OK, no worries. Since you took the trouble to weigh in on it, by taking the moral high ground; I thought you might have something enlightening to offer. Just in case you misunderstood I wasn't by any means asking you to 'take sides'. I'm not looking at this whole ridiculous exchange in terms of sides at all.

Also, you're projecting if you think my intention was to treat you as a "plaything" to alleviate "my boredom". But, whatever....

You reading that like a reductionist scientist. As if being an object in the would amounts to being immanent. If that were so, we wouldn't need anything more than empirical description.

To dwell in the world has a far deeper meaning than to be an object of causality. Any state of the world also has a logical expression, an infinite, which cannot be altered by changes in the finite world.

I am Willow, for example, a logical truth and expression immune to change, no matter what the finite world does. Not even my death alters it-- a necessary truth, inherent and indewelling to any world. To think the inherence and indewelling of immanence amounts to just being an object in the world is miss what it's about.

Indeed, it is to claim immanence (infinite) is only state in the world (finite), which is precisely what immanence is not.

When Spinoza makes the distinction between objects of causality (finite) and the principle of self (infinite), your response is to claim the are the same (that it's only about objects in the world). You are missing the entire point Spinoza is making and haven't even addressed the concept he is talking about.

Idealism's point is the world is not an illusion. It claims experiences, states of existence, are the extent of things.

Experience is treated as infinite and objects of existence (experiences) are the extent of everything.Idealism (and it close cousin Substance Dualism) are reductionst: there's nothing but present experiences.

The acosmist can only cohrently be a realist. For them, the world (finite states) can only be illusionary. Experiences (states of the world) cannot be Real.

Only Substance is Real for the acosmist-- the infinite, the logical necessity, which is not subject to finite change-- that which is outside the finite but never seperate from it.

You wouldn't say that objects and events are immanent in the world? Why do you think it follows that if objects are immanent in the world all we would need is empirical descriptions? Is causality immanent in the world? I would say it is not clear that it is immanent in the world as experienced, as Hume points out. Causality itself is never directly experienced; so causal relation between things remain inferences to forces which cannot themselves be detected, and are simply inferred due to their observed purported effects.

Any state of the world also has a logical expression, an infinite, which cannot be altered by changes in the finite world. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Would you say these logical expressions are real independently of our formulations of them? If they are real, then they are transcendent of the temporal world, insofar as they are timeless or eternal truths. This is not the common notion of immanence at all.

Contrary to your claims the infinite, if it is more than merely an abstraction, is the very definition of transcendence. This whole question of immanence and transcendence is extremely complex and multi-layered. You seem to want to reduce it to being subject to Willow's set of stipulated definitions, which don't accord at all with ordinary usage, as far as I can tell.

When Spinoza makes the distinction between objects of causality (finite) and the principle of self (infinite), your response is to claim the are the same (that it's only about objects in the world). You are missing the entire point Spinoza is making and haven't even addressed the concept he is talking about. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Spinoza believed the self to be utterly subject to the determinism he believed to be inherent in nature. He believed that the freedom we experience ourselves as being is an illusion due to the fact that we cannot be aware of all the causal factors determining our actions. I believe this view is deeply flawed, but there is no point arguing about it, since more than two thousand years of philosophical arguments about free will vs determinism have gotten us no closer to the truth. People show what kind they according to whether they choose to believe in free will or determinism; it cannot ever be anything more than a matter of taste, so to speak.

Only Substance is Real for the acosmist- — TheWillowOfDarkness

OK, so what is substance then? If you cannot clearly say what it is, then it would seem to be utterly senseless to claim that it is the only real.

Bye!

