phenomenology was effectively begun by Brentano, and the notion of intentionality he used and that Husserl took up is a medieval one that involves thought directed at an in-existent object. — Snakes Alive

I would agree that intentionality was effectively begun
by Brentano. Kohler and Koffka studied with him
and were inspired to found gestalt psychology, Freud took classes from him and created psychonanalysis. So, three different interpretations of intentionality led to 3 distinct approaches.

Brentano founded psychological intentionality on the cartesianiam of empirical naturalism, which Husserl
rejected in favor of a thoroughgoing subject-object interactionism, so Bretano’s intentionality is not Husserl’s phenomenology. The central method of phenomenology, maintained by Heidegger and Merleau-ponty as well , is the epoche , the bracketing of the taken-for-granted objective world.

p The writers you're referring to are part of when phenomenology was just assimilated into the general soup of continental philosophy, and so lost most of its unique identity and methodological concerns (much in the way that OLP was subsumed into the soup of analytic philosophy more generally, and so lost its specific identity). — Snakes Alive

In order for it to be assimilated it has to be understood , and from my vantage most continental
writers haven’t effectively done so yet, which is why the group of writers I mentioned to you who work in the overlapping terrain of constructivism, hermeneutics , phenomenology , enactivism and self-organizing theory are so valuable to me. ( the journal Phenonemology and the Cognitive Sciences showcase a lot of this work).
They don’t stick just to one phenomenologist but preserve its methodological concerns.

The authors your bud mentions here are just general big names that all continentals read, and besides Merleau-Ponty, aren't even especially related to phenomenology (though like with much in philosophical movements, people sometimes retroactively declare every author to be everything). — Snakes Alive

There is much more overlap and cross-fertilization among strands of philosophies that you seem to indicate here. Each phenenologist offers a unique perspective , and built into that unique perspective is the influence of particular works outside of phenomenology. So Gendlin isn’t just naming influences in common with other continental philosophers , his phenomenology is fused with some of these influences. And yet I recognize his method as unquestionably phenomenological.

Isn’t that reducible to experience? If context stands for the the myriad distinguishable opportunities for using a concept, doesn’t that presupposes the time and place of them, which is the same thing as experience? It follows that a possible miscommunication using a common concept can be merely a matter of uncommon experiences. — Mww

It’s not so much communicating experience. It’s more like training someone (indirectly most times) in a practice (in one or a few contexts and then people are able to extend a concept (say, asking or pointing) into new contexts; as I said, this usually just happens from us being around people and picking up the way things work; this is based on our ability and the flexibility of concepts into new contexts (another reason their criteria (Grammar) is dissimilar to rules). I would also tweak "myriad distinguishable opportunities for using a concept" as a concept has its possibilities (like Kant's), thus it has some uses (like options), and, even though concepts can be taken into new contexts, they won't go into every/any situation. The time and place is the event of me saying something. The fact of our concepts being common (as English speakers)'makes any uncommonness of our experience less important (say, you may have seen something that no one else did).

[People are] always in fear of failing in their language use. So...even while we are aware OLP has exposed what it considers a problem, has it done anything to fix it? What does a philosophical picture of how all language works, actually do for human frailties, other than seeming to disregard them? — Mww

Well the fear (philosophically) is basically a reaction to radical skepticism (uncertainty), and the picture it creates is that we need a theory of how all language works. Austin and Witt start with showing that we already had tons of individual ways that language works (the Grammar for each concept), but Witt (further developed by Cavell) saw that knowledge has a limit (which I discuss in relation to the Other in that post on the lion quote), but, with our expression, it means that I say something (at a time and place) using the options of our concepts, along their Grammar (but not conscious of, or justified by, them), but after that, I am responsible for that expression, answerable to it. So knowledge and theory end at a certain point and (after saying something) I take over; this is the fact that skepticism records, that everything can fail between us, and Cavell will label this part of our human condition (the "truth of skepticism"), so there is no "cure" or dismissal of skepticism. So OLP, in bringing a rationality back to every concept, simply gives us a view of our condition and to see (philosophically), reflect on, the ordinary (only) ways we have to resolve each situation. As you say "procedures are in place to prevent failings in language use, so in that sense, there is a fix, albeit hardly philosophical." Responding to that last bit, I would say that is the new approach OLP brings to the situation, claiming that: looking at what we mean when we say something, IS Philosophically relevant.

the average smuck on the street doesn’t care...about how all language works. — Mww

Cavell will see this as not that philosophers are different from other people, but that there is a moment for philosophy--where we do not know what to do; where we do need to turn and look at the criteria for our concepts (each with their own) in order to examine how far our criteria take us to understand the position we are in and, in learning about the criteria of our concepts, to learn about ourselves.

The point being that a "concept" for Witt is not like an "idea" of something, or, say, conceptual--just language.
— Antony Nickles

A concept is just language? — Mww

Sorry I write by assuming the continuation of words so I remove them (probably from being a twin). I should have written
a "concept" for Witt is:
Not like an "idea" of something,
Not "conceptual"
Not "just language."

It is impossible to have language without concepts, so if I speak, I must already have the ground for speech. — Mww

Wouldn't we say poetry (at least some) is language without a concept? And here, again, Witt's term "concept" is not a "ground" for communication (as I said above, if there is any "justification" or "ground" for communcation, it is us--being responsible for what we have said).

