If it is metaphysically possible for there to be such things, then we no longer have any epistemic reason to doubt we are morally responsible — Bartricks

But we have empirical reasons to doubt them.

If an argument relies on unicorns existing you can’t say “It is metaphysically possible for unicorns to exist therefore this argument goes through”. If we have never seen a unicorn, DESPITE looking for unicorns, then we have very good reason to think that that argument is mistaken, for it relies on something that (it is reasonable to believe) doesn’t exist to exist.

In the same way that if we have never detected the effects of “uncaused causers” (as detecting them themselves is impossible by definition) despite looking, we have very good reason to think the argument is mistaken no?

One can have excellent evidence that X is the case, without having to know 'how' it is the case. For instance, I have excellent evidence my computer is working - it is working - yet if you ask me 'how' it is working, I haven't a clue. By your logic, of course, the fact I haven't a clue how it is working would constitute evidence that it isn't working! — Bartricks

Not a good comparison. Because your computer working does not fly in the face of empirical observations. Moreover, your computer working can be confirmed empirically. I can try to turn it on and if it does then it is working.

However the existence of uncaused causers does fly in the face of empirical observations. And is not itself an empirical observation.

On the one hand you have a confirmable event that you cannot explain. On the other you have a hypothesis that flies in the face of empirical data not just that you cannot explain (though that too). Again, not a good comparison.

fallaciously thinking that if one can't explain how something works, then one has evidence it isn't working — Bartricks

That would be fallacious indeed.

However what I actually said was that we already have evidence that goes against your hypothesis of the existence of uncaused causers. Or, at least, we have no evidence supporting it despite looking (which makes it reasonable to believe it doesn’t exist). Therefore uncaused causers don’t exist (at least we aren’t those). Until you can detect their effects you cannot assume they exist.

For what do you mean by 'how does it work?' — Bartricks

“How does it fit into our understanding of physics”. It doesn’t, it contradicts it (conservation of energy and momentum would be thrown out the window). So it’s wrong in the absence of empirical evidence confirming the effects of these uncaused causers. And if you can find such evidence no doubt you would win at least a Nobel prize and would result in a new era for physics. A total overhaul.

you are just appealing to the conventional assumption that we are physical bodies — Bartricks

It’s conventional because no other “we” had been detected. It isn’t question begging. It’s you who assumes uncaused causers exist despite a complete lack of evidence.

And the way you arrive at the conclusion relies on premise 2 which I will get to.

Oh, and you commit further fallacies - you think that as there is no empirical evidence that we are uncaused causers (how could there be?), that means there is empirical evidence that we are 'not' uncaused causers. Which is fallacious. — Bartricks

Where did I say this? I never said we have evidence uncaused causers don’t exist. I said we don’t have evidence they do. And such evidence is required for your argument, if you want it to be any more than idle conjecture.



More importantly you haven’t addressed one of the more important points. That this:

Okay. Now, we have extremely powerful epistemic reason to think we're morally responsible. Billions - I mean, literally billions - of people have rational intuitions that represent themselves and others to be morally responsible — Bartricks

Is not actually the case when it comes to evolutionarily useful beliefs. As I have explained and gave an example for. When something is evolutionarily advantageous to believe then we CANNOT say that simply because it seems to be the case and it is possible that it is the case. Because if it evolutionarily advantageous it will seem the case REGARDLESS of what is actually the case.

As an example, if what follows death is heaven OR hell (not saying those are the 2 options, just a hypothetical), people will still think death is bad. Because the people that survive are only those that think death is bad REGARDLESS of which is actually the case.

Similarly, the people that survive will think they are morally responsible REGARDLESS of which is actually the case (because if they didn’t they would be dead by now).

So your premise 2 remains unjustified. The premise you use to say that we are uncaused causers.

So your conclusion, that we are uncaused causers, uses an unjustified premise (that we are morally responsible) AND flies in the face of empirical observations or at least is completely unsupported empirically despite people looking for support for it.