This notion that there can only be one substance is an unfounded assumption. God may be constituted of a multitude of substances, one of which is in our case the same substance as that of which the world and or our being is constituted. While God also partakes of a multitude of other substances, or unknowns elsewhere in existence. — Punshhh

This is incoherent - you're using a notion of substance that would be completely foreign to Spinoza, Descartes, Aristotle, and the whole philosophic corpus. Substance is what necessarily exists - God can't partake of substances - rather God can be substance. Maybe what you're saying is that God is a substance with multiple attributes, say attributes A, B, C, D and we're a substance with attributes A and B only. Now let's see, why couldn't that be the case? (Spinoza actually DOES go through this and explains why it can't be the case)

Spinoza explains that the nature of a substance is described by its attributes. Since the attributes are the essence of substance and substance is always logically prior to its modes, then that means that what we must use to distinguish two different substances are their attributes. Spinoza defends E1p5 that in nature there cannot be two or more substances having the same attribute by citing E1d3, and E1a6. Now, Spinoza following Descartes and the tradition defines substance as what is in itself and is conceived through itself (E1d3) and defines the correspondence of a true idea to its object in E1a6. Now suppose we have two substances with the different attributes as described above. Can we distinguish the two substances by the attributes they have in common? No. So it must be by the attributes they don't have in common. How do we conceive of a substance? Through its essence via E1d3 (ie through any one of its attributes E1p10). So to conceive of an extended substance, we just need to make reference to the attribute of extension and to no other attribute. But in the case we have previously mentioned, if I try to conceive substance 1 through attribute A that isn't enough, because how would it be different from conceiving substance 2 which also has attribute A? So because we cannot conceive of a substance if it shares an attribute with another substance, we know that substances cannot share attributes (E1p5). Now neither can Substances be distinguished through their modes, because the Substance is logically prior to its modes. Therefore still E1p5.

Now substance necessarily has all possible attributes (from E1d6). If you claim it doesn't, and say there's substance with attribute A, and substance with attribute B, than a substance with attributes A and B can always be conceived which incorporates both "substances" (and indeed MUST be conceived). Because, say, an extended substance only requires the attribute of extension to be conceived, the attribute of thought or any other kind of attribute is not necessary when conceiving the substance qua extended substance - and thus there's nothing in the substance being an extended substance precluding it from being a thinking substance also. Since God - or Substance - can be conceived, and God necessarily has all the attributes (because God has the most reality and power), then it follows that whatever substance that exists must have all the attributes (E1p11). From the fact that substances cannot share attributes (E1p5) and whatever substance exists must have all the attributes (E1p11) we conclude that there can only be ONE Substance and ONE God - E1p14.

OK, so what is substance then? If you cannot clearly say what it is, then it would seem to be utterly senseless to claim that it is the only real. — John

After all those years of you claiming you studied Spinoza you still can't understand even the basics of his system. Have you bothered to read how Spinoza or Descartes CLEARLY define what substance is?

"By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself" (E1d3) Spinoza
OR
"By Substance we can understand nothing other than a thing which so exists that it needs no other thing to exist" (I, 51) Descartes

Spinoza believed the self to be utterly subject to the determinism he believed to be inherent in nature. He believed that the freedom we experience ourselves as being is an illusion due to the fact that we cannot be aware of all the causal factors determining our actions. — John

>:O Yeah maybe if you stop after reading the fourth book "On Man's Bondage", and never move to the fifth ("On Man's FREEDOM") :-d

By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself" — Spinoza

This is the 'first cause' or 'uncaused cause'. I was, coincidentally, just reading a definition of Nirvāṇa in The Buddhist Dictionary, to whit:

'Nirvāṇa is the one dharma that exists without being the result of a cause'.

From here.

With respect to Descartes definition of substance:

Substance: A thing whose existence is dependent on no other thing.


Created Substance: A thing whose existence is dependent on nothing other than God.


Strictly speaking, for Descartes there is only one Substance (as opposed to Created Substance), since there is only one thing whose existence is independent of all other things: God.

From here

A lot of the confusion here rests on the notion of what constitutes 'substance'. The meaning of 'substance' in philosophy is different to our 'substance stuff or thing', the original, 'ousia', is much nearer in meaning to 'essence' or 'being' than what we take to be 'substance' in the modern lexicon.

As for these posts....