So for Witt, the spontaneity is relinquished for the objective manifestations of concepts in language. But he’s just kicked the speculative can down the philosophical road, wouldn’t you say, in that we still need to know what makes language possible. — Mww

Again, this is not like an "idea", or some other thing, that gets "manifested" in language. Witt's terms "concepts" is just a shorthand grouping our, say, practices, together (like pointing, asking, sitting in a chair, intending, knowing, etc.). They are not (put?) IN language (we could say, maybe, they are expressed by language). "What makes language possible", or, as it were, communication, is the fact that, in each concept, our ways of judging, making distinctions, knowing what counts, how to continue, when to question, etc. are in line with each other (Cavell say "attuned"), as well as everything else in our lives that surround and come before, e.g., believing (as discussed with Creative Soul above).

Concepts, on the other hand, as I’ve hinted before, always originate privately, by the first instance of it, and which usually, but not necessarily, subsequently become public in the communication of it. For which we must fall back on spontaneity....but, so be it? Not many choices in the matter, actually. — Mww

So, again, this is not how Witt uses "concept". And the picture of an idea originating in me which is then "communicated" (as explained through some theory)--or something of that order--is the picture Witt is investigating in PI. That he is trying to get people to see that language is public, is to say we, in a sense, lock ourselves into a public way of expressing (a use of a concept); we give ourselves over to it. Expression is not (always) taking my ..."experience" and putting it into words. Apologizing, threatening, lying, are concepts that make my expressions meaningful, not me.

Rules in the sense I’ve been using, merely indicate a logical significance in accordance with a complementary system, the empirical knowledge of which we have no privilege. It’s the same as, we don’t know why that happened but there must have been a reason for it....this theory doesn’t tell us how this happens but if it wasn’t in conformity to a rule we can say it wouldn’t have happened. — Mww

Well this is a lot, and, as I said, the section on rules in PI is not my strong suit, so I would check that out, or the essay by Cavell. I may review that section and come back to this.

So saying the written word ‘exists’ without us doesn’t tell us exactly what it is that is existing. — Joshs

I thought the argument was clear.

You claimed that standards do not have any existence outside of their use. I argued that they are not always used, despite the fact that they are written. Either written standards do not exist by virtue of being written, or standards have existence outside of their use.

My compliments; a fine sample of proper philosophizing, these last few pages. I could continue to argue almost all of it, but to more spoil your effort than gain from mine. Just as it would have been, were our dialectical roles reversed.

Carry on.

Thank you sir. Always a pleasure.

My point is that there is no such thing as a regulation or principle which governs, that is not explicitly stated. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you saying the dictionary definition is incorrect?

The issue appears to be, that if rules of language use don't exist as an expression of language, then the rules do not exist within the public domain. If they are public, then where else could they exist if not as language? — Metaphysician Undercover

Try these:
Convention_(norm)
Unspoken_rule
Unwritten_rules_of_baseball

So we must turn to the private, internal domain of the individual to find these implicit rules, if they are real. — Metaphysician Undercover

:roll:

Within the internal, private, we find what I called (for lack of a better word) "principles", in my discussion with Josh. The argument is that there is a very significant need to distinguish these private "principles", which serve as some sort of guidance to free willing, intentional choices, and public "rules", which are explicit regulations that govern conduct. The difference is immediately evident in the role of correction. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is meaningless babble.

The hammer is a good example. There are no rules for how to use a hammer, so long as you do not damage private property, or injure someone. — Metaphysician Undercover

There are conventional ways to use a hammer. These conventions are not explicit, but implicit rules. In case you missed it, a rule is "one of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity".

Intention is irrelevant to our disagreement, which is whether or not rules must be made explicit.
— Luke

How is intention irrelevant, when to follow a rule is to intentionally act according to the rule? — Metaphysician Undercover

This was already answered by the quote. Our disagreement is over whether or not rules must be made explicit. You are trying to change the topic.

This is evidence of your delusion. You think that the dictionary definition provides a stated rule for how the word "rule" must be used, and if I step outside the precise boundary of your interpretation of that stated rule, I am necessarily mistaken. — Metaphysician Undercover

There might be no explicit rules for how to use a dictionary or the words it contains. But, then, there are unstated, conventional rules for their uses, including the conventional uses of the word "rule".

It's ironic that you accuse me of drawing precise boundaries. Your attempt to exclude unwritten rules is an attempt to restrict and censor the dictionary definition. Otherwise, by all means, tell me how I've misinterpreted.

199. Is what we call “following a rule” something that it would be possible
for only one person, only once in a lifetime, to do? — And this
is, of course, a gloss on the grammar of the expression “to follow a
rule”.
It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on
which only one person followed a rule. It is not possible that there should
have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order given
or understood, and so on. — To follow a rule, to make a report, to give
an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (usages, institutions).
To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand
a language means to have mastered a technique.

206. Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. One is trained
to do so, and one reacts to an order in a particular way. But what if
one person reacts to the order and training thus, and another otherwise?
Who is right, then?
Suppose you came as an explorer to an unknown country with a language
quite unknown to you. In what circumstances would you say that
the people there gave orders, understood them, obeyed them, rebelled
against them, and so on?
Shared human behaviour is the system of reference by means of which
we interpret an unknown language. — Witt, PI

e.g., believing (as discussed with Luke above) — Antony Nickles

I don't recall having this discussion.

