No. It is foundational to chess. — Banno

OK, but chess is not foundational to reality. The purpose of philosophy is not to understand chess, but reality.

I didn't read the OP that closely, but I would have assumed the idea is that foundations need not be infallible, rather than a requirement of fallibility.

It's an interesting example, but do you want to wade into "true by convention" waters?

Since knowing is relational, it cannot exist independently of its relata, viz. its subject and object. ... In knowing we do not construct concepts. Rather, we encounter intelligible objects, — Dfpolis

My point was that this is too simplistic. A fully relational view of knowledge makes the psychological observation that the "we" who observes is a construction, not something already given. And the world as it exists for this subject - the "we" - is then constructed as the "other" of this we. It is a phenomenal umwelt. A sophisticated interpretation.

So of course it is taken for granted that we do exist - as creatures modelling an actual world. Pragmatism situates knowledge in an actual relationship where there is a reality to regulate, to act in meaningfully. Thus a modelling relation will target the intelligibility that exists to be discovered.

But it also then makes the point that the model is "self-interested" in its knowledge. It embodies a purpose. And in coming to do that - in developing a "point of view" - a selfhood is constructed. And also the "world" that self inhabits is constructed accordingly. The world - as it "intelligibly" becomes as the "other" to this self - is a system of interpreted signs. A phenomenal world and not a noumenal one.

This is how it has to be for life and mind to exist. Biology is a relation where bodies find a way to stand apart from the physics and chemistry that they need to regulate. That involves a model - an epistemic cut. A sense of self - an embodied state of purpose - emerges in conjunction with a similarly intelligible sense of "the world".

So it is an irreducibly triadic relation, not the simpler dyadic one of a (mental) subject relating to a (physical) object.

The intelligibility lies in the discovery of a way of looking at the world which itself crystalises the thing of a subjective point of view with its idea of the world. And the intelligibility of this model is confirmed to the degree it then works in serving that embodied purpose.

If seeing rocks as rocks works for me, then I will keep seeing them just like that. I will simply take everything at face value. The knowledge relation can just take for granted there is a "me" and "a world".

But pragmatism - as became clear through science - says knowledge is in fact more complex than that.

We have to realise that selves are constructions of purposes. Therefore we need to have a method of deconstructing that subjectivity and instead constructing a new epistemic ideal - the dispassionate and objective "view from nowhere" of the self imagined as a scientist or mathematician.

And likewise, we have to realise our "world" is a semiotic umwelt. A collection of habits of interpretance. So we need to clean that up too. We need to accept that our understanding of the world must be made "more objective" by reducing it to acts of measurement. We take a disembodied view from nowhere by replacing our embodied sensations with the business of reading numbers off dials and other measuring instruments. We construct sets of objective facts.

Under disembodied scrutiny, a rock can become something else to the scientist. Some kind of crystalised compound. Some kind of quantum state. Some kind of whatever it now seems to make sense to describe nature if we are aiming at a maximally "objective" viewpoint to counter what is usually our maximally subjective state of interest in the world.

Clearly, human beings are fallible. So it is an enormous error to begin philosophizing by seeking an infallible basis for human knowledge, as Descartes did. He, and others, made divine omniscience the paradigm case of human knowing. We are not God, and will never know as God does. Thinking that we do, or ought to, is what I call the Omniscience Fallacy. Not only are we subject to errors of judgement, but our brains can only maintain 5-9 “chunks” of information in working memory. — Dfpolis

I'm an atheist but I find your invocation of God here something which should be understandable to anyone, it is a basic point. I was recently discussing an idea about how "truth is arranged" which suggests that we process an already incomplete picture and personalise it by interpreting, emphasising, characterising and narrativising until we end up with something workable. So if you ask me "what do you think about X", my answer will be necessarily personal due to these aforementioned factors. Honestly, I would argue God would arrange truth as well although he would have full knowledge, I wonder if you might argue differently though?

I think that we deal with an intellectualised version of reality, which is mostly based on rulesets which function epistemologically but do not fall apart regardless of it corresponds with reality. I think we should aim to be logical, rational, reasonable and not purposefully deal in falsehood but just looking at language, we can see how I can describe things and there is no epistemic counterforce. What we really deal with is the consequence in practicality and things are categorised and characterised by oftentimes abstract divisions. I think when something works well to help us to navigate a complex issue and it is useful then that should be sufficient.

