I'm not going to just keep repeating myself here. I'm not talking about what anti-natalism actually says. I'm talking about the implications of their line of argument. So the fact that it doesn't say "that non-existence is the ONLY way to avoid suffering" is irrelevant if that's what the arguments imply. The fact that it doesn't say "we advocate suicide" is irrelevant if that's what the arguments imply. The fact that it doesn't specifically mention the sanctity of human life is irrelevant if undermining it is what the arguments imply.

I understand what you're saying yet thinking that these are the implications of an antinatalist's line of argument just means you don't understand the line of argument or you've heard a bad one.

So the fact that it doesn't say "that non-existence is the ONLY way to avoid suffering" is irrelevant if that's what the arguments imply. — Isaac

The fact that it doesn't specifically mention the sanctity of human life is irrelevant if undermining it is what the arguments imply. — Isaac

Where is this implied? Which part of the argument can be used to reach this conclusion? I asked you this already and you didn't asnwer.

I think you're saying "implies x" where it's more like "sounds vaguely close to x from a quick skim of the arguments". The way you use the term, it would not surprise me if next you say "Veganism implies that animal lives are more valuable than human lives" or something like that.

Where is this implied? — khaled

I can't speak to all anti-natalist arguments, obviously, it was lazy of me not to specify. The argument here, and in previous such posts, is that we cannot alleviate suffering by our actions toward each other sufficiently to overcome the advocacy of doing so by avoiding procreation. That either implies that avoiding birth is the only way to alleviate suffering, or the human life is so trivial a thing that we need not consider its extinction a good reason to seek alternative methods.

I've been thinking about this for a bit and the funny thing about anti-natalism, is that even if we envisioned a world with absolutely no pain we still have a multitude of conditions "imposed" on us by nature. For instance no one "consents" to waking up tired or wanting to go back to sleep. If I have to walk to my drawer or refrigerator to get food I'm going to need to do that or just get hungry so really there's no way to win.

Non-existence can't be flawed after all according to the anti-natalist and if in even the most perfect universe or society imaginable we'd still be de facto non-consenting to annoyances (say when it comes to waking up or having to walk somewhere) so non-existence is clearly preferable. Of course no one actually acts this out and kills themselves because of this, nor should they. It's just a nice thought experiment predicated on being super critical of everything.

That either implies that avoiding birth is the only way to alleviate suffering, or the human life is so trivial a thing that we need not consider its extinction a good reason to seek alternative methods. — Isaac

That is not an either/or. Rather, I have a different perspective on how to look at ethics than what you have stated. The way you phrased it right there is that human life is some kind of mission, and by having new people, we are fulfilling this mission. Rather, at least this form of antinatalism that I am discussing, would look at the individual's worth and dignity rather than a cause (e.g. humanity, human life). How so, you say? Because in the procreational decision, one can prevent all future harm from befalling a future individual, without any negative consequences to that future individual. That would be actually affirming the worth, by considering that one is not foisting negative consequences, or perhaps a game that the future person would not want to play (or even have a tendency to play poorly). [And these are the reasons why I make these threads, to change perspectives on these things which only SEEM counter-intuitive. Luckily something like a PHILOSOPHY FORUM would be the place to posit these kind of counterintuitive notions.]

Anyways, under your perspective as written here, we would be affirming a cause (i.e. humanity), over and above the consideration of suffering of the future life. And here is another perspective change I would like to propose. Even if the future life wouldn't be agony all of the time [which who knows, there could be pretty bad lives created inadvertently anyways, so there's an argument there as well], it is that we should consider that if an alternative is not creating conditions/capacities for suffering to creating conditions/capacities of known and unknown quantities of suffering for a future individual, then the moral choice is to always prevent creating conditions/capacities of suffering when one is able.

Even further you might say.. How is negatives weighted so heavily? I'd go back to the idea that it doesn't seem intuitively bad that no beings exist on Mars. We don't hold vigils for the non-happiness situation there. However, if we were to learn Martians exist and live tortuous lives, then we might feel some empathy for this and start some advocacy group or something. But why? Because not creating a new situation of happiness is not weighted as much as not creating new situations of harm. It is moral to prevent harm, but there is no obligation to create beings who experience things like happiness.