Sorry, I should have went back and checked. It was Creative Soul; I fixed it.

From the Cavell paper "Must We Mean What We say?"...

That what we ordinarily say and mean may have a direct and deep control over what we can philosophically say and mean is an idea which many philosophers find oppressive. It might be argued that in part the oppression results from misunderstanding; that the new philosophy which proceeds from ordinary language is not that different from traditional methods of philosophizing, and that the frequent attacks upon it are misdirected. But I shall not attempt to be conciliatory, both because I think the new philosophy at Oxford is critically different from traditional philosophy, and because I think it is worth trying to bring out their differences as fully as possible. There is, after all, something oppressive about a philosophy which seems to have uncanny information about our most personal philosophical assumptions (those, for example, about whether we can ever know for certain of the existence of the external world, or of other minds; and those we make about favorite distinctions between "the descriptive and the normative", or between matters of fact and matters of language) and which inveterately nags us about them.

Particularly oppressive when that, philosophy seems so often merely to nag and to try no special answers to the questions which possess us — unless it be to suggest that we sit quietly in a room. Eventually, I suppose, we will have to look at that sense of oppression itself: such feelings can come from a truth about ourselves which we are holding off.

I've bolded and italicized the portions above which piqued my interest.

Whether or not we can know for certain of the existence of the external world is the kind of consideration that can only be arrived at via very complex self-referencing language use(metacognition). Ordinary people do not become paralyzed by such contemplations. Ask a non-philosophical thinker whether or not an external worlds exists, or if other people have minds(thoughts, beliefs, and human experiences), and they will surely look at you as if you're mad/crazy/insane, and rightly so, because you are not far from it if you believe that doubting the existence of an external world or other minds is warranted. When such an argument comes from an otherwise seemingly intelligent person, it smacks of dishonesty and/or insincerity.

Sure, there are certainly valid logical arguments that lead to having/holding such doubt. What this shows me, beyond a reasonable doubt, is that an argument can be perfectly valid and false; that validity(coherence) alone is insufficient for truth, and as a result of my knowing that much, validity alone is also insufficient for belief/assent/warrant. Hence, logical possibility alone does not warrant belief.

Who assumes such things to begin with? If the charge is made that I am assuming an external world, I would respond by saying that if it were not for an external world, there could be no such a thing as making a mistake, or being mistaken, or unexpected results/consequences, or being caught off guard, or being pleasantly surprised, or experiencing cognitive dissonance, or being in a state of confusion, etc. I grant the possibility and look to see where it would lead. It leads to claims that are in direct conflict with what happens on an everyday basis. If it were true that there was no such thing as an external world, there could be no such things as just described.

But there are.

And what does it even mean to say that we assume that others have minds? To whom would an author stating such a thing even be talking to? Both of these are laughable questions/consideration; patently absurd on their face. Again, who assumes such a thing? If it were not for other minds, and an external world, there could be no such thing as misunderstanding. There could be no correction thereof. There could be no shared meaning. There could be no language use, etc. It is not that we assume that there is an external world and other minds. To quite the contrary, it's that the existence of an external world including other minds is the only way to make good sense of our own human experience and/or everyday lives.






So...

Cavell actually grants far more than I would to begin with regarding those two, by granting the claim that such things as external worlds and other minds are assumed. Although I do strongly agree with much of the criticism of philosophy that s/he puts forth in the paper(I'm still mulling it over), and I also agree with the idea that philosophical discourse has become so disconnected from the lives of ordinary everyday language use, that's it's become so obtuse to everyday language users, and lost touch with everyday life as a result(and lost it's practical application as well). Such historical philosophical 'problems' have led to the demise of value and respect for philosophy and philosophers. That's a sad situation, given that all governments are based upon considerations about how to best govern a nation of ordinary people, and that is nothing but the moral belief of very few being imbued with legal power to impose those beliefs on the many.

All that being said, I do not think that everyday common language use, is the standard-bearer when it comes to acquiring an adequate understanding or knowledge of the human condition; our own minds; our own capability to form, have, and/or hold thoughts and beliefs; or the ability to have what we call "a human experience".

Common language use is how philosophy began, mind you. To labor the point, I certainly agree that it's gone horribly wrong somewhere along the line. Actually, that's an understatement, because it is my considered opinion that it's gone wrong in several different ways, in several different respects, all of them stemming from not getting our own thought and belief right to begin with.

Attention to the details of cases as they arise may not provide a quick path to an all-embracing system; but at least it promises genuine instead of spurious clarity...

Genuine clarity between and/or regarding what, exactly?

Two problems immediately come to mind. First, there are multiple different accepted uses/senses/definitions of the same term, and not all of them are compatible. We know that much the same thing is true regarding phrases as well. Secondly, we're still left with the need to further discriminate between these distinct uses.




Regarding the first problem...

Looking at common use is a path which arrives at different, accepted but often incompatible, senses of the same term.

