Still doesn't make sense to me, but thanks for pointing them out. — Xtrix

Been trying to untangle these, and playing somewhat fast and loose here, checking the index in Stambaugh to references to "inauthentic temporality," I'm gathering something like the following:

Authentic temporality and inauthentic temporality are linked with finitude and infinite time, respectively, toward the end of section 65 (331/304 Stambaugh).

In turn, finitude is linked both with the unity of the ecstasies and "my death." Infinite time/inauthentic temporality is linked with our everyday dealings with others, our entanglement with the they, and our flight from death.

"Looking away from finitude, the inauthentic temporality of entangled everyday Da-sein must fail to recognize authentic futurality and thus temporality in general." (424/389).

"Herein lies an inauthentic awaiting of 'moments' that already forgets the moments as they slip by. The awaiting of inauthentic existence that makes present and forgets is the condition of the possibility of the vulgar experience of time's passing away." (425/389-390)

In the above quote, "inauthentic awaiting" appears contrasted with anticipatory resoluteness and authentic being towards death.

...

"Thus if we demonstrate that the 'time' accessible to the common sense of Dasein is not primordial, but arises rather from authentic temporality, then, according to the principle a potiori fit denominatio, we are justified in calling the temporality now set forth primordial time." (329/302)

...

"The problem is not how does 'derivative,' infinite time 'in which' objectively present things come into being and pass away, become primordial, finite temporality, but rather, how does inauthentic temporality, as inauthentic, temporalize an infinite time out of finite time?" (331/304)

...

So, playing fast and loose here, a sketch of what I think he's doing here (or if one likes, what he seems to be attempting or what he thinks he's doing/attempting) is showing our vulgar concept of time as an endless succession of nows to be taken as the expression of inauthentic temporality - which is our understanding of time in terms of our everyday dealings and entangled being-with others ("public time"), which is a levelling down of primordial time (the ecstases, finitude, and the potentiality-of being-a-whole disclosed by my death).

The vulgar concept of time I'm taking to be the expression (qua objective presence) of "public time," and the latter to be grounded in the ecstases/finite time.

The expression "Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care" (326/300) perhaps should have simply read "Temporality reveals itself as care" (?) as his playing with "authenticity" here lends itself to confusion over the possibility of something like "inauthentic temporality but authentic care."

(Open to corrections of course - these were just some initial impressions.)

If you don't quote any valid reason you are blocking the discussion. — David Mo

I've gone through his description of temporality, and I think it's quite accurate and, if you get into his terminology, quite elegant. His valid reasons for "changing" the common usage of the word "time" is partially based on this new analysis, and partially based on a historical and linguistic analysis. I've gone over this several times as well. If none of these are considered valid reasons, I'm not interested.

"So you stick with Aristotle"
I do not adhere to anyone. — David Mo

We all have influences. The common description of time in physics is largely influenced by Aristotle's Physics and common notions are likewise influenced. In fact mostly we treat time as something measurable in clocks and calendars.

I am affirming the common perception of time that Heidegger violates without valid reason. — David Mo

The "common perception" has a long history, and in fact is not common everywhere. However, Heidegger isn't 'violating' anything -- in fact he spends hundreds of pages distinguishing between "time" (which he reserves for the ordinary conception) and "temporality" (which is his analysis of time as experienced, rather than a present-at-hand phenomenon the tradition has always held).

So, playing fast and loose here, a sketch of what I think he's doing here (or if one likes, what he seems to be attempting or what he thinks he's doing/attempting) is showing our vulgar concept of time as an endless succession of nows to be taken as the expression of inauthentic temporality - which is our understanding of time in terms of our everyday dealings and entangled being-with others ("public time"), which is a levelling down of primordial time (the ecstases, finitude, and the potentiality-of being-a-whole disclosed by my death). — Kevin

This wouldn't be surprising, I suppose. If this is correct, I don't see why he calls common notions of time "inauthentic temporality" -- why not just call it "ordinary time" as he does elsewhere? But I'll have to re-read most of it for a useful opinion. Your analysis seems reasonable.

Heidegger did "violence" to historical texts because he was very aggressive . His results are interesting

I'm not sure either. All I can think of so far is it being a part of his attempt to link each discussion (insofar as the phrase only appears to show up once he has identified temporality as the meaning of care) in something like a thorough fashion (?). Will have to chew on it more.


This has been an interesting thread. My readings of Heidegger have been limited to BT, Intro to M, some of the shorter works and supplemental material - have found your posts to be helpful as well as waarala's and other earlier posts - even some of the criticisms, although the criticisms for the most part seem here to range from the fairly weak to the cartoonish. If nothing else this forum is good for reading notes - upon coming across this thread I think I'll take a look at History of the Concept of Time next or Contributions.

