What - exactly - do each of us classify as a "red cup" if not red cups? — creativesoul
How do you know that what I experience (colour-wise) when I see a red cup is the same as what you experience (colour-wise) when you see a red cup?
I do not. — creativesoul
the experience of red cups always includes red cups — khaled
Here you emphasize that the experience (colour-wise) produced by the red cup can be different. So let me just call the experience of a red cup you have X. Now when Janus looks at a red cup he has the experience Y. — khaled
I would be pleased if, to satisfy my curiosity, you would tell me whether you are an idealist or believe in an afterlife. — Janus
It seems to me you are thinking that because I could hallucinate a red cup on the table when there was no red cup; and that I would be unable to tell the difference by visual appearance alone, that what I see when I hallucinate is exactly the same as what I see when I am actually seeing an object. — Janus
But such hallucinations are rarely so stable, and also the rest of the environment would not usually be an hallucination, just the red cup. — Janus
Me too! I imagine there must be some emotional attachment to the term because it is thought to support some form of idealism. I think perhaps some people feel disappointed with materialism, because they think it challenges their hopes for a life beyond this one. — Janus
When you say
the experience of red cups always includes red cups
— khaled
Can mean 2 things:
"X and Y are identical" which would be an unsubstatiated claim as you yourself said.
"X and Y are both produced by looking at red cups" which no one is disagreeing with. — khaled
materialism fails to properly account for conscious experience. — Marchesk
Indeed. — creativesoul
One might turn the psychologizing around and say that materialists have a dogmatic commitment to dismissing any arguments challenging their metaphysical commitments. — Marchesk
Wait, now I'm confused. Whose side are you on? — Marchesk
and my seeing red cups always always always includes red cups. — creativesoul
How do you know that what I experience (colour-wise) when I see a red cup is the same as what you experience (colour-wise) when you see a red cup?
I do not. — creativesoul
Neither, and I said as much from the very beginning. Curious that, huh? — creativesoul
and my seeing red cups always always always includes red cups.
— creativesoul
Let me rephrase. Here you say "includes red cups". And also you say:
How do you know that what I experience (colour-wise) when I see a red cup is the same as what you experience (colour-wise) when you see a red cup?
I do not. — khaled
What do you think about the three kinds of conscious experience I set out recently? — creativesoul
All conscious experience of seeing red cups includes more than just red cups, ya know? — creativesoul
Conscious experience of red cups includes more than just red cups — creativesoul
What do you think about the three kinds of conscious experience I set out recently?
— creativesoul
Didn’t see that — Olivier5
Part of the Cartesian error is to categorize unlike things together based on superficial similarities instead of making natural and functional distinctions. So visualizing, dreaming, imagining, hallucinating, etc., are considered by the Cartesian to be a kind of seeing and perception, when they are not.
— Andrew M
But they are kinds of conscious experiences. And the thing about them is you can't just dismiss dreams, hallucinations, etc. as properties in relation to the objects being perceived, since there are no objects, and thus no such relations. — Marchesk
But there are still experiences.
I dream of a red apple, and that red apple is a visual experience. — Marchesk
We understand the entire process of swimming towards the attractant at this level of detail. We know that the attractant chemicals react with chemicals in the cell, setting off a chain of reactions which eventually cause the flagella to rotate in such a way that the bacterium swims in the direction where the concentration of attractant is increasing. — Daemon
Conscious experience of red cups includes more than just red cups
— creativesoul
Sure but I'm not sure what that has to do with anything. — khaled
It sets out what counts as pretheoretical conscious experience. But, since you've expressed no interest in that criterion, calling it a "strawman" built by Dennett, I suspected you may not have taken note that I'm not in complete agreement with Dennett, because I'm neither a dualist, nor a monist. — creativesoul
I know that both experiences include red cups and people seeing red cups in whatever way they appear to them, each and every time. — creativesoul
That's why it's not a problem for someone(like me) to make both claims you're asking about. — creativesoul
We can’t synthesise the mechanism from scratch yet, which means we are still guessing how it might work. Note that all the flagella have to paddle in the same direction, so the process involves some uniform sense of spatial direction, which ain’t easy to do with mere chemistry. — Olivier5
But this is just nitpicking. More importantly, how would you propose that we differentiate « real codes » from « unreal codes »? Is the genetic code not real, and why? — Olivier5
The genetic code is not "actual coding", coding here is again a metaphor, the whole amazing thing happens by what you call "mere chemistry". "Actual coding" takes place in the way you describe for the colour coding of a map, it's an activity which requires the involvement of conscious agents with the cognitive capacity to make use of symbols. — Daemon
So if the genetic code was written by God (or some alien race), then it is actual coding, but if it is the result of random variations, then it is not actual coding. By this reasoning, you cannot know if the genetic code is an ‘actual code’ or not, because you don’t know who wrote it. — Olivier5
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