But it also then makes the point that the model is "self-interested" in its knowledge. It embodies a purpose. And in coming to do that - in developing a "point of view" - a selfhood is constructed. And also the "world" that self inhabits is constructed accordingly. The world - as it "intelligibly" becomes as the "other" to this self - is a system of interpreted signs. A phenomenal world and not a noumenal one.

This is how it has to be for life and mind to exist. Biology is a relation where bodies find a way to stand apart from the physics and chemistry that they need to regulate. That involves a model - an epistemic cut. A sense of self - an embodied state of purpose - emerges in conjunction with a similarly intelligible sense of "the world".

So it is an irreducibly triadic relation, not the simpler dyadic one of a (mental) subject relating to a (physical) object.

The intelligibility lies in the discovery of a way of looking at the world which itself crystalises the thing of a subjective point of view with its idea of the world. And the intelligibility of this model is confirmed to the degree it then works in serving that embodied purpose. — apokrisis

Here one has a concise masterclass in man's formation and value of knowledge. Very impressive Sir. Though one could argue over the details it seems to me every position is going to fall into this materialist structure in one form or another. There is also a required humility to it, so far from seeing ideals as some kind of transcendent entities contained in the universe, this views deals with them as they are, cognitive attempts to gain some kind of control [make order] out of existence.

this views deals with them as they are, cognitive attempts to gain some kind of control [make order] out of existence. — JerseyFlight

Yup. It is by understanding how knowledge is an embodied process that we can start to imagine how to turn it into a disembodied one. We can move from the psychology of ordinary experience to a system of scientific reasoning.

However we can't actually transcend our embodied limits to "see reality as it really is". Science remains weighed down by human self interest. The knowledge being produced has to be intelligible to someone - a someone with some intelligible purpose.

Small steps. You asked about foundationalism.

Since, we grasp the object's intelligibility, we know it, and not our own construct. — Dfpolis

Yes. Stove's gem. IS that closer to what you have in mind?

but chess is not foundational to reality. — Dfpolis

Going back to my first post,

If you like, that the bishop stays on the red squares is foundational to chess.

And perhaps, that the cup does not sink into the table is foundational to their being solid. — Banno

I'm wondering if, by thinking about what is foundational to chess, we might be able to develop a view about what is foundational elsewhere - to what is solid, perhaps.

SO give some consideration to the question I asked before:

Given the title of this thread, that would seem to be the issue: in what way could the foundational rule, that the bishop moves only diagonally, be fallible? — Banno

We might imagine variations to chess, where the Bishop moves in some heterodox fashion. Perhaps it is allowed to "bounce" off the edge of the board, or change to a different coloured square every fifth time it is moved, or some such.

Should we consider these failures? A purest might. Or we might just consider these as alternate forms of chess.

A fully relational view of knowledge makes the psychological observation that the "we" who observes is a construction, not something already given — apokrisis

What is experienced, here the knowing self, is neither constructed nor assumed. Acts of knowledge are self-reflective. Every act of vision informs us not only about what is seen (its objective object), but also that we can see (its subjective object). Similarly, acts of cognition not only inform us about the object of our attention (its objective object), but also that we are informed (its subjective object). There is no knowing, no being informed, without a subject being informed. You may not wish to admit this, but I can think of no cogent objection.

So of course it is taken for granted that we do exist - as creatures modelling an actual world — apokrisis

Do you even realize how incoherent your position is? Without knowing subjects, there is no agent capable of "modelling an actual world." We model by positing relations between concepts that can only exist in knowing minds.

If you think concepts can exist mind-independently, or that we could model without being knowing subjects, then on what basis do you believe this? Surely it cannot be on the basis of evidence, for, ex hypothesis, you can know no evidence. In fact, we can do nothing as there is no we -- not even a single I.

But it also then makes the point that the model is "self-interested" in its knowledge. — apokrisis

Models are not subjects, and so can have no knowledge or interests.

There is no point in commenting further on the consequences of this incoherent theory.

I would argue God would arrange truth as well although he would have full knowledge, I wonder if you might argue differently though? — Judaka

Classical theism, as represented by Aquinas, sees God as entirely simple and immutable. So, God does not elaborate positions over time, nor does He design, then execute. Rather, God sustains all existence in a single act and knows it by knowing His sustaining act.