I think Heidegger was presenting in his work an alternative to Hegel's attempt to break free from Kant. Ontic for me means Kants disconnection from the world, and ontology is the study of the true world ( "noumena" ?)

This has been an interesting thread. My readings of Heidegger have been limited to BT, Intro to M, some of the shorter works and supplemental material - have found your posts to be helpful as well as waarala's and other earlier posts - even some of the criticisms, although the criticisms for the most part seem here to range from the fairly weak to the cartoonish. If nothing else this forum is good for reading notes - upon coming across this thread I think I'll take a look at History of the Concept of Time next or Contributions. — Kevin

You've already read, in my view, very essential ones. I'd add "Basic Problems of Phenomenology" to the list. The History of the Concept of Time isn't all that informative, in my view. "Basic Questions of Philosophy" is also important.

Thanks for the suggestions.

I also want to quickly add, moreover, that in paragraph 314 Heidegger makes a distinction between "reality and existence" . Reality is the world positivists experience. Existence is the world mystics experience, and it is this road which philosophy truly follows and through which it can understand time. "Care" in B&T might literally relate to the feeling of caring. The universe is our mother and to lose our Egos is to find to be cared about. Maybe we have several egos..

"I've gone over this several times as well."
My memory is bad and I don't remember you doing what you say. Can you repeat any of those valid reasons?
Thank you
(Actually I don't think you've commented on any. )

"- in fact he spends hundreds of pages distinguishing between "time" (which he reserves for the ordinary conception) and "temporality" (which is his analysis of time as experienced,"
I am referring to the commonly lived time (temporality). I put special emphasis on that).

Paragraph 314?
Being and Time has 83 epigraphs.
What do you mean?

I have the Joan Stambaugh translation. It has a number on the side of the page every few paragraphs. I thought these were the original paragraphs. My apology

Yeah I'm not sure what you're driving at anymore.

It is very simple.

"His valid reasons for "changing" the common usage of the word "time" is partially based on this new analysis, and partially based on a historical and linguistic analysis".(Xtrix)

I'm waiting for you to refresh my memory with some of those valid reasons you mention. Obviously, I don't think they exist.

Note: I insist: I am not talking about any objective concept of time. I am talking about time lived subjectively. I believe that there are certain common traits in all this subjectivity. I believe that Heidegger's "existential" description is in contradiction with them.

Epigraph 64 "Care already contains the phenomenon of self, if indeed the thesis is correct that the expression 'care for yourself' would be tautalogical if it were proposed in conformity with concern as care for others."

I don't think this sentence makes much sense, but indicates my hunch was right that "care" is connected with the sum of reality caring for us somehow

The

Does Heidegger agree that time is linear?

In continuing my reading of B&T, I have come across 3 passages that illuminate some of my posts.

"The being that is disclosed is that of a being that is concerned about its being. The meaning of this being- that is, care- is what makes care possible in its constitution, and it is what makes up primordially the being of this potentiality of being."

" future does not mean a now that has not yet come, but a coming in which Dasein comes toward itself in its ownmost potentiality -of-being. "

In a footnote in my translation "existential project and existential self-engagement projecting itself itself into that project go together."

Every thing is moving for Heidegger, even truth

Having read S und Z and found it tough going but having a reasonable understanding of it, what to read next? I have only read his Opus Magnus, otherwise just secondary litterature. Any suggestion for some shorter, more accessible of his works to read to get a good picture of his thoughts/philosophy?

Did the ... interruption caused by certain events in Germany affect his philosophy? S und Z is pre-Nürmberg.

" future does not mean a now that has not yet come, but a coming in which Dasein comes toward itself in its ownmost potentiality -of-being. " — Gregory

Reading Les Mots at the moment, no wonder Sartre did find an interest in the works of Heidegger...

"...future does not mean a now that has not yet come, but a coming in which Dasein comes toward itself in its ownmost potentiality -of-being. "

This is one of the many occasions that show that Heidegger was only interested in subjective time (temporality). Here it is about the evolution of the self towards a supposed primordial identity.
He claims to have overcome the subject-object opposition. How? Falsely, in my opinion, like all phenomenologists... that I have read.

It is very simple.

