I am not an event, right? Events are events. Objects are objects. Big difference. All you're doing is pointing to events and pointing out that they have causes. Which is not something I dispute. — Bartricks

First off, what exactly does it mean to you for an object to be "uncaused". You argue that:

We would satisfy the negative condition if we are uncaused causers - that is, if we are prime movers. — Bartricks

I assumed this meant "uncaused" as in "nothing caused its creation". Something like God. But no apparently the creation of something can be caused by external factors, yet the thing can still be an "uncaused mover". So what the heck does "uncaused" mean here? What would be a "caused" mover be if even when the object's creation is due to factors that have nothing to do with it, it is still apparently an "uncaused mover"?

Yes really. And hopefully the mods. — khaled

Stop being such a snowflake. You accused me - falsely - of committing fallacies while committing at least one yourself.

I assumed this meant "uncaused" as in "nothing caused its creation". — khaled

Yes, that's what it means. Some objects exist and have not been caused to exist. And some objects can cause events to occur without having been caused to do so. We can know this by rational reflection.

If we ourselves are objects of such a kind, then our decisions will not trace exclusively to external causes. And, as such, we would then be capable of being morally responsible.

But no apparently the creation of something can be caused by external factors, yet the thing can still be an "uncaused mover". — khaled

I haven't the faintest idea how you have reached that conclusion. That's not my view. If an object has been created by something external to it, then even though that object may well be able to cause events to occur without being directly caused to do so, the simple fact is that its existence traces to external causes and so the condition on responsibility will not be satisfied if we are objects of that kind.

To satisfy the condition on moral responsibility we would need to be objects that have not been created. As it is metaphysically possible for us to be such objects - for such objects clearly exist as events could not occur without them, and what is actually the case is also possibly the case - then Strawson is wrong in thinking that it is impossible for anyone to be morally responsible.

You accused me - falsely - of committing fallacies. — Bartricks

But I didn’t attack you personally did I?

If an object has been created by something external to it, then even though that object may well be able to cause events to occur without being directly caused to do so, the simple fact is that its existence traces to external causes and so the condition on responsibility will not be satisfied if we are objects of that kind. — Bartricks

And aren’t you an object of that kind? Your parents, and whatever factors influenced their decision to have you are all external to you. So even though you will be able to cause events to occur without being directly caused to do so, the simple fact is that your existence traces to external causes and so the condition on responsibility will not be satisfied if you are an object of that kind.

To satisfy the condition on moral responsibility we would need to be objects that have not been created. — Bartricks

But we are so too bad.

As it is metaphysically possible for us to be such objects — Bartricks

I have yet to see a human that was uncaused. So I don’t understand what you mean here. If a mind exists uncaused it’s definitely not a human mind.

But I didn’t attack you personally did I? — khaled

Nor I you. If you accuse someone of committing fallacies when they are clearly not - which is, incidentally, to accuse someone of reasoning badly - then you should expect to be told that you are reasoning badly if you yourself are committing fallacies.

And aren’t you an object of that kind? — khaled

Again with the bad reasoning. The following argument is not fallacious:

1. If I am morally responsible, I am an uncreated thing
2. I am morally responsible
3. Therefore, I am an uncreated thing

I have provided an argument in support of 1. To be morally responsible - as Strawson agrees - it needs to be the case that one's decisions do not trace to exclusively external causes. The only way that condition can be satisfied is if I am an uncreated thing. So, 'if' I am morally responsible, then I am an uncreated thing.

I am morally responsible - or at least, I have epistemic reason to believe I am and none to believe I am not. So premise 2 is true beyond a reasonable doubt. The conclusion follows as a matter of logic.

So, by simply asserting that I am not an uncreated thing you are committing another fallacy - the fallacy of begging the question.

Your parents, and whatever factors influenced their decision to have you are all external to you. — khaled

Yes, and I have not disputed that. But it is a conventional belief - and not a truth of reason - that we are our sensible bodies. That's just the view of the current age, not evidence that it is true. Philosophy is about figuring out what's true, it is not about just parroting what's conventionally believed.

