phenomenology was effectively begun by Brentano, and the notion of intentionality he used and that Husserl took up is a medieval one that involves thought directed at an in-existent object. — Snakes Alive
p The writers you're referring to are part of when phenomenology was just assimilated into the general soup of continental philosophy, and so lost most of its unique identity and methodological concerns (much in the way that OLP was subsumed into the soup of analytic philosophy more generally, and so lost its specific identity). — Snakes Alive
The authors your bud mentions here are just general big names that all continentals read, and besides Merleau-Ponty, aren't even especially related to phenomenology (though like with much in philosophical movements, people sometimes retroactively declare every author to be everything). — Snakes Alive
Isn’t that reducible to experience? If context stands for the the myriad distinguishable opportunities for using a concept, doesn’t that presupposes the time and place of them, which is the same thing as experience? It follows that a possible miscommunication using a common concept can be merely a matter of uncommon experiences. — Mww
[People are] always in fear of failing in their language use. So...even while we are aware OLP has exposed what it considers a problem, has it done anything to fix it? What does a philosophical picture of how all language works, actually do for human frailties, other than seeming to disregard them? — Mww
the average smuck on the street doesn’t care...about how all language works. — Mww
The point being that a "concept" for Witt is not like an "idea" of something, or, say, conceptual--just language.
— Antony Nickles
A concept is just language? — Mww
It is impossible to have language without concepts, so if I speak, I must already have the ground for speech. — Mww
So for Witt, the spontaneity is relinquished for the objective manifestations of concepts in language. But he’s just kicked the speculative can down the philosophical road, wouldn’t you say, in that we still need to know what makes language possible. — Mww
Concepts, on the other hand, as I’ve hinted before, always originate privately, by the first instance of it, and which usually, but not necessarily, subsequently become public in the communication of it. For which we must fall back on spontaneity....but, so be it? Not many choices in the matter, actually. — Mww
Rules in the sense I’ve been using, merely indicate a logical significance in accordance with a complementary system, the empirical knowledge of which we have no privilege. It’s the same as, we don’t know why that happened but there must have been a reason for it....this theory doesn’t tell us how this happens but if it wasn’t in conformity to a rule we can say it wouldn’t have happened. — Mww
So saying the written word ‘exists’ without us doesn’t tell us exactly what it is that is existing. — Joshs
My point is that there is no such thing as a regulation or principle which governs, that is not explicitly stated. — Metaphysician Undercover
The issue appears to be, that if rules of language use don't exist as an expression of language, then the rules do not exist within the public domain. If they are public, then where else could they exist if not as language? — Metaphysician Undercover
So we must turn to the private, internal domain of the individual to find these implicit rules, if they are real. — Metaphysician Undercover
Within the internal, private, we find what I called (for lack of a better word) "principles", in my discussion with Josh. The argument is that there is a very significant need to distinguish these private "principles", which serve as some sort of guidance to free willing, intentional choices, and public "rules", which are explicit regulations that govern conduct. The difference is immediately evident in the role of correction. — Metaphysician Undercover
The hammer is a good example. There are no rules for how to use a hammer, so long as you do not damage private property, or injure someone. — Metaphysician Undercover
Intention is irrelevant to our disagreement, which is whether or not rules must be made explicit.
— Luke
How is intention irrelevant, when to follow a rule is to intentionally act according to the rule? — Metaphysician Undercover
This is evidence of your delusion. You think that the dictionary definition provides a stated rule for how the word "rule" must be used, and if I step outside the precise boundary of your interpretation of that stated rule, I am necessarily mistaken. — Metaphysician Undercover
199. Is what we call “following a rule” something that it would be possible
for only one person, only once in a lifetime, to do? — And this
is, of course, a gloss on the grammar of the expression “to follow a
rule”.
It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on
which only one person followed a rule. It is not possible that there should
have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order given
or understood, and so on. — To follow a rule, to make a report, to give
an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (usages, institutions).
To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand
a language means to have mastered a technique.
206. Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. One is trained
to do so, and one reacts to an order in a particular way. But what if
one person reacts to the order and training thus, and another otherwise?
Who is right, then?
Suppose you came as an explorer to an unknown country with a language
quite unknown to you. In what circumstances would you say that
the people there gave orders, understood them, obeyed them, rebelled
against them, and so on?