"His valid reasons for "changing" the common usage of the word "time" is partially based on this new analysis, and partially based on a historical and linguistic analysis".(Xtrix)

I'm waiting for you to refresh my memory with some of those valid reasons you mention. Obviously, I don't think they exist. — David Mo

I've done so. Yet:

I insist: I am not talking about any objective concept of time. I am talking about time lived subjectively. I believe that there are certain common traits in all this subjectivity. I believe that Heidegger's "existential" description is in contradiction with them. — David Mo

What is time lived subjectively? Because that's essentially all Heidegger means by temporality -- existential time as opposed to clock time, without talking about "subjects" or "objects." If you're arguing that "subjective" time is a sequence of nows, of a future being not-here-yet and a past being no-longer-here, etc., then what you're describing is indeed the ordinary conception of time and which has been influenced by Aristotle and the tradition generally. Aristotle's ideas did not exclusively influence the field of physics, but our ordinary lives as well. In a way, so did Descartes' conception of the world as mind and body. And this is exactly the reason why Heidegger questions it and wants to describe it anew -- because it is not even seen (including by you) as something questionable. It appears as the most self-evident, obvious thing on earth. But it isn't. So why is it important to question and re-interpret? Because it's this long tradition of conceptualizing time which has blocked off other lines of inquiry -- particularly about Being itself, which has itself been interpreted as something "present" (in the sense of this "ordinary conception of time").

And why is that important? Because we're living with the results of such an understanding -- namely, how we interpret and define ourselves as human beings. This has consequences for the future of the species. If we're not calling into question our most basic assumptions, there's less of a chance to change things. Heidegger doesn't say this specifically (although he alludes to it with references to the "fate of the West"), but it's what he has to mean. There's also interesting passages about the foundations of science, and how real revolutions in science occur when their foundations are challenged:

"Basic concepts determine the way in which we get an understanding beforehand of the area of subject-matter underlying all the objects a science takes as its theme, and all positive investigation is guided by that understanding. [...] The real 'movement' of the sciences takes place when their basis concepts undergo a more or less radical revision which is transparent to itself. The level wh ice a science has reached is determined by how far it is capable of a crisis in its basic concepts." (B&T p 29/9)

I bring this up because this applies to "ontology" as well, its basic question being the question of the meaning of being in general. Heidegger is calling for such a revolution in thinking.

Does Heidegger agree that time is linear? — Gregory

Which "time"? The time of ordinary meaning and physics is linear, sure. Experiential time -- temporality -- is not linear.

Having read S und Z and found it tough going but having a reasonable understanding of it, what to read next? I have only read his Opus Magnus, otherwise just secondary litterature. Any suggestion for some shorter, more accessible of his works to read to get a good picture of his thoughts/philosophy?

Did the ... interruption caused by certain events in Germany affect his philosophy? S und Z is pre-Nürmberg. — Ansiktsburk

I can't say for a certainty that WWII in particular changed his thinking, but neither can anyone else. As far as his writing goes, there's debate about what the "turn" really consisted of. Some say he became more about "openness" to the world, some say his thinking became more "historical," etc. He seems to have much more to say about art (particularly poetry) and technology.

Anyway, as far as what to read next -- I would listen to Heidegger himself. If you notice in the preface to the seventh edition of Being and Time, Heidegger recommends "Introduction to Metaphysics," and I highly recommend that as well. I found it much more clear than Being and Time in many ways. Otherwise "Basic Problems of Phenomenology" is important too.

Reading Heidegger is not easy. I've found I've had to read several books, several times. Best to avoid secondary sources at first and make sense of it yourself, if possible. My personal opinion is that no one can really interpret Heidegger clearly without at least 6 months or so of reading. There's just a certain minimum needed to read, ruminate, re-read, etc. Hunting down a lot of these books isn't always easy either. I think in the end it's very much worthwhile -- I don't see any other philosopher in the last 200 years, besides Nietzsche, who is as challenging and fascinating as Heidegger.

" If you're arguing that "subjective" time is a sequence of nows, of a future being not-here-yet and a past being no-longer-here, etc., then what you're describing is indeed the ordinary conception of time and which has been influenced by Aristotle and the tradition generally"

You (Heidegger? ) are mixing theories about time (succession of homogeneous instants) with perceptions of time (past not present). The perception of the past and the future as something that is no longer or not yet here present is more authentic (i.e. immediate) than Heidegger's vision of the primacy of an "already been" future. Only if we speak in terms of "meaning" can we say that the future "is here" as a project. But meaning is subjectivity, in the face of the common perception of the irreversibility of time.

Then, you (Heidegger?) introduce your subjective theory of time with a false excuse: that the common perception of time is theory. Moreover, you assume that this statement validates your attribution of "authenticity". False: that your theory is an alternative to another does not imply that it is better.

"And why is that important?"
Of course, it is!
I'm talking to my father about my mother. My father is here. My mother is not here. She is dead. I wish she were! My mother is present only in our memory. But they are two very different ways of existing. I experience my father's presence as objective. My mother's presence is subjective: that is, my father and I do not remember the same things in the same way or give them the same meaning.
Any philosophy that does not take into account these simple starting facts about time is illusory. I think Heidegger hides them under an avalanche of pretentious words. His twisted language is a screen before the simplicity of the primary facts.
Avoiding illusions is important for many obvious reasons.