EDIT: @khaled@Isaac

Actually I'd like to amend what I said above. I should say, what is SEEMINGLY counterintuitive (antinatalist) stance, comes from very intuitive understandings of harm and positive states (like happiness). I wanted to say this so as not to create a performative contradiction. I don't think I made that clear when I mentioned "counterintuitive". I meant, what SEEMS counterintuitive.

The very fact that any suffering can befall someone, that someone can even make bad decisions that lead to ruinous consequences, the fact that conditions are present whereby one can have natural or human decision-making causes for pain is all considered equally bad. — schopenhauer1

Agreed. This seems like a specific instance of the broader asymmetry and deprivationalist account (re: intra-worldly balance) of pleasure and pain. Is it better to be put in a situation where there is a right choice and a wrong choice, or to not be put in that situation to begin with? If there is no reason or need for someone to make choices, why give them this burden?

It seems clear that someone who makes a very bad choice would have been better off had they either made a different choice (an empirical truth), or never had to make that choice to begin with (a metaphysical truth).

Agreed. This seems like a specific instance of the broader asymmetry and deprivationalist account (re: intra-worldly balance) of pleasure and pain. Is it better to be put in a situation where there is a right choice and a wrong choice, or to not be put in that situation to begin with? If there is no reason or need for someone to make choices, why give them this burden? — darthbarracuda

Yes, exactly!

It seems clear that someone who makes a very bad choice would have been better off had they either made a different choice (an empirical truth), or never had to make that choice to begin with (a metaphysical truth). — darthbarracuda

I like the way you categorized the empirical outcome vs. the very decision-making situation itself as a more metaphysical aspect of having to be in the situation at all.

I'm just curious as to what you would say if someone said the inevitable, "But we can learn from bad decisions, ergo, they must be good". I know there are many things wrong with that statement, but that seems to be the kind of argument that would put forth as a response. I think I know what your answer would be, but just wanted to put it out there.

Silver-linings are understood to be accidental goods that come about from things that are otherwise bad. They are not something to be sought after in themselves. I think the reality is that any goods in life in general are silver-linings to the condition of being alive. They don't justify it, they only ameliorate it.

I have a different perspective on how to look at ethics than what you have stated. — schopenhauer1

Yeah, and this sums up exactly what I'm saying. You're not compelled by unassailable logic to look at things the way you do. Absolutely every single one of your arguments proceeds from some unusual axiom which you have simply chosen to hold despite being free to choose otherwise There are any of a dozen different ways to interpret that silly 'life on Mars' intuition, for example. You've chosen a set of frames which leads you to the annihilation if the human race as an answer. Anyone in their right mind would see that as a sign they might have taken a wrong turn somewhere.

You're not compelled by unassailable logic to look at things the way you do. Absolutely every single one of your arguments proceeds from some unusual axiom which you have simply chosen to hold despite being free to choose otherwise There are any of a dozen different ways to interpret that silly 'life on Mars' intuition, for example. — Isaac

Dude, I JUST said above what you are objecting to, thus anticipating it:

Rather, I have a different perspective on how to look at ethics than what you have stated. The way you phrased it right there is that human life is some kind of mission, and by having new people, we are fulfilling this mission. Rather, at least this form of antinatalism that I am discussing, would look at the individual's worth and dignity rather than a cause (e.g. humanity, human life). How so, you say? Because in the procreational decision, one can prevent all future harm from befalling a future individual, without any negative consequences to that future individual. That would be actually affirming the worth, by considering that one is not foisting negative consequences, or perhaps a game that the future person would not want to play (or even have a tendency to play poorly). [And these are the reasons why I make these threads, to change perspectives on these things which only SEEM counter-intuitive. Luckily something like a PHILOSOPHY FORUM would be the place to posit these kind of counterintuitive notions.] — schopenhauer1

There are any of a dozen different ways to interpret that silly 'life on Mars' intuition, for example. You've chosen a set of frames which leads you to the annihilation if the human race as an answer. — Isaac

It's called an argument. Almost no argument posited, even "This is my hand" has ever been uncontested. So the fact that you can say something otherwise, is not news, and is AGAIN ARGUING IN BAD FAITH. You just find my philosophy and my frequency of posts odious to you, and thus you pick on this argument more than others. It is literally the stock-and-trade of philosophical arguments to present what SEEM to be counterintuitive arguments that are contested back-and-forth over many articles, over many years over many posts, or whatever the forum of communication.