So, my sensible body appears to be a created thing. i seem to have good evidence that it came into being at a certain time, and that before that time it was not around.

I also have evidence that I am an uncreated thing.

Therefore, the evidence that I am an uncreated thing is also evidence that I am not a sensible thing.

Thus, though my sensible body was created, I was not and thus I am not my sensible body.

Not a conventional view at the moment, but so what?

I have yet to see a human that was uncaused. So I don’t understand what you mean here. If a mind exists uncaused it’s definitely not a human mind. — khaled

You're just not following the argument. Yes, human bodies - sensible bodies - seem to be created things. Not in dispute. We have empirical evidence that it is true.

Don't just assume that you are your sensible body. You don't have any evidence for that. You have evidence that you 'have' a sensible body. But that is not evidence that you 'are' a sensible body. I have a car. I am not a car. I have a house. I am not a house. And so on. I have a sensible body. Am I my sensible body?

It would seem not. I have prima facie evidence I am morally responsible, for my reason represents me to be and I shouldn't just ignore what my reason says arbitrarily. I have prima facie evidence that moral responsibility requires being an uncreated thing, for reasons already gone through at length above. I have prima facie evidence that this is a valid argument:

1. If I am morally responsible, I am an uncreated thing
2. I am morally responsible
3. Therefore, I am an uncreated thing

I therefore have good evidence that I am an uncreated thing.

I have good evidence my sensible body is a created thing.

I have good evidence that this is a valid argument:

1. If I am my sensible body, then I am a created thing
2. I am not a created thing
3. Therefore I am not my sensible body.

So, I have good evidence that I am an uncreated thing and, as such, not my sensible body.

That's not a conventional belief. So what?

2. I am morally responsible — Bartricks

Is question begging no? Not for the purposes of proving that we are uncreated or whatever, but for the purposes of proving that we are morally responsible. As I understand you use “We are uncaused movers” to show that we are morally responsible.

I have epistemic reason to believe I am and none to believe I am not. — Bartricks

So your argument for:

But when it comes to establishing that a proposition (in this case that we are morally responsible) is true, the most we can do is establish that there is powerful epistemic reason to believe the proposition is true, and no epistemic reason to think it is false. — Bartricks

Relies on the premise that:

I have epistemic reason to believe I am (morally responsible) and none to believe I am not. — Bartricks

?

Yes, and I have not disputed that. But it is a conventional belief - and not a truth of reason - that we are our sensible bodies — Bartricks

Yes and I’ve asked a while ago what you mean by “uncaused” if not that your physical bodies are uncaused. You didn’t reply so I assumed that’s what you meant. Apparently not.

Thus, though my sensible body was created, I was not and thus I am not my sensible body. — Bartricks

I never claimed you were. But was your creation not caused by the creation of your sensible body? I am not saying they are the same. I am saying the former is caused by the latter. If you wish to dispute this you’d have to show a “person” that doesn’t have a body. A tall order.

On the other hand we know when certain things happen to the body “You” no longer exist. So that provides evidence that “You” require your body to exist. Or do we disagree there too?

Imagine that punishing Jane for a crime you know she did not commit would nevertheless be extremely helpful and deter others from committing such crimes (for everyone else is convinced Jane did it). Well, even if it is overall justified to punish Jane, it is quite obvious that she will have been dealt an injustice.
Why? Because she doesn't 'deserve' to be punished.
Moral responsibility is not an 'idea'. It is something we have an idea 'of'. That doesn't mean it's an idea. I have an idea of you. That doesn't mean you are an idea. Yet that is how you are reasoning, yes? We have an idea of moral responsibility, therefore moral responsibility is an idea? If that's not the fallacious basis upon which you've come to your now no doubt irrevocable conclusion, kindly provide the valid means by which you did so. — Bartricks

If something is "quite obvious", does that mean it is no longer possible for it to exist only as a judgement? It does mean something but not that. There is a biological basis for concepts such as "fairness" understood by many creatures less intelligent than us. Even a dog or a chimp will become irate if it believes it has been treated unfairly. However, that is based on their perspective, it is just their idea that they've been treated unfairly, we don't have to agree. Our uniformity, where we all agree that Jane has been treated unfairly can be explained in this alternative way, our shared biology. It is not evidence that moral responsibility exists as something more than a perspective.