Say we find that some native use of the term "believe" is accompanied by doubt. We can recognize some hesitation from the speaker to proclaim assuredness, certainty, or knowledge because we know what it's like to be uncertain. I'm sure most native speakers of an American English dialect would be perfectly capable of making the right sort of sense of someone else saying "I believe so" when the signs of uncertainty appear within their facial expressions and are supported by body language(shoulder shrugging, perhaps). So, we can agree that uncertainty can and does sometimes accompany the native speaker's use of "I believe". However, that's certainly not the only accepted use. There are common ordinary everyday situations where there is no difference of certainty at all in one's use of "I believe", no more certainty; no less certainty; equally on par with "I know", or "I am certain of it". Doubtlessness.

So, this exercise brings us to the crux of both issues. Clearly, instances of native use alone cannot be expected to be used to further discriminate between philosophical notions and native visual dopple-gangers in any meaningful way whatsoever aside from being used to show that there is a difference between them. There's also differences between different ordinary native uses as well. If we throw out the philosophical notions, we would be throwing out one, or several, of many incompatible meanings/senses/uses/definitions, but we would still be left with others. Upon what ground, by what standard are we further discriminating between different uses, aside from some are native, common, everyday uses and some are not?

Reaching a compatibility standard clearly isn't the aim here, nor is eliminating incompatibility. So what does this method provide us with that no other method has been able to? By what measure to we intend to judge which of these terminological uses is worth saving and which deserves forgetting? Which is more valuable to us, as an accounting practice, and how?

By the way, I am impressed by his treatment and discussion about the use of "voluntary" regarding the argument referenced between Ryle and Austin...

I'm still wrapping my head around the three kinds of statements made about ordinary language, and it seems that grasping that is a key part of rightly understanding the methodology.

the abstraction ("divorcing") of statements from their expression removes a context for them, which allows for the creation of criteria for certainty, universality, etc. in general--as in the difference between a "true" (certain, universal) statement and a statement of belief (uncertain, contingent). — Antony Nickles

I had to consciously refrain from criticizing this...

It is one of the historical conventional mistaken practices that paved the way to Gettier; misunderstanding belief, and neglecting to take careful note of the differences I laid out earlier in my refutation of Gettier. It's too tangential for this topic though. So...

I'll leave it here.

True belief statements are true statements. A statement can be certain and false, and uncertain and true. So...

A statement can be certain and false, and uncertain and true. — creativesoul

And? Not....or? For a, re: singular, statement?

Are you saying the dictionary definition is incorrect? — Luke

I'm saying that the the dictionary definition does not qualify as a "rule". Having said that, you can use "rule" however you want, there's no rule telling you how it must be used. But sloppy use of words is conducive to misunderstanding. That's the point. So, we can see that as language evolved, human beings produced rules, logic, and understanding was facilitated.

There are conventional ways to use a hammer. These conventions are not explicit, but implicit rules. In case you missed it, a rule is "one of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity". — Luke

You can insist that "convention" implies "rules being followed", but that's just fallacious logic, unless you define "convention" in a way which only begs the question. The reality of the situation is that "conventional" is used in numerous different ways, and you are arguing by equivocation. Your use is most consistent with my OED definition #6 "following tradition rather than nature". This does not even imply "agreement", as in definition #1. So even to claim that "conventional" as you use it, implies "agreement" is fallacy by equivocation.

Furthermore, if we proceed to assume that "conventional" implies agreement, as your fallacious, deceptive, equivocal argument would lead us to believe, we still must address the fact that "agreement" to a rule does not imply that the rule will be followed. So even if there were agreements concerning how one ought to use a hammer, as the equivocal, argument would imply if it wasn't fallacious, this does not mean that the activity of using a hammer can be described as people adhering to that agreement. This is because people have free will, and they often simply decide not to adhere to their agreements, for various reason. This is a very important part of moral philosophy, there is no necessary relation between agreeing to something, and actually adhering to the agreement, the act of adhering to is completely separate from the act of making an agreement. So when it appears like someone is adhering to an agreement, we cannot conclude that an agreement has been made, because we do not have that logical relation. All we can conclude is that there is an act of "adhering to", but this is completely distinct from making an agreement.

So, we can see two completely different types of fallacies involved in your argument. First there is equivocation in the meaning of "conventional". If we let that get past us, then we have an is/ought separation, whereby "what ought to be" does not necessitate "what is", because people have the freedom to do what they ought not do. So if we work backward, from a description of "what is", in your example, "there are conventional ways to use a hammer", we do not have the necessity required to assert that "what ought to be", in this case an assumed rule of how to use a hammer, has caused this situation of "what is".

This was already answered by the quote. Our disagreement is over whether or not rules must be made explicit. You are trying to change the topic. — Luke

Yes, that describes the disagreement. Intention is relevant because following rules is an intentional activity. I am not changing the subject. There is a very real, and relevant question of how can a person follow a rule if that rule is not explicit. If you want to characterize following-a-rule as something which is not an intentional activity, then it is you who is changing the subject. I suggest that this is the case, you want to change the subject, yet give the new subject the same name. That is done for the purpose of equivocation. The new subject, is perhaps what is named in my OED under the #6 sense of conventional, as "following tradition", and you want to give it the name of "following-a-rule", and I see no other reason for you to be doing this, other than for the purpose of equivocation.

