We do not have the kind of knowledge about our own minds; about our own thought and belief; about our own imaginings, experience; worldview; about our own operative influences that I'm talking about simply by virtue of growing up and learning English at the same time. If such knowledge acquisition were that easy, none of us would be wrong. — creativesoul

Part of what Witt is trying to do is elevate the publicness of our communication. Not to deny that we imagine things or have individual experiences or that we can think to ourselves, but just, to put it roughly, those things are not as important as we think. Not that we don't have misunderstandings, but that it is not a confusion between your meaning and my understanding. The gap is that you and I are separate bodies. If I make an expression, it is through public means, so it is now apart from me, but I still have a future with it. I can answer for any misunderstanding or I can try to wiggle out of it by saying "That's not what I meant." But we can be understood (read) through what we say. As Witt says, sometimes I can know better than you what you are going to do. PI p. 225 Anscombe Ed.

That doesn't answer the question. You clearly disagree with the dictionary definition which states that a rule can be either "explicit or understood". You already agreed earlier that our disagreement was over whether or not rules must be made explicit: — Luke

I thought the implication was clear. That I disagree with a proposed definition does not mean that I think it is incorrect, it simply means that it's not a definition I would use for this purpose.

That is, unless you can explain how "explicit or understood" means only "explicit". — Luke

It's very clear to me, that a rule can only be properly understood if explicit. I asked you for examples otherwise, and you haven't yet produced any. Your examples of habitual behaviour were clearly not instances of understanding a rule. So I'll maintain my proposition as most likely true, until you produce the evidence required to support your dispute.

What do you mean by "Your use"? I posted a link to a Wikipedia article. — Luke

I think you need to pay more attention to what you are saying. Clearly you used "conventional". Here's what you said:

There are conventional ways to use a hammer. These conventions are not explicit, but implicit rules. In case you missed it, a rule is "one of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity". — Luke

Oh? What does the OED definition #1 say? — Luke

We could argue dictionary definitions forever, without getting anywhere, for the simple reason that dictionary definitions do not constitutes rules for usage in natural language use. There are no such rules. And, you are grasping at straws insisting that I must adhere to your dictionary definition, in order to prove that one must follow rules to use language.

Don't blow a gasket, sweetheart. I never mentioned the word "agreement".

You asked how can a rule be public if it is not explicitly stated. I indicated my answer by linking to the Wikipedia article on conventions. It appears you do not disagree that conventions are public, nor that conventions are not explicitly stated. Perhaps you disagree that conventions are rules? Your argument appears to be that conventions cannot be rules because it isn't necessary to follow conventions. But how are explicitly stated rules any different in that respect? Rules are made to be broken, as they say.

If there is any sort of agreement in conventions, then "This is not agreement in opinions, but rather in form of life" (PI 241). Google defines "convention" (in the relevant sense) as: "a way in which something is usually done." Is this a rule? Well, I'd say it is "one of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity", so yes. — Luke

Conventions are agreements, they are not rules. And even if they were, they are not necessarily followed, as I indicated in my last post. We cannot exclude the unconventional as not part of language use.

What's nonsense is your relentless twisting of words and meaning. The dictionary definition of the word "rule" states that a rule can be either "explicit or understood". According to your own personal defintion of the word "rule", you want to exclude the "understood" and leave only the "explicit". — Luke

No, but I'm still waiting for an example of how a rule could be understood which is not explicit. This mode of arguing by dictionary reference really doesn't make any sense. All you need to do, is refer to OED #2, which states "a prevailing custom or standard, the normal state of things.". But all this means, is that you and are are talking about different things, one described by #1, the other described by #2.

You want to talk about the part of language use which conforms to such customs and traditions, I want to talk about the part of language use which is unconventional. The problem is that you don't even recognize the existence of this part, insisting that language use necessarily conforms to such traditions.

Let's sort out what a rule is first, and then we can discuss rule following. — Luke

No, let's not, because we will never sort out "what a rule is". We will not ever sort this out, because it always depends on how the word is used, in context. Otherwise, I will refer to definition #1 "a principle to which an action conforms or is required to conform", and you will refer to definition #2 a prevailing custom or standard; the normal state of things", and we will always disagree as to "what a rule is".