I also think more than one thing. — counterpunch

Really? Who's a good boy!? You are. Yes you are.

you were inviting me to make as ass of myself. — counterpunch

You didn't wait for me to invite you.

and mock your clumsy attempts at boxing me in. — counterpunch

I can't box fog.

Really? — Bartricks

You expressed no agreement with Strawson in the OP. You expressed strong disagreement; and then asked me if I agree with you and Strawson. Either you're an idiot or a snake. Your choice!

Most of that was just question begging.

The only point of note was your appeal to the possibility of an evolutionary discrediting account of our rational intuition that we are morally responsible.

The problem is that if evolutionary accounts of how we have acquired our rational intuitions discredit those intuitions, then all of our rational intuitions are going to end up being discredited. And that's self-defeating (because our evidence that there is a sensible world in which evolution operates itself involves appealing to rational intuitions).

So, it is not in general the case that rational intuitions are discredited by having evolutionary explanations. Rather, one must distinguish between when such an account discredits the intuitions and when it does not.

What's your account? When does an evolutionary account of our rational intuitions discredit them, and when does it not?

Baby steps. In the OP I expressed disagreement with one of Strawson's claims, namely the claim that it is impossible for us to satisfy his condition on moral responsibility (the condition I agree with - and agreed with implicity in the OP, for why apart from agreement with it, would I otherwise explain how we can satisfy it and thus can, in principle, be morally responsible?)

So, once more - and I have to be honest, I think a five year old could understand this - Strawson thinks more than one thing. I disagree with one of the things he thinks. But I agree with another thing he thinks.

One thing I disagree with. One thing. Not all things.

In the OP I expressed disagreement with one of Strawson's claims, — Bartricks

Opening line:

Contemporary philosopher Galen Strawson wrote a famous article called 'The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility' in which - as the title suggests - he argued that it is not possible for anyone to be truly morally responsible. I think he is wrong. — Bartricks

Closing line:

So there we are: Strawson is wrong. — Bartricks

Nothing in-between indicates any agreement with, or acceptance of any part of his argument.

Most of that was just question begging. — Bartricks

Question begging is assuming the conclusion in your premises. Which conclusion have I assumed in which premise?

I want to establish is that we have good reason to believe that there are no uncaused causers. The same reason we give for believing there are no unicorns or Yetis. We’ve looked and haven’t found any or even the effects of any. Moreover, for uncaused causers, we have found a massive volumes of contradictory evidence (conservation of energy and momentum) which is not even the case for the unicorn or yeti. What’s wrong with that as an argument?

What's your account? When does an evolutionary account of our rational intuitions discredit them, and when does it not? — Bartricks

When a difference between what is actually the case and what we think is the case cannot be afforded for the purposes of survival.

For example: mathematical laws. If we thought 2+2=5 we would not be able to survive. If every time we put two and two things together we are bewildered at a missing thing we would’ve died out long ago. So we have good reason to believe our belief is the truth.

But an objective moral responsibility is not such a thing. Whether or not we actually ARE morally responsible has little to do with our survival. What matters is whether or not we think we are morally responsible.

In other words, we could FALSELY believe that we are morally responsible and the belief would evolve. We could also TRUTHFULLY believe that we are morally responsible and the belief would evolve.

However if our understanding of basic arithmetic is false we would’ve died out long ago. And definitely wouldn’t have been able to manipulate nature to the extent that we have.

This is why I used AN btw. Our intuition about having children being ok can be dismissed on these grounds. Because even if it is the case that having children is wrong, our belief that having them is right would evolve anyways. So having the belief is not indicative of what is actually the case.

You have failed this class.

I want to establish is that we have good reason to believe that there are no uncaused causers. The same reason we give for believing there are no unicorns or Yetis. We’ve looked and haven’t found any or even the effects of any. Moreover, for uncaused causers, we have found a massive volumes of contradictory evidence (conservation of energy and momentum) which is not even the case for the unicorn or yeti. What’s wrong with that as an argument? — khaled

It's question begging, that's what.

