However Kant believes only the "idea of freedom" is required. I think Kant's position may involve a vicious regress, however.... — Pantagruel

Maybe not required, but sufficient? Can we say there is a distinction between the two? And Kant’s position would involve an infinite regress, if he didn’t acknowledge that his idea was merely a stipulation grounding a very specifically predicated theory.

“...I adopt this method of assuming freedom merely as an idea which rational beings suppose in their actions, in order to avoid the necessity of proving it in its theoretical aspect also. The former is sufficient for my purpose; for even though the speculative proof should not be made out, yet a being that cannot act except with the idea of freedom is bound by the same laws that would oblige a being who was actually free. Thus we can escape here from the onus which presses on the theory....”

Still, the question remains whether or not an idea is itself sufficient justification for anything generally, and a moral philosophy in particular, which we are told by the post-modern determinists, it is not.

Maybe not required, but sufficient? — Mww

Yes, I wasn't being precise, that's correct. But if the whole point is, even if it is just the "idea of freedom", even if that is just an illusion, is it a "free illusion"? i.e. there is still a freedom there.

Yes, I wasn't being precise, that's correct. But if the whole point is, even if it is just the "idea of freedom", even if that is just an illusion, is it a "free illusion"? i.e. there is still a freedom there. — Pantagruel

I can’t see what would be the advantage of such an illusion. There’s no point. Nature doesn’t need to lie to us.

Right. And yet there is error.

And yet there is error. — Pantagruel

Error is how we learn. It is unavoidable and productive. But I can't see how a systemic illusion about the whole shebang would be necessary or useful.

Error is how we learn. It is unavoidable and productive. But I can't see how a systemic illusion about the whole shebang would be necessary or useful. — Olivier5

But if there is no freedom then learning would also be an illusion.

But if there is no freedom then learning would also be an illusion. — Pantagruel

Even error would be an illusion.

As I see it, free will is important to many because without it would mean each of is nothing more than an atomaton, which is anathema to the notion personal freedom. If I have no freedom of choice how can I be praised or blamed for what I do? For Christians this has the added consequence of robbing the concept of sin/salvation of any meaning. So most people are loath to even entertain the idea of no free will. Free will is almost always regarded as a given.

Any exception to free will is seen as temporary constraint. "I am free to to do this or that unless someone/thing comes and prevents it. Of course this isn't at all what the issue of free will is about. Free will is about the idea that, aside from any external constraints, "I could have chosen to do differently if I wished." So I think a decent working definition of "free will" is just that: the ability to do differently if one wished, which is a very common definition of "free will."

Those who most disagree with this are most often hard determinists, people claiming that everything we do has a cause. And because everything we do is caused then we could not have done differently, therefore it's absurd to place blame or praise. A pretty drastic notion, and one rejected by almost everyone. So whatever else is said about the issue of free will ultimately it must come down to this very basic level: Are we free to do other than what we chose or not? I say, No you are not. Free will is an illusion. But before going into why, we first need to get rid of the term "choice" because it assumes to be true the condition under consideration, freedom to do what we want. So no use of "choice," "choosing," or any of its other cognates.

Here's how I see it.
There are only two ways actions take place; completely randomly, or caused. By "completely randomly" I mean absolutely and utterly random, not an action which, for some reason, we do not or cannot determine a cause. This excludes things such as the "random" roll of dice. Dice land as they do because of the laws of physics, and although we may not be able to identify and calculate how dice land it doesn't mean that the end result is not caused. This is the most common notion of "random" events: those we are unable to predict and appear to come about by pure chance. The only place where true randomness, an absolutely uncaused event is said to occur is at the subatomic level, which has no effect on superatomic events, those at which we operate. And I don't think anyone would suggest that's how we operate anyway, completely randomly: what we do is for absolutely no reason whatsoever. So that leaves non-randomness as the operative agent of our actions. We do this or that because. . . . And the "cause" in "because" is telling. It signals a deterministic operation at work. What we do is determined by something. Were it not, what we do would be absolutely random in nature: for absolutely no reason at all. But as all of us claim from time to time, we do have reasons for what we do. And these reasons are the causes that negate any randomness.

So, because what we do obviously has a cause, could we have done differently? Not unless the causes had been different. If I end up at home after going for a walk it would be impossible to end up at my neighbor's house if I took the exact same route. Of course I could take a different route and still wind up at home, but I would still be in the same position of not ending up at my neighbor's. To do that there would have had to be a different set of circumstances (causes) at work. But there weren't so I had no option but to wind up at home. The previous chain of cause/effects inexorably determined where I ended up. So to is it with our decisions. We do what we do because all the relevant preceding cause/effect events inexorably led up to that very act and no other. We HAD to do what we did. There was no freedom to do any differently.

What does this all mean then? It means that we cannot do any any differently than what we do. Our actions are caused (determined) by previous events and nothing else. Even our wishing to think we could have done otherwise is a mental event that was determined by all the cause/effect events that led to it. We think as we do because. . . . And that "because" could never have been any different than what it was. The operation of our will is at the mercy of everything that directs it. We have no will to do anything other than what we're caused to do. In effect then, a free will does not exist, nor does choice.

Of course this means that blame and praise come out as pretty hollow concepts. If you cannot do other than what you did why should you be blamed or praised for them? To do so is like blaming or praising a rock for where it lies. It had no "choice" in the matter. Of course we can still claim to have free will if we define the term as being free of external constraints, but that's not really addressing free will, and why free will exists as an issue. The free will issue exists because people claim "I could have done differently if I had wished." Problem is, of course, they didn't wish differently because . . . .


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no "choice" in the matter — Lida Rose

Good post, Lisa.

How would you know if you are thinking freely or merely have the concept of thinking freely. I think I can freely choose to spend time on this forum, but how free is my choice really? I know I have other jobs to do, but debating complex concepts provides reward stimuli to the brain which activates the base animal in me that chooses such immediate rewards over longer term rewards (like getting paid for doing actual work).

I concur with 's well reasoned post. And the 'becauses' that we use include many levels, such as biological imperative, psychological, behavioural and so forth.

I think this is coming close to another post on this forum about morality. Why do we choose to act morally - do we indeed have a choice?

Perhaps then freedom of thought is not so much having absolute (infinite) freedom to choose, but freedom to choose from a finite number of predetermined possible courses of action?