I am not an event, right? Events are events. Objects are objects. Big difference. All you're doing is pointing to events and pointing out that they have causes. Which is not something I dispute. — Bartricks
We would satisfy the negative condition if we are uncaused causers - that is, if we are prime movers. — Bartricks
Yes really. And hopefully the mods. — khaled
I assumed this meant "uncaused" as in "nothing caused its creation". — khaled
But no apparently the creation of something can be caused by external factors, yet the thing can still be an "uncaused mover". — khaled
You accused me - falsely - of committing fallacies. — Bartricks
If an object has been created by something external to it, then even though that object may well be able to cause events to occur without being directly caused to do so, the simple fact is that its existence traces to external causes and so the condition on responsibility will not be satisfied if we are objects of that kind. — Bartricks
To satisfy the condition on moral responsibility we would need to be objects that have not been created. — Bartricks
As it is metaphysically possible for us to be such objects — Bartricks
But I didn’t attack you personally did I? — khaled
And aren’t you an object of that kind? — khaled
Your parents, and whatever factors influenced their decision to have you are all external to you. — khaled
I have yet to see a human that was uncaused. So I don’t understand what you mean here. If a mind exists uncaused it’s definitely not a human mind. — khaled
2. I am morally responsible — Bartricks
I have epistemic reason to believe I am and none to believe I am not. — Bartricks
But when it comes to establishing that a proposition (in this case that we are morally responsible) is true, the most we can do is establish that there is powerful epistemic reason to believe the proposition is true, and no epistemic reason to think it is false. — Bartricks
I have epistemic reason to believe I am (morally responsible) and none to believe I am not. — Bartricks
Yes, and I have not disputed that. But it is a conventional belief - and not a truth of reason - that we are our sensible bodies — Bartricks
Thus, though my sensible body was created, I was not and thus I am not my sensible body. — Bartricks
Imagine that punishing Jane for a crime you know she did not commit would nevertheless be extremely helpful and deter others from committing such crimes (for everyone else is convinced Jane did it). Well, even if it is overall justified to punish Jane, it is quite obvious that she will have been dealt an injustice.
Why? Because she doesn't 'deserve' to be punished.
Moral responsibility is not an 'idea'. It is something we have an idea 'of'. That doesn't mean it's an idea. I have an idea of you. That doesn't mean you are an idea. Yet that is how you are reasoning, yes? We have an idea of moral responsibility, therefore moral responsibility is an idea? If that's not the fallacious basis upon which you've come to your now no doubt irrevocable conclusion, kindly provide the valid means by which you did so. — Bartricks
As I understand you use “We are uncaused movers” to show that we are morally responsible. — khaled
Yes and I’ve asked a while ago what you mean by “uncaused” if not that your physical bodies are uncaused. You didn’t reply so I assumed that’s what you meant. Apparently not. — khaled
But was your creation not caused by the creation of your sensible body? — khaled
If you wish to dispute this you’d have to show a “person” that doesn’t have a body. A tall order. — khaled
On the other hand we know when certain things happen to the body “You” no longer exist. So that provides evidence that “You” require your body to exist. Or do we disagree there too? — khaled
If something is "quite obvious", does that mean it is no longer possible for it to exist only as a judgement? — Judaka
Even a dog or a chimp will become irate if it believes it has been treated unfairly. — Judaka
I see moral responsibility as a judgement made by an intelligent being because it only exists as something asserted by an intelligent being. — Judaka
Where else can we see moral responsibility? If there is a circumstance where it's more than an idea then where can someone see it? — Judaka
I see moral responsibility as a judgement made by an intelligent being because it only exists as something asserted by an intelligent being. — Judaka
No. The opposite! We are morally responsible, therefore we are uncreated things. — Bartricks
I have argued that moral responsibility requires being an uncreated thing, right? — Bartricks
1. If I am morally responsible, then I am an uncreated thing — Bartricks
2. I am morally responsible. — Bartricks
But Strawson is not right - or so I have argued — Bartricks
a) our reason represents us to be and b) it is possible for us to be. — Bartricks
Am I a created thing? No. — Bartricks
Why mention strawson at all then? — khaled