When a difference between what is actually the case and what we think is the case cannot be afforded for the purposes of survival. — khaled

That's going to be self-defeating. The reason why is, frankly, above your intellectual pay grade, but I'll explain anyway because I'm phenomenally nice.

The actual existence of epistemic reasons would make no difference to our chances of survival. All that's needed to survive, is to 'believe' that we have epistemic reason to believe some things - such as that 2 = 2 = 4 - and not others - such as that 2 + 2 = 89. There does not need to be any actual epistemic reason to believe those things in reality.

Thus, you would end up having to conclude that epistemic reasons do not exist - that is, that we do not in reality have any reason to believe anything.

And that's self-defeating, because you'd think there's reason to think that.

It's question begging, that's what. — Bartricks

In which premise is the conclusion assumed?

There does not need to be any actual epistemic reason to believe those things in reality. — Bartricks

All that's needed to survive, is to 'believe' that we have epistemic reason to believe some things — Bartricks

Now you’re applying epistemology to itself. “When can you reasonably believe that you can reasonably believe X?”.

That just seems confused. You can keep adding layers here. “When can you reasonably believe that you can reasonably believe that you can reasonably believe that....... that you can reasonably believe X?”

At some point you have to stop asking “when can you reasonably believe that”. Epistemology is about asking what we can know. If you start asking what we can know about epistemology, we’ll never get anywhere!

Thus, you would end up having to conclude that epistemic reasons do not exist — Bartricks

But even if the above makes sense this doesn’t follow. Just as “All that’s needed to survive is to believe that we are morally responsible thus we are not morally responsible” doesn’t follow.

All that would follow is that there need not actually be epistemic reasons to believe anything for us to survive. Not that there factually aren’t. It doesn’t follow from A not being needed that A doesn’t nevertheless exist.

You have failed this class. — Bartricks

You have failed to defend your thesis. And ironically, done so by failing to act in a morally responsible manner. You have acted, as I would have expected you to act - because that's who you are! Your disingenuous style of argumentation is inherent to your character, and so perhaps there is something to Strawson's claims after all. I'm would add, perhaps, that it takes someone who is blisteringly lacking in self-awareness to play out their script - so consistently, to ill effect, without revision.

Tomkins, Silvan. "Script Theory". The Emergence of Personality. New York: Springer Publishing Company, 1987.

In which premise is the conclusion assumed? — khaled

You assume my view is false for the purposes of refuting it. That's begging the question.

There's no empirical evidence that nothing that exists exists uncaused. There's empirical evidence that sensible objects are caused to exist. So, insofar as you've thought at all about your position, you have simply assumed that all objects that exist are sensible objects. That's not a truth of reason, it is just a conventional belief of the age we live in and it is contradicted by the conclusion of my argument - an argument you've done nothing to challenge any premise of.

Now you’re applying epistemology to itself. “When can you reasonably believe that you can reasonably believe X?”. — khaled

What? No, I am showing you where the logic of 'your' position leads. If you think that an evolutionary account of a rational intuition serves always and everywhere to undermine that rational intuition's credibility, then you would have to conclude that we have no evidence of any reason to believe anything, and as you would 'conclude' that, you would at the same time be assuming that there are reasons to believe things. That's confused - but of course, people who are poor at reasoning will not recognise the confusion inherent in the view and thus will feel no pressure to revise it.

What you need to do is provide a principled account of when an evolutionary explanation does undermine a rational intuition's credibility and when it doesn't. And that principle had better not be one that, when applied consistently, would undermine the credibility of our rational intuition that we have reason to believe things.

Shall I do it for you? I mean, it'll just speed things up.

Here's what I'd say. If we have a rational intuition that seems - intuitively - to be inconsistent with the rest, and if we can in addition see that this particular rational intuition is one that seems highly adaptive, then we have some reason to suppose that that alone is why we are subject to it. That intuition can then be reasonably discounted.

That approach - which is independently motivated - would give us grounds for discounting the rational intuition that procreation is permissible. For if the antinatalists are right, that rational intuition does indeed conflict with a whole load of others and furthermore it is clearly adaptive.