Shared human behaviour is the system of reference by means of which
we interpret an unknown language. — Witt, PI
e.g., believing (as discussed with Luke above) — Antony Nickles
That what we ordinarily say and mean may have a direct and deep control over what we can philosophically say and mean is an idea which many philosophers find oppressive. It might be argued that in part the oppression results from misunderstanding; that the new philosophy which proceeds from ordinary language is not that different from traditional methods of philosophizing, and that the frequent attacks upon it are misdirected. But I shall not attempt to be conciliatory, both because I think the new philosophy at Oxford is critically different from traditional philosophy, and because I think it is worth trying to bring out their differences as fully as possible. There is, after all, something oppressive about a philosophy which seems to have uncanny information about our most personal philosophical assumptions (those, for example, about whether we can ever know for certain of the existence of the external world, or of other minds; and those we make about favorite distinctions between "the descriptive and the normative", or between matters of fact and matters of language) and which inveterately nags us about them.
Particularly oppressive when that, philosophy seems so often merely to nag and to try no special answers to the questions which possess us — unless it be to suggest that we sit quietly in a room. Eventually, I suppose, we will have to look at that sense of oppression itself: such feelings can come from a truth about ourselves which we are holding off.
Attention to the details of cases as they arise may not provide a quick path to an all-embracing system; but at least it promises genuine instead of spurious clarity...
the abstraction ("divorcing") of statements from their expression removes a context for them, which allows for the creation of criteria for certainty, universality, etc. in general--as in the difference between a "true" (certain, universal) statement and a statement of belief (uncertain, contingent). — Antony Nickles
A statement can be certain and false, and uncertain and true. — creativesoul
Are you saying the dictionary definition is incorrect? — Luke
There are conventional ways to use a hammer. These conventions are not explicit, but implicit rules. In case you missed it, a rule is "one of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity". — Luke
This was already answered by the quote. Our disagreement is over whether or not rules must be made explicit. You are trying to change the topic. — Luke
It's ironic that you accuse me of drawing precise boundaries. Your attempt to exclude unwritten rules is an attempt to restrict and censor the dictionary definition. Otherwise, by all means, tell me how I've misinterpreted. — Luke
"There is, after all, something oppressive about a philosophy which seems to have uncanny information about our most personal philosophicalassumptions (those, for example, about whether we can ever know for certain of the existence of the external world, or of other minds; and those we make about favorite distinctions between "the descriptive and the normative", or between matters of fact and matters of language) and which inveterately nags us about them."
--Stanley Cavell
Whether or not we can know for certain of the existence of the external world is the kind of consideration that can only be arrived at via very complex self-referencing language use(metacognition). Ordinary people do not become paralyzed by such contemplations. Ask a non-philosophical thinker whether or not an external worlds exists, or if other people have minds(thoughts, beliefs, and human experiences), and they will surely look at you as if you're mad/crazy/insane, and rightly so * * * — creativesoul
Such historical philosophical 'problems' have led to the demise of value and respect for philosophy and philosophers. — creativesoul
Two problems immediately come to mind. First, there are multiple different accepted uses/senses/definitions of the same term, and not all of them are compatible. We know that much the same thing is true regarding phrases as well. — creativesoul
Say we find that some native use of the term "believe" is accompanied by doubt. We can recognize some hesitation from the speaker to proclaim assuredness, certainty, or knowledge because we know what it's like to be uncertain. I'm sure most native speakers of an American English dialect would be perfectly capable of making the right sort of sense of someone else saying "I believe so" when the signs of uncertainty appear within their facial expressions and are supported by body language(shoulder shrugging, perhaps). So, we can agree that uncertainty can and does sometimes accompany the native speaker's use of "I believe". However, that's certainly not the only accepted use. There are common ordinary everyday situations where there is no difference of certainty at all in one's use of "I believe", no more certainty; no less certainty; equally on par with "I know", or "I am certain of it". Doubtlessness. — creativesoul
Upon what ground, by what standard are we further discriminating between different uses, aside from some are native, common, everyday uses and some are not? — creativesoul
I'm still wrapping my head around the three kinds of statements made about ordinary language, and it seems that grasping that is a key part of rightly understanding the methodology. — creativesoul
I did say OLP was analytical philosophy that worked within the tradition. I've also said that it looks at what we might say at a time and place (in context) to see what the ordinary criteria are (the implications, etc.). It does not speak in "ordinary language", nor is it trying to explain skepticism to lay people. — Antony Nickles
Two problems immediately come to mind. First, there are multiple different accepted uses/senses/definitions of the same term, and not all of them are compatible. We know that much the same thing is true regarding phrases as well.