The problem is that you do not seem to apprehend the fact that we cannot use definition #2 when we "discuss rule following". When we say "rule following", definition #1 is implied, not definition #2, because to judge whether a custom or standard, normal state of things is being followed requires that the custom or standard be described in words, and this becomes the "principle" referred to in definition #1.

So, we cannot talk about "rule following", and assume definition #2 without equivocation. Do you agree? And do you agree further, that any sense of "rule following" implies an explicit rule, as the "principle" in definition #1? This is because "rule following" implies a separation between the rule and the activity which is judged to follow the rule, so the rule cannot exist within the activity itself, and must exist somewhere else. Where else could the rule exist if not as expressed in language?

I've asked a few different questions, and raised a few different concerns. Do you believe that you've answered and attended to those satisfactorily?

The approach depends upon a metacognitive endeavor; to make that which remains implicit explicit. Exposing and/or discovering the implicit content of some particular language use is the aim of the OLP endeavor. It is an aim that is satisfied solely by virtue of offering an adequate account thereof.

All accounting practices require something to be taken account of, something to take account of it, a means in order to do so, and a creature capable of doing it.

OLP is taking account of... how it takes account.

The aim is the implicit meaningful content accompanying specific instances of ordinary language use.

A statement can be certain and false, and uncertain and true.
— creativesoul

And? Not....or? For a, re: singular, statement? — Mww

Yes... I left the rest unspoken...

Because some belief statements can be both uncertain and true, and certain but false, it only follows that certainty has nothing at all to do with truth.

The attempt to create a dichotomy between belief and knowledge is asinine. It's akin to creating a dichotomy between an orange and a valencia orange. Knowledge is a kind of belief.

Part of what Witt is trying to do is elevate the publicness of our communication. — Antony Nickles

I've no issue at all with rejecting the idea of private language. To reject private meaning however, shows an inherent inability to take adequate account of language creation and/or acquisition, successful communication, and/or the minds of any and all creatures prior to having done so.

That's unacceptable.

If you could, would you mind revisiting the post where I described Gettier's mistake? Imagine, before you do, that I'm employing a similar approach to OLP. I'm setting out what Smith(anyone and everyone in that same situation) must mean if he's(they are) talking about himself(themselves), which he purportedly is.

Smith believes, for good reason, that he will get the job. Smith does not believe that anyone else but himself will get the job. Smith believes, again for good reason, that Jones owns a Ford. Smith believes "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true, because Jones owns a Ford. Smith does not believe that "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true because Brown is in Barcelona.

Is this not the aim of OLP? To make explicit what is otherwise implicit in some native speakers' language use?

The underlying, unspoken aim is a better account of meaning.

That I disagree with a proposed definition does not mean that I think it is incorrect, it simply means that it's not a definition I would use for this purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

What purpose? There was no purpose. Instead, you made these absolute claims:

All the rules I've ever known have been expressed in language, therefore I think that a rule must be expressed in language. — Metaphysician Undercover

Language allows for the existence of rules, which are expressed via language, and therefore cannot exist without language. — Metaphysician Undercover

You make no mention of context or purpose here. Instead, these are absolute claims regarding all rules.

We will not ever sort this out, because it always depends on how the word is used, in context. Otherwise, I will refer to definition #1 "a principle to which an action conforms or is required to conform", and you will refer to definition #2 a prevailing custom or standard; the normal state of things", and we will always disagree as to "what a rule is". — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a total mischaracterisation. You want to pretend as though my position all along has been that rules can only be non-explicit and that all rules are unwritten? You must be a post-truth philosopher dealing in alternative facts.

It has been your position throughout that a rule can only be explicit. My position, in line with the dictionary definitions, has been that a rule can either be explicit or understood (i.e. explicit or non-explicit).

Now that you have finally acknowledged that a rule can either be explicit or non-explicit, as per your own OED definitions #1 and #2 of the word "rule", then you must also acknowledge what I have been telling you for five pages: a rule does not have to be explicit.