You lack even the basic shame required of a man to avoid humiliating himself even more than he is already humiliated. It seems that in your old age you have realised that young minds have achieved far more than you have in far shorter time, and there is no possibility for you to catch up. Thus you choose to resort to ressentiment, and cast as sour and untrue all that you cannot reach up to because of your own weakness and lack of character. Accuse them of failing because they are young, and all sorts of other non-philosophical and philistinic rationalisations. You claim:

The fact is that I really don't care about this kind of bullshit; I'm not here to trade insults or to play boring games. — John

And on you go, post after post engaging in insults and playing boring games. You should really be ashamed of yourself, there is no greater shame than to have a man let his own jealousy conquer him. Your jealousy is so great in fact, that you even have the audacity to suggest:

Why not start a thread and ask others to honestly express their opinions, no holds barred, about your behavior on these forums; you might be surprised! — John

But of course, you don't care about this kind of bullshit. Why suggest it then? I think you really do care, and the fact that you care tells the rest of us a lot about you. But again I really think you ought to meditate on this and bear the shame you have accumulated in silence instead of opening that mouth again and pushing yourself even deeper down in the pit. Shame on you John, shame on you.

'Nirvāṇa is the one dharma that exists without being the result of a cause'. — Wayfarer

This is not a very clear definition because we don't know if there exists such a thing. Spinoza ties it with Substance being in itself (not depending on other things) and requiring nothing but itself in order to be conceived. Because Spinoza makes such a distinction it ends up clear that substance is something that we MUST conceive in order to make sense of reality (and hence there definitely exists such a thing). Descartes' definition, and the definition provided by the Buddhist dictionary don't make this clear.

With respect to Descartes definition of substance — Wayfarer

Which is precisely how Spinoza could subvert Cartesianism ;)

A lot of the confusion here rests on the notion of what constitutes 'substance' — Wayfarer

In philosophic discourse the notion of substance is pretty clear at least in my opinion.

But I do agree that the quote is aimed at pointing towards the same thing. The problem with Buddhism generally in my opinion is that it is confused - it says everything and nothing, and hasn't clarified its teachings, the way say, the Catholic Church has. This is a serious problem - it means pretty much anyone who labels themselves as a Buddhist can be one. I gave you a series of links to have a look for yourself at this - but it seems you haven't bothered. In addition to this Buddhism is purposefully adapting itself to the West to gain converts - this is a KNOWING adaptation. This I find to be quite inadequate for a religion - Christianity for example isn't "adapting itself" to gain converts, for the most part.

And Buddhists themselves are saying this. Have a look here for example:
http://www.mysticbanana.com/i-would-really-like-to-practice-buddhism-but-will-i-be-faced-with-leftist-loons.html

Read the comment by Roshi Bill Yoshin Jordan for example. Buddhism has become corrupted, because it wasn't sufficiently structured - and therefore it has failed because it has allowed the virus to get in. Once the virus is in, it will be almost impossible to change - the preachers of Buddhism themselves become twisted. Which is a pity because Buddhism had some valuable insights and good potential - if only it hadn't formed such an alliance, we may have envisioned a different future for it. But now in the bottles with the label Buddhism we can either find poison or good wine - and how to distinguish them without drinking them - they bear the same label! ;)

I suggest you look at what I said again, I said,"one of which is in our case the same substance as that of which the world and or our being is constituted". So I am accepting that substance can be being. Indeed, I allow a broad spread of definitions of substance.

The problem with what Spinoza is saying (as you have presented it), is that there are two unfounded conclusions, conclusions which cannot be supported using logic. Firstly that there is only one substance and secondly that God is this substance. It may be true, but we cannot determine it and logic is unequipped to determine it, because logic is an intellectualisation of knowledge, which are both products of the computation, of a thinking, limited, mind. A thing which is susceptible to solipsism.

You should know by now that we cannot think God into/or out of existence, or think eternity into our own guise.

:-}

You haven't understood what I've said all this time.

