How does that follow from the premise that the universe has been partly negentropic from the Big Bang get go? This being something you’ve previously stipulated in other threads. — javra
Upholding a partly negentropic universe that is, and has always been, governed by teleological and formal principles is nothing short of a proposal for an Anima Mundi, i.e. for an animated cosmos with teleological strivings, this being a form of panpsychism. — javra
On the other hand, if there indeed is upheld a sharp division between the entropic and the negentropic, as you’ve here asserted, then how can a fully entropic system logically give rise to negentropy? — javra
With one example being that of the objective world being effete mind; another being the difference in where the cosmos is headed: a difference that is exceedingly substantial. — javra
But I gather the primacy of awareness is a bit too theistic reeking for the materialistically minded. So, to avoid that slippery slope into monotheism or some such, it must be denied tout court. — javra
A car is in fact the worst kind of example as a car is a machine and not an organism. — apokrisis
So, when there's a whole car there are no parts and when there are parts there's no car? — TheMadFool
So, when the car is being assembled piece by piece the souls of the parts conveniently vanish and the soul of the car comes into existence when the car is being disassembled, the souls of the parts magically reappear and the soul of the car vanishes? Is this what you're saying? — TheMadFool
If you are then everything doesn't have a soul for the simple reason that the parts are still things even when they're all assembled together into a car and, according to you, they don't have souls when they are so. — TheMadFool
...Consciousness - in that view - is simply what it is like to be in a meaningful and intentional semiotic modelling relation with the world... — apokrisis
Yes. Most of the higher animals have some form of culture, including ants & bees. But I wouldn't put them in the same category with human culture. I'm aware that some people prefer to belittle the accomplishments of humans, in order to avoid the notion that they are something more than mere animals. I assume it's a rejection of the notion of human souls, and a unique "human nature". But that's not what I'm talking about. There's no need for the miraculous addition of a soul to turn a sheep into a shepherd. Evolution does that trick naturally, but it takes time, lots of it. :smile:Haven't read up on dolphins but, as a fun tidbit, chimpanzee cohorts have their own unique cultures (with a small "C"). — javra
But it doesn't support panpsychism for the reason I gave. There is still a clear line to be drawn between the inorganic realm and the organic realm. Science also talks about that. — apokrisis
The "effete mind" quote is easy to misinterpret as one sentence picked out from a large corpus.
Peirce was clearly trying to move beyond Cartesian dualism in toto, not merely declare against materialism and for divine soul. His focus was on the semiotic relation between impersonal information and informed material being.
Either you critique that machinery - the thirdness of a modelling relation - or you are avoiding the point of his metaphysics. — apokrisis
Primacy itself is the problem here.
Whether you are an idealist or realist, theist or materialist, the problem with your scheme is the drive to declare one metaphysics right and its opposing metaphysics wrong. That is the faulty mindset that defines the Cartesian bind. — apokrisis
That is the point of my Enformationism thesis. It's not just dumb Information all the way down. Instead, it's the upward evolution of Information over the ages. The information in the Big Bang singularity is imagined as a simple mathematical algorithm. That simple expression must have included self-reference to create feed-back loops in the program.Yet even if we accept a physics which says "everything is an informational process all the way down, rather than a material process all the way up," this same ToE must make a hard distinction between "mindless physical systems" and "mindful living systems". — apokrisis
I disagree with the semiotic distinction between syntax and semantics when it comes to meaning, but other than that.. — creativesoul
Conscious experience is meaningful to the creature having it. — creativesoul
I disagree with the semiotic distinction between syntax and semantics when it comes to meaning, but other than that..