I've asked a few different questions, and raised a few different concerns. Do you believe that you've answered and attended to those satisfactorily? — creativesoul

I've had what seemed like the same objections leveled at OLP a number of times so I may have lost some. There are a few responses after this so maybe those answer some things. I went back over your responses and I found these:

Upon what ground, by what standard are we further discriminating between different uses, aside from some are native, common, everyday uses and some are not? * * * By what measure to we intend to judge which of these terminological uses is worth saving and which deserves forgetting? * * * Which is more valuable to us, as an accounting practice, and how? — creativesoul

We aren't discriminating between "uses"; the examples we imagine are even how they are used in philosophy but they have to be put in a context--which traditional philosophy doesn't do--of when we express our concepts, like "believing", in order to see and claim a description of our ordinary criteria, based only on your agreement, your ability to see for yourself.

Then these claimed criteria of our concepts like thinking, knowing, intending have to account for the issues of the philosophical tradition.

"575. When I sat down on this chair, of course I believed [had the hyposthesis] it would bear me. I had no thought of its possibly collapsing... — Antony Nickles

When one has never even had the thought of the chair collapsing, there could be no possible belief that it would not. Believing a chair will bear our weight is to consider(think about) whether or not it will collapse under our weight, and believing that it will not. That's exactly what having the hypothesis that a chair will bear our weight amounts to.

There's a little irony here, regarding the method I'm using.

We arrive at different acceptable senses of the same term.

Then what?

:brow:

Then these claimed criteria of our concepts like thinking, knowing, intending have to account for the issues of the philosophical tradition. — Antony Nickles

Those who hold that all belief content is propositional are using different senses of the term "belief", ones that cannot possibly take proper account of belief that exists in it's entirety prior to language use unless they somehow attempt to claim that propositions can exist prior to language in such a way so that they can be the content of language-less belief. All propositions are proposed. All propositions require language. Language-less belief cannot. Thus, such a notion(that all belief content is propositional) leads - on pains of coherency alone - to a denial of language-less thought and belief.

Like that?

:wink:

We aren't discriminating between "uses"... — Antony Nickles

Sure we are. It's a bit curious that you'd deny that that's exactly what we're doing.

he examples we imagine are even how they are used in philosophy but they have to be put in a context--which traditional philosophy doesn't do--of when we express our concepts, like "believing"... — Antony Nickles

Concepts...

Muddle on top of misunderstanding.

The approach depends upon a metacognitive endeavor; to make that which remains implicit, explicit. Exposing and/or discovering the implicit content of some particular language use is the aim of the OLP endeavor. It is an aim that is satisfied solely by virtue of offering an adequate account thereof. — creativesoul

I'm not sure what metacognitive means but I don't know how figuring out our ordinary criteria can be considered "meta" if anyone can be the judge. Just because we normally don't think about walking doesn't mean we can't explain the difference between it and running if we think about it. And I wouldn't say "exposing and/or discovering" but remembering or seeing. And the "content" is the "criteria" of "concepts" (both terms of Witt's I have explained above) not "some particular language use". But you are correct that it "is satisfied solely by virtue of offering an adequate account thereof. "Adequate" being to speak for both of us (all of us), for you to see what I see.

All accounting practices require something to be taken account of, something to take account of it, a means in order to do so, and a creature capable of doing it.

Hopefully I've accounted for all of this.
— creativesoul

OLP is taking account of... how it takes account. — creativesoul

It has to account for itself because its method is also a critique of the philosophical tradition. But it is also seeing what counts in our concepts, what matters to us in them.

The aim is the implicit meaningful content accompanying specific instances of ordinary language use. — creativesoul

As I've said above, what is meaningful to us are our shared judgments. This is not an accompaniment or a justification; they are the criteria for our concepts.

Not that we don't have misunderstandings, but that it is not a confusion between your meaning and my understanding — Antony Nickles

A misunderstanding is a lack of shared meaning.

Usually, when one misunderstands another, they've misattributed meaning somewhere along the way. However, in the case of Mrs. Malaprop, understanding another requires misattributing meaning to the speaker's actual words, because those words were misspoken to begin with. Hence, both speaker and listener misattribute meaning to the speakers own words, and successful communication happens despite the speaker's mistaken language use.

