Since knowing is relational, it cannot exist independently of its relata, viz. its subject and object. ... In knowing we do not construct concepts. Rather, we encounter intelligible objects, — Dfpolis
Clearly, human beings are fallible. So it is an enormous error to begin philosophizing by seeking an infallible basis for human knowledge, as Descartes did. He, and others, made divine omniscience the paradigm case of human knowing. We are not God, and will never know as God does. Thinking that we do, or ought to, is what I call the Omniscience Fallacy. Not only are we subject to errors of judgement, but our brains can only maintain 5-9 “chunks” of information in working memory. — Dfpolis
But it also then makes the point that the model is "self-interested" in its knowledge. It embodies a purpose. And in coming to do that - in developing a "point of view" - a selfhood is constructed. And also the "world" that self inhabits is constructed accordingly. The world - as it "intelligibly" becomes as the "other" to this self - is a system of interpreted signs. A phenomenal world and not a noumenal one.
This is how it has to be for life and mind to exist. Biology is a relation where bodies find a way to stand apart from the physics and chemistry that they need to regulate. That involves a model - an epistemic cut. A sense of self - an embodied state of purpose - emerges in conjunction with a similarly intelligible sense of "the world".
So it is an irreducibly triadic relation, not the simpler dyadic one of a (mental) subject relating to a (physical) object.
The intelligibility lies in the discovery of a way of looking at the world which itself crystalises the thing of a subjective point of view with its idea of the world. And the intelligibility of this model is confirmed to the degree it then works in serving that embodied purpose. — apokrisis
this views deals with them as they are, cognitive attempts to gain some kind of control [make order] out of existence. — JerseyFlight
but chess is not foundational to reality. — Dfpolis
If you like, that the bishop stays on the red squares is foundational to chess.
And perhaps, that the cup does not sink into the table is foundational to their being solid. — Banno
Given the title of this thread, that would seem to be the issue: in what way could the foundational rule, that the bishop moves only diagonally, be fallible? — Banno
A fully relational view of knowledge makes the psychological observation that the "we" who observes is a construction, not something already given — apokrisis
So of course it is taken for granted that we do exist - as creatures modelling an actual world — apokrisis
But it also then makes the point that the model is "self-interested" in its knowledge. — apokrisis
I would argue God would arrange truth as well although he would have full knowledge, I wonder if you might argue differently though? — Judaka
I think that we deal with an intellectualised version of reality, which is mostly based on rulesets which function epistemologically but do not fall apart regardless of it corresponds with reality. — Judaka
I think when something works well to help us to navigate a complex issue and it is useful then that should be sufficient. — Judaka
Similarly, acts of cognition not only inform us about the object of our attention (its objective object), but also that we are informed (its subjective object). — Dfpolis
Without knowing subjects, there is no agent capable of "modelling an actual world." — Dfpolis
Yes. Stove's gem. IS that closer to what you have in mind? — Banno
Given the title of this thread, that would seem to be the issue: in what way could the foundational rule, that the bishop moves only diagonally, be fallible? — Banno
Should we consider these failures? A purest might. Or we might just consider these as alternate forms of chess. — Banno
Is that different from what I said? — apokrisis
My point is that this is something that has to develop. Every newborn has to go through the process of discovering its own hands as something “they” control. — apokrisis
Rules can't be fallible, for they do not think. It is thinking subjects that can fail to think correctly. We can make routine mistakes, or suffer the devastation of Alzheimer's. As we use our brains to process data, and brains are subject to trauma, we are all to the possibility of error. — Dfpolis
In the first paragraph above you state that you taught them that was adequate for their needs. The knowledge of what was adequate, can you say that that was ONLY based on knowledge? No gut feeling?For example, I do not think I was lying when I taught freshmen engineering students Newtonian physics without fully explaining how relativistic quantum physics falsified it. Why? Because what I taught them was adequate to their needs. Those who would need more precise physics would take other courses to learn it. We can never present all that we know, but we can speak the truth by presenting something adequate to the needs of our audience.
In sum, philosophy can only deal with human knowledge, because, however limited, it is the only knowledge we have. It begins by accepting experience, not as infallible, but as the only raw material that we have to reflect upon. — Dfpolis
Interesting. In the article, to be fallible is to be capable of being false, wrong; hence it speaks of fallible foundations. I followed the usage. — Banno
in what way could the foundational rule, that the bishop moves only diagonally, be wrong, or false? — Banno
The knowledge of what was adequate, can you say that that was ONLY based on knowledge? No gut feeling? — Ansiktsburk
For example, I do not think I was lying when I taught freshmen engineering students Newtonian physics without fully explaining how relativistic quantum physics falsified it. — Dfpolis
(3) The features of the object of knowing included in our judgments are those features adequate to our needs. — Srap Tasmaner
What you tell them is, for their purposes, true, even though for other purposes what you are telling them may be false.
But this is not what (1) claimed. This is
(1') We are committed to the truth of some judgments we can prove are false. — Srap Tasmaner
Your claim is that there is no requirement to take into account the contexts in which the judgment is false; — Srap Tasmaner
we only think there is such a requirement because we imagine a context in which we have knowledge not relativized to our needs, "objective" knowledge, which would therefore be exhaustive. — Srap Tasmaner
(iii) What we leave out are features of the object of knowledge irrelevant to our needs. — Srap Tasmaner
(iv*) Therefore if we leave out a feature of the object of knowledge, it must be a feature irrelevant to our needs. — Srap Tasmaner
What are you leaving out is that you know what you are telling your students to be false. — Srap Tasmaner
what you are telling them is true "for all practical purposes"; it is an approximation, and will serve in the contexts in which they will make use of it. — Srap Tasmaner
(a) Because it will not matter to them that it is false, relative to their needs it is true. — Srap Tasmaner
The complete formulation would be "P is true in context C", or "P is true relative to needs N" or something like that. (b*) imagines there is truth relative to no particular needs, that there is (I can't resist) "needless truth" — Srap Tasmaner
This sounds reasonable enough, but if we want eventually to come back to (b*) and define "truth (full stop)" as "truth relative to human needs", we will engage in further abstraction, but what will we compare humans to? Is abstraction enough to get you there, or will we compare humans to other animals, and then be forced to talk about the judgments of animals? — Srap Tasmaner
Raw experience is infallible, because whatever we are aware of is what we are aware of. Still, there is a difference between being aware of something (knowledge by acquaintance) and making judgements. Since we are infallibly aware of whatever we are aware of, there is no question of its truth, but there is a question of the truth or falsity of judgements. That question derives from abstraction. — Dfpolis
perilously close to traditional empiricist foundationalism, which is a mistake. Read "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind." — Srap Tasmaner
The question is how you are to give knowledge a foundation you acknowledge is non-epistemic — Srap Tasmaner
The question is how you are to give knowledge a foundation you acknowledge is non-epistemic — Srap Tasmaner
I take it that you mean non-propositional by non-epistemic. — Dfpolis
While the datum (the phantasm) is not a judgement, by abstraction and identification (division and reunification), we can use it as the basis for sound judgement. — Dfpolis
I think this largely right, but there are different kinds of details to fill in: roughly, (a) where our conceptual framework comes from, and (b) how we use it. That's my evolving view. — Srap Tasmaner
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