Nominalists are not saying that regularlities of behavior are limited to one particular object. — Terrapin Station
By the way, it's become increasingly clear that in your view universalism is ONLY about laws of nature. That's not at all what the traditional issue is about. — Terrapin Station
I don't know why you keep stressing this, because no one is denying it. — Terrapin Station
Why, in your view, (a) would information theory be a waste of time, (b) would technology based on information theory not be possible, (c) would computation not exist, and (d) would virtual reality be impossible just in case concepts/abstractions are purely mental? — Terrapin Station
If abstractions were purely mental (whatever you might mean by that) then they could not be instantiated in physical reality by physical objects like DNA molecules. — tom
Abstractions/concepts are particular, concrete phenomena in brains. — Terrapin Station
Abstractions/concepts are particular, concrete phenomena in brains. Mentality is simply specific dynamic brain states. — Terrapin Station
Concepts are particular? My impression is that nominalists agree with realists that all of our knowledge is only of generals; the disagreement is over whether any of them are real vs. mere names. Again, am I mistaken? — aletheist
... there are a number of things I should clear up. — Terrapin Station
The only real requirement for nominalism is that nominalists believe that only particulars exist. — Terrapin Station
The only requirement for it to remain nominalistic is that the physical laws aren't identically instantiated in both a real abstract and a particular that's not the physical law. — Terrapin Station
That forms the concept. This is a concrete particular ontologically, because it's a specific set of dynamic brain states in a specific individual. — Terrapin Station
I apologize for nitpicking, but moderate realists agree that only particulars exist - i.e., react with other like things in the environment. I assume you meant to say that nominalists believe that only particulars are real. — aletheist
Realism does not hold that a physical law is "instantiated" in (or even as) a real abstract. — aletheist
Can the object of a conception - i.e., its content - be a concrete particular, and thus absolutely determinate in every conceivable respect? — aletheist
To a nominalist, there are no entries in that inventory that are not particulars. — Terrapin Station
In other words, nominalists can believe that there are physical laws as real abstracts. — Terrapin Station
I don't recall how you're using "determinate." — Terrapin Station
I agree that we look for reasons. But I think eventually crash into brute fact as we seek the most general explanation. — R-13
As I see it, we link events or objects by postulating necessary relationships. — R-13
To clarify, would they have to be "real abstracts" in particular minds (i.e., concepts), or could they be real abstracts independent of any particular mind? — aletheist
The content of a concept - not the concept itself, but what it represents, what it is about - would be absolutely determinate if and only if it either has or does not have every conceivable predicate. — aletheist
"Real" is mind-independent, extramental, or "outside of minds." — Terrapin Station
What would it be for a concept to "have every conceivable predicate"? — Terrapin Station
If this were true, then how could we ever know that we have reached the brute fact that has no further explanation? What would be the unmistakable indicator that any further investigation would be a waste of time? — aletheist
This sounds like the nominalist view - we invent laws of nature that are descriptive; things seem to behave with a certain consistency. The realist, on the other hand, believes that we discover laws of — aletheist
Is explanation anything more than increased prediction, control, and the linking of the unfamiliar to the familiar? — R-13
In short, I think analyzing the concept of explanation unveils the brute facticity of reality as a whole. — R-13
What difference in the world does a position on realism or nominalism make? — R-13
Anyway, I wouldn't expect that any contemporary nominalist would accept the first premise. — Terrapin Station
So "knowing a general" is actually knowing a particular--namely, the particular that is the siphoning off of necessary and sufficient similar properties we require in order to call some x an F. — Terrapin Station
Why would they assert that there is something that they can't even know? — Terrapin Station
And for that matter, if you believe that you can only know universals, how in the world could you say that you can know there are any particulars? — Terrapin Station
To a nominalist, there are no entries in that inventory [of everything there is] that are not particulars. — Terrapin Station
It occurs to me that even if this were true, then particularity itself would be a real general - something that all things really have in common. Therefore, nominalism is effectively self-refuting. 8-) — aletheist
Anyway, particularity isn't a property that things have, it's not something identical that's instantiated in multiple things. — Terrapin Station
I wouldn't say that I see properties as being anything different than the colloquial senses of those terms. — Terrapin Station
Anyway, particularity isn't a property that things have, it's not something identical that's instantiated in multiple things.
— Terrapin Station
Why not? — aletheist
it should be clear to you by now that I am not defining a real general as "something identical that is instantiated in multiple things." — aletheist
Particularity is not a characteristic or quality of matter/structure/process relations. Particularity is merely the fact that there's nothing that's identically instantiated in numerically distinct matter/structure/process relations. — Terrapin Station
That's not to say that particularity is real. — Terrapin Station
It's an extramental fact that there is nothing identically instantiated in numerically distinct particulars. It's just not a property of matter/structure/process relations. — Terrapin Station
Sure, but it's as if we're simply talking about another topic than the traditional universals vs. particulars topic, which is what I've been talking about. — Terrapin Station
What blocks me from restating your view as effectively holding that particularity itself is identically instantiated in (all) numerically distinct matter/structure/process relations? — aletheist
or that "numerical distinctness" is likewise a property/characteristic/quality of all matter/structure/process relations? — aletheist
Did you mean to say "not real" here? — aletheist
What distinguishes an "extramental fact" from a (real) "property"? — aletheist
Whatever term you use for it, you are attributing the exact same characteristic or quality to everything that is real. — aletheist
What makes particularity somehow different from other predicates?
You have acknowledged that you hold some idiosyncratic views about certain aspects of nominalism; — aletheist
It would just suggest, especially in light of my explanation above, that you don't at all understand what properties are on my view. — Terrapin Station
Facts are states of affairs. They include properties, but aren't limited to them. — Terrapin Station
Come on, now. Did you not see where I explained what properties were above?I have asked you for your technical definition . . . — aletheist
can you provide any examples of states of affairs that do not involve properties? — aletheist
Did you not see where I explained what properties were above? — Terrapin Station
I then cited my dictionary and provided a lengthy excerpt from it, confirming that "quality," "property," "characteristic," and "attribute" all refer to the same basic concept. I still fail to see how particularity does not qualify. You claim that matter/structures/processes (and everything else) are all particular; in other words, that is what they are "like." I am not trying to aggravate you here; I am honestly not seeing the distinction that you seem to be making.Properties are characteristics or qualities of matter/structure/process relations, what matter/structures/processes are "like" in other words. — Terrapin Station
Another is that it's a fact that there are no objective aesthetic evaluations. — Terrapin Station
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