I'm not sure what metacognitive means — Antony Nickles

Thinking about thought, belief, and language use as topics and/or subject matters in their own right.

...what is meaningful to us are our shared judgments. — Antony Nickles

That's quite the impoverished notion of what is meaningful to us...

I believe my work is done here.

"575. When I sat down on this chair, of course I believed [had the hyposthesis] it would bear me. I had no thought of its possibly collapsing...
— Antony Nickles

When one has never even had the thought of the chair collapsing, there could be no possible belief that it would not. Believing a chair will bear our weight is to consider whether or not it will collapse under our weight, and believing that it will not. — creativesoul

I think you're right this isn't an instance of believing as hypothesizing. From the paragraph before I think we can infer that Witt is using this as an example of believing as a feeling, like hoping.

"#574 A proposition, and hence in another sense a thought, can be the 'expression' of belief, hope, expectation, etc. But believing is not thinking. (A grammatical remark.) The concepts of believing, expecting, hoping are less distantly related to one another than they are to the concept of thinking."

There are multiple sensible uses of the term "belief". Not everyone knows and/or uses them all. Some of them are in direct conflict with others.

That does not bode well for what you've been arguing here.

Witt is helpful in expanding our understanding of what all goes into some meaningful expression or another. Witt's failures(on my view) are what so many people hold with high regard(the claims about not being able to get beneath language, the limits of one's language is the limits of one's world, and that sort of thing). Those are the sorts of considerations that made it so tempting to link him to folk like Heiddy. Both had a clue of the impact that language has upon one's life and worldview, but Witt's was just an inkling of a clue that could not be developed to the extent that understanding results as a result of his pre-existing beliefs being too unshakable. Heiddy just failed to make much sense because he did not quite have the basics down in order to be able to effectively take proper account of the affects/effects that language use has upon it's users.

Anyway, I'm busy in real life. Sorry if I seem short here, but my full attention is needed elsewhere.

Take care. Be well. Until next time...

:flower:

Then these claimed criteria of our concepts like thinking, knowing, intending have to account for the issues of the philosophical tradition.
— Antony Nickles

Those who hold that all belief content is propositional are using different senses of the term "belief" that cannot possibly take proper account of belief that exists in it's entirety prior to language use. Thus, such a notion leads - on pains of coherency alone - to a denial of language-less thought and belief.

Like that? — creativesoul

Witt will ask, what are we denying? #305-306. Haven't we accounted for language-less belief? "What we deny is that the picture of the inner process gives us the correct idea of the use of the word...."

If you could, would you mind revisiting the post where I described Gettier's mistake? Imagine, before you do, that I'm employing a similar approach to OLP. I'm setting out what Smith(anyone and everyone in that same situation) must mean if he's(they are) talking about himself(themselves), which he purportedly is.

"Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona". — creativesoul

For OLP usually the example is something expressed with a context. When we have something like this, or something like "I only see the appearance of a chair" or "I know that I am in pain!" we try to imagine the context this would go in. With this, say, Jones has a house in Barcelona. We see someone in a Ford drive up to Jones' house and go in. We know Brown owns a Ford, but we didn't think Jones had one, so "Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona." It is a conjecture or hypothesis that one or the other is true. Sure I can have a feeling about it one way or the other, but it will take something else to know if it is true.

I'm not sure what metacognitive means
— Antony Nickles

Thinking about thought, belief, and language use as topics and/or subject matters in their own right. — creativesoul

I discussed this above in looking up the definition of a kayak. That we learn our lives and our language at the same time, so learning about our ordinary criteria is to learn about the world.

There are multiple sensible uses of the term "belief". Not everyone knows and/or uses them all. Some of them are in direct conflict with others. — creativesoul

And here It would seem appropriate to provide some examples of expressions of different senses (uses) of belief that are in direct conflict.

Witt's failures(on my view) are what so many people hold with high regard(the claims about not being able to get beneath language, the limits of one's language is the limits of one's world, and that sort of thing). — creativesoul

If I'm not mistaken, this might be from the Tractatus, which basically walled off a part of the world as unspeakable. He spends the whole of the PI showing that our language operates in different ways as varied as our lives together.

