Says the person who doesn't understand. — Xtrix
Of course, it only says what interpretation is blind, perverted and concealing. Which is not the same as saying it' s wrong, according to you. Where' s the difference? I don't see it anywhere. Please explain it.Not to go through them and point out how they're all "wrong," — Xtrix
Only by presenting this entity in the right way can we have any understanding of its Being. No matter how provisional our analysis may be, it always requires the assurance that we have started correctly. — Heidegger: (T&B, 43/69)
There is no "knowledge of the truth" mentioned, at all. — Xtrix
n the age of the first and definitive unfolding of Western philosophy among the Greeks, when questioning about beings as such and as a whole received its true inception, beings were called phusis.
This fundamental Greek word for beings is usually translated as "nature." We use the Latin translation natura, which really means "to be born," ''birth." But with this Latin translation, the originary content of the Greek word phusis is already thrust aside, the authentic philosophical naming force of the Greek word is destroyed. This is true not only of the Latin translation of this word but of all other translations of Greek philosophical language into Roman — Heidegger: ItM:10/14
Heraclitus, to whom one ascribes the doctrine of becoming, in stark contrast to Parmenides, in truth says the same as Parmenides. He would not be one of the greatest of the great Greeks if he said anything else. One simply must not interpret his doctrine of becoming according to the notions of a nineteenth-century Darwinist. Certainly, subsequent presentations of the opposition between Being and becoming never attained the uniquely self-contained self-sufficiency of Parmenides' saying. In that great era, the saying of the Being of beings contained within itself the [concealed] essence of Being of which it spoke. The secret of greatness consists in such historical necessity. — Ibid: 74/103
If we pay attention to what has been said, then we will discover the inner connection between Being and seeming. But we can grasp this connection fully only if we understand "Being" in a correspondingly originary way, and here this means in a Greek way. — Ibid:76/106
With those or similar words he says it repeatedly. If the truth is the unveiling of Being, the Presocratics were much closer to it. That's why Heidegger comes back and interprets his texts over and over again. If not, why does he do it? Is it not because he hopes to regain a path (beginning or way in his words) that has been lost? In the texts I have quoted here he says that the "Greeks" were closer to Being than anything that came after. Isn't proximity to Being a criterion of truth in Heideger? Of course it is.Heidegger never puts it as "truth of being." — Xtrix
Aquinas is just as "wrong" as Parmenides. They both view being as something present-at-hand. — Xtrix
Heidegger, then, denies that the categories of subject and object characterize our most basic way of encountering entities. He maintains, however, that they apply to a derivative kind of encounter. When Dasein engages in, for example, the practices of natural science, when sensing takes place purely in the service of reflective or philosophical contemplation, or when philosophers claim to have identified certain context-free metaphysical building blocks of the universe (e.g., points of pure extension, monads), the entities under study are phenomenologically removed from the settings of everyday equipmental practice and are thereby revealed as fully fledged independent objects, that is, as the bearers of certain context-general determinate or measurable properties (size in metres, weight in kilos etc.). Heidegger calls this mode of Being presence-at-hand, and he sometimes refers to present-at-hand entities as ‘Things’. — Wheeler, Michael, Martin Heidegger, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Anyway, your maniacal repetition that Heidegger does not present the understanding of Being in the sense of right and wrong, is strongly refuted by this little phrase:
Only by presenting this entity in the right way can we have any understanding of its Being. No matter how provisional our analysis may be, it always requires the assurance that we have started correctly.
— Heidegger: (T&B, 43/69) — David Mo
There is no "knowledge of the truth" mentioned, at all.
— Xtrix
It is impossible to understand something without having knowledge about it. If the early Greeks had a primordial understanding of the question of Being, they knew something important about it, which lost the later metaphysics. This is Heidegger’s Bible. — David Mo
n the age of the first and definitive unfolding of Western philosophy among the Greeks, when questioning about beings as such and as a whole received its true inception, beings were called phusis.