I think that we deal with an intellectualised version of reality, which is mostly based on rulesets which function epistemologically but do not fall apart regardless of it corresponds with reality. — Judaka

I would find examples helpful in understanding your position. I am thinking of science as your "intellectualised version of reality," but see new evidence as falsifying old theories. So, I don't quite understand what you're saying.

I think when something works well to help us to navigate a complex issue and it is useful then that should be sufficient. — Judaka

Yes, it is "adequate to reality," and so close enough to be taken as true. When we aren't concerned with practice, but just want to know, pragmatism fails us.

Similarly, acts of cognition not only inform us about the object of our attention (its objective object), but also that we are informed (its subjective object). — Dfpolis

Is that different from what I said?

Without knowing subjects, there is no agent capable of "modelling an actual world." — Dfpolis

Sure. My point is that this is something that has to develop. Every newborn has to go through the process of discovering its own hands as something “they” control.

Yes. Stove's gem. IS that closer to what you have in mind? — Banno

I just looked up Stove's Gem, as I had not heard of it before you mentioned it. From the little I could learn in a short time, I agree with Stove that instances of his Gem are fallacious.

While we can and do know our thoughts, primarily, our thoughts are not what we know, but means of knowing.

Given the title of this thread, that would seem to be the issue: in what way could the foundational rule, that the bishop moves only diagonally, be fallible? — Banno

Rules can't be fallible, for they do not think. It is thinking subjects that can fail to think correctly. We can make routine mistakes, or suffer the devastation of Alzheimer's. As we use our brains to process data, and brains are subject to trauma, we are all to the possibility of error.

Should we consider these failures? A purest might. Or we might just consider these as alternate forms of chess. — Banno

I return to the conditional nature of such rules, "If we are playing chess, ..." If you remove the condition, the rule looses its force.

Is that different from what I said? — apokrisis

You seemed to be arguing that the knowing self is a construct, not an experienced reality. If so, then yes, it is different.

My point is that this is something that has to develop. Every newborn has to go through the process of discovering its own hands as something “they” control. — apokrisis

Of course. And, it takes time to develop a set of concepts to reason with. Still, I would not say that most of our concepts are "constructed." They are abstracted, which means that they actualize some notes of intelligibility in our perceptions to the exclusion of others. We have to accumulate experience to learn which abstractions are most useful in dealing with the world.

Hey man i just signed up how do i hear the audio of this?this is assuming the megaphone image means this has been recorded please correct me if im wrong

Rules can't be fallible, for they do not think. It is thinking subjects that can fail to think correctly. We can make routine mistakes, or suffer the devastation of Alzheimer's. As we use our brains to process data, and brains are subject to trauma, we are all to the possibility of error. — Dfpolis

Interesting. In the article, to be fallible is to be capable of being false, wrong; hence it speaks of fallible foundations. I followed the usage.

Taking your reading into account, given the title of this thread, that would seem to be the issue: in what way could the foundational rule, that the bishop moves only diagonally, be wrong, or false?

For example, I do not think I was lying when I taught freshmen engineering students Newtonian physics without fully explaining how relativistic quantum physics falsified it. Why? Because what I taught them was adequate to their needs. Those who would need more precise physics would take other courses to learn it. We can never present all that we know, but we can speak the truth by presenting something adequate to the needs of our audience.

In sum, philosophy can only deal with human knowledge, because, however limited, it is the only knowledge we have. It begins by accepting experience, not as infallible, but as the only raw material that we have to reflect upon. — Dfpolis

In the first paragraph above you state that you taught them that was adequate for their needs. The knowledge of what was adequate, can you say that that was ONLY based on knowledge? No gut feeling?

Interesting. In the article, to be fallible is to be capable of being false, wrong; hence it speaks of fallible foundations. I followed the usage. — Banno

Perhaps the title was confusing, but in the body I only said humans are fallible.

in what way could the foundational rule, that the bishop moves only diagonally, be wrong, or false? — Banno

If one violated the unspoken condition that one is playing standard chess.

If you're visually impaired, I could record the OP and send it to you privately. Otherwise, you'll need a text reading app.

The knowledge of what was adequate, can you say that that was ONLY based on knowledge? No gut feeling? — Ansiktsburk

Choosing what to do is a moral decision -- based not on absolute certitude, but on moral certitude, i.e. on what is generally true, given what we know. So, my assessment was based on knowing what most engineers do. Certainly, some will go on to highly specialized work, in which advanced physics is needed, but, as I said, they will take other courses to prepare.