Anyone in their right mind would see that as a sign they might have taken a wrong turn somewhere. — Isaac

That is just, like, your opinion man.

in the procreational decision, one can prevent all future harm from befalling a future individual, without any negative consequences to that future individual — schopenhauer1

By making sure that individual doesn't exist, what a court might call an "overly broad remedy".

the moral choice is to always prevent creating conditions/capacities of suffering when one is able. — schopenhauer1

I'm sure you don't consider the argument against procreating to be an argument for murder, but you must rely on some other principle right? Without something else you have an argument for mercy killing on a global scale.

I'm sure you don't consider the argument against procreating to be an argument for murder, but you must rely on some other principle right? Without something else you have an argument for mercy killing on a global scale. — Srap Tasmaner

Ah, but the procreational decision is the only one where one would be recognizing the dignity of the person, without doing something against their consent.

the dignity of the person — schopenhauer1

The dignity of a person who doesn't exist and cannot give or withhold consent?

The dignity of a person who doesn't exist and cannot give or withhold consent? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes respecting what could be by NOT foisting a game on them without their consent nor "gifting" them the conditions whereby they have the (known and unknown) capacity for suffering. Correct.

Respecting "what could be"? But that's not an individual, and they have no consent to give or withhold.

At any rate, it turns out you don't need a extra principle to block mass mercy killing, because you start from respect for the individual life, and believe anti-natalism can be derived from that. Yes?

Respecting "what could be"? But that's not an individual, and they have no consent to give or withhold. — Srap Tasmaner

You can repeat it like I don't understand, I get it. You can respect someone by NOT doing something to them. Because they don't exist YET, doesn't negate this principle. For example, if someone was to be born into KNOWN horrifying circumstances.. like literally a woman gives birth to a baby and the baby falls in a pit of doom or something... would you not consider that? Now extend this idea to a lifetime of known and unknown suffering. It's as if your capacity to understand future circumstances (like a future existing being) STOPS only when it comes to this argument, because you don't like it.

At any rate, it turns out you don't need a extra principle to block mass mercy killing, because you start from respect for the individual life, and believe anti-natalism can be derived from that. Yes? — Srap Tasmaner

No rather, not foisting a game without consent (cause as you acknowledged, cannot do this de facto), and not causing conditions of all suffering, is recognizing the dignity. Once born, certainly there is a being for which consent can be had, and thus mercy killing would be not respecting this aspect, yes.

Yeah, and this sums up exactly what I'm saying. You're not compelled by unassailable logic to look at things the way you do. Absolutely every single one of your arguments proceeds from some unusual axiom which you have simply chosen to hold despite being free to choose otherwise There are any of a dozen different ways to interpret that silly 'life on Mars' intuition, for example. You've chosen a set of frames which leads you to the annihilation if the human race as an answer. Anyone in their right mind would see that as a sign they might have taken a wrong turn somewhere. — Isaac

I think you're right on the money here, Isaac. I've always been a little suspicious of people who espouse views that they can't (or refuse to) actually live out. If someone really thinks that non-existence is the preferable state of being they're free to kill themselves (not that I am suggesting this.)

Even if society was perfect and we had eliminated war, poverty, and disease humans would still be subject to terrible, non-consensual forces outside of their control, like having to wake up from a pleasant sleep or go to the bathroom. We solve these problems by destroying humanity. /s.

I think you're right on the money here, Isaac. I've always been a little suspicious of people who espouse views that they can't (or refuse to) actually live out. If someone really thinks that non-existence is the preferable state of being they're free to kill themselves (not that I am suggesting this.)

Even if society was perfect and we had eliminated war, poverty, and disease humans would still be subject to terrible, non-consensual forces outside of their control, like having to wake up from a pleasant sleep or go to the bathroom. We solve fix these problems by destroying humanity. /s. — BitconnectCarlos

So I stated before, that it is perhaps not worth being brought into a world that is not a paradise or utopia. So, you seem to be describing one that isn't even if more flagrant forms of suffering are eliminated. Actually, I still think it would be bad to a certain extent as the way this often works is that more "refined" versions of suffering will simply become the biggest forms of suffering and be the new "standard" for suffering.

I often acknowledged, a utopia or paradise would probably be akin to some sort of Buddhist nirvana, a nothingness or complete fullness of being, which one cannot really imagine in our current something, or non-complete state.