Indeed, I allow a broad spread of definitions of substance. — Punshhh

Yes and using substence in a way that doesn't follow the use of it that has been philosophically established. You're just redefining words.

The problem with what Spinoza is saying (as you have presented it), is that there are two unfounded conclusions, conclusions which cannot be supported using logic. — Punshhh

How are they unfounded? Can you explain this when I just provided you the reasons for why there is only one substance, and the reasons for why this substance must be God? :s

You should know by now that we cannot think God into existence, or think eternity into our own guise. — Punshhh

Yes unfortunately Spinoza's ontological argument works - unlike that of Descartes or St. Anselm. Your only option is to retreat into irrationalism if you want to deny Spinoza's point. Reason itself demands that we adopt such a conception if reality is to be intelligible at all. Of course you can say "fuck it, reality isn't intelligible", but that's your only option. And if you choose that, you're not really doing philosophy anymore. So if that's what you want to do, be my guest.

Jesus, Agustino, get your head on straight; philosophy is not a competition! My intention was never to insult you. The same, it seems cannot be said about you though.
Your continued insults make it obvious that in fact it is just you projecting your own jealousies and seeking to put me down. Your upstart behavior on these forums is obnoxious and not very intelligent Agustino, at least that's the way it strikes me, and I feel no shame in honestly expressing that impression. The idea that I could be jealous ( don't you mean 'envious' ? ;) ) of you is a real laugh. Project on if you like, I won't disturb you again.

:-} try a bit harder John, maybe you can convince yourself too! At least you're smart enough to avoid answering my objections to your Spinoza misinterpretations - that way you think you can fool some people.

The problem with the notion of 'God as substance' and the idea that He must be constituted as we are if He is to be able to act on us is that the idea of substance being constituted is unintelligible.

If substance is what constitutes, how could substance itself be constituted? Substance is therefore a deeply confused notion. The conception of substance has never been clear and free from paradox in Western philosophy, and I think that's why the most interesting philosophy in the modern Era has been oriented to process ontology and the incoherent notion 'substance' has mostly been abandoned.

If substance is what constitutes — John

:-} Is this how Spinoza has defined Substance? Yes or no? If yes, then please cite adequate evidence. If no, then your point is a red herring or at best a strawman.

And I'm not even mentioning that even if things were as you frame them - your question, "if substance is what constitutes, how could substance itself be constituted?" is just as stupid as the question "if the Prime Mover is what moves, how could the Prime Mover itself be moved?" :s

Buddhism generally in my opinion is that it is confused - it says everything and nothing, and hasn't clarified its teachings, the way say, the Catholic Church has — Agustino

Have you considered that it's possible you don't understand it very well? Those sources are plainly polemical. Plenty of people hate Buddhism. Anyway, the point of the post is not about Buddhism in particular, it's a cross-cultural comparison between Spinoza's and Descartes' idea of the 'uncaused' and a similar idea in Buddhist philosophy.

And I'm not even mentioning that even if things were as you frame them - your question, "if substance is what constitutes, how could substance itself be constituted?" is just as stupid as the question "if the Prime Mover is what moves, how could the Prime Mover itself be moved?" — Agustino

Of course it's a stupid question, that is the point; it is stupid to think of God as "being of a substance", which was what I was trying to point out to you earlier.

I'm not saying it would be impossible, I'm saying it is incoherent. How would we make sense of that? I can make sense of touching you for example, because we're both physical and made of the same substance - atoms - hence we can interact. That's what it means to be of the same substance - being capable of interacting. So if God isn't of the same substance, and is thus incapable of interacting with us, in what sense does he even exist? — Agustino

Anyway, the point of the post is not about Buddhism in particular, it's a cross-cultural comparison between Spinoza's and Descartes' idea of the 'uncaused' and a similar idea in Buddhist philosophy. — Wayfarer

Pretty much all metaphysics must have an idea of the uncaused, because otherwise you're stuck with an infinite regress no? So even materialism must have an uncaused cause - for Epicurus "atoms and void" are eternal. So the very attempt to make an intelligible whole out of reality leads to the idea.