Here's my reconstruction of the argument in the OP:

(1) We are committed to the truth of some judgments we cannot prove are true.
(2) We have limited representational capacity; therefore our judgments about the world cannot be exhaustive, but must leave out features of the object of the judgment (abstraction).
(3) The features of the object of knowing included in our judgments are those features adequate to our needs.

But what is the argument?

For example, I do not think I was lying when I taught freshmen engineering students Newtonian physics without fully explaining how relativistic quantum physics falsified it. — Dfpolis

You tell the students something; it leaves something out, therefore it is an abstraction, adequate to their needs. What you tell them is, for their purposes, true, even though for other purposes what you are telling them may be false.

But this is not what (1) claimed. This is

(1') We are committed to the truth of some judgments we can prove are false.

In this case, the proof would come in a different context. Your claim is that there is no requirement to take into account the contexts in which the judgment is false; we only think there is such a requirement because we imagine a context in which we have knowledge not relativized to our needs, "objective" knowledge, which would therefore be exhaustive.

Let's go through the argument again:

(i) We know that our knowledge is not and cannot be exhaustive; we are limited.
(ii) Therefore we know that our knowledge must leave things out.
(iii) What we leave out are features of the object of knowledge irrelevant to our needs.

But here it seems you are on the verge of claiming

(iv*) Therefore if we leave out a feature of the object of knowledge, it must be a feature irrelevant to our needs.

which is clearly false, and does not follow from (iii). (iii) is "If it's irrelevant, we leave it out"; this is the converse.

But do you rely on (iv*) to justify the claim that what you tell your students is true?

What are you leaving out is that you know what you are telling your students to be false. That it is false will not matter to them, because what you are telling them is true "for all practical purposes"; it is an approximation, and will serve in the contexts in which they will make use of it.

So we have this claim:

(a) Because it will not matter to them that it is false, relative to their needs it is true.

And since truth is always relative to our needs,

(b*) If a judgment is true relative to some needs, it is true.

which, like (iv*), is also clearly false and not what you want to say.

I think what you want to say is that (b*) is just nonsense. "P is true" is incomplete, and says nothing. The complete formulation would be "P is true in context C", or "P is true relative to needs N" or something like that. (b*) imagines there is truth relative to no particular needs, that there is (I can't resist) "needless truth".

But you must still avoid (iv*) because (iv*) is a license to sophistry. How will you do that?

It seems that the burden of determining truth is shifted from some imagined exhaustive and needs-indifferent adequacy to the the object itself, to whether the judgment is genuinely adequate to the circumstances of its assertion.

How will you determine this? It's clear enough that structural engineers and high-energy physicists have different needs; you are able to relativize truth by comparing those needs.

This sounds reasonable enough, but if we want eventually to come back to (b*) and define "truth (full stop)" as "truth relative to human needs", we will engage in further abstraction, but what will we compare humans to? Is abstraction enough to get you there, or will we compare humans to other animals, and then be forced to talk about the judgments of animals?

(3) The features of the object of knowing included in our judgments are those features adequate to our needs. — Srap Tasmaner

This isn't my conclusion. What I'm saying is that knowing only how reality relates to us (and not exhaustively as it is) is not a problem, because we only deal with reality in relation to ourselves.

What you tell them is, for their purposes, true, even though for other purposes what you are telling them may be false.

But this is not what (1) claimed. This is

(1') We are committed to the truth of some judgments we can prove are false. — Srap Tasmaner

That is not what I said, nor is it implied. Still, it has some merit.

What in (1) I am following Aristotle's observation that we cannot prove everything. So, we must accept some things as given. Reflecting, what we accept as given is what is given in experience.

Raw experience is infallible, because whatever we are aware of is what we are aware of. Still, there is a difference between being aware of something (knowledge by acquaintance) and making judgements. Since we are infallibly aware of whatever we are aware of, there is no question of its truth, but there is a question of the truth or falsity of judgements. That question derives from abstraction.

Universal concepts are derived from abstraction, but they may not be the result of abstraction alone, but also of construction -- combining associated data from different experiences. Concepts are universal because each of their instances is capable of evoking the same concept. But, it may be that the aspects (notes of intelligibility) one object that evoke a concept are not the same as the aspects of a different object that evokes the same concept. For example, we have may have seen Jane nude and know she is female, and Kathy made up and dressed in a skirt, and think she is also female. Perhaps, Kathy is a transvestite or transgendered, and biologically male. Then we have erred in judgement.