I see moral responsibility as a judgement made by an intelligent being because it only exists as something asserted by an intelligent being. Where else can we see moral responsibility? If there is a circumstance where it's more than an idea then where can someone see it?

As I understand you use “We are uncaused movers” to show that we are morally responsible. — khaled

No. The opposite! We are morally responsible, therefore we are uncreated things.

I have argued that moral responsibility requires being an uncreated thing, right? That's the first leg. That's the important leg - it's the part where I disagree with, and hopefully refute Strawson.

That leg establishes the truth of this premise:

1. If I am morally responsible, then I am an uncreated thing

Am I morally responsible? Well, I now have every reason to think I am - for my reason represents me to be - and no reason to think I am not. If you think otherwise, you need to show some fault in the first leg.

So, this premise is now one I have every reason to think is true, and none to think is false:

2. I am morally responsible.

From which it follows

3. I am an uncreated thing.

This isn't hard. If Strawson was right, then we had excellent reason to think that we are not morally responsible. For if it is not possible to be morally responsible, then we're obviously not morally responsible and that our reason says otherwise would have to be deemed an occasion where our reason lets us down.

But Strawson is not right - or so I have argued - and thus we do now have excellent reason to think that we are morally responsible, for a) our reason represents us to be and b) it is possible for us to be.

Yes and I’ve asked a while ago what you mean by “uncaused” if not that your physical bodies are uncaused. You didn’t reply so I assumed that’s what you meant. Apparently not. — khaled

Are you being obtuse or is English not your first language? I can't take seriously that you are failing to understand this. I did reply - I said that my sensible body appears to have been caused to exist.

I have not been caused to exist.

My sensible body has.

I have not.

My sensible body has.

Am I a created thing? No.

Is my sensible body? Yes.

Clear enough for you?

But was your creation not caused by the creation of your sensible body? — khaled

Er, no. I will try and express it in a way you can understand. "I is uncreated thing. Body is created thing. I not be created. Body created. I not be. Body is be. I not be body be."

If you wish to dispute this you’d have to show a “person” that doesn’t have a body. A tall order. — khaled

No. Just no.

On the other hand we know when certain things happen to the body “You” no longer exist. So that provides evidence that “You” require your body to exist. Or do we disagree there too? — khaled

Christ.

If something is "quite obvious", does that mean it is no longer possible for it to exist only as a judgement? — Judaka

If strawberries taste nice, does that mean I own a mercedes?

Even a dog or a chimp will become irate if it believes it has been treated unfairly. — Judaka

So? I don't think any premise of my argument mentioned irate chimps or dogs. All it does is suggest that dogs and chimps recognise that they deserve things - that is, that dogs and chimps have a rudimentary faculty of reason and recognise that others are morally responsible for their behaviour and owe them certain kinds of respect and so on. It doesn't address anything in my argument or Strawson's.

I see moral responsibility as a judgement made by an intelligent being because it only exists as something asserted by an intelligent being. — Judaka

And I think that's confused nonsense.

You're confusing beliefs with their objects. I believe I am sat on a chair. that doesn't mean that chairs are beliefs, right?

I believe I am morally responsible.

That doesn't mean moral responsibility is a belief.

Note, this thread is not about what moral responsibility 'is'. That's a topic in metaethics. (Your view is thoroughly confused - and you've arrived at it via fallaciously - but that's beside the point). This thread is about what's needed to be morally responsible. Strawson thinks you need to be a self-creator. I think you just need to be uncreated.