Because they don't exist YET, doesn't negate this principle — schopenhauer1

I get how the logic works: you are only entitled to do something to someone with their consent; therefore not existing is functionally equivalent to withholding consent. But it's still a little odd: my moral duty is constituted by the claim others have on me to respect their autonomy; but then somehow I end up having a moral duty to people who don't exist.

The inference only holds because one or more of the premises fail, so it's vacuously true, which doesn't seem like much of a foundation for an ethical position.

If that's really it, then no wonder no one ever persuades you (your position is logically defensible) and you never persuade anyone else (the key inference is only vacuously valid, but not sound).

Actually, I still think it would be bad to a certain extent as the way this often works is that more "refined" versions of suffering will simply become the biggest forms of suffering and be the new "standard" for suffering. — schopenhauer1

Yeah, I feel like you're talking about a utopia/perfect society that is very far removed from our current understanding of society. What you're saying kind of reminds me of that scene in one of the Matrix movies where Neo goes into the "real world" and he discovers the humans are housed unconscious in these gel pods living out their own virtual reality elsewhere. But on second thought maybe they could still suffer in that virtual reality, who knows.

I am content to hear that even if, for all intents and purposes the problems in our society were eliminated you'd still hold to your position. It shows that we're both on the same page that the anti-natalism objection is less to do with society and more to do with just a general objection to being.

It has nothing to do with intuitions at this point. The intuition that we are not upset about the lack of life on Mars is uncontested (though it could be). It's about your interpretation of that intuition (and others like it).

to change perspectives on these things which only SEEM counter-intuitive. — schopenhauer1

Why? This is the question I'm really getting at. Why would you do this. We've just established that the axioms which lead you here are chosen voluntarily. Yes, if you choose to look at things a certain way you could logically end up with anti-natalism. Why on earth, then, would you choose to do so, let alone try to get other people to look at things that way too?

The argument here, and in previous such posts, is that we cannot alleviate suffering by our actions toward each other sufficiently to overcome the advocacy of doing so by avoiding procreation. — Isaac

Yes.

That either implies that avoiding birth is the only way to alleviate suffering, or the human life is so trivial a thing that we need not consider its extinction a good reason to seek alternative methods. — Isaac

But I don't think this part is correct. The first "implication" is a reasonable position to hold already, and doesn't rely on the above argument really. We know of no way to alleviate suffering 100% nor have we even come close to it. No matter how much easier we make life suffering seems to still be there. Right now, even among people who have no material difficulties, have loving parents, etc, there still seems to be suffering.

And the second "implication" is not implied. If you offer an antinatalist a button that makes sure no children will ever be born again and a button that makes earth a utopia he would pick the utopia without hesitation. It's not so much that there is not a good reason to seek alternative methods as: We have no right to force others to seek alternative methods without even knowing if they are possible just because we want said methods.

How would you feel if you were born into some dystopian society forced to work to the bone, hating your life and it was all justified by: "Your great great great grandchildren MAY not experience suffering". A bit of an extreme example just to illustrate the point.

You're not compelled by unassailable logic to look at things the way you do. — Isaac

This is the case for every single ethical argument. So why do you have such a problem with this one?

And might I add that the main premises antinatalism relies on are already adopted widely:
1- Life has suffering in it
2- It is wrong to inflict suffering on others without consent
3- Commiting an act in the present which one knows will result in harm in the future for someone else without their consent is still wrong (EX: setting a bear trap in a public park)

Those are really all you need to argue for antinatalism.

Anyone in their right mind would see that as a sign they might have taken a wrong turn somewhere. — Isaac

You are not compelled by unassailable logic to look at things the way you do :wink:

Why? This is the question I'm really getting at. Why would you do this. We've just established that the axioms which lead you here are chosen voluntarily. Yes, if you choose to look at things a certain way you could logically end up with anti-natalism — Isaac

"Why not?" is a possible answer. You cannot on one hand stress how moral interpretations are subjective and baseless and on the other hand try to imply that this particular interpretation should be changed to a "better" interpretation.

Mine is: "Other interpretations reek of self-deception to me. To pretend that one is completely not responsible for their child's suffering just because they tried their best to raise him/her is something I can't do. And I don't think life is an easy enough or short enough undertaking so as to force people through it who may not want to." But since I recognize that this is a personal view I don't spend time trying to convince others of it so unlike many antinatalists I would NOT press the "Instant global vasecomy button".