It's ironic that you accuse me of drawing precise boundaries. Your attempt to exclude unwritten rules is an attempt to restrict and censor the dictionary definition. Otherwise, by all means, tell me how I've misinterpreted. — Luke

This is nonsense. How could a dictionary definition qualify as an "unwritten rule"?

I've already explained to you your misinterpretation, but I'll briefly describe it again.. An individual cannot judge oneself to be following a rule, because this just means "I think I am following the rule" which is not necessarily a case of following a rule. Therefore the judgement of whether or not a person follows a rule must be made in reference to the rule as existing in a public setting, not a rule as existing within one's mind. Such a public rule could only exist as expressed in language.

This is explained in the part between 199 and 206 which you left out for some reason:

202. And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one
is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey
a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be
the same thing as obeying it.

You don't seem to be apprehending the significance of this passage, which Banno brought to my attention, (I'll thank him for that), years ago when I debated the private language argument with him at the other forum. Under no circumstances does having a rule within my mind, and believing that I am following that rule, necessitate the conclusion that I am actually following a rule. This means that the rule cannot exist within the mind. If the rule does not exist within the mind, it must exist outside the mind, if there is any such thing as a rule whatsoever. If the rules exist outside the mind, then the only form that they could have, which would be intelligible to us as rules which we could followed, is as expressed in language.

"There is, after all, something oppressive about a philosophy which seems to have uncanny information about our most personal philosophicalassumptions (those, for example, about whether we can ever know for certain of the existence of the external world, or of other minds; and those we make about favorite distinctions between "the descriptive and the normative", or between matters of fact and matters of language) and which inveterately nags us about them."
--Stanley Cavell

Whether or not we can know for certain of the existence of the external world is the kind of consideration that can only be arrived at via very complex self-referencing language use(metacognition). Ordinary people do not become paralyzed by such contemplations. Ask a non-philosophical thinker whether or not an external worlds exists, or if other people have minds(thoughts, beliefs, and human experiences), and they will surely look at you as if you're mad/crazy/insane, and rightly so * * * — creativesoul

I did say OLP was analytical philosophy that worked within the tradition. I've also said that it looks at what we might say at a time and place (in context) to make claims about what the ordinary criteria are (the implications, etc.). It does not speak in "ordinary language", nor is it trying to explain skepticism to lay people.

Such historical philosophical 'problems' have led to the demise of value and respect for philosophy and philosophers. — creativesoul

Traditional philosophy has become irrelevant because people are still applying methods from last century, especially when they think that they aren't or when they think they have moved on from the traditional philosophical issues.

Two problems immediately come to mind. First, there are multiple different accepted uses/senses/definitions of the same term, and not all of them are compatible. We know that much the same thing is true regarding phrases as well. — creativesoul

As I discussed above, Witt will call these the "senses" (as in options) for a concept (like "I know" discussed above), and thus why it is important to fill out a context which differentiates one sense from another. These senses are not endless.

Say we find that some native use of the term "believe" is accompanied by doubt. We can recognize some hesitation from the speaker to proclaim assuredness, certainty, or knowledge because we know what it's like to be uncertain. I'm sure most native speakers of an American English dialect would be perfectly capable of making the right sort of sense of someone else saying "I believe so" when the signs of uncertainty appear within their facial expressions and are supported by body language(shoulder shrugging, perhaps). So, we can agree that uncertainty can and does sometimes accompany the native speaker's use of "I believe". However, that's certainly not the only accepted use. There are common ordinary everyday situations where there is no difference of certainty at all in one's use of "I believe", no more certainty; no less certainty; equally on par with "I know", or "I am certain of it". Doubtlessness. — creativesoul

As Cavell will point out, the examples are not a survey of what people say (sociology as it were), they are examples in a context to make a claim about the criteria that is implied. The claim is to the criteria. Now I think your example is to say sometimes "I believe" is like a guess, "I believe the child is hiding behind the second shrub." (This is the sense that belief is like a hypothesis (from Witt, as I discussed above).) Now I would claim that the criteria of this is not that there is uncertainty in the person, as opposed to a feeling of certainty. What if I say "The child is behind the second shrub" and they are not? Was I not certain? (And I think this is what you mentioned with Gettier.)

Perhaps we can say there is no reason in this case to say "I know"? If I did have a reason--"I just saw them go back there"--but they were not, would we now say you only "believed"? or were just wrong? If I guess, and am right, is there a case where it would matter if I had no reason? At least now, we have some things to discuss and a means for being more specific in cases in order to settle them between us. There are not endless senses, just not "one" (There is also a believing as in hoping). And with these questions we can see maybe that there is more to consider before putting the cart before the horse with a picture of "knowledge" as just opposed to "belief".

Upon what ground, by what standard are we further discriminating between different uses, aside from some are native, common, everyday uses and some are not? — creativesoul

We, you and I, are agreeing on my (universal) claim about the implications when we say "I believe" in a certain context (in a certain sense). This is not judging that one is "common", and one is "not", but agreeing about the criteria for judging it is being used that way (in that "sense"). If you can not see for yourself than either the example is not correct, not detailed enough, etc., but you can make a competing example or bring out different details in a case, claiming different criteria are involved, and thus we have a rational discussion.