Where else can we see moral responsibility? If there is a circumstance where it's more than an idea then where can someone see it? — Judaka

Where can you 'see' moral responsibility? In the cabinet between love and numbers.

We are not mere robots, with pre-programmed characters resulting in unexamined behaviours. Doing anything requires thought, and an effort of will. We are imbued with a moral sense - informed by inter-subjectivity and empathy, that must be aware, in some degree - of the rightness or wrongness of the actions that we think about, decide upon and commit. Or don't - because that would be wrong. We have a choice, and that's what makes us responsible.

I see moral responsibility as a judgement made by an intelligent being because it only exists as something asserted by an intelligent being. — Judaka

The keyword here is only, does a chair only exist as a belief? No, a chair is a physical object that can be touched and seen. When we are dealing with metrics like these, the way we prove the existence of chairs is simple. I gave the examples of dogs and chimps to hypothesise that the uniformity in our moral judgements is likely due to our shared biology. It is not because Jane is factually lacking in moral responsibility and everyone can just see the truth.

You would likely not agree with the ideas about what people should accept moral responsibility for which existed hundreds or thousands of years ago. Based on that trend, people will not agree with how you see moral responsibility in a hundred or hundreds of years in the future. Even when your obvious goes against the beliefs of other cultures and people, where does your confidence come from? If we took ten people who had views identical about the objectivity of morality, from different places around the world, at different times, you'd all disagree with each other. Do you even deny that?

No. The opposite! We are morally responsible, therefore we are uncreated things. — Bartricks

So... all you argue is that we are uncreated things? You don’t actually argue about whether or not we are morally responsible? That’s just a given?

Why mention strawson at all then?

I have argued that moral responsibility requires being an uncreated thing, right? — Bartricks

Well you’ve argued that being an uncreated being is sufficient for moral responsibility as far as I can tell. But that’s a technicality since the alternative is impossible.

1. If I am morally responsible, then I am an uncreated thing — Bartricks

Or you somehow created yourself but that makes no sense.

2. I am morally responsible. — Bartricks

You just assume this. And you do so to reach the conclusion that we are uncreated things (whatever that means). Again, why mention strawson at all if you’re not even going to argue that we are morally responsible, just that we are uncreated.

But Strawson is not right - or so I have argued — Bartricks

What you have argued is really only premise 1. That is, one of the ways to be morally responsible is to be an uncaused mover. I don’t think anyone would disagree with this. The other way is to somehow cause yourself but that is impossible (because it makes no sense). And then you use this to say that we are uncaused movers based on the assumption that we are morally responsible.

You have not argued that people have a moral responsibility. You’ve assumed it. When you title your post “Strawson and the impossibility of moral responsibility” and you conclude he’s wrong I assumed that you meant he is wrong about us not being morally responsible. But that’s not what you show. All you show is that we are uncaused movers based on the assumption that we are morally responsible. You do not justify or argue for this assumption. You just deem it obvious.

a) our reason represents us to be and b) it is possible for us to be. — Bartricks

“It is possible and it seems to be the case so it must be the case” Is a weak argument. Sure we shouldn’t dismiss our intuitions, but saying that X is the case because it is possible for X to be the case and X seems to be the case is not very convincing in a debate about whether or not X is the case.

This also applies to having children being correct. Possible, metaphysically. Also what our reason represents to us (at least, demonstrably what most people’s reason represents to them). Does that make it the case? Or are you going to say that our reason does not represent to us that having children is ok?

Am I a created thing? No. — Bartricks

Ok so you are not a created thing. “You” also seem to be unaffected by what happens to your body (since when I suggest that “you” cease to exist upon death or blackout you don’t like that)

So what the heck is this “You” exactly? A ghost? It is completely unaffected by the body, and uncaused by it. Yet it somehow affects it.

What happens to “You” after you die do you think?