Have you considered that it's possible you don't understand it very well? Those sources are plainly polemical. — Wayfarer

Whether I understand it or not is besides the point I'm trying to make to you. I may very well think highly of Buddhism, and in fact I do. However - this doesn't change the fact that many of the people who claim to be Buddhists, who go to practice Buddhism, and so forth have misinterpreted the teaching. My point is political - Buddhism has been so misinterpreted by so many people that it is beyond saving - at least in the West. It becomes a host for liberalism/progressivism, and it merely becomes another way to spread them. It has no mechanism - as far as I'm aware, to stop these misinterpretations and correct them - practically speaking, it doesn't even seem to be doing so, instead it is happy that it is gaining converts.

Those links I have given you may be polemical, but it is people of different persuasions, liberals and conservatives, noting the same trend with regards to Buddhism. These people may very well be misunderstanding Buddhism. So it is. But so what? The facts are still the facts - they are a large share of those who call themselves Buddhists, and use Buddhism to spread their beliefs. How do you, as not this kind of Buddhist, deal with this for example? Are you happy your religion is used for these purposes? If no, then what are you doing about it and how do you propose it can be corrected?

Of course, that is the point; it is stupid to think of God as "being of a substance", which was what I was trying to point out to you earlier. — John

I asked you a question. Please answer it.

:-} Is this how Spinoza has defined Substance? Yes or no? If yes, then please cite adequate evidence. If no, then your point is a red herring or at best a strawman. — Agustino

Of course, that is the point; it is stupid to think of God as "being of a substance", which was what I was trying to point out to you earlier. — John

:s No it isn't stupid. Your question is stupid. If the Prime Mover does the moving then nothing moves it, so asking how could the Prime Mover itself be moved is nonsense. That's why in Aristotelian science it is known as the Unmoved Mover.

You obviously fail to understand that I was presenting it as a stupid question, not posing it as a sensible question to which we should seek an answer. It shows that thinking of God as being constituted as we are, or in your terms as "being of a substance" is flawed. Typical lack of subtlety.

You obviously fail to understand that I was presenting it as a stupid question, not posing it as a sensible question to which we should seek an answer. It shows that thinking of God as being constituted as we are, or in your terms as "being of a substance" is flawed. Typical lack of subtlety. — John

In what way is it flawed? Stop being pedantic and back-peddling. This is what you do every single time to run away. You gave your question - and the inability to answer it - as proof for the notion of substance being flawed. I've explained that given the notion of substance, your question makes no sense at all. If it makes no sense at all, that means that it's not substance that is at fault, but your question, and it can't be used as a criticism of substance. Therefore you have presented no case for how substance is flawed.

You referred to God as being constituted as we are, as "being of the same substance". But if God is the substance that constitutes, then it makes no sense to speak of God as being constituted as we are or as "being of the same substance". It makes no more more sense to say that substance is itself constituted, than it does to say the Prime Mover is moved, as you put it yourself.

I am not claiming that God is the substance that constitutes, or that God is substance at all, by the way. If you still say you don't understand what I am saying then you either lack good faith or are not very bright.

This is the last time I am going to explain it.

So even materialism must have an uncaused cause - for Epicurus "atoms and void" are eternal. — Agustino

Right! Which is why I am of the view that physics has torpedoed materialism.

As for Buddhism - what it means to me is a practical philosophy and way, grounded in meditative insight into the nature of the self. It is at its best a meta-cognitive discipline, it is all about 'knowing how you know'. There are indeed many forms of Buddhism and Buddhist organisations that I have no interest in, there are Buddhist cults and Buddhist dogmatists and fundamentalists. There are even Buddhist atheists. Zero interest.

OK, so what is substance then? If you cannot clearly say what it is, then it would seem to be utterly senseless to claim that it is the only real. — John

Have a look at the Wikipedia article on Substance (philosophy) and this article http://www.iep.utm.edu/substanc/

Instead of the question 'how many kinds of substances are there? put it like this 'how many kinds of being are there?'