I'm still wrapping my head around the three kinds of statements made about ordinary language, and it seems that grasping that is a key part of rightly understanding the methodology. — creativesoul

Yes, this is the part people skip over. It is not making an argument in everyday language (or for it), it is making claims about the criteria (or Grammar) of our concepts. So we take a concept like "believing" and we come up with examples of when we would say "we believe" and then make claims about what the implications would be: the necessary threshold situation that would have to be in place, the consequences, the type of judgements that would follow, the kind of things that would not be said, etc.

I did say OLP was analytical philosophy that worked within the tradition. I've also said that it looks at what we might say at a time and place (in context) to see what the ordinary criteria are (the implications, etc.). It does not speak in "ordinary language", nor is it trying to explain skepticism to lay people. — Antony Nickles

Understood. Never implied otherwise.

Two problems immediately come to mind. First, there are multiple different accepted uses/senses/definitions of the same term, and not all of them are compatible. We know that much the same thing is true regarding phrases as well.
— creativesoul

As I discussed above, Witt will call these the "senses" (as in options) for a concept (like "I know" discussed above), and thus why it is important to fill out a context which differentiates one sense from another. These senses are not endless. — Antony Nickles

Again, understood.

I'm still struggling quite a bit here. I'm trying to wrap my head around what the purpose of this method is? What is achieved? What does it have to do with the historical philosophical problems mentioned in the opening paragraph?

Say we follow the metholodogy to a tee, as precisely as possible. We will arrive at multiple different senses of the same words, each respectively accompanied by their own sets of special circumstances and/or implications(whatever those may be).

What have we done here that is philosophically interesting or relevant aside from parsing out different acceptable uses, albeit in a bit more detail than usual? Surely, this is a method capable of acquiring knowledge about language use, what different people in different situations may or may not mean when they say______. But...

It quite simply cannot be done effectively in an armchair. Can't happen. Sitting around thinking about what other people's use of some word or phrase implies doesn't do anyone much good at all regarding any of the acceptable uses that are unknown to us. It looks like a recipe for some pretentiousness about another's language use.

Ought we not ask others?

By the way, I may have very well misunderstood your response to the bit I offered about "I believe" sometimes being accompanied by uncertainty and sometimes not. To be sure, are you denying that "I believe" can be accompanied by certainty and uncertainty both? Are you denying that "I believe" is sometimes used in a manner that is not a guess?

Whoops. Its been all sides so I might have jumped to that reflexively.

Sitting around thinking about what other people's use of some word or phrase implies doesn't do anyone much good at all regarding any of the acceptable uses that are unknown to us. It looks like a recipe for some pretentiousness about another's language use.

Ought we not ask others? — creativesoul

It is not "other people's use" it is a claim on behalf of everyone. The "we" is all English speakers. I make that claim in the first-person plural (as discussed in the post on objective aesthetics, in Kant's "universal voice" regarding the Beautiful). What is implied when we say/do is justified by your being able to make the same claims, or see for yourself that I am correct. (I feel like there is a sense in which you can hear when it is wrong, but epistemologically this adds nothing.) There is no further justification. Cavell will refer to these insights as "philosophical data" but only when they fully account for everything at issue--they are not just arguments in themselves. I have been trying to focus on the method as I feel the examples are being dismissed or argued with independent of trying to understand the method.

What have we done here that is philosophically interesting or relevant aside from parsing out different acceptable uses, albeit in a bit more detail than usual? — creativesoul

Well the example of Austin's about accidentally and mistakenly (above) is part of seeing that intent (meaning, thought) is not a cause of action/speech. He will use this and a whole mess of other examples to say we only speak of intention when there is something unexpected, inappropriate, etc. to an action in that context: "Did you intend to... ?" There is also the claim (Cavell's) that when we say "I know" (above) it is in one sense an acknowledgment, as part of an argument that knowledge is not the only relation we have to the world and that at a certain point we are left with how we answer to the other's claim on us, that we are responsible to what we have said as it defines us.

By the way, I may have very well misunderstood your response to the bit I offered about "I believe" sometimes being accompanied by uncertainty and sometimes not. To be sure, are you denying that "I believe" can be accompanied by certainty and uncertainty both? Are you denying that "I believe" is sometimes used in a manner that is not a guess? — creativesoul

Yes, Witt's claim is that when we say "I believe" the implication is a hypothesis: "I believe it is going to rain" is, in other words, "My guess is that it is going to rain." Now you can say "I believe the earth is flat", but in this sense, belief is simply a claim to knowledge (as if you just said "The earth is flat"), and knowledge is a different matter. Witt does also talk about a sense of belief as a feeling of confidence or determination, which (grammatically) is expressed: "You're going to make it to the finish line!", i.e., I believe in you. And he does mention that certainty has a similar sense (of a feeling): "I shall [am certain I will] burn by hand if I put it in the fire." PI #474. I didn't think these senses of belief or certainty applied, though Witt also talks about feeling certain (about what time it is) but without any justification, and Cavell discusses whether being (feeling) certain is necessary for a claim to knowledge or not (can't remember how this comes down).

