Mind-matter battles are like flower arrangement to me, and not like some grand science of the foundations. — norm
The term "Idealism" came into vogue roughly during the time of Kant (though it was used earlier by others, such as Leibniz) to label one of two trends that had emerged in reaction to Cartesian philosophy. Descartes had argued that there were two basic yet separate substances in the universe: Extension (the material world of things in space) and Thought (the world of mind and ideas). Subsequently opposing camps took one or the other substance as their metaphysical foundation, treating it as the primary substance while reducing the remaining substance to derivative status.
Materialists argued that only matter was ultimately real, so that thought and consciousness derived from physical entities (chemistry, brain states, etc.) Idealists countered that the mind and its ideas were ultimately real, and that the physical world derived from mind (e.g., the mind of God, Berkeley's esse est percipi, or from ideal prototypes, etc.). Materialists gravitated toward mechanical, physical explanations for why and how things existed, while Idealists tended to look for purposes - moral as well as rational - to explain existence. Idealism meant "idea-ism," frequently in the sense Plato's notion of "ideas" (eidos) was understood at the time, namely ideal types that transcended the physical, sensory world and provided the form (eidos) that gave matter meaning and purpose. As materialism, buttressed by advances in materialistic science, gained wider acceptance, those inclined toward spiritual and theological aims turned increasingly toward idealism as a countermeasure. Before long there were many types of materialism and idealism.
Idealism, in its broadest sense, came to encompass everything that was not materialism, which included so many different types of positions that the term lost any hope of univocality. Most forms of theistic and theological thought were, by this definition, types of idealism, even if they accepted matter as real, since they also asserted something as more real than matter, either as the creator of matter (in monotheism) or as the reality behind matter (in pantheism). Extreme empiricists [e.g. Berkeley] who only accepted their own experience and sensations as real were also idealists. Thus the term "idealism" united monotheists, pantheists and atheists. At one extreme were various forms of metaphysical idealism which posited a mind (or minds) as the only ultimate reality. The physical world was either an unreal illusion or not as real as the mind that created it. To avoid solipsism (which is a subjectivized version of metaphysical idealism) metaphysical idealists posited an overarching mind that envisions and creates the universe.
A more limited type of idealism is epistemological idealism, which argues that since knowledge of the world only exists in the mental realm, we cannot know actual physical objects as they truly are, but only as they appear in our mental representations of them. Epistemological idealists could be ontological materialists, accepting that matter exists substantially; they could even accept that mental states derived at least in part from material processes. What they denied was that matter could be known in itself directly, without the mediation of mental representations. Though unknowable in itself, matter's existence and properties could be known through inference based on certain consistencies in the way material things are represented in perception.
Transcendental idealism contends that not only matter but also the self remains transcendental in an act of cognition. Kant and Husserl, who were both transcendental idealists, defined "transcendental" as "that which constitutes experience but is not itself given in experience." A mundane example would be the eye, which is the condition for seeing even though the eye does not see itself. By applying vision and drawing inferences from it, one can come to know the role eyes play in seeing, even though one never sees one's own eyes. Similarly, things in themselves and the transcendental self could be known if the proper methods were applied for uncovering the conditions that constitute experience, even though such conditions do not themselves appear in experience. Even here, where epistemological issues are at the forefront, it is actually ontological concerns, viz. the ontological status of self and objects, that is really at stake. Western philosophy rarely escapes that ontological tilt. Those who accepted that both the self and its objects were unknowable except through reason, and that such reason(s) was their cause and purpose for existing - thus epistemologically and ontologically grounding everything in the mind and its ideas - were labeled Absolute Idealists (e.g., Schelling, Hegel, Bradley), since only such ideas are absolute while all else is relative to them.