This fundamental Greek word for beings is usually translated as "nature." We use the Latin translation natura, which really means "to be born," ''birth." But with this Latin translation, the originary content of the Greek word phusis is already thrust aside, the authentic philosophical naming force of the Greek word is destroyed. This is true not only of the Latin translation of this word but of all other translations of Greek philosophical language into Roman — Heidegger: ItM:10/14
If we pay attention to what has been said, then we will discover the inner connection between Being and seeming. But we can grasp this connection fully only if we understand "Being" in a correspondingly originary way, and here this means in a Greek way. — Ibid:76/106
Heidegger never puts it as "truth of being."
— Xtrix
With those or similar words he says it repeatedly. — David Mo
If the truth is the unveiling of Being, — David Mo
That's why Heidegger comes back and interprets his texts over and over again. If not, why does he do it? Is it not because he hopes to regain a path (beginning or way in his words) that has been lost? — David Mo
Aquinas is just as "wrong" as Parmenides. They both view being as something present-at-hand.
— Xtrix
Absolutely not. I have you presented a Heidegger's text against the perversion of Parmenides and Heraclitus by the Latin metaphysics (see above). Aquinas is a perfect example of substantialism that is the main concealment of Being in the Medieval philosophy. You cannot put them at the same level. — David Mo
Heidegger says (T&B: 26/48) that Parmenides is guided by things for his interpretation of Being. Let us leave aside that this phrase is quite strange, since Parmenides denies the existence of everything that is not the unique Being. — David Mo
About the presence-at-hand things you should read this.
Heidegger, then, denies that the categories of subject and object characterize our most basic way of encountering entities. He maintains, however, that they apply to a derivative kind of encounter. When Dasein engages in, for example, the practices of natural science, when sensing takes place purely in the service of reflective or philosophical contemplation, or when philosophers claim to have identified certain context-free metaphysical building blocks of the universe (e.g., points of pure extension, monads), the entities under study are phenomenologically removed from the settings of everyday equipmental practice and are thereby revealed as fully fledged independent objects, that is, as the bearers of certain context-general determinate or measurable properties (size in metres, weight in kilos etc.). Heidegger calls this mode of Being presence-at-hand, and he sometimes refers to present-at-hand entities as ‘Things’.
— Wheeler, Michael, Martin Heidegger, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy — David Mo
That is, a secondary knowledge because Being that is obviously not a “thing” and the knowledge of Being is the sine quanon condition, the most universal, etc. As Heidegger is never clear I am not sure if presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand knowledge can be preliminary steps to Being. But what they are not is the primordial knowledge that conditions everything else, that is, the knowledge of Being. — David Mo
...Oh, I forgot. I don't know what your cryptic reference to time is about. It's not what we're discussing. — David Mo
"We have already intimated that Dasein has a pre-ontological Being as its optically constitutive state. Dasein is in such a way as to be something which understands something like Being. Keeping this interconnection firmly in mind, we shall show that whenever Dasein tacitly understands and interprets something like Being, it does so with time as its standpoint. Time must be brought to light -- and genuinely conceived --as the horizon for all understanding of Being and for any way of interpreting it. In order for us to discern this, time needs to be explicated primordially as the horizon for the understanding of Being, and in terms of temporality as the Being of Dasein, which understands Being." -- p. 17/39 —
I'm sorry to say you didn't understand the meaning of my quote. I had included it so that you would see that your idea that Heidegger does not speak of a knowledge, interpretation, etc. that is "right" is false. The term "right", although rarely used in Being and Time, also appears in the sense of "correct".has nothing to do with your claim. Why? Because here Heidegger is talking about Dasein, and specifically about how to analyze it — Xtrix
I'm not doing an exegesis of Heidegger, but a critique. This criticism refers to his use and abuse of language. If he says that to understand is not to know, I would think it was nonsense. Can you separate the two things?He doesn't use the word "knowledge" for many reasons, as I mentioned above — Xtrix