— creativesoul
As I discussed above, Witt will call these the "senses" (as in options) for a concept (like "I know" discussed above), and thus why it is important to fill out a context which differentiates one sense from another. These senses are not endless. — Antony Nickles
Sitting around thinking about what other people's use of some word or phrase implies doesn't do anyone much good at all regarding any of the acceptable uses that are unknown to us. It looks like a recipe for some pretentiousness about another's language use.
Ought we not ask others? — creativesoul
What have we done here that is philosophically interesting or relevant aside from parsing out different acceptable uses, albeit in a bit more detail than usual? — creativesoul
By the way, I may have very well misunderstood your response to the bit I offered about "I believe" sometimes being accompanied by uncertainty and sometimes not. To be sure, are you denying that "I believe" can be accompanied by certainty and uncertainty both? Are you denying that "I believe" is sometimes used in a manner that is not a guess? — creativesoul
Sitting around thinking about what other people's use of some word or phrase implies doesn't do anyone much good at all regarding any of the acceptable uses that are unknown to us. It looks like a recipe for some pretentiousness about another's language use.
Ought we not ask others?
— creativesoul
It is not "other people's use" it is a claim on behalf of everyone. — Antony Nickles
I'm not going to object to the idea that we can acquire knowledge regarding everyone's language use. — creativesoul
What is implied when we say/do is justified by your being able to make the same claims, or see for yourself that I am correct. — Antony Nickles
We are just making what is implicit in saying something, explicit. — Antony Nickles
Are you saying the dictionary definition is incorrect?
— Luke
I'm saying that the the dictionary definition does not qualify as a "rule". — Metaphysician Undercover
This was already answered by the quote. Our disagreement is over whether or not rules must be made explicit. You are trying to change the topic.
— Luke
Yes, that describes the disagreement. — Metaphysician Undercover
You can insist that "convention" implies "rules being followed", but that's just fallacious logic, unless you define "convention" in a way which only begs the question. The reality of the situation is that "conventional" is used in numerous different ways, and you are arguing by equivocation. — Metaphysician Undercover
Your use is most consistent with my OED definition #6 "following tradition rather than nature". — Metaphysician Undercover
This does not even imply "agreement", as in definition #1. — Metaphysician Undercover
So even to claim that "conventional" as you use it, implies "agreement" is fallacy by equivocation. — Metaphysician Undercover
Furthermore, if we proceed to assume that "conventional" implies agreement, as your fallacious, deceptive, equivocal argument would lead us to believe, we still must address the fact that "agreement" to a rule does not imply that the rule will be followed. So even if there were agreements concerning how one ought to use a hammer, as the equivocal, argument would imply if it wasn't fallacious, this does not mean that the activity of using a hammer can be described as people adhering to that agreement. This is because people have free will, and they often simply decide not to adhere to their agreements, for various reason. This is a very important part of moral philosophy, there is no necessary relation between agreeing to something, and actually adhering to the agreement, the act of adhering to is completely separate from the act of making an agreement. So when it appears like someone is adhering to an agreement, we cannot conclude that an agreement has been made, because we do not have that logical relation. All we can conclude is that there is an act of "adhering to", but this is completely distinct from making an agreement. — Metaphysician Undercover
It's ironic that you accuse me of drawing precise boundaries. Your attempt to exclude unwritten rules is an attempt to restrict and censor the dictionary definition. Otherwise, by all means, tell me how I've misinterpreted.
— Luke
This is nonsense. How could a dictionary definition qualify as an "unwritten rule"? — Metaphysician Undercover
I've already explained to you your misinterpretation, but I'll briefly describe it again.. An individual cannot judge oneself to be following a rule, because this just means "I think I am following the rule" which is not necessarily a case of following a rule. Therefore the judgement of whether or not a person follows a rule must be made in reference to the rule as existing in a public setting, not a rule as existing within one's mind. Such a public rule could only exist as expressed in language. — Metaphysician Undercover
This would seem to be a kind of census; like linguistic anthropology. We are not "acquiring" knowledge; we already have it from growing up and learning English at the same time. — Antony Nickles
If we take the words "I believe", when spoken by someone with unfettered confidence that something just happened, and what immediately follows that particular use of "I believe" is nothing other than a description thereof(a belief statement about what happened), it makes absolutely no sense whatsoever for us to make a universal claim that all English speakers' use of "I believe" implies a hypothesis about future events. — creativesoul
This [that intent is only asked after something fishy] reminds me of a legal argument. Namely, when the defense argues that the charges presuppose intent, and thus the burden of proof rests upon the shoulders of prosecution to prove the defendant's intent of wrongdoing, or something similar... — creativesoul
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