Well you’ve argued that being an uncreated being is sufficient for moral responsibility as far as I can tell. — khaled
However, I think he hasn't because there isn't really any evidence that you need positively to have created yourself in order to be morally responsible for what you are subsequently caused to do. What we have evidence for is a negative condition: that you need 'not' to have been created by alien forces. After all, if - per impossible - we did create ourselves from nothing, the reason that would make us in principle capable of being morally responsible for what we subsequently do is surely because under such circumstances nothing outside of ourselves would be responsible for us being how we are. So, the plausibility of Strawson's positive condition rests on the more fundamental negative condition: that to be morally responsible for how you are, you need 'not' to be a product of forces that have nothing to do with you. — Bartricks
But that’s a technicality since the alternative is impossible. — khaled
The rest, I shall charitably assume, is you being obtuse for the purpose of some kind of sadistic amusement. — Bartricks
“It is possible and it seems to be the case so it must be the case” Is a weak argument. — khaled
This also applies to having children being correct. Possible, metaphysically. Also what our reason represents to us (at least, demonstrably what most people’s reason represents to them). Does that make it the case? Or are you going to say that our reason does not represent to us that having children is ok? — khaled
So what the heck is this “You” exactly? — khaled
What you did was show that it is sufficient. But then since the only other alternative is impossible it becomes necessary. — khaled
So what the heck is this “You” exactly? — khaled
No. I said that if we are prime movers then we have what is 'in principle' needed to be morally responsible. — Bartricks
Once more: saying 'this is needed for moral responsibility' is not equivalent to saying 'this is sufficient for moral responsibility'. — Bartricks
“It is possible and it seems to be the case so it must be the case” Is a weak argument. — khaled
So what the heck is this “You” exactly?
— khaled
Me. — Bartricks
So he's talking about being responsible in a 'retributivist' sense. — Bartricks
I understand. — khaled
Ok. How do you then get premise 2? Because
“It is possible and it seems to be the case so it must be the case” Is a weak argument.
— khaled — khaled
Any other properties? Is it physical? What happens to it after its body dies? Etc — khaled
The best evidence one can ever have for anything is powerful epistemic reason to think that it is the case and none to think that it isn't. Right? — Bartricks
Antinatalists accept that they have the burden of proof and then they seek to discharge it. — Bartricks
I don't know what will happen to me after my sensible body dies. But it seems likely something very bad awaits us after our sensible bodies die, for our reason tells us to do pretty much all we can to avoid sensible death unless we are in absolute agony. So, that suggests - but doesn't entail - that what awaits us after our sensible demise is worse than here, but not absolute agony. — Bartricks
Okay. Now, we have extremely powerful epistemic reason to think we're morally responsible. Billions - I mean, literally billions - of people have rational intuitions that represent themselves and others to be morally responsible — Bartricks
Well done for not addressing anything in the OP. — Bartricks
Do you agree with Strawson and myself that if one is in no way morally responsible for A, and in no way morally responsible for B, and A and B are wholly causally responsible for C, then one is in no way morally responsible for C? — Bartricks
I have some slight suspicion that your congratulations are not sincere, and yet - I accept your congratulations sincerely because I am a philosopher, and as such can only respond in my own terms, in reference to my tradition. — counterpunch
.I am a philosopher, and as such can only respond in my own terms, in reference to my tradition. — counterpunch
If you demand I respond directly to the OP - I can, but only to point out that there you said Strawson is wrong, and now you say:
Do you agree with Strawson and myself that if one is in no way morally responsible for A, and in no way morally responsible for B, and A and B are wholly causally responsible for C, then one is in no way morally responsible for C?
— Bartricks — counterpunch
Problem is, you don’t actually specify in any way what this “uncaused mover” does or how it works. — khaled
Erm, Strawson thinks more than one thing. — Bartricks
Do you agree with Strawson and myself that if one is in no way morally responsible for A, and in no way morally responsible for B, and A and B are wholly causally responsible for C, then one is in no way morally responsible for C? — Bartricks
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