Any interpretation which is to contribute understanding, must already have understood what is to be interpreted. This is a fact that has always been remarked, even if only in the area of derivative ways of understanding and interpretation, such as philological Interpretation. The latter belongs within the range of scientific knowledge. — T&B: 151/192
The logos of the phenomenology of Dasein has the character of a herménuein, through which the authentic meaning of Being, and also those basic structures of Being which Dasein itself possesses, are made known to Dasein's understanding of Being. — B&T: 37/62)
Or we can interpret this as his saying "The Greeks had the truth of being, — Xtrix
It is.If the truth is the unveiling of Being, — David Mo
It isn't. — Xtrix
The 'Being-true' of the lógos as aletheia means that inlegéin as apophaínesthai, the entities of which one is talking must be taken out of their hiddenness ; one must let them be seen as something unbidden that is, they must be discovered. — Ibid, 32/56
We are not discussing the meaning of Heidegger's philosophy, but a series of partial issues that do not need the understanding of time to be resolved.It's exactly what we're discussing, because we're discussing Heidegger, and you cannot possibly understand him if you don't understand his claims about time. — Xtrix
And no, Parmenides is not "guided by things." The claim in that passage is that he is guided by legein, or "noein," which is the simple awareness of something present-at-hand. — Xtrix
Is it clear enough?Heidegger calls this mode of Being presence-at-hand, and he sometimes refers to present-at-hand entities as ‘Things’. — Wheeler, Michael, Martin Heidegger, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
And perverted because of its interpretation as substance.You most certainly can, because that's in essence the heart of Western philosophy: presence. Heidegger says so himself -- i.e., that this has been how Being has been interpreted since the early Greeks. — Xtrix
Greece after the Presocratics, Rome, the Middle Ages, modernity—has asserted a metaphysics and, therefore, is placed in a specific relationship to what-is as a whole. Metaphysics inquires about the being of beings, but it reduces being to a being; it does not think of being as being. Insofar as being itself is obliterated in it, metaphysics is nihilism. The metaphysics of Plato is no less nihilistic than that of Nietzsche. Consequently, Heidegger tries to demonstrate the nihilism of metaphysics in his account of the history of being, which he considers as the history of being’s oblivion. His attempt to overcome metaphysics is not based on a common-sense positing of a different set of values or the setting out of an alternative worldview, but rather is related to his concept of history, the central theme of which is the repetition of the possibilities for existence. This repetition consists in thinking being back to the primordial beginning of the West—to the early Greek experience of being as presencing—and repeating this beginning, so that the Western world can begin anew. — W. J. Korab-Karpowicz: Martin Heidegger (1889—1976), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
has nothing to do with your claim. Why? Because here Heidegger is talking about Dasein, and specifically about how to analyze it
— Xtrix
I'm sorry to say you didn't understand the meaning of my quote. I had included it so that you would see that your idea that Heidegger does not speak of a knowledge, interpretation, etc. that is "right" is false. The term "right", although rarely used in Being and Time, also appears in the sense of "correct".
I take this opportunity to remind you that Dasein's Being is the center of the research on Being in the mentioned book, to the point that it displaces other considerations of Being.
"Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being". (T&B: 12/32) — David Mo
I'm not doing an exegesis of Heidegger, but a critique. This criticism refers to his use and abuse of language. If he says that to understand is not to know, I would think it was nonsense. Can you separate the two things? — David Mo
Or we can interpret this as his saying "The Greeks had the truth of being,
— Xtrix
Who said that? I am not. It is one thing for them to be closer to the knowledge of Being and another for them to have the knowledge of Being. My on words: "If the truth is the unveiling of Being, the Presocratics were much closer to it". — David Mo
If the truth is the unveiling of Being, — David Mo
It isn't.
— Xtrix
It is. — David Mo
We are not discussing the meaning of Heidegger's philosophy, but a series of partial issues that do not need the understanding of time to be resolved.
The preeminence of Greek thought.
The concept of truth.
The criticism of Western metaphysics. — David Mo
To bring up the subject of time now is to try to deflect the question. — David Mo
And no, Parmenides is not "guided by things." The claim in that passage is that he is guided by legein, or "noein," which is the simple awareness of something present-at-hand.