My understanding (though don't hold me to it as I did not prepare to get into a defense of this) is that this is part of Witt's argument that a certain difference between knowledge and opinion ("belief") is created to separate and dismiss certain types of justification in order to maintain certainty, universality and other skeptically-mandated criteria for knowledge. He says that Moore's formulation would be as if two people were speaking out of my mouth PI p. 164; Cavell is more conciliatory and says it would be as if you said "It is raining" to a person on the phone, and then covered it and said "but I don't believe it" to someone else.

Sitting around thinking about what other people's use of some word or phrase implies doesn't do anyone much good at all regarding any of the acceptable uses that are unknown to us. It looks like a recipe for some pretentiousness about another's language use.

Ought we not ask others?
— creativesoul

It is not "other people's use" it is a claim on behalf of everyone. — Antony Nickles

I'm not going to object to the idea that we can acquire knowledge regarding everyone's language use. That is, we can make universal statements about each and every native English speakers' use of "I believe", and those claims about that use can be true of each and every native English speaker. However, it will quite simply not be true if we claim that all native English speakers' use "I believe" in the same way/sense of those words, because they quite clearly do not. Otherwise, we would not have different acceptable senses of the same terms. But we do. So, clearly it is false to say that we(each and every English speaker) uses "I believe" in a manner that implies something about what has not yet happened but is expected to(hypothesis about future events).

Need this be further argued?

I'm not going to object to the idea that we can acquire knowledge regarding everyone's language use. — creativesoul

This would seem to be a kind of census; like linguistic anthropology. We are not "acquiring" knowledge; we already have it from growing up and learning English at the same time. We are just making what is implicit in saying something, explicit. Socrates and others will refer to this as "remembering".

What is implied when we say/do is justified by your being able to make the same claims, or see for yourself that I am correct. — Antony Nickles

We may agree upon specific scenarios/situations/circumstances in which "I believe" implies a guess. That's one language game(Grammar?) involving the use of "I believe". It's not the only one.

We are just making what is implicit in saying something, explicit. — Antony Nickles

Right. Sometimes this is quite unproblematic. Could be trivial even.

However, and this is to further labor the point being made...

If we take the words "I believe", when spoken by someone with unfettered confidence that something just happened, and what immediately follows that particular use of "I believe" is nothing other than a description thereof(a belief statement about what happened), it makes absolutely no sense whatsoever for us to make a universal claim that all English speakers' use of "I believe" implies a hypothesis about future events.

Do you agree?

Are you saying the dictionary definition is incorrect?
— Luke

I'm saying that the the dictionary definition does not qualify as a "rule". — Metaphysician Undercover

That doesn't answer the question. You clearly disagree with the dictionary definition which states that a rule can be either "explicit or understood". You already agreed earlier that our disagreement was over whether or not rules must be made explicit:

This was already answered by the quote. Our disagreement is over whether or not rules must be made explicit. You are trying to change the topic.
— Luke

Yes, that describes the disagreement. — Metaphysician Undercover

If a rule must be made explicit, as you claim, then it cannot also be "explicit or understood" as the dictionary definition states. That is, unless you can explain how "explicit or understood" means only "explicit".

Whether or not the dictionary definition of the word "rule" itself qualifies as a rule is a separate issue to whether or not you believe the dictionary definition is incorrect.

You can insist that "convention" implies "rules being followed", but that's just fallacious logic, unless you define "convention" in a way which only begs the question. The reality of the situation is that "conventional" is used in numerous different ways, and you are arguing by equivocation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I simply posted a link to the Wikipedia article on 'Convention'. I didn't make any argument.

Your use is most consistent with my OED definition #6 "following tradition rather than nature". — Metaphysician Undercover

What do you mean by "Your use"? I posted a link to a Wikipedia article.

This does not even imply "agreement", as in definition #1. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh? What does the OED definition #1 say?

So even to claim that "conventional" as you use it, implies "agreement" is fallacy by equivocation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I haven't made any such claim. You seem to be arguing with the voices in your head.

Furthermore, if we proceed to assume that "conventional" implies agreement, as your fallacious, deceptive, equivocal argument would lead us to believe, we still must address the fact that "agreement" to a rule does not imply that the rule will be followed. So even if there were agreements concerning how one ought to use a hammer, as the equivocal, argument would imply if it wasn't fallacious, this does not mean that the activity of using a hammer can be described as people adhering to that agreement. This is because people have free will, and they often simply decide not to adhere to their agreements, for various reason. This is a very important part of moral philosophy, there is no necessary relation between agreeing to something, and actually adhering to the agreement, the act of adhering to is completely separate from the act of making an agreement. So when it appears like someone is adhering to an agreement, we cannot conclude that an agreement has been made, because we do not have that logical relation. All we can conclude is that there is an act of "adhering to", but this is completely distinct from making an agreement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Don't blow a gasket, sweetheart. I never mentioned the word "agreement".

You asked how can a rule be public if it is not explicitly stated. I indicated my answer by linking to the Wikipedia article on conventions. It appears you do not disagree that conventions are public, nor that conventions are not explicitly stated. Perhaps you disagree that conventions are rules? Your argument appears to be that conventions cannot be rules because it isn't necessary to follow conventions. But how are explicitly stated rules any different in that respect? Rules are made to be broken, as they say.

If there is any sort of agreement in conventions, then "This is not agreement in opinions, but rather in form of life" (PI 241). Google defines "convention" (in the relevant sense) as: "a way in which something is usually done." Is this a rule? Well, I'd say it is "one of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity", so yes.