I've no issue at all with rejecting the idea of private language. To reject private meaning however, shows an inherent inability to take adequate account of language creation and/or acquisition, successful communication, and/or the minds of any and all creatures prior to having done so. — creativesoul

I have elsewhere tried to show how "meaning " is part of a picture Witt is trying to unravel, and, in doing so he does account for language acquisition (we learn it as we learn our lives), communication (expression in a shared language), language creation (that our concepts carry into new contexts) and even what we would consider the "mind" (He does not deny it, as I mentioned.). I think it would be easier for me if you just read the thread for those arguments; I was hoping to only explain OLP here. And, spoiler alert; do not read Philosophical Investigations.

What purpose? — Luke

For the purpose of of this philosophical inquiry into the nature of language. How the obvious escapes your apprehension I cannot fathom.

Now that you have finally acknowledged that a rule can either be explicit or non-explicit, as per your own OED definitions #1 and #2 of the word "rule", then you must also acknowledge what I have been telling you for five pages: a rule does not have to be explicit. — Luke

Do you understand equivocation? We cannot use both definitions #1 and #2 for a logical proceeding. We must choose one or the other, or produce another, as required for our purpose.

So, we've been talking about "rule-following". As I explained, this use of "rule" is consistent with definition #1 and not consistent with definition #2. Do you agree that we can move forward with our inquiry by using definition #1, and rejecting definition #2 as irrelevant?

Do you agree that we can move forward with our inquiry by using definition #1, and rejecting definition #2 as irrelevant? — Metaphysician Undercover

There's a delicious irony here: you demonstrate that you have understood my point that a rule can be defined as either #1 or #2 - as explicit or understood - but you refuse to explicitly state that you were wrong. I have no interest in "moving forward" with "our inquiry", thanks.

A statement can be certain and false, and uncertain and true.
— creativesoul

And? Not....or? For a, re: singular, statement?
— Mww

Yes... I left the rest unspoken... — creativesoul

...and I surmise the unspoken part tacitly implies a plurality of subjects expressing the same statement. It remains, nonetheless, that for each subject, his statement can only be judged in accordance with one of the four logical possibilities intrinsic to a matrix with a pair of conceptions and their respective negations.
————-

Because some belief statements can be both uncertain and true, and certain but false, it only follows that certainty has nothing at all to do with truth. — creativesoul

Agreed, in principle, in that certainty is a quality and truth is merely a logical condition. But logical conditions are themselves predicated on a necessary quality, so it seems as if there exists a relation between them. I think the only way your assertion works, is to say my certainty has nothing to do with your truth, and vice versa.
————-

The attempt to create a dichotomy between belief and knowledge is asinine. It's akin to creating a dichotomy between an orange and a valencia orange. Knowledge is a kind of belief. — creativesoul

Attempt to create....agreed. But it doesn’t need any attempt, if it is an intrinsic condition of human cognition itself, in which case it isn’t asinine if it is given necessarily. After all, if it is the case that the human cognitive system is logical, relational and complementary.....there must be dichotomies by the very nature of the system. Or at least dualities. Theoretical as they may be.

Creating a dichotomy between an orange and a valencia orange is absurd, sure, such being reducible to mere experience. Doing that, between oranges, however, is not the same as creating a dichotomy between belief and knowledge.

I take issue with “knowledge is a kind of belief”, while not creating a dichotomy between them. I reject outright the logical validity of knowing and believing the same thing under the same conditions, which makes explicit, under those conditions, knowledge and belief do not share a kind between themselves, but do each partake of an antecedent kind common to both of them, and that is judgement. In other words, knowledge is a kind of judgement, belief is a kind of judgement, but that does not equate to knowledge is a kind of belief.

Minor point of contention on my part.....same as it ever was; I’m with you on most of your responses to Antony, regardless.

Yup. The Kantian difference. Judgement as a talent.

:wink:

Be well.

There's a delicious irony here: you demonstrate that you have understood my point that a rule can be defined as either #1 or #2 - as explicit or understood - but you refuse to explicitly state that you were wrong. I have no interest in "moving forward" with "our inquiry", thanks. — Luke

It appears you never read what I wrote. I repeatedly said that you can use "rule", or define it however you want. There is no rule which dictates how "rule" must be used or defined, that was my argument. You were the one arguing that such rules of usage exist.