— Xtrix
Heidegger calls this mode of Being presence-at-hand, and he sometimes refers to present-at-hand entities as ‘Things’.
— Wheeler, Michael, Martin Heidegger, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Is it clear enough?
As you can see in the previous text, present-at-hand is equivalent to beings or things in the empirical world.
For Parmenides there are two different ways of knowledge: that of reason and that of opinion. The one of reason affirms that only the Being exists. That of opinion says that multiple and different things exist, but this is what the Goddess advises against as mere appearance.
Heidegger says that Parmenides is guided by things (“presents-at-hand”; see above!). There is a contradiction with Parmenides’ theory that he does not explain.
That from the things present-at-hand cannot be passed to Being or Dasein, is clearly expressed in a text that we have already commented. — David Mo
You most certainly can, because that's in essence the heart of Western philosophy: presence. Heidegger says so himself -- i.e., that this has been how Being has been interpreted since the early Greeks.
— Xtrix
And perverted because of its interpretation as substance.
Greece after the Presocratics, Rome, the Middle Ages, modernity—has asserted a metaphysics and, therefore, is placed in a specific relationship to what-is as a whole. Metaphysics inquires about the being of beings, but it reduces being to a being; it does not think of being as being. Insofar as being itself is obliterated in it, metaphysics is nihilism. The metaphysics of Plato is no less nihilistic than that of Nietzsche. Consequently, Heidegger tries to demonstrate the nihilism of metaphysics in his account of the history of being, which he considers as the history of being’s oblivion. His attempt to overcome metaphysics is not based on a common-sense positing of a different set of values or the setting out of an alternative worldview, but rather is related to his concept of history, the central theme of which is the repetition of the possibilities for existence. This repetition consists in thinking being back to the primordial beginning of the West—to the early Greek experience of being as presencing—and repeating this beginning, so that the Western world can begin anew.
— W. J. Korab-Karpowicz: Martin Heidegger (1889—1976), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
*********** — David Mo
There is a very simple question that you will never answer: What is the difference between being wrong and being blind and hiding the question that really matters? Is not the wrong question a mistake that prevents you from giving the right answer? — David Mo
"Since the essence of man, for the Greeks, is not determined as subject, a knowledge of the historical beginning of the Occident is difficult and unsettling for modern "thought," assuming that modern "lived experience" is not simply interpreted back into the Greek world, as if modern man enjoyed a relation of personal intimacy with Hellenism for the simple reason that he organizes "Olympic games" periodically in the main cities of the planet. For here only the facade of the borrowed word is Greek. This is not in any way meant to be derogatory toward the Olympics themselves; it is only censorious of the mistaken opinion that they bear an relation to the Greek essence." (Parmenides, p 165 -- emphasis mine) —
"In thus demonstrating the origin of our basic ontological concepts by an investigation in which their 'birth certificate' is displayed, we have nothing to do with a viscous relativizing of ontological standpoints. But this destruction is just as far from having the negative sense of shaking off the ontological tradition. We must, on the contrary, stake out the positive possibilities of that tradition, and this always means keeping it within its limits; these in turn are given facticly in the way the question is formulated at the time, and in the way the possible field for investigation is thus bounded off. On its negative side, this destruction does not relate itself towards the past; its criticism is aimed at 'today' and at the prevalent way of treating the history of ontology, whether it is headed towards doxography, towards intellectual history, or towards a history of problems. But to bury the past in nullity is not the purpose of this destruction; its aim is positive; its negative function remains unexpressed and indirect." B/T p. 23/44 —
Remember that "Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and per verted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task".
I bet you are unable to answer this simple and straightforward question without beating about the bush. — David Mo
I'm sorry to say, but the one who hasn't read it (or hasn't understood it) is you.You obviously haven't read Parmenides's poem. The goddess guides him to pure Being through beings of the world — Gregory
(2.1.)Come now, I will tell thee - and do thou hearken to my saying and carry it away - the only two ways of search that can be thought of. The first, namely, that It is, and that it is impossible for anything not to be, is the way of conviction, (2.5.)for truth is its companion. The other, namely, that It is not, and that something must needs not be, - that, I tell thee, is a wholly untrustworthy path.