But that approach would not give us grounds for discounting the rational intuitions that represent us to be morally responsible.

There's no empirical evidence that nothing that exists exists uncaused — Bartricks

There is no empirical evidence that unicorns don’t exist either. But that’s not what I’m arguing. I’m arguing which is more reasonable to believe. An argument made over the internet about the existence of unicorns, or centuries of us failing to find them. I think the latter, wouldn’t you?

Uncaused movers are worse than unicorns because not only have we utterly failed to find them, finding them would mean that our entire understanding of physics is false.

an argument you've done nothing to challenge any premise of. — Bartricks

I’ve been challenging premise 2 haven’t I?

So, insofar as you've thought at all about your position, you have simply assumed that all objects that exist are sensible objects. — Bartricks

I’ve assumed that all objects capable of moving things are sensible objects. And for good reason. Because if this was not the case the laws of conservation of energy and momentum would go in the garbage bin. If there were uncaused movers there would be uncaused energy, and uncaused momentum.

So I’m pitting the conclusion of your argument against centuries of confirmed science. Conservation of energy and momentum haven’t failed yet as far as I’m aware. Which is more reasonable to believe?

If you think that an evolutionary account of a rational intuition serves always and everywhere to undermine that rational intuition's credibility — Bartricks

I laid out when it does and when it doesn’t didn’t I?

In the case of epistemology, if we think we have good reason for believing something when in reality it is not a good reason, we would not survive would we?

So we have good reason to believe our reasons for believing things are accurate, as any mistake in them would result in our demise. If, for example, we thought we should believe things based on the time of day we heard them, and that was not the case, we would have all died out. Because we would end up falsely believing many things. Which is not conducive to survival.

And that principle had better not be one that, when applied consistently, would undermine the credibility of our rational intuition that we have reason to believe things. — Bartricks

It doesn’t undermine it. Because a mistake in our epistemological reason to believe things would kill us. And since we’re not dead, we can assume no mistake.

Here's what I'd say. If we have a rational intuition that seems - intuitively - to be inconsistent with the rest, and if we can in addition see that this particular rational intuition is one that seems highly adaptive, then we have some reason to suppose that that alone is why we are subject to it. That intuition can then be reasonably discounted. — Bartricks

What about when the intuition is inconsistent with centuries of confirmed science? I would think that if a scientific principle hasn’t failed for centuries despite us constantly looking for places it might fail, they puts it above any intuition wouldn’t you? If said intuition had implications that contradict it.

A good example: We gave a very strong rational intuition that the earth is flat. All of us are surprised when first hearing it is round. Yet we do not go favoring the intuition do we? Even though that intuition is not particularly contradictory with any others.

Cod psychology. How about addressing the argument I made? That's what a philosopher would do...

There is no empirical evidence that unicorns don’t exist either. — khaled

Erm, yes there is.

An argument made over the internet about the existence of unicorns, or centuries of us failing to find them. I think the latter, wouldn’t you? — khaled

What. On. Earth. Are. You. On. About?

I’ve assumed that all objects capable of moving things are sensible objects. — khaled

Yes, like I say, you're just begging the question. And it doesn't seem to you that you are because a) you're an inept reasoner and b) you're too conventional and thus you think that if a conclusion is unconventional that itself is evidence that it is false. I mean, can you seriously not see how that assumption is question begging? Seriously?

I’ve been challenging premise 2 haven’t I? — khaled

Not that I can see.

Premise 2 says that if I am morally responsible, then not everything I do traces to external causes, yes?

Where have you challenged that? Present a deductively valid argument that has the negation of that premise as a conclusion.

Erm, yes there is. — Bartricks

Which is?

It makes no sense to say you have empirical evidence something doesn’t exist. You can only have a lack of evidence that something exists.

What. On. Earth. Are. You. On. About? — Bartricks

If someone concludes that unicorns exist, despite us searching for them for centuries and not finding them, and yet is unable to provide an example of a unicorn existing, would it be reasonable to believe them? Especially when he ascribes them powers that contradict our physical theories?