The Hindu idea of ātman and Brahman is nearer to Spinoza and Descartes conception of substance, than modern or analytical notions of substance, because they're both speaking of 'substance' in the sense of 'being' rather than as an objective reality.

Yes, I get that the idea of substance is coterminous with the idea of being for Spinoza. But the question as to what is being is no easier to answer than 'What is substance'?

In any case, it seems to me that to think of God as substance or being is to objectify God. This is not to say that God is thus thought as an object or a being, but that He is thought as nothing more than the being of objects or beings. This idea that God is being (wholly immanent) is really, without the accompanying idea that God is also transcendent of being, nothing more than pantheism. This is the salient point of my disagreement with Spinoza's philosophy.

You referred to God as being constituted as we are, as "being of the same substance" — John

Number 1: This means that God isn't (or rather CAN'T be) transcendent. I meant to say that the notion of transcendence is incoherent - ie there is only one substance, there can't be many.
Number 2: I never used the word constituted. (for something to be constituted requires that there is something to constitute it)
Number 3: This is what I was referring to in a post to you, where I wasn't even using Spinoza's system. Now your reply with the stupid question (and everyone knows the stupid question by now) occurred in a post replying to Punshhh who was quibbling with me over Spinoza's system. So can I know what the fuck what I said earlier in a post to you had to do with your reply to Punshhh talking to me about Spinoza's system?

But if God is the substance that constitutes, then it makes no sense to speak of God as being constituted as we are or as "being of the same substance" — John

Yeah - thanks to your lack of subtlety as you like to say, you interpret it that way. All that the statement meant is that God being transcendent is incoherent - ie there are no two substances.

Now you still haven't answered my question that I've asked you two times to answer already. If you don't answer this question this time again, and deliberately ignore it, I will ignore your post.

:-} Is this how Spinoza has defined Substance? Yes or no? If yes, then please cite adequate evidence. If no, then your point is a red herring or at best a strawman. — Agustino

In addition to this I've asked you to provide evidence for what exactly you're referencing here:

Spinoza's own arguments concerning the difference between necessary and contingent beings — John

But the question as to what is being is no easier to answer than 'What is substance'? — John

Are you lacking in reading comprehension skills by any chance?
"By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself"

In any case, it seems to me that to think of God as substance or being is to objectify God. This is not to say that God is thus thought as an object or a being, but that He is thought as nothing more than the being of objects or beings. — John

No - you totally misunderstood Spinoza. No wonder 180 didn't want to have anything to do with you. He would usually not bother with those of low intellectual capacity and would easily break conversation with them when they couldn't keep up. "The being of objects" - get off your Heidegger and other obscurantists. The modes of substance are the waves of the ocean, and the substance is the ocean itself. Is the ocean the "being" (understood in an ACTIVE sense) of the waves? Yes, but this is an incredibly obscurantist way of putting it, because being is usually understood as a noun, and in this case it's also an activity. So the fact that "God is thought as nothing more than the being of objects or beings" is dead wrong.

This idea that God is being (wholly immanent) is really, without the accompanying idea that God is also transcendent of being, nothing more than pantheism. — John

*facepalm* - The waves of the ocean are illusory - only the ocean is real (and divine) vs the waves of the ocean are real (and divine). The former is acosmism; the latter is pantheism. Now how the fuck is Spinoza a pantheist if God is wholly immanent? You have no fucking clue what you're talking about.

Now you'll run out of here claiming victory over both myself and 180 - shamelessly like you've already done before. It's not our fault that you don't even understand Spinoza, even after "years of reading him" >:O .

When are you going to relax? You sound like you're becoming apoplectic.

"The being of objects" - get off your Heidegger — Agustino

By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself" — Agustino

I am well aware that Spinoza does not use the same language as Heidegger. But much of philosophy is "the same old stew, reheated". Can you explain to me what the difference between substance and being is?

For example, is being not "what is in itself" and "conceived through itself" ?