It is because sets are not things, but mental constructs (ways of grouping elements in our minds). Primitive shepherds counted sheep by tying knots in a string. ((...)) Why count sheep and not relations or sets? Because shepherds are not generally interested in possible relations between sheep, but in the number of sheep they have. — Dfpolis
The point of focusing on how we count was to point out how much of our conceptual apparatus (and not only that but other practices as well) must already be in place to do it. — Srap Tasmaner
that's the cardinality of the set of sheep they have. — Srap Tasmaner
There's no counting without both the mental constructs — Srap Tasmaner
What point were you making with the example of shepherds? — Srap Tasmaner
Yes, counting requires that we have developed the idea of number, but that is not difficult. All we need is for our mate to be happier when we bring home 2-3 birds or melons instead of one. — Dfpolis
(But see fdrake's interesting example. He claims to infer, from "I am not in pain now", that "I was in pain previously". I'm not convince infer is quite right here.) — Banno
The first is compatible with never having been in pain, the second is not. — Dfpolis
It's ultimately a question of whether you can feel something while not believing you feel it! — fdrake
Looks rather a lot like an inference to me! — fdrake
"I have stopped being in pain now" -> "I was previously in pain" — fdrake
What exactly is the missing premise? "If I have stopped being in pain then I was previously in pain"? — Banno
Alice: "I saw Jane today"
Bob: "How do you know?"
Alice: "I saw her." — fdrake
Have you stopped being in pain?
If someone answers yes, then we infer that they were previously in pain.
If someone answers no, then we infer that they are still in pain. — fdrake
...but if they have not been in pain, then they have not stoped being in pain, and hence they answer "no". So the posited inference that they are still in pain would be wrong. — Banno
Seems like the presence of sensations very much can be inferred, but perhaps only after a transition in their intensity. — fdrake
(1) I was in pain up until time t.
(2) I did not realise I was in pain before t+1.
(3) I stop being in pain at t+1.
(4) I realise that I was in pain at all times* before t+1 at t+1 as a consequence of the cessation ** of sensation in (3). — fdrake
Fredis suddenly certainthat he has just stopped having a pain, of which he was unaware. — Banno
Or, to switch examples, even if you and I don't mean the very same colour when we say "red" - if your red is my blue - we will both stop at the red light. — Banno
Is it just me, or oughtn't everyone here (and on similar threads) to clarify which of these two related but separable questions they are addressing?
• is my external red the same as your external red?
• is my internal red the same as your internal red? — bongo fury
• is my internal red the same as your internal red? — bongo fury
Or, to switch examples, even if you and I don't mean the very same colour when we say "red" - if your red is my blue - — Banno
It's intended to reinforce the argument that the question drops out of any relevance. — Banno
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