It is because sets are not things, but mental constructs (ways of grouping elements in our minds). Primitive shepherds counted sheep by tying knots in a string. ((...)) Why count sheep and not relations or sets? Because shepherds are not generally interested in possible relations between sheep, but in the number of sheep they have. — Dfpolis

The point of focusing on how we count was to point out how much of our conceptual apparatus (and not only that but other practices as well) must already be in place to do it.

So if a shepherd is interested in keeping track of how many sheep they have, that's not a property of the sheep (as "having white wool" is); that's the cardinality of the set of sheep they have. If they use knots on a string to keep track, that's Hume's principle, a one-to-one correspondence (a relation) between the set of sheep they have and the set of knots on the string. Thus shepherds must use sets and relations if they're interested in sheep.

And more than that, you have to know not to make a knot every time you see a sheep, even if it's one of yours, but only to make a knot, one knot, for each numerically different animal, either by keeping track or by artificial means like forcing them one-by-one through a gate.

There's no counting without both the mental constructs and the associated practices already in place. Does that matter to your position? What point were you making with the example of shepherds?

Philosophy moved on a bit after Aristotle. And after the Tractatus. — Banno

Yes, but moved on does not mean rightly moved on.

The point of focusing on how we count was to point out how much of our conceptual apparatus (and not only that but other practices as well) must already be in place to do it. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, counting requires that we have developed the idea of number, but that is not difficult. All we need is for our mate to be happier when we bring home 2-3 birds or melons instead of one.

that's the cardinality of the set of sheep they have. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, it is, but you don't need to generalize from a flock concept to a set concept to count them. All you need is an ownership concept -- my sheep or our sheep. I learned to count at 3-4, long before I knew about sets and cardinality.

There's no counting without both the mental constructs — Srap Tasmaner

We should not equate instruments of thought, like concepts and judgements, with constructs, which imply we have added constructive elements. If you want to say we've added elements we did not find in experience, you have to do more than say we have used concepts.

What point were you making with the example of shepherds? — Srap Tasmaner

I was responding to why shepherds count sheep, not all possible sets of sheep.

Yes, counting requires that we have developed the idea of number, but that is not difficult. All we need is for our mate to be happier when we bring home 2-3 birds or melons instead of one. — Dfpolis

Read that as many times as you have to to see what's wrong here.


Thanks for the conversation and the reading recommendations. Cheers!

Thanks to you as well.

Just because we can use our ability to count to describe a situation does not mean that those in it must be able to count. All they need do is see that scarcity is not sufficiency or abundance, and reflect on the nature of the difference.

(But see fdrake's interesting example. He claims to infer, from "I am not in pain now", that "I was in pain previously". I'm not convince infer is quite right here.) — Banno

"I have stopped being in pain now" -> "I was previously in pain"
Similar to:
"I have stopped hearing the storm" -> "I previously heard the storm"

Looks rather a lot like an inference to me!

Looks rather a lot like an inference to me! — fdrake

"I am not in pain now" is not the same as "I have stopped being in pain now." The first is compatible with never having been in pain, the second is not.

The first is compatible with never having been in pain, the second is not. — Dfpolis

Eh, you could argue that I've never experienced something which could appropriately be described as "I have stopped being in pain now". That's not something I'm interested in discussing really. If my experience that it happened is not sufficient to convince someone that it's possible, I don't really know what to do.

And yes, the first is compatible with not being in pain at the appropriate time while the second is not. However, stopping being in pain is consistent with not believing one was in pain before it stopped. It's ultimately a question of whether you can feel something while not believing you feel it!

It's ultimately a question of whether you can feel something while not believing you feel it! — fdrake

Of course, you can not believe what you are experiencing, for example, look at Descartes. He knew he was in his chamber, but chose to doubt it. The problem is that knowing is being aware, while believing is committing.

Looks rather a lot like an inference to me! — fdrake

It's curious - there is more going on here.

"I have stopped being in pain now" -> "I was previously in pain" — fdrake

What exactly is the missing premise? "If I have stopped being in pain then I was previously in pain"? There's something of question begging in that... it needs to be more like "I am not in pain now"; but that will not suffice to carry the conclusion. If your realisation that you are not in pain now is to imply that you were in pain, then it must include something like "but I remember being in pain..."

What is important about Aristotle is that he was wrong; and what is interesting about Aristotle is how he was wrong.

How was Aristotle wrong in your view?

What exactly is the missing premise? "If I have stopped being in pain then I was previously in pain"? — Banno

I don't think it's any more question begging than:

Alice: "I saw Jane today"
Bob: "How do you know?"
Alice: "I saw her."

Have you stopped beating your wife?
If someone answers yes, then we infer that they previously beat their wife.
If someone answers no, then we infer that they are still beating their wife.

Have you stopped being in pain?
If someone answers yes, then we infer that they were previously in pain.
If someone answers no, then we infer that they are still in pain.

Alice: "I saw Jane today"
Bob: "How do you know?"
Alice: "I saw her." — fdrake

That's not an inference. That's repetition...

Have you stopped being in pain?
If someone answers yes, then we infer that they were previously in pain.
If someone answers no, then we infer that they are still in pain. — fdrake

...but if they have not been in pain, then they have not stoped being in pain, and hence they answer "no". So the posited inference that they are still in pain would be wrong.