How did we err? Not by a mistake in awareness, but by miscategorizing -- by attributing to Kathy aspects we did not experience and she did not have.

We need to reflect on how we make experiential judgements and what justifies them. If the identical object that evokes the concept <tiger> also evokes the concept <sharp teeth>, I am justified in judging <the tiger has sharp teeth>. This is fully justified as long as my concepts do not carry the baggage of other experiences, but, almost invariably, they do. It is this associative baggage that is typical the source of false judgements.

It is, then, theoretically possible, but very difficult, to make reliable experiential judgements -- because the habit of association, while corrigible, is typically unconscious.

So, back to (1) and (1'): It is a fact that we can't prove everything. So, we have to commit to things we can't prove, but that does not mean that we can't analyze them and root out sources of error. Of course, we don't root out all our errors. So we wind up being committed to things that can be proven false. Still, there is hope. As social animals we can expose our assumptions to others with different life experiences and perspectives, and so root out further errors. One way of doing this is to value the reflections of previous generations enough to hear them.

Your claim is that there is no requirement to take into account the contexts in which the judgment is false; — Srap Tasmaner

I don't think I claimed that. If we're to be serious thinkers, we need to reflect on the limits of what we know.

we only think there is such a requirement because we imagine a context in which we have knowledge not relativized to our needs, "objective" knowledge, which would therefore be exhaustive. — Srap Tasmaner

And so, impossible for human beings. This is the error of making divine omniscience the paradigm against which we judge human knowing. All we need to do is be humble and admit, that while we know many things, we don't know everything about anything.

(iii) What we leave out are features of the object of knowledge irrelevant to our needs. — Srap Tasmaner

Not quite. What we actually leave out (in coming to know) is what does not interest us, and hope that what does interest us is adequate.

(iv*) Therefore if we leave out a feature of the object of knowledge, it must be a feature irrelevant to our needs. — Srap Tasmaner

No, which is why I did not accept your (iii). Still, this often happens in practice. Critical evidence or lines of reasoning may be ignored because we have "made up our minds" -- which means we have closed our minds.

What are you leaving out is that you know what you are telling your students to be false. — Srap Tasmaner

No, it is not false. That is the point. It is an adequate to what they will deal with. If you do measurements in the Newtonian regime and compare them to the equations, you will find no discrepancies. The scientific method will never give us absolute truth. It may, and often does, give us a theory that represents our observations adequately.

What we say is never exhaustive. Every discourse is limited. Even the most "objective" news stories include some facts and exclude others. If these inclusions and exclusions are made in good faith, we place no blame. Still, the story is (and has to be) intrinsically imperfect. So also is it with teaching, journal articles, books and so on. We will accept these imperfect discourses as true if they do not lead us into error -- if they are adequate to our needs.

what you are telling them is true "for all practical purposes"; it is an approximation, and will serve in the contexts in which they will make use of it. — Srap Tasmaner

That is the very nature of science. The so-called "theory of everything" (TOE) is a theory of everything but 96% of the stuff. Darwin's theory of evolution knew nothing of DNA transcription errors, toolkit genes or punctuated equilibrium. Our best understanding of quantum physics contradicts our best understanding of gravity. We accept these theories not because we think they are metaphysical truths, but because they provide adequate accounts of the aspects of reality we apply them to. That is why naturalists who treat them with religious reverence are so foolish.

(a) Because it will not matter to them that it is false, relative to their needs it is true. — Srap Tasmaner

Perhaps you are having difficulty because I haven't made it sufficiently clear that I don't see truth as a univocal concept. That is, "truth" does not mean the same thing in every context. Instead, "truth" is analogically predicated by an analogy of proportionality. What that means is that the requirements for being true are proportioned to the needs the truth is intended to meet. If we're doing metaphysics, we want it to be exceptionless, but if we're building a bridge, a set of reliable equations adequately modelling the conditions to be encountered are a true description -- in fact, one that corresponds to the relevant domain of reality, even though it may not correspond to irrelevant domains.

The complete formulation would be "P is true in context C", or "P is true relative to needs N" or something like that. (b*) imagines there is truth relative to no particular needs, that there is (I can't resist) "needless truth" — Srap Tasmaner

I think this is close. I am not sure that there actually is "needless truth."