"Reading Heidegger is not easy. I've found I've had to read several books, several times. Best to avoid secondary sources at first and make sense of it yourself, if possible. My personal opinion is that no one can really interpret Heidegger clearly without at least 6 months or so of reading. "
Pretending to understand Heidegger without help is like pretending to climb Everest in a bathing suit.
6 months is a joke. That's what it took me to understand what I don't understand and what others who presume to understand don't understand.

"Reading Heidegger is not easy. I've found I've had to read several books, several times. Best to avoid secondary sources at first and make sense of it yourself, if possible. My personal opinion is that no one can really interpret Heidegger clearly without at least 6 months or so of reading. "
Pretending to understand Heidegger without help is like pretending to climb Everest in a bathing suit.
6 months is a joke. That's what it took me to understand what I don't understand and what others who presume to understand don't understand. — David Mo

You've still not shown you really understand much, unfortunately. Not meant as a cheap shot, just my opinion. I don't think you're in any position to give advice. Your reading of Heidegger is about as accurate as your reading of my statement: I didn't say 6 months is all you need, I said it's at least what you need -- and even at that it's just an approximate number, which depends on how much time you have to read, your reading comprehension, your reading speed, etc. After that rough amount of time, a general picture of Heidegger will emerge. I agree that may indeed be a "joke" for you. Whatever time you've put in so far one might say is a "joke," based on many, many of your statements.

Lastly, it's not "pretending." I've demonstrated it over and over again and, if I'm off base, which I've rarely been, and this has been shown, I've corrected myself. But I never claimed to "understand" Heidegger completely. Do I understand his basic theses? Yes, I think I do. If I don't, no one has shown it to be the case -- least of all you.

Of course there has been help involved -- I've explicitly mentioned the help, in fact -- especially Hubert Dreyfus. Again, the point is not to start with secondary sources. Give yourself some time to read directly. Clearly you haven't heeded this advice, and it's shown from the beginning, when you started from the interpretations and criticisms of Carnap et al. So you're a good example of why it's important to read something first for yourself before summoning outside help.

You (Heidegger? ) are mixing theories about time (succession of homogeneous instants) with perceptions of time (past not present). — David Mo

What you claim is "perception," isn't. Declaring it such proves nothing. One could argue, just as sincerely, that the mind/body dichotomy is also "perception." In fact many have.

The perception of the past and the future as something that is no longer or not yet here present is more authentic (i.e. immediate) than Heidegger's vision of the primacy of an "already been" future. — David Mo

Another assertion. And clearly the "already been" of the future is especially tripping you up. Which is odd, since he also says similar things about the past.

Then, you (Heidegger?) introduce your subjective theory of time with a false excuse: that the common perception of time is theory. Moreover, you assume that this statement validates your attribution of "authenticity". False: that your theory is an alternative to another does not imply that it is better. — David Mo

No one is proposing a theory, certainly not a "subjective" theory.

Is Heidegger saying we experience time backwards? The quantum eraser experiment comes to mind

Since there's no "forward," I don't think he'd argue in favor of "backwards" either. This is still a linear sequence view of time -- the time that's measurable, that's mathematical, that's abstract. It's the time of physics, measured in the unit of a "second," etc., closely linked to space and motion. This is what Heidegger is saying does not describe the phenomenon of time accurately in terms of experience. This is why he goes through the concept of time through history, in part to show how we've arrived at this current formulation of time. In many ways, "time" is as concealed as "being" (in general); they are both related.

You seem interested enough in Heidegger, so I suggest giving Being and Time or Introduction to Metaphysics a read (or re-read). Not an easy task, of course. A lot of it is very unclear.

It's important to always keep in mind the things in Heidegger that are clear. My eyes glaze over many times in division II when he talks about conscience, anxiety, etc. There are many passages that I can't make heads or tails out of. But I don't think that's all that important if we keep in mind his general argument.

The most obvious (and superficial) thing to keep in mind is the title: Sein und Zeit. The question of being is central throughout the book and throughout Heidegger's life. Also central to the book is Zeit, time. Why the "and"? How are they related or connected? What does he mean by "being"? Does he ever give "it" a definition or interpretation? What of "time"? Does he mean clock time? How is thinking defined in Heideggerian thought? Or truth? Or human being? Etc. All things worth asking.

He says from the beginning that his analysis will be exceedingly difficult because he wants to essentially "get under" an entire tradition, whose set of assumptions we've take for granted for 2 and a half thousand years:

"With regard to the awkwardness and 'inelegance' of expression in the analyses to come, we may remark that it is one thing to give a report in which we tell about entities, but another to grasp entities in their Being. For the latter task we lack not only most of the words but, above all, the 'grammar.'" (B&T, p. 63/39)