(…) (7.1.)For this shall never be proved, that the things that are not are; and do thou restrain thy thought from this way of inquiry. Nor let habit force thee to cast a wandering eye upon this devious track, or to turn thither thy resounding ear or thy (7.5.) tongue; but do thou judge the subtle refutation of their discourse uttered by me. — Parmenides' Poem
(6.1.)It needs to be that what can be thought and spoken of is; for it is possible for it to be, and it is not possible for, what is nothing to be. — Ibid
This is because the goddess told him to consider the world and how change doesn't make sense. — Gregory
To claim that these activities, when conducted in a ready-to-hand manner (in a sense "unconsciously" or transparently), involve "knowledge" is misleading — Xtrix
Put "understanding of Being" if you like it better. Or "un-concealing". You won't deny that these are Heideggerian terms.I understand. But again, what on earth is "knowledge of Being"? — Xtrix
Of course "degenerated" implies a value judgment, but it is not moral, as you suppose. You can make mistakes in the Mont Blanc path and never reach the top, but that does not mean you are a bad person.f Heidegger makes any kind of value judgment, — Xtrix
Parmenides thinks being, but is still guided in his interpretation of it by temporality (as anyone has to be, as Dasein -- who's meaning is temporality), in the sense of "presencing", which has dominated ever since. — Xtrix
In the course of this history certain distinctive domains of Being
have come into view and have served as the primary guides for subsequent
problematics : the ego cogito of Descartes, the subject, the "I", reason,
spirit, person. But these all remain uninterrogated as to their Being and
its structure, in accordance with the thoroughgoing way in which the
question of Being has been neglected. (22/44)
With the 'cogito sum' Descartes had claimed that he was putting philo
sophy on a new and firm footing. But what he left undetermined when he
began in this 'radical' way, was the kind of Being which belongs to the
res cogitans, or-more precisely-the meaning of the Being of the 'sum'. (...)The seemingly new beginning which Descartes proposed for philosophizing has revealed
itself as the implantation of a baleful prejudice, which has kept later
generations from making any thematic ontological analytic of the 'mind'
such as would take the question of Being as a clue and
would at the same time come to grips critically with the traditional
ancient ontology (24-25/45-46)
I think that's enough of a sample.If, however, this is not possible, we must then demonstrate explicitly not only that Descartes' conception of the world is ontologically defective, but that his Interpretation and the foundations
on which it is based have led him to pass over both the phenomenon of the world and the Being of those entities within-the-world which are proximally ready-to-hand. (95/128)
Because while an interpretation may very well be perverted regarding it's interpretation of what the Greeks originally believed (and hence "wrong" as incorrect, inaccurate, etc), in and of itself it is just as "valid" to interpret Being as "God," — Xtrix
Heidegger is not against science or technology. He's not against God or substance, either. — Xtrix
Because something ontical is made to underlie the ontological, the expression "substantia" functions sometimes with a signification which is ontological, sometimes with one which is ontical, but mostly with one which is hazily ontico-ontological. Behind this slight difference of signification, however, there lies hidden a failure to master the basic problem of Being. To treat this adequately, we must 'track down' the equivocations in the right way. (94/127)
Like Zeno, I think Heidegger started with the world — Gregory
I found B&T quite difficult. — path
What is the purpose of philosophy? — Hippyhead
I've never read Heideggers lectures on Parmenides. Would Zeno's paradox demonstrate a concealment of being for him? — Gregory
But you may want to go further (you are curious!) and sooner or later you will wonder why philosophy has to be so obscure? If you are interested we can continue. — David Mo
Deciding whether the philosopher's obscurantism is a guru's ruse or a genuine yearning for darkness seems impossible to me. — David Mo
That gives little room for anything more than malicious suspicion. — David Mo
As for the first one: the defenders of obscure writers, such as Hegel, Heidegger or Lacan, answer that the obscurity is given by the complex and often unsolvable nature of the problems. — David Mo
I assume that you are not providing a reasoning or evidence, but a feeling. I can share that feeling more or less, but it's not a basis on which we can argue.It's my sense — Hippyhead
And many others become more and more complicated when we go deeper into them. For example: I intuitively understand Rutherford's atomic model, but when we go deeper into quantum mechanics I read more and understand less. Is it Niels Bohr's fault or the complexity of the theories about the atom?I would counter that many things are complicated on the surface, but if one digs deep enough the bottom line is usually pretty straightforward and can be expressed in every day language. — Hippyhead
but also I sincerely believe the purpose of philosophy is to serve human beings — Hippyhead
Parmenides thinks being, but is still guided in his interpretation of it by temporality (as anyone has to be, as Dasein -- who's meaning is temporality), in the sense of "presencing", which has dominated ever since.