And what are the physical implications of “You”. It is a mover yes? So it can exert some force on the physical world? (Otherwise it would just be obsolete and not a mover). So how do you explain that in the context of our understanding of physics? Are you going to propose that within a human body it is possible to detect spontaneous, uncaused forces or current that are caused by “You”?

Why mention strawson at all then? — khaled

See the OP.

Well you’ve argued that being an uncreated being is sufficient for moral responsibility as far as I can tell. — khaled

No, my arguments imply that it is 'necessary' not that it is sufficient. It is your poor reasoning skills - your tendency to commit the fallacy of affirming the consequent - that convinces you otherwise.

The rest, I shall charitably assume, is you being obtuse for the purpose of some kind of sadistic amusement.

I am afraid that I do not understand what you are saying or how it relates to anything I have argued.

However, I think he hasn't because there isn't really any evidence that you need positively to have created yourself in order to be morally responsible for what you are subsequently caused to do. What we have evidence for is a negative condition: that you need 'not' to have been created by alien forces. After all, if - per impossible - we did create ourselves from nothing, the reason that would make us in principle capable of being morally responsible for what we subsequently do is surely because under such circumstances nothing outside of ourselves would be responsible for us being how we are. So, the plausibility of Strawson's positive condition rests on the more fundamental negative condition: that to be morally responsible for how you are, you need 'not' to be a product of forces that have nothing to do with you. — Bartricks

What you did was show that it is sufficient. But then since the only other alternative is impossible it becomes necessary.

As I said:

But that’s a technicality since the alternative is impossible. — khaled

The rest, I shall charitably assume, is you being obtuse for the purpose of some kind of sadistic amusement. — Bartricks

Charitably? Sadistic? Amusement??????

None of those applies.

“It is possible and it seems to be the case so it must be the case” Is a weak argument. — khaled

This also applies to having children being correct. Possible, metaphysically. Also what our reason represents to us (at least, demonstrably what most people’s reason represents to them). Does that make it the case? Or are you going to say that our reason does not represent to us that having children is ok? — khaled

So what the heck is this “You” exactly? — khaled

What you did was show that it is sufficient. But then since the only other alternative is impossible it becomes necessary. — khaled

No. I said that if we are prime movers then we have what is 'in principle' needed to be morally responsible. That doesn't mean that it is 'sufficient' for moral responsibility. Once more: saying 'this is needed for moral responsibility' is not equivalent to saying 'this is sufficient for moral responsibility'. (Strawson isn't talking about what's sufficient either).

So what the heck is this “You” exactly? — khaled

Me.

No. I said that if we are prime movers then we have what is 'in principle' needed to be morally responsible. — Bartricks

I understand.

Once more: saying 'this is needed for moral responsibility' is not equivalent to saying 'this is sufficient for moral responsibility'. — Bartricks

Ok. How do you then get premise 2? Because

“It is possible and it seems to be the case so it must be the case” Is a weak argument. — khaled

And it also applies to having children.

First leg, and something I think anyone can agree on:

1- If we need not concern ourselves with the well-being of people who are not born yet, having children is ok.

Is having children ok? Well, I now have every reason to think it is - for my reason represents it to be ok - and no reason to think it is not ok. If you think otherwise, you need to show some fault in the first leg.

2- Having children is ok.

3- We need not concern ourselves with the well-being of people who are not born yet.

See the problem? It is in deriving premise 2. It just doesn’t follow that “it is possible and it seems to be the case so it must be the case”. Which then leads to a conclusion that is probably false.

So what the heck is this “You” exactly?
— khaled

Me. — Bartricks

Any other properties? Is it physical? What happens to it after its body dies? Etc

A question for all parties.
Moral Responsibility

So he's talking about being responsible in a 'retributivist' sense. — Bartricks

Every voluntary action that a person takes (so excluding breathing, sleeping, etc) has some measurable impact on the physical world - however minimal. Are there other categories of responsibility that are non-retributive in nature?