...but if they have not been in pain, then they have not stoped being in pain, and hence they answer "no". So the posited inference that they are still in pain would be wrong. — Banno

And if someone really had stopped being in pain? Would you infer that they were in pain just prior to then?

And if someone really had stopped being in pain? — fdrake

Would that be an inference or a memory?

I say memory.

I say memory. — Banno

Why not both?

(1) I was in pain up until time t.
(2) I did not realise I was in pain before t+1.
(3) I stop being in pain at t+1.
(4) I realise that I was in pain at all times before t+1 at t+1 as a consequence of the cessation of sensation in (3).

Does that seem problematic to you?

I don't think it's inappropriate to rephrase (4) as:

(4) I learned that I was in pain at all times before t+1 at t+1 as a consequence of the cessation of sensation in (3).

Because I am now in possession of a fact I did not know; that I was in pain up until time t (and did not realise it)!

Some people are probably going to balk at the idea that a sensation can happen without realising the sensation is had.

The cessation of pain is, you're claiming, a particular experience different from not being in pain, like your Erfworld example. Another real life example is being in a room with a noisy old-fashioned window air conditioner that suddenly cuts off when you're in the middle of a sentence -- you find that you were speaking much more loudly than you realized in order to be heard over the noise.

What's salient here is your claim that this is an inference:

Seems like the presence of sensations very much can be inferred, but perhaps only after a transition in their intensity. — fdrake

(1) I was in pain up until time t.
(2) I did not realise I was in pain before t+1.
(3) I stop being in pain at t+1.
(4) I realise that I was in pain at all times* before t+1 at t+1 as a consequence of the cessation ** of sensation in (3). — fdrake

That's a series of unrelated statements, not an inference.

That's a series of unrelated statements, not an inference. — Banno

(4) has "as a consequence" of something in (3) in it.

OK, let's try a different approach. Fred is suddenly certain that he has just stopped having a pain, of which he was unaware.

Only in this case Fred is mistaken. Although he believes he had been in pain, he was not.

Nothing in this entails a contradiction.

Hence the inference from the belief that your pain has just stoped to your just hsving been in pain is invalid.

Fred is suddenly certain that he has just stopped having a pain, of which he was unaware. — Banno

Parsed it wrongly - Fred suddenly stops being in pain, a pain of which he was unaware. He isn't just certain of it; as it it were just an epistemic state directed towards a pain; Fred had stopped being in pain! If you stop experiencing something, you must've experienced it before that.

I think you are making a mountain out of a molehill.

Or, to switch examples, even if you and I don't mean the very same colour when we say "red" - if your red is my blue - we will both stop at the red light. — Banno

Is it just me, or oughtn't everyone here (and on similar threads) to clarify which of these two related but separable questions they are addressing?
• is my external red the same as your external red?
• is my internal red the same as your internal red? — bongo fury

E.g. isn't Wittgenstein's aim (with his linguistical speculation) to dissolve or reconceive the second one, not to entrench it?

I guess that you and he are saying "even if" the second question makes sense, but, like... how could you?? Are your linguistical insights worth the price of that hypothetical admission? Or is the private language argument no more than a reductio on the hypothesis of qualia? Excuse my irony failure if so.



et al

For at least 20 years - confounding my assumption that it would inevitably worsen - I've been able to cure the occasional onset of a "tuning fork" tinnitus within a few seconds, apparently by calling its bluff: listening as carefully as possible to the tone as though it were produced by a musical instrument, comparing it with the rest of real and imagined sound with respect to pitch, volume, tone colour, partials etc. Either by complete coincidence or (I prefer to think) in consequence of a recalibration of the whole auditory system, it stops.

I've seldom had the courage or presence of mind to withhold the procedure and thus test for coincidence. Too anxious to make it stop. Which is appalling superstition. I must henceforth attain more (haha, even the slightest semblance of) rigour in assessing the effect of the procedure. (But hey, this is the internet, so, take it from me, it really works!)

But what is recalibration? Not necessarily correction of a mapping of (sets of matching) internals to (sets of matching) externals. (Qualia sets to stimulus sets.) Rather, perhaps, just the matching of externals: (re-)learning to recognise the same stimulus sets that others do.

Same with pain, except the stimulus sets are types of bodily trauma and hence partly or wholly internal. But pains are (analogously) traumas as classified through public pain-talk.

.....muttering to self from the back of the room....

Damned if I can figure out how the pain I never knew I was in, stopped being one.

• is my internal red the same as your internal red? — bongo fury

The notion of an internal red - a private sensation - cannot be made a coherent part of our public conversation. The problem is dissolved. There is only the public red.

Ok, but your interlocutor could reasonably complain of having been misled by your blarney here:

Or, to switch examples, even if you and I don't mean the very same colour when we say "red" - if your red is my blue - — Banno

In my defence, it's a conditional... IF.

It's intended to reinforce the argument that the question drops out of any relevance.

It's intended to reinforce the argument that the question drops out of any relevance. — Banno

I doubt it has the intended effect. It implies that you are only concerned about what is relevant to the linguistic aspects, and are perfectly prepared to admit the possibility of a beetle beetling away.

Sure there are beetles. We just don't talk about them.


Or better, folk do, but their talk makes no sense.