This sounds reasonable enough, but if we want eventually to come back to (b*) and define "truth (full stop)" as "truth relative to human needs", we will engage in further abstraction, but what will we compare humans to? Is abstraction enough to get you there, or will we compare humans to other animals, and then be forced to talk about the judgments of animals? — Srap Tasmaner

I think we are justifiably anthropocentric, because the problems we have to deal with are human problems -- not that we should not value other species. It is just that we can never know what it is like to be a bat.

Thank you for taking so much time reflecting on my post.

I think you could have saved yourself some typing if you read the whole post before responding.

I'm going to save myself some typing by saying that this

Raw experience is infallible, because whatever we are aware of is what we are aware of. Still, there is a difference between being aware of something (knowledge by acquaintance) and making judgements. Since we are infallibly aware of whatever we are aware of, there is no question of its truth, but there is a question of the truth or falsity of judgements. That question derives from abstraction. — Dfpolis

is perilously close to traditional empiricist foundationalism, which is a mistake. Read "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind."

perilously close to traditional empiricist foundationalism, which is a mistake. Read "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind." — Srap Tasmaner

"Perilously close" means "different from." I'll look at Sellars' argument, but I am pretty sure it doesn't work against my position.

The question is how you are to give knowledge a foundation you acknowledge is non-epistemic.

I read the SEP article on Sellars' section on epistemology.

"(1) There must be cognitive states that are basic in the sense that they possess some positive epistemic status independently of their epistemic relations to any other cognitive states. I call this the Epistemic Independence Requirement [EIR]."

"(2) Every nonbasic cognitive state can possess positive epistemic status only because of the epistemic relations it bears, directly or indirectly, to basic cognitive states. Thus the basic states must provide the ultimate support for the rest of our knowledge, which I call the Epistemic Efficacy Requirement [EER]."

"Sellars denies not only that there must be a given, but that there can be a given in the sense defined, for nothing can satisfy both EIR and EER. To satisfy EER, a basic cognition must be capable of participating in inferential relations with other cognitions; it must possess propositional form and be truth-evaluable. To meet EIR, such a propositionally structured cognition must possess its epistemic status independently of inferential connections to other cognitions. No cognitive states satisfy both requirements."

I am proposing that we are infallibly aware of whatever we are aware of, but that this awareness is not proportional knowledge. Let's use Aristotle's terminology and call the combined sensory representation we are aware of a "phantasm." If the phantasm as a whole properly elicits a subject concept, <S>, and the identical phantasm properly elicits a predicate concept <P>, we are justified in judging <S is P>. (The copula "is" betokens the identity of source.) While the datum (the phantasm) is not a judgement, by abstraction and identification (division and reunification), we can use it as the basis for sound judgement.

As Aristotle points out, to make justified inferences, we need to find middle terms (aka connections). Thus, if we judge <S is P1> and <P1 is P2>, we may conclude <S is P2>. What this means, it is that a phantasm capable of eliciting <S> is also capable of eliciting <P2>.

This account seems capable of satisfying both EIR and EER. Or, have I missed something?

The question is how you are to give knowledge a foundation you acknowledge is non-epistemic — Srap Tasmaner

I take it that you mean non-propositional by non-epistemic.

The question is how you are to give knowledge a foundation you acknowledge is non-epistemic — Srap Tasmaner

The foundation of knowledge is not "epistemic," it is psychological and neurobiological. It is not ideas that make the philosopher, but social environments that make ideas.

I take it that you mean non-propositional by non-epistemic. — Dfpolis

Well, you get to pick your poison.

While the datum (the phantasm) is not a judgement, by abstraction and identification (division and reunification), we can use it as the basis for sound judgement. — Dfpolis

Abstraction from what?

If the datum is raw, unconceptualized, it's going to be useless for knowledge that's supposed to be inferred from it. If it is already conceptualized, then it's not independent.

Remember above you did end up reaching for an infallible foundation after all, but justified this move by it being knowledge by acquaintance, not propositional. Is this knowledge conceptualized? Is it "I'm experiencing that" or "I'm experiencing the red triangular facing surface of an object"?

I think this is largely right, but there are different kinds of details to fill in: roughly, (a) where our conceptual framework comes from, and (b) how we use it. That's my evolving view.

I think this largely right, but there are different kinds of details to fill in: roughly, (a) where our conceptual framework comes from, and (b) how we use it. That's my evolving view. — Srap Tasmaner

That is correct. Here the details are to be found in the categories I mentioned.