It's ironic that you accuse me of drawing precise boundaries. Your attempt to exclude unwritten rules is an attempt to restrict and censor the dictionary definition. Otherwise, by all means, tell me how I've misinterpreted.
— Luke

This is nonsense. How could a dictionary definition qualify as an "unwritten rule"? — Metaphysician Undercover

What's nonsense is your relentless twisting of words and meaning. The dictionary definition of the word "rule" states that a rule can be either "explicit or understood". According to your own personal defintion of the word "rule", you want to exclude the "understood" and leave only the "explicit". What this - the agreed-upon subject of our disagreement - has to do with your question is beyond me. I never suggested that an explicitly stated definition qualifies as an "unwritten rule".

What might qualify as unwritten rules here, however, are how we use dictionaries and how we use the words contained within them in terms of writing style, tone of voice, body language, and a host of other things that surround, support and provide sense to explicitly stated language.

I've already explained to you your misinterpretation, but I'll briefly describe it again.. An individual cannot judge oneself to be following a rule, because this just means "I think I am following the rule" which is not necessarily a case of following a rule. Therefore the judgement of whether or not a person follows a rule must be made in reference to the rule as existing in a public setting, not a rule as existing within one's mind. Such a public rule could only exist as expressed in language. — Metaphysician Undercover

There you go again trying to change the subject. Our disagreement, as you agreed, is over the definition of the word "rule" and whether a rule must be explicitly stated or not (in order for it to be a rule). Let's sort out what a rule is first, and then we can discuss rule following. I've offered you a class of examples of an understood, implicit rule in the form of conventions. How are these not rules? And what authority do you have to disagree with the dictionary definition?

This would seem to be a kind of census; like linguistic anthropology. We are not "acquiring" knowledge; we already have it from growing up and learning English at the same time. — Antony Nickles

Well, the claim I'm making is quite a bit more nuanced than that...

We do not have the kind of knowledge about our own minds; about our own thought and belief; about our own imaginings, experience; worldview; about our own operative influences that I'm talking about simply by virtue of growing up and learning English at the same time. If such knowledge acquisition were that easy, none of us would be wrong.

But yes, we certainly do know how to use certain words in certain situations for specific reasons simply by virtue of growing up and learning English at the same time(we learn the Grammar of certain words by learning how to use them at the right time and place for the right reasons).

Indeed. Later OLP understood that it wasn't doing linguistics or sociology. The commentary on ordinary language was from 'within' native knowledge of that language, and so it was neither descriptive nor normative in its claims, but rather acted as a kind of participation, that of a native heir to a tradition, as to what that tradition was, and so was partially criterial for it, but also served as the unearthing of ordinary linguistic knowledge as a kind of 'remembering,' with analogies to Platonic anamnesis. We neither stipulate, nor discover empirically, what we would say; we 'remember' it. There is an affinity here to Chomsky's notion of a native speaker judgment as to the grammaticality of a sentence. It's like telling someone 'these are the steps to the dance.'

That's what separates 'ordinary' language philosophy from the study of language as an empirical science. The ordinary language is ordinary in that the inquiry is conducted by someone who can only inquire because they are, in some sense, already masters of the domain.

I've asked a few different questions, and raised a few different concerns. Do you believe that you've answered and attended to those satisfactorily?

If we take the words "I believe", when spoken by someone with unfettered confidence that something just happened, and what immediately follows that particular use of "I believe" is nothing other than a description thereof(a belief statement about what happened), it makes absolutely no sense whatsoever for us to make a universal claim that all English speakers' use of "I believe" implies a hypothesis about future events. — creativesoul

Well, Wittgenstein comes at it a number of different ways so maybe it is hard to see with just my one example/route, but "it makes absolutely no sense whatsoever"? If to say "I believe it's raining" is not, in a sense, to say "I believe it might be raining, let's check" or "I beliiiieeeve it's raining, I might be wrong" than what are we saying? Does it change it to say someone has "unfettered confidence"? Kinda? It sounds like it could be a bet, even if something happened in the past: "I believe [confidently] the Packers won; $5 says I'm right." But if the Packers did win, it is only that the person was right; and wouldn't we just say they guessed right? And if that is not a hypothesis (guess), what would we say? in what context? It might just be that we are talking about a claim like "I believe that the earth is flat". But, again, we can just say "The earth is flat". If someone questions us, we will have to provide some proof or justification. But this is the grammar of a claim to knowledge.

This [that intent is only asked after something fishy] reminds me of a legal argument. Namely, when the defense argues that the charges presuppose intent, and thus the burden of proof rests upon the shoulders of prosecution to prove the defendant's intent of wrongdoing, or something similar... — creativesoul

And wouldn't it be appropriate to say we are asking about intent because something unexpected happened? And mens rea (intent) can be inferred by actions (without confession) based on circumstances. The point is that we made an assumption thinking that intent (or some other internal placeholder) came before action or expression. And that leads to the question: why do we want (need) there to be internal causality? (There is another occasion where I could say "I intend to go to the market" say to hedge my bets because I'll probably end up at the bar and need an excuse. There are perhaps other senses; do any help us here?)