And I don't think shope is really trying to recruit here. It is very common for people to post on this site to debate the beliefs they already hold. This post isn't even exactly about antinatalism, and as you said, even though this post implies that all suffering is unjustified to some extent, you don't have to take that and argue for antinatalism as a result. IMO you probably just think shope is recruiting because he's known for being an antinatalist and if some other member posted this you wouldn't react this way.

We know of no way to alleviate suffering 100% ... If you offer an antinatalist a button that makes sure no children will ever be born again and a button that makes earth a utopia he would pick the utopia without hesitation — khaled

I didn't mention 109% or utopia. It is only necessary that suffering is outweighed by pleasures unless you hold to something like asymmetric valuation, which brings me back to the question of why anyone would maintain such axioms.

We have no right to force others to seek alternative methods without even knowing if they are possible just because we want said methods.

How would you feel if you were born into some dystopian society forced to work to the bone, hating your life and it was all justified by: "Your great great great grandchildren MAY not experience suffering". A bit of an extreme example just to illustrate the point. — khaled

Fine. How would you feel about the prospect of the entire human race becoming extinct? I expect your answer to that question will seem as unlikely to me as my answer to your question does to you.

The point here is that you can't use some human intuitions to base an argument on (here, rights of autonomy) and then later when your conclusions clash with other intuitions (here, that annihilating the human race is a bad thing) claim to have demonstrated those second intuitions to be thus wrong. If intuitions (no matter his strong) can nonetheless be wrong, then the whole project of applying logic to them to get sound conclusions is a complete non-starter.

This is the case for every single ethical argument. So why do you have such a problem with this one? — khaled

Because it leads to the annihilation of the human race. That you personally might have no issue with that says more about your own psychology than it does about ethics.

"Why not?" is a possible answer. — khaled

See above.

You cannot on one hand stress how moral interpretations are subjective and baseless and on the other hand try to imply that this particular interpretation should be changed to a "better" interpretation. — khaled

Yes, I absolutely can. That's the whole point of moral relativism. I don't have to present an argument from some God-given objective moral code in order to make a moral argument. Morals are not 'found' by mathematics, they are the reason we do the mathematics.

It is very common for people to post on this site to debate the beliefs they already hold. — khaled

You can't debate a belief, that's the point. You can debate the validity of a conclusion presuming shared axioms and an agreement as to what constitutes a rational step and what doesn't. Absent of such an agreement one is persuading, not 'debating'. That is the issue I have. One might persuade others of a course of action one is sure is for the best, but the more sketchy the argument, and the more serious the consequences, the more careful one should be about pursuing such rhetoric. Here the argument is based on some flimsy logic applied to unpopular axioms and the consequence is the end of humanity forever.

It is only necessary that suffering is outweighed by pleasures — Isaac

Agreed. And currently we cannot know that for any given child.

Fine. How would you feel about the prospect of the entire human race becoming extinct? — Isaac

Pretty sad. Not as sad as seeing someone going through severe depression though.

then later when your conclusions clash with other intuitions (here, that annihilating the human race is a bad thing) claim to have demonstrated those second intuitions to be thus wrong — Isaac

That you personally might have no issue with that — Isaac

First off, intuitions are neither right or wrong, we all have different "amounts" of them. And secondly I never said that the prospect of human extinction doesn't make me sad. You just expected I would because you have some preconceived notion about all antinatalists and you are arguing with that caricature rather than actually trying to reach a conclusion with the person you're talking to.

It's just that I don't think the sadness that I will feel over human extinction gives me a right to have a child to prevent it. Because that's just another form of harming someone ELSE to alleviate MY sadness. And worst part is, that child will ALSO likely be saddned at the prospect and so pass the harm on to someone else ad inifnium (That's why a "logo" for antinatalism that I see often is a broken circle with the letter A breaking it). If we were to quantify sadness due to extinction as (x) then the choice is "Experience x or likely inflict way worse than x on a member of your family tree"

Yes, I absolutely can. That's the whole point of moral relativism — Isaac

What I interpreted was you saying "You can hold any position you want but you shouldn't hold that position because it's objectively bad". If you had said "You can hold any position you want butI think antinatalism is some fundamentally depressed and messed up philosophy that should be exorcised" I would have had no issue with that. But you are implying that somehow DESPITE moral relativism being the case than one should not be an antinatalist.