The issue though, is that we were discussing a specific context of use, "rule-following". This specified context provides us with limitations.as to how we can accurately interpret "rule". If you now want to argue that you can give "rule" whichever definition you want, #1, #2, or any other random definition, in reference to that particular context in which it has been used, then the actual context of that particular usage gives me grounds to judge your proposal as right or wrong. Notice that I am not referring to a rule to make this judgement, I am referring to the particular context.

I repeatedly said that you can use "rule", or define it however you want. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know about "repeatedly". You didn't say this until the previous page (page 11). Before that, you had made the absolute claims that "a rule must be expressed in language" on page 10, and that "rules cannot exist without language" on page 8.

I should have looked more closely at your #1 and #2 definitions, which I had assumed drew the same distinctions between explicit and non-explicit rules that I was trying to point out to you with the Google definition that I posted earlier. However, this is not the distinction between them. Your #1 definition of rule is: "a principle to which an action conforms or is required to conform". This is very similar to the Google definition, and likewise allows for the principle or rule to be either explicit or non-explicit. I was probably quick to overlook this because your definition #2: "a prevailing custom or standard; the normal state of things" is close to what I had in mind when it comes to non-explicit rules.

There is no rule which dictates how "rule" must be used or defined, that was my argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

This may be the case if you're not concerned with making sense, or if you're Humpty Dumpty.

If you now want to argue that you can give "rule" whichever definition you want, #1, #2, or any other random definition — Metaphysician Undercover

Wait, isn't this your position, which you claim you've "repeatedly said" and which you repeated again at the start of your post? Except, I wouldn't include "any other random definition".

in reference to that particular context in which it has been used, then the actual context of that particular usage gives me grounds to judge your proposal as right or wrong. Notice that I am not referring to a rule to make this judgement, I am referring to the particular context. — Metaphysician Undercover

What do you mean by a "context"? If a context isn't a rule, then you can't mean any of the OED definitions of "rule". Do you think language ever gets used in the context of "a prevailing custom or standard; the normal state of things"? It seems fairly obvious to me that this OED definition #2 of "rule" has at least some part to play in the teaching of language, the meanings of our words, and the contexts in which those words are used.

You were the one arguing that such rules of usage exist. — Metaphysician Undercover

I was trying to say, in accordance with Wittgenstein's view, that grammar is not restricted to explicitly stated language. For Wittgenstein, "grammar consists of the conditions of intelligibility of a language. It is the conventionally-established basis on which we can make sense: 'Grammar consists of conventions' (PG 138), keeping in mind that conventions here are not due to a concerted consensus, but to an unconcerted agreement in practice" (Moyall-Sharrock). This is why I've been arguing that rules can be non-explicit. Rules can be explicitly stated, although they don't have to be. I probably didn't help at all, but I was trying to assist @Antony Nickles in his explanation of the ideas and methods of OLP, which is supposed to be the purpose of this discussion.

139. When someone says the word “cube” to me, for example, I know what it means. But can the whole use of the word come before my mind when I understand it in this way?
Yes; but on the other hand, isn’t the meaning of the word also determined by this use? And can these ways of determining meaning conflict? Can what we grasp at a stroke agree with a use, fit or fail to fit it? And how can what is present to us in an instant, what comes before our mind in an instant, fit a use?
What really comes before our mind when we understand a word? — Isn’t it something like a picture? Can’t it be a picture?
Well, suppose that a picture does come before your mind when you hear the word “cube”, say the drawing of a cube. In what way can this picture fit or fail to fit a use of the word “cube”? — Perhaps you say: “It’s quite simple; if that picture occurs to me and I point to a triangular prism for instance, and say it is a cube, then this use of the word doesn’t fit the picture.” — But doesn’t it fit? I have purposely so chosen the example that it is quite easy to imagine a method of projection according to which the picture does fit after all.
The picture of the cube did indeed suggest a certain use to us, but it was also possible for me to use it differently. — Wittgenstein, PI