Now replace “unicorn” with “uncaused causers”

Premise 2 says that if I am morally responsible, then not everything I do traces to external causes, yes? — Bartricks

No. Premise 2 is that you are morally responsible.

I’m challenging this:

Am I morally responsible? Well, I now have every reason to think I am - for my reason represents me to be - and no reason to think I am not. If you think otherwise, you need to show some fault in the first leg.

So, this premise is now one I have every reason to think is true, and none to think is false:

2. I am morally responsible. — Bartricks

I am challenging it by showing that the intuition that we are morally responsible can be dismissed. Because it is one of the intuitions that would have evolved anyways regardless of what is actually the case.

This is not the case with mathematical intuitions or epistemology. If we are wrong about either of those we die. If we are wrong about what we morally ought to do, we just survive as sinners not knowing they are sinners.

In other words, we do NOT have every reason to think it is true, as it would have seemed true regardless of its actual truth value in reality (because it is what is evolutionarily advantageous)

b) you're too conventional and thus you think that if a conclusion is unconventional that itself is evidence that it is false. I mean, can you seriously not see how that assumption is question begging? Seriously? — Bartricks

Let's establish a few things, shall we.

First off, do you recognize that if something contradicts the laws of conservation of energy and momentum that we have pretty good reason to disbelieve it?

And secondly, do you recognize that “uncaused causers” contradict those laws?

I am not using “convention” (I would say physical theory is a bit more than convention) to conclusively say that uncaused causers don’t exist. I am saying that it is more reasonable to assume they don’t exist than that they do. Since we have centuries of searching for such things and not finding any.

On the other hand, the only reason (you provided) to believe they exist would be your argument which relies on premise 2 where you use a dismissible intuition to argue that something is factually the case.

Question begging would be assuming the conclusion in the premises. But I’m not assuming anything unreasonably here. Or do you think the laws of conservation are in question?

It makes no sense to say you have empirical evidence something doesn’t exist. You can only have a lack of evidence that something exists. — khaled

Yes it does. Christ.

Now replace “unicorn” with “uncaused causers” — khaled

No parallel at all. Jesus.

I am challenging it by showing that the intuition that we are morally responsible can be dismissed. — khaled

And you haven't shown that. You've just ineptly dismissed all rational intuitions, which is kinda silly given that all arguments for anything presuppose that at least some rational intuitions are accurate. Good job!

The rest was just you question beggingly expressing your conventional views.

Present valid arguments that have the negation of my premises - whichever one you want to challenge - as conclusions.

Cod psychology. How about addressing the argument I made? That's what a philosopher would do... — Bartricks

Well, if it's cod psychology, I thought we could just cut straight to the argument about the argument. Isn't that what every one of your discussions devolves to? Why is that, do you think?

Isn't that what every one of your discussions devolves to? Why is that, do you think? — counterpunch

Well, my theory about that would be because I'm debating with people who can't recognize an argument from their elbow. The main argument I made in the OP - the one that's interesting and novel - is one that no-one yet seems even to have noticed or said anything about.

Yes it does. Christ. — Bartricks

Then we have as good evidence as we will ever have that uncaused causers don’t exist.

If looking for something and not finding it is evidence then uncaused causers are probably the most sought after and not found thing humanity has ever seen.

No parallel at all. — Bartricks

Let’s see about that.

Did you conclude that uncaused causers exist despite us searching for them for centuries and not finding them? Yes.

Did you give an example of one existing (or even its effects)? No.

Did you ascribe them powers that contradict our physical theories? Yes.

So I don’t see how there is no parallel.

You've just ineptly dismissed all rational intuitions — Bartricks

I told you why I didn’t. You didn’t address it.

You wanted to make the case that epistemological intuitions would fall under the list of things that would have evolved anyways regardless of their truth value. However that is not the case. They’re in the same boat about mathematical intuitions. If we’re wrong about them we perish.