— creativesoul
I'm not sure what you mean. — apokrisis
Most of the higher animals have some form of culture, including ants & bees. But I wouldn't put them in the same category with human culture. — Gnomon
I would say that Humanity is "metaphysically divided" from animals as an Aristotelian ten-fold conceptual category. Perhaps number (3) Quality. Christians would call that "quality" a "Soul". But I don't use that terminology. :smile:The question isn't whether human culture should be placed into the same camp as the culture of some lesser animal species or another. The issue is one of whether humans are metaphysically divided from the rest of life, or, else, are a progressive aspect of life in general - this despite the massive punctuated-equilibrium leap which our species has undergone. — javra
Other than via mischaracterization or willful strawmaning, panpsychism does not deny the (somewhat) clear line between the inorganic realm and the organic realm — javra
Recall that, of itself, panpsychism "is a difference that makes no difference". — javra
I'd don't believe that I misinterpreted the notion of effete mind. Peirce, after all, was an objective idealist, not a materialist. — javra
As to Peirce's point, agapeism was a part of it. Something your system appears to conveniently overlook. — javra
That is where panpsychism becomes even more intellectually dishonest. People do argue that neural complexity somehow amplifies the dilute awareness that is already a property of the material realm. — apokrisis
At the begining was the word, and the word was with God. John 1 — Olivier5
Consciousness - in that view - is simply what it is like to be in a meaningful and intentional semiotic modelling relation with the world. — apokrisis
Enactivism argues that cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment.[1] It claims that our environment is one which we selectively create through our capacities to interact with the world.[2] "Organisms do not passively receive information from their environments, which they then translate into internal representations. Natural cognitive systems...participate in the generation of meaning ...engaging in transformational and not merely informational interactions: they enact a world. — Wikipedia
My question to khaled was: what properties do they [experiences] have that are not accounted for neurologically? — Kenosha Kid
As is well known, current science has nothing to say about subjective (phenomenal) experience and this discrepancy between science and experience is also called the “explanatory gap” and “the hard problem” (Chalmers 1996). ....What we do know is that there is no place in the brain where there could be a direct neural encoding of the illusory detailed scene (Kaas and Collins 2003). That is, enough is known about the structure and function of the visual system to rule out any detailed neural representation that embodies the subjective experience. So, this version of the neural binding problem really is a scientific mystery at this time. — Jerome S. Feldman
If one accepts both a) the primacy of awareness in one form of another, together will all that this entails (e.g., goal, and thereby telos, driven behaviors), this as an idealist would; and b) the logical necessity that life - and, thereby, the first-person awareness it can be deemed to necessitate - evolved from nonlife; what other conceivable, logically consistent inference could one arrive at other than that of panpsychism? — javra
conscious of, say, a red ball — Kenosha Kid
If I say the red ball has a soul (a rubber soul, natch) but you can't do anything that proves or disproves it even in principle, or some new property that interacts with nothing in the universe, even other things having that property, it would be foolish to believe me. — Kenosha Kid
Be aware that Christian theology appropriated many of these ideas from Greek philosophy, and then adapted them so they would confirm their dogma. And now such ideas are tacitly rejected BECAUSE of their association with that dogma. It's a tangled web. — Wayfarer
No, we do not; what is seen, is a mechanical representation of my thinking. — Mww
I will admit that pure reason is an individuated closed system and by association, is inaccessible to general external inquiry. — Mww
Difficult indeed. And with a neural connectivity average of 12.9 x 10^8/mm3**, the physical process of burrowing down to specific network paths in order to correlate them to specific cognitive manifestations, may very well destroy that path.
**Alonso-Nanclares, et. al., Department of Anatomy/Compared Pathological Anatomy, Madrid, 2008) — Mww
In order for science to study consciousness, it must reify it, or, which is the same thing, turn it into a phenomenon — Mww
Oh...forgot: in what sense do you say metaphysics is doomed? — Mww
On a more mundane level, the description of a thing is not that thing. Knowing about the physiology of pain or fear, does not amount to 'knowing pain' or 'knowing fear'. — Wayfarer
You can describe the physiology of a bee sting or a shark bite but the description doesn't amount to the experience. — Wayfarer
And besides, as I've pointed out to you previously, neuroscience has had to acknowledge the 'neural binding problem' - which is that it can find no neural mechanism which accounts for the subjective unity of experience. — Wayfarer
In very general terms, the appearance of life anywhere in the cosmos represents the manfestation of subjective awareness. — Wayfarer
conscious of, say, a red ball
— Kenosha Kid
This. This is basically exactly as I defined it but although you were apparently confused by my definition you still reused it. Which shows that maybe it's not confusing or vague, at least for the purposes of this discussion. — khaled
Similar to what you're arguing, I think. — Wayfarer
To say that 'everything is composed of matter and information' is a kind of modern update of hylomorphic dualism, but 'information' is a very different conception to 'form'. — Wayfarer
A sign intrinsically refers to nothing. — apokrisis
But you are aware that you are conscious and you being conscious is part of your surroundings, no? Informed, as in possessing knowledge. Are you conscious, or aware, of your knowledge?I can be unaware of my surroundings and still be conscious. And idk what informed has to do with it. — khaled
Then what did you mean by "first-person"? You still haven't clarified what that even means, or how ti compares to zero-person or second-person experiences.as in only you have this view and no one else does?