Well done for not addressing anything in the OP.

Do you agree with Strawson and myself that if one is in no way morally responsible for A, and in no way morally responsible for B, and A and B are wholly causally responsible for C, then one is in no way morally responsible for C?

I understand. — khaled

Hmm....

Ok. How do you then get premise 2? Because

“It is possible and it seems to be the case so it must be the case” Is a weak argument.
— khaled — khaled

It's not a weak argument at all. You really don't seem to understand the dialectic here. The best evidence one can ever have for anything is powerful epistemic reason to think that it is the case and none to think that it isn't. Right?

Okay. Now, we have extremely powerful epistemic reason to think we're morally responsible. Billions - I mean, literally billions - of people have rational intuitions that represent themselves and others to be morally responsible. There's about as much evidence that we're morally responsible as there is that there are trees.

Strawson's argument - if it worked - would have been a source of countervailing epistemic reasons. So, Strawson's argument - if it worked - would have raised a reasonable doubt about whether we really are morally responsible.

It doesn't work. So now the way is clear - we have powerful epistemic reason to believe we are morally responsible and no epistemic reason to think otherwise.

I don't know why you keep drawing a parallel with antinatalism. Nobody - including prominent antinatalists - denies that the antinatalist conclusion is counter-intuitive on its face. Antinatalists accept that they have the burden of proof and then they seek to discharge it.

Any other properties? Is it physical? What happens to it after its body dies? Etc — khaled

It's not 'it'. It's 'me'.

No,I don't appear to be a physical thing - I, the morally responsible thing, appear not to be my sensible body. And if you believe sensible bodies are physical bodies, then I appear not to be a physical body. Physical bodies - if any exist - are the kinds of thing that come into being. That is, they don't seem to exist uncreated. So, given that I appear to exist uncreated, I appear not to be a physical thing.

I don't know what will happen to me after my sensible body dies. But it seems likely something very bad awaits us after our sensible bodies die, for our reason tells us to do pretty much all we can to avoid sensible death unless we are in absolute agony. So, that suggests - but doesn't entail - that what awaits us after our sensible demise is worse than here, but not absolute agony.

The term 'moral responsibility' has at least two distinct meanings. Sometimes it is used to denote 'being a moral agent' - that is, being someone who has moral obligations. So, I am 'morally responsible' in that sense of the term just if I am someone who is subject to moral obligations.

Then there's 'moral responsibility' in the 'desert' or 'retributivist' sense used by Strawson and most others working on the issue of free will. Here is denotes the idea that we can, in principle, be deserving of benefit or harm depending on how we have behaved. That's why it is associated with free will.

It is entirely possible for someone to defend the idea that we are morally responsible in the first sense, yet deny that we are morally responsible in the second. There are some moral theories that actually entail this, such as utilitarianism. This is because the desert-based notion of moral responsibility is essentially deontological. If you deserve to come to harm, then it is good if you come to harm even if no benefit accrues from the harm being visited on you. So, what one deserves in terms of retribution is a function of what one has done, rather than a function of the consequences of giving it to you.

The best evidence one can ever have for anything is powerful epistemic reason to think that it is the case and none to think that it isn't. Right? — Bartricks

But there is plenty to think it isn’t.

Antinatalists accept that they have the burden of proof and then they seek to discharge it. — Bartricks

And Strawson accepts that he has burden of proof and seeks to discharge it. He does this (in the same way antinatalists do) by relying on our other intuitions. One such intuition is that we are not responsible for something if its cause traces entirely outside of ourselves. So in order to be responsible you would have to somehow cause your own creation. Or, as you noted, you would have to be an uncaused mover.

Problem is, you don’t actually specify in any way what this “uncaused mover” does or how it works. If it existed, then we would expect spontaneous, uncaused current or force within the body that we can then attribute to the “uncaused mover” aka “you”. Since this is not the case, we can conclude that we are not uncaused movers. That there is no “you” that is uncaused by your birth. As, again, if you want to propose the existence of a non sensible (or non physical) thing that can actually cause some movement, you would be flying in the face of empirical observations.