The rest was just you question beggingly expressing your conventional views. — Bartricks

If you seriously consider the laws of conservation are under doubt that would put you in the same boat as flat earthers. A staunch refusal to consider scientific evidence as anything more than “convention”. Completely dismissing the effort and rigor by which these theories were confirmed time and time again. All in favor of wanting to assert that what seems to be the case is in fact the case.

Even worse than flat earthers. Because the thing you want to assert is the case due to it seeming the case can be shown to be dismissible. Since it would seem the case regardless of what the case actually is due to its evolutionary advantages.

Present valid arguments that have the negation of my premises — Bartricks

I did. The premise that we are morally responsible can be dismissed.

Then we have as good evidence as we will ever have that uncaused causers don’t exist. — khaled

Question begging. Refute my argument.

I did. The premise that we are morally responsible can be dismissed. — khaled

You didn't.
Do it.

Deductively valid argument (you're going to have trouble there as your arguments have so far been fallacious, almost without exception).

Premises that are self-evident to reason.

Do it.

Oh. You’re trolling. I see now.

Well have a good one. You got me good.

Nope. You just can't construct a deductively valid argument that has the negation of one of my premises as a conclusion and has rationally compelling premises, can you?

I have.

Deductively valid argument — Bartricks

False.

Nope. You just can't construct a deductively valid argument that has the negation of one of my premises as a conclusion and has rationally compelling premises, can you? — Bartricks

I can and I have. Your inability or unwillingness to recognize it is not my issue.

I’ll go over it again one last time.

Your premise 2 is fallacious. You cannot say that we are morally responsible simply because we seem to be and that it is metaphysically possible. As it would have seemed to us that we are morally responsible regardless of whether or not we actually are.

You tried to refute this by bringing up epistemology. But epistemology is not in the same boat as moral intuitions. Epistemological intuitions, if wrong, would get is killed. So we have good reason to think they’re correct.

Where is the deductively valid argument that has the negation of one of my premises as a conclusion? Lay it out.

Your premise 2 is fallacious. You cannot say that we are morally responsible simply because we seem to be and that it is metaphysically possible. As it would have seemed to us that we are morally responsible regardless of whether or not we actually are.

You tried to refute this by bringing up epistemology. But epistemology is not in the same boat as moral intuitions. Epistemological intuitions, if wrong, would get is killed. So we have good reason to think they’re correct. — khaled

Lay it out. I'm tired of trying to argue with someone who doesn't know how to argue. Lay it out.

Pssst, premises can't be fallacious. Fallaciousness is a property of arguments, not premises.

can you read? Sure I’ll make it simpler for your comprehension.

1- If a difference between an intuition and reality cannot be afforded we have good reason to believe the intuition is correct. On the other hand, if a difference can be afforded we do not have such a reason.

2- A difference between our moral intuitions and what is actually moral can be afforded.

3- therefore we cannot conclude that our moral intuitions indicate reality.

4- Therefore your second premise is unjustified.

Yes, I can read. Is English your first language? What does 'a difference between an intuition and reality cannot be afforded' mean? It's gibberish.

Just express it in this form

1. If P, then Q
2. P
3. Therefore Q

or

1. If P, then Q
2. Not Q
3. therefore not P.

What does 'a difference between an intuition and reality cannot be afforded' mean? It's gibberish. — Bartricks

I have explained it before. Can be afforded for the purposes of survival.

Just express it in this form

1. If P, then Q
2. P
3. Therefore Q — Bartricks

Why do you make it sound like that's the only form an argument can be expressed?

Put your second premise in that form. Try. Try to deduce that we are morally responsible.

Let me put it another way:

If A -> C and B -> C and C is true, we cannot conclude A or B definitively correct? (We can conclude "A or B" but we cannot conclude "A" or conclude "B", not enough evidence as either could have led to C)

Now replace A with "We are morally responsible", B with "We are not morally responsible" and C with "We believe we are morally responsible"

You use C to conclude A definitively. Which is fallacious.