— Harry Hindu
I don't know. Will get back to you after I become someone else and compare. — khaled
But you're entertaining panpsychism — Kenosha Kid
which is not compatible with consciousness as I define it — Kenosha Kid
Seeing that I use the word is not evidence that you and I use it in the same way. — Kenosha Kid
The question is: what properties does consciousness have such that one could say a computer has or doesn't have it, or an atom has or doesn't have it. — Kenosha Kid
But you are aware that you are conscious and you being conscious is part of your surroundings, no? — Harry Hindu
Informed, as in possessing knowledge. Are you conscious, or aware, of your knowledge? — Harry Hindu
Then what did you mean by "first-person"? You still haven't clarified what that even means, or how ti compares to zero-person or second-person experiences. — Harry Hindu
as in only you have this view and no one else does? -> I don't know. Will get back to you after I become someone else and compare — khaled
I don't think so. Can you report anything that you aren't aware of, like being conscious? By what means do you know things, like that an apple is on the table and that you are conscious?Saying "aware that you are conscious" is like saying "wet water" — khaled
Do you know anything when not conscious?Can't remember a point where I possessed no knowledge so I can't tell you if you need to know things to be conscious. — khaled
third person and first person seem to be the same thing as "from a distance" is just a different location of the first person experience.Zero person doesn't make sense. Second person also doesn't make sense in this context. Third person is your view of something from a distance. First person is the view from my perspective. I'm just saying the same things over and over again because this definition cannot be simplified. Maybe check what the difference is between "first person shooter" and "third person rpg" — khaled
Can you report anything that you aren't aware of, like being conscious? — Harry Hindu
Do you know anything when not conscious? — Harry Hindu
is just a different location of the first person experience. — Harry Hindu
You're saying the same things over and over because you seem to be unwilling to even try to make any sense and be consistent. — Harry Hindu
what is seen, is a mechanical representation of my thinking.
— Mww
Therefore:
I will admit that pure reason is an individuated closed system and by association, is inaccessible to general external inquiry.
— Mww
must be false, since observing that mechanical representation is a form of external enquiry. — Kenosha Kid
the description of a thing is not that thing.
— Wayfarer
Good point. — Kenosha Kid
In order for science to study consciousness, it must reify it, or, which is the same thing, turn it into a phenomenon
— Mww
It's still not shown why this is problematic........
It is problematic by implication, insofar as turning a thing into something else presupposes that thing never was what it’s being turned into. The question remains...is it still possible the presupposition itself is false, such that there never was any turning into, in the case at hand, consciousness always was a phenomenon so science didn’t have to reify it in order to study it.
You have sufficient reason to suppose consciousness is already a phenomenon insofar as you suppose properties belonging to it, hence available for scientific study, and I have sufficient reason to suppose consciousness is merely a quality to which no such thing as properties can ever belong, hence cannot be a phenomenon and therefore invisible to scientific study.
Given that the criterion of the truth of a conception, that is to say, the constituency of the manifold of representations possible to subsume under it without contradiction, I would ask.....how is consciousness defined from a perspective of it being a phenomenon? And a follow-up would ask...is there any doubt that being conscious-of is not the same as conscious-ness?
.......There are good methods precisely for this. — Kenosha Kid
in what sense do you say metaphysics is doomed?
— Mww
Well... who would win in a fight between Superman and The Rock? — Kenosha Kid
I don't see how that follows. Maybe if you were to define it I'd see why it's incompatable with panpsychism. — khaled
Again, it would help if you defined what you mean by it. — khaled
This is putting the cart before the horse. You already assumed that computers and atoms don't have consciousness before even coming up with a theory that explains what consciousness is. — khaled
I place a cup, a ball and a towel in front of you. One of these has property X. Which one? — Kenosha Kid
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