Using moral relativism to undermine an ethical position doesn't really work because it undermines all ethical positions not just the one you take issue with. Instead of knocking down a building you move the whole playing field downwards.

You can debate the validity of a conclusion presuming shared axioms and an agreement as to what constitutes a rational step and what doesn't. — Isaac

And what shope is trying to do is trying to debate whether or not a shared axiom is correct. I don't see a problem with that. If someone makes a post about how he thinks god doesn't exist you wouldn't mind that would you (I know we don't have many theists here but it is still a commonly held axiom in the general population)?

Mind you you don't need the axiom that "Self inflicted pain is still unjustified" to argue for antinatalism at all which is why I'm saying that you likely wouldn't have even minded the post if it wasn't shope's

Here the argument is based on some flimsy logic applied to unpopular axioms and the consequence is the end of humanity forever. — Isaac

As I said before (and you conveniently ignored), the axioms antinatalism needs are not unpopular at all. And I don't think the logic is flimsy. I don't like replying to empty statements that are just blurted out like these so if you want to argue this then I ask you to at least present the unpopular axioms and why you think the logic is flimsy or you've effectively said nothing.

It's just that I don't think the sadness that I will feel over human extinction gives me a right to have a child to prevent it. — khaled

I'm not sure many would, but I don't see that's relevant. It's quite an unusual principle that one's personal emotional response is what provides the basis for rights, so if you did have a 'right' to have a child to prevent the extinction if the human race it would be because of the intrinsic value of humanity, not because you might be sad about something.

Using moral relativism to undermine an ethical position doesn't really work because it undermines all ethical positions not just the one you take issue with. — khaled

I think you've misunderstood moral relativism. I still think you ought to behave a certain way, it doesn't stop being about how others ought to behave. I just don't think there's a logical method by which I can derive that feeling.

And what shope is trying to do is trying to debate whether or not a shared axiom is correct. I don't see a problem with that. — khaled

How do you propose to debate whether an axiom is 'correct'? What measures would we judge it by?

As I said before (and you conveniently ignored), the axioms antinatalism needs are not unpopular at all. — khaled

It needs the axiom that annihilating humanity is an acceptable conclusion, that not having children is an acceptable conclusion. I've not done the surveys but I think that's about the most unpopular axiom there is.

Whatever intuition(s) you start from you've arrived at a conclusion which clashes with one of our strongest intuitions. You're faced with either a) intuitions can be very wrong - in which case your argument is built on air, or b) intuitions like the ones you start from are to be taken seriously - in which case the clash involved in your conclusion should indicate that your logic has gone very wrong somewhere.

The inference only holds because one or more of the premises fail, so it's vacuously true, which doesn't seem like much of a foundation for an ethical position.

If that's really it, then no wonder no one ever persuades you (your position is logically defensible) and you never persuade anyone else (the key inference is only vacuously valid, but not sound). — Srap Tasmaner

This is typically overwrought rhetoric. Your logic like others, goes something like this "Even if I was to know a being would be born into certain torture, I would not consider this future event because that being doesn't actually exist yet, so how can I consider a future being or event if they don't exist yet!" Thus, the person would have ONLY exist and be tortured in order to have any consideration for harm towards the being. Obviously there is something wrong there, no matter how crazy you say my claim is. This is philosophical gaslighting.

It shows that we're both on the same page that the anti-natalism objection is less to do with society and more to do with just a general objection to being. — BitconnectCarlos

I'm not sure about all antinatalist philosophies, its not monolithic. The way I explain this version is to split up necessary and contingent suffering. You seem to be talking about getting rid of contingent (circumstantial) suffering. However, there is a necessary deprivation to being- that doesn't go away. That is the Suffering as discussed in Schopenhauer/Eastern philosophy: "Always becoming but never being".

However, there is a necessary deprivation to being- that doesn't go away. — schopenhauer1

Oh yeah if you're talking about the "suffering" or whatever you want to call that is inherent in being (i.e. the way that humans experience the world) that's not going away anytime soon. If you want to be hyper sensitive to it that's on you. I hate to say it but you're free to enter into non-being at any point and regardless we'll all be spending billions upon billions of years in non-being after we die (assuming no reincarnation or afterlife) so if non-being is the preferable state then things are probably looking pretty good in your view given the time spent in both states.

Sure.. But this sounds like justification for bringing people into being, because, well there was eternity before and after.. so why not ?-100 years of being, right?