorsed previously:

I wouldn't say that I see properties as being anything different than the colloquial senses of those terms. — Terrapin Station

In any case, it should be clear to you by now that I am not defining a real general as "something identical that is instantiated in multiple things." Rather, a real general is a continuum of potentiality that is actualized in multiple individuals, each of which is also general to some degree.

Anyway, particularity isn't a property that things have, it's not something identical that's instantiated in multiple things.
— Terrapin Station

Why not? — aletheist

It's not a property because of what properties are. Properties are characteristics or qualities of matter/structure/process relations, what matter/structures/processes are "like" in other words. Particularity is not a characteristic or quality of matter/structure/process relations. Particularity is merely the fact that there's nothing that's identically instantiated in numerically distinct matter/structure/process relations.

That's not to say that particularity isn't real. It's an extramental fact that there is nothing identically instantiated in numerically distinct particulars. It's just not a property of matter/structure/process relations. And the colloquial sense of property isn't other than I'm describing.

it should be clear to you by now that I am not defining a real general as "something identical that is instantiated in multiple things." — aletheist

Sure, but it's as if we're simply talking about another topic than the traditional universals vs. particulars topic, which is what I've been talking about. You're kind of changing the topic like Dennett does when he talks about free will vs. determinism.

Particularity is not a characteristic or quality of matter/structure/process relations. Particularity is merely the fact that there's nothing that's identically instantiated in numerically distinct matter/structure/process relations. — Terrapin Station

What blocks me from restating your view as effectively holding that particularity itself is identically instantiated in (all) numerically distinct matter/structure/process relations? or that "numerical distinctness" is likewise a property/characteristic/quality of all matter/structure/process relations?

That's not to say that particularity is real. — Terrapin Station

Did you mean to say "not real" here?

It's an extramental fact that there is nothing identically instantiated in numerically distinct particulars. It's just not a property of matter/structure/process relations. — Terrapin Station

What distinguishes an "extramental fact" from a (real) "property"? Whatever term you use for it, you are attributing the exact same characteristic or quality to everything that is real. What makes particularity somehow different from other predicates?

Sure, but it's as if we're simply talking about another topic than the traditional universals vs. particulars topic, which is what I've been talking about. — Terrapin Station

You have acknowledged that you hold some idiosyncratic views about certain aspects of nominalism; likewise, I am suggesting some idiosyncratic views about certain aspects of realism.

What blocks me from restating your view as effectively holding that particularity itself is identically instantiated in (all) numerically distinct matter/structure/process relations? — aletheist

You can say whatever you like, of course. What I'd say if you were to say that is that it misunderstands my view. Particularity isn't instantiated at all. It's not a property. Properties are what are instantiated.

or that "numerical distinctness" is likewise a property/characteristic/quality of all matter/structure/process relations? — aletheist

Again, that's not a property, so it's not instantiated at all.

It would just suggest, especially in light of my explanation above, that you don't at all understand what properties are on my view.

Did you mean to say "not real" here? — aletheist

"Isn't real"--I made a typo initially and corrected it after you read the post apparently. Real=extramental. An extramental fact in this case, by virtue of there being no properties that are identically instantiated in numerically distinct things, as I explained.

What distinguishes an "extramental fact" from a (real) "property"? — aletheist

I defined properties above, so I won't repeat that again. Facts are states of affairs. They include properties, but aren't limited to them.

Whatever term you use for it, you are attributing the exact same characteristic or quality to everything that is real. — aletheist

But I'm not at all. I just explained this. I'm not saying that "particularlness" is a quality or characteristic or property that objects have. I explained what properties/characteristics/qualities are above.

What makes particularity somehow different from other predicates?

(Everyone sing along: "Repetition is very good")

"Predicate" is a synonym for "property." Particularness is not a property. Properties are what matter/structures/relations are like, the qualities they have by virtue of being the matter/structure/relation in question.

You have acknowledged that you hold some idiosyncratic views about certain aspects of nominalism; — aletheist

Sure, but that the universal vs nominalism issue is traditionally about whether there are properties that are identically instantiated in numerically distinct particulars isn't at all idiosyncratic. The word "traditional" should have clued you in to that.

It would just suggest, especially in light of my explanation above, that you don't at all understand what properties are on my view. — Terrapin Station

I have asked you for your technical definition, but you keep claiming that you mean nothing other than the colloquial sense of quality or characteristic. My dictionary says that a property is "an attribute common to all members of a class," a quality is "an inherent feature" or "a distinguishing attribute," and a characteristic is "a distinguishing trait, quality, or property." It even has a discussion of four synonyms: "QUALITY, PROPERTY, CHARACTER, ATTRIBUTE mean an intelligible feature by which a thing may be identified. QUALITY is a general term applicable to any trait or characteristic whether individual or generic ... PROPERTY implies a characteristic that belongs to a thing's essential nature and may be used to describe a type or species ... CHARACTER applies to a peculiar and distinctive quality of a thing or a class ... ATTRIBUTE implies a quality ascribed to a thing or a being." By these definitions, particularity is a quality/property/character/attribute.

Facts are states of affairs. They include properties, but aren't limited to them. — Terrapin Station

Without begging the question with respect to particularity, can you provide any examples of states of affairs that do not involve properties?

I have asked you for your technical definition . . . — aletheist

Come on, now. Did you not see where I explained what properties were above?

can you provide any examples of states of affairs that do not involve properties? — aletheist

Sure. Another is that it's a fact that there are no objective aesthetic evaluations.

Did you not see where I explained what properties were above? — Terrapin Station

Yes, and here is what you "explained."

Properties are characteristics or qualities of matter/structure/process relations, what matter/structures/processes are "like" in other words. — Terrapin Station

I then cited my dictionary and provided a lengthy excerpt from it, confirming that "quality," "property," "characteristic," and "attribute" all refer to the same basic concept. I still fail to see how particularity does not qualify. You claim that matter/structures/processes (and everything else) are all particular; in other words, that is what they are "like." I am not trying to aggravate you here; I am honestly not seeing the distinction that you seem to be making.

Another is that it's a fact that there are no objective aesthetic evaluations. — Terrapin Station

"Fact," "objective," "aesthetic," and "evaluations" are all properties. Anything that you can state as a proposition will include predicates, which you acknowledged is a synonym for properties.