Conservation of energy and momentum still hold even inside the human body. There is no “non physical causer”. Once one is detected then we can conclude that the necessary conditions for moral responsibility have been met. But until then, you cannot assume that the necessary conditions have been met.

So given that, and given you cannot have created yourself, we have good reason to believe people are not morally responsible, since all your actions trace to external causes. It is a good reason because it is derived from other rational intuitions, in the same way ANs try to derive their argument.

Again, if you have issue with this you would need to find some action A, and trace its causes backwards until you find an “uncaused movement” that can be attributed to yourself. Until this is actually done, you cannot assume it is possible. And if such a thing exists, I think scientists would have noticed by now that conservation of energy and momentum for some reason seem to not hold in the human body. So we have good empirical data (rather lack thereof) suggesting there is no such thing.

I don't know what will happen to me after my sensible body dies. But it seems likely something very bad awaits us after our sensible bodies die, for our reason tells us to do pretty much all we can to avoid sensible death unless we are in absolute agony. So, that suggests - but doesn't entail - that what awaits us after our sensible demise is worse than here, but not absolute agony. — Bartricks

Not really suggestive. Thinking in terms of evolution, the only creatures that survive would be those that seek to avoid dying. So the fact that you are here right now implies you’re such a creature. In this sense, our reason is biased. Creatures whose reason told them that dying isn’t so bad just aren’t around anymore. Due to the bias there is not enough evidence to conclude that our reason tells us that dying is bad because it is actually bad. It doesn’t mean it is actually bad, only that it had been evolutionarily useful to think it is bad.

It could be the case that heaven is real and everyone goes there with no downsides and people would still think dying is bad. Because they have no way of confirming the afterlife, and only the ones that avoid it (by thinking death is bad) will survive (obviously)

Okay. Now, we have extremely powerful epistemic reason to think we're morally responsible. Billions - I mean, literally billions - of people have rational intuitions that represent themselves and others to be morally responsible — Bartricks

Again, not suggestive for the same reasons as above. A rational intuition that we are morally responsible is useful. Societies and people who didn’t have it died out. So of course everyone today would have it. That doesn’t mean it is true, only that it is evolutionarily useful to have. So we do not have powerful epistemic reason to believe we are morally responsible due to this bias.

This is precisely why “It seems to be the case and it could be the case therefore it is the case” is a terrible argument. It could just be that it seems to be the case because it had been evolutionarily useful to assume it to be the case, not because it is actually the case. I gave the heaven example above.

Well done for not addressing anything in the OP. — Bartricks

I have some slight suspicion that your congratulations are not sincere, and yet - I accept your congratulations sincerely because I am a philosopher, and as such can only respond in my own terms, in reference to my tradition.

If you demand I respond directly to the OP - I can, but only to point out that there you said Strawson is wrong, and now you say:

Do you agree with Strawson and myself that if one is in no way morally responsible for A, and in no way morally responsible for B, and A and B are wholly causally responsible for C, then one is in no way morally responsible for C? — Bartricks

If insincere congratulations are the order of the day: bravo!

This is all interesting, but not what I asked. Perhaps I was not clear.

I'm questioning why the word moral needs to be in here. Is there such a concept as immoral responsibility? I doubt it.

But perhaps there are other categories of responsibility that are conceptually distinct from "moral responsibility"? If not, then the word "moral" seems redundant.

It's 'moral' responsibility - of the desert variety - that Strawson is talking about and arguing is impossible. So other kinds are irrelevant. For instance, if we were discussing whether minds can be split, then the fact that there are other kinds of split - Sundae splits, for example - would be irrelevant to that discussion.