— Xtrix
Look at my previous comment to Gregory. Parmenides does not think in terms of temporality since Being is immobile and eternal. — David Mo
You misinterpret the quote about the Olympics. — David Mo
Heidegger does not think that the solution lies in simply repeating the thought of the Greeks. Like all attempts, including his own, they do not definitively resolve the question of being. But their approach to them is closer to the fundamental question of any thought, then he recommends that we must go back to take it as a starting point for a new beginning. — David Mo
Because while an interpretation may very well be perverted regarding it's interpretation of what the Greeks originally believed (and hence "wrong" as incorrect, inaccurate, etc), in and of itself it is just as "valid" to interpret Being as "God,"
— Xtrix
Greek thought is not wrong like that of metaphysics in general. But I doubt that Heidegger thought it was "valid" to interpret Being as God. Heidegger's theological position in his final stage is confusing enough to reach any convincing conclusions. His followers have found in it a poetic license or a theology. It may be one or the other. But I don't think there is a quote in Being and Time that supports the idea you expound. I'm almost certain of it. Nor later either, except in some marginal writing. Can you provide a quotation on this? It would be interesting to discuss this subject. — David Mo
Heidegger is not against science or technology. He's not against God or substance, either.
— Xtrix
In short, the difference between the correct ontology of the Greeks and the erroneous one of the later metaphysicists is well condensed in this quotation:
Because something ontical is made to underlie the ontological, the expression "substantia" functions sometimes with a signification which is ontological, sometimes with one which is ontical, but mostly with one which is hazily ontico-ontological. Behind this slight difference of signification, however, there lies hidden a failure to master the basic problem of Being. To treat this adequately, we must 'track down' the equivocations in the right way. (94/127) — David Mo
He does indeed interpret being in temporal terms -- not in the common understanding of "time," but in "presencing" (as Heidegger mentions) in terms of the present-at-hand
— Xtrix
Can you define what this "presence-at-hand" is and what it has to do with time and Parmenides? — David Mo
In Being and Time (1927; transl. 1962), Martin Heidegger argues that the concept of time prevalent in all Western thought has largely remained unchanged since the definition offered by Aristotle in the Physics. Heidegger says, "Aristotle's essay on time is the first detailed Interpretation of this phenomenon [time] which has come down to us. Every subsequent account of time, including Henri Bergson's, has been essentially determined by it."[2] Aristotle defined time as "the number of movement in respect of before and after".[3] By defining time in this way Aristotle privileges what is present-at-hand, namely the "presence" of time. Heidegger argues in response that "entities are grasped in their Being as 'presence'; this means that they are understood with regard to a definite mode of time – the 'Present'".[2] Central to Heidegger's own philosophical project is the attempt to gain a more authentic understanding of time. Heidegger considers time to be the unity of three ecstases: the past, the present, and the future. —
I would like to save intelligent young people some time. You can forgo Heidegger, he was essentially something very strange (a philosophical mystic?). — JerseyFlight
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