I have some slight suspicion that your congratulations are not sincere, and yet - I accept your congratulations sincerely because I am a philosopher, and as such can only respond in my own terms, in reference to my tradition. — counterpunch

They weren't remotely sincere. And no philosopher would say

I am a philosopher, and as such can only respond in my own terms, in reference to my tradition. — counterpunch

.

So you're not scoring too highly on the sincerity scale.

If you demand I respond directly to the OP - I can, but only to point out that there you said Strawson is wrong, and now you say:

Do you agree with Strawson and myself that if one is in no way morally responsible for A, and in no way morally responsible for B, and A and B are wholly causally responsible for C, then one is in no way morally responsible for C?
— Bartricks — counterpunch

Well if you were a philosopher - or, indeed, just a careful reasoner - you'd realize that my disagreement with Strawson is not over the truth of that principle, but rather over whether it is metaphysically possible for us to make decisions to which it would not apply. He thinks not - hence he concludes that moral responsibility is impossible - whereas I am arguing otherwise. So, kudos for seeing inconsistency where it isn't. Quite an achievement.

So there we are: Strawson is wrong. Contrary to what he has argued, moral responsibility is not impossible, — Bartricks

Do you agree with Strawson and myself ... — Bartricks

If Strawson is wrong, and you agree with him, that would make you wrong.

So, no - I don't agree with you!

lol.

Problem is, you don’t actually specify in any way what this “uncaused mover” does or how it works. — khaled

And I don't have to. It is sufficient for the argument to go through that it is metaphysically possible for there to be such things. If it is metaphysically possible for there to be such things, then we no longer have any epistemic reason to doubt we are morally responsible and also have reason to conclude that we are such things - that we are uncaused causers.

One can have excellent evidence that X is the case, without having to know 'how' it is the case. For instance, I have excellent evidence my computer is working - it is working - yet if you ask me 'how' it is working, I haven't a clue. By your logic, of course, the fact I haven't a clue how it is working would constitute evidence that it isn't working!

It gets worse for you. Not only have you reasoned fallaciously once more - fallaciously thinking that if one can't explain how something works, then one has evidence it isn't working - you also demonstrate conceptual incompetence. For what do you mean by 'how does it work?' if not 'explain the causes of the uncaused causer's causings?' Which is, of course, conceptually confused.

The rest of what you say is once more flagrantly question begging. Rather than following the argument to its logical conclusion - which we've already established you have great trouble doing - you are just appealing to the conventional assumption that we are physical bodies. Oh, and you commit further fallacies - you think that as there is no empirical evidence that we are uncaused causers (how could there be?), that means there is empirical evidence that we are 'not' uncaused causers. Which is fallacious. Are you being sponsored? I mean, it's actually quite impressive to commit that many fallacies in such a small space. It's almost like you think fallaciously exclusively.

Erm, Strawson thinks more than one thing. He thinks one thing - A - that I agree with. And he thinks another thing - B - that I do not.

He thinks that if the causes of your decision trace to external events, then you are not morally responsible for that decision.

I agree with that. That's 'A' above.

He also thinks that it is impossible for it to be the case that the causes of our decisions will not trace to external events.

I disagree with that. That's B.

Presumably you are very puzzled by doors that have 'push' written on one side and 'pull' on the other. I pulled it to get in, so manifestly I must pull it to get out. That's you reasoning about opening the door.

Erm, Strawson thinks more than one thing. — Bartricks

I also think more than one thing. Given that I had already expressed a view that we are morally responsible, when you asked me:

Do you agree with Strawson and myself that if one is in no way morally responsible for A, and in no way morally responsible for B, and A and B are wholly causally responsible for C, then one is in no way morally responsible for C? — Bartricks

You must have assumed I would disagree, but the crude arithmetic of these propositions is sound - if one accepts the propositions; and so you were inviting me to make as ass of myself. Alternatively, the more difficult route, would be that I agree with the crude arithmetic, and you attack me with the metaphysical implications. Neither seemed particularly attractive, and so instead, I decided to stick with what I wrote, and mock your clumsy attempts at boxing me in.