With the exception of some epistemological idealists, what unites all the positions enumerated above, including the materialists, is that these positions are ontological. They are concerned with the ontological status of the objects of sense and thought, as well as the ontological nature of the self who knows. Mainstream Western philosophy since Plato and Aristotle has treated ontology and metaphysics as the ultimate philosophic pursuit, with epistemology's role being little more than to provide access and justification for one's ontological pursuits and commitments. Since many of what are decried as philosophy's excesses - such as skepticism, solipsism, sophistry - could be and were accused of deriving from overactive epistemological questioning, epistemology has often been held suspect, and in some theological formulations, considered entirely dispensable in favor of faith. Ontology is primary, and epistemology is either secondary or expendable. — Dan Lusthaus
But why choose 'ontology is primary' over 'epistemology is primary'? — norm
Instead of choosing the correct grand metaphysical statement, we can simply abandon the entire project of making such statements. — norm
There still remains a malady for which philosophy is the cure. — Wayfarer
In this way a chaos of visual, auditory and tactile sensations which constantly bombard us becomes sorted into stable objects. Other animals must also construe perceptual order out of constantly changing sensory stimulation. So we invent constructs but the world teaches us whether those constructs are useful or not are by either validating or invalidating our constructed patterns that we attempt to impose on the world in order to make sense of it’s changes. — Joshs
Other animals also have concepts for nature as well as social interchanges in their communities. They don’t have the complex verbal language that we do but they do have simpler gestural and auditory language. When your dog responds to a command , or anticipates your next behavior( taking him for a walk) based on your currents actions (bringing him his leash)he has formed a concept. — Joshs
I am not a philosopher. I practice critical thinking with a philosophical bent. I'm not into labels. I have spelled out what I consider to be reliable and non reliable pathways to knowledge. I do privilege empiricism and methodological naturalism but I don't think we can be 100% certain of anything. To be called an anti foundational skeptic is thematically close, but way too grand and extreme. I am still working out what I am. Sorry if that sounds inadequate. — Tom Storm
I was talking about child development - as I thought should have been clear. The cultural affectations that adults later see value in appropriating are irrelevant. — Isaac
I'll ask you the question I suppose in 5,000 years, when spirituality has explained pretty much everything it is mandated to, except how matter arises from consciousness.And I'll ask you the same question I asked another person: suppose in 5,000 years, science has explained pretty much everything except how consciousness arises from matter — RogueAI
I'll ask you the question I suppose in 5,000 years, when spirituality has explained pretty much everything it is mandated to, except how matter arises from consciousness.
That's also false. Children are believers in gods, angels, demons, entities like that, until society socially conditions them out of it. — Dharmi
That's been studied. — Dharmi
And Idealism doesn't say "the world is all in my mind" it says the world is constituted of mental/spiritual/conscious stuff. It doesn't have to be in any particular person's mind. — Dharmi
So? Do the children concerned believe that these gods, angels, and demons are material objects ideas? Believing something exists which, it turns out, doesn't is not a measure of one's commitment or otherwise to physicalism. — Isaac
think you misunderstand where I'm coming from. It's not a denial of mind but a 'denial' of the individual mind, of the single mind. This is a hyberbolic attack on the Cartesian starting point. 'I' is a piece of language that only exists socially. Obviously, in an everyday sense, we can hide in the closet and murmur to ourselves. But we've already absorbed the language from social interaction. Even if I were to somehow persuade you to my view, it wouldn't change you life much. You'd just be more bored with mind/matter talk (yet here I am, at least for the moment.)
Where I'm coming from, it's not about 'go mind !' or 'go matter!' but about seeing the futility of trying to make one the foundation of the other. All of our words are caught up in a system. Our practical distinctions of inner and outer are fine but way too flexible and leaky to take seriously for the construction of metaphysical castles in the air. (Mind-matter battles are like flower arrangement to me, and not like some grand science of the foundations. If anything is a foundation, I vote for practical life in all its ambiguity.)
Great. Let's have the citations then. — Isaac
Google's algorithm isn't helping me find the particular study, but here's a related study: https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/07/110714103828.htm — Dharmi
And like, I don't know how you can expect me to have all of the scientific studies ever published ready on the spot, that's a very unreasonable standard of evidence. — Dharmi
My position, on the other hand, doesn't depend on an assumption that consciousness exists. — RogueAI
To put it simply, the foundation of idealism is stuff that *has* to exist: mind and thought. The foundation of materialism is stuff that *might* exist. I think it obvious idealism clearly has an a priori advantage. — RogueAI
If you assert something to be the case you should have the evidence to hand to back up that assertion. Otherwise, don't assert it, enquire instead. It's of no interest what you just happen to reckon. Why would anyone want to know what you think there might be studies of, we're not compiling your autobiography. — Isaac
Mind and thought exists for sure. But why are you so absolutely certain that they both are matters of idealism? Mind could be matter, from where we sit, we don't know if it is or not; and conversely, we don't know if mind is idealism stuff or not. You say it is obvious that mind is idealism stuff. To me it's not obvious.
Consider the following: two people from thousands of years ago can meaningfully talk about their minds, agreed? — RogueAI
Animals don't have language in any sense of the word. They can communicate, sure. But that's not language. The have cries that signify things like this is edible, this is dangerous, come here and so on. I'm obviously anthropomorphizing the cries. They probably have categories of some kind that allows them to interpret something as a sound for something specific like food or predator, etc. As for dogs when they respond to a command, they are repeating a behavior which they have associated with that command. One command is for them to sit down, for example. They do an action which the human has shown leads to a reward, or a desired outcome. — Manuel
So, my reply is that it is so obvious to me that my mind is not a physical thing with physical characteristics, like size, shape, weight, volume, etc. that I'm not making an assumption when I say my mind is not a physical thing. It's clearly not. It makes sense to ask what a (supposedly) physical thing like a flower smells like, but it's incoherent to ask what my mind smells like, or looks like, or tastes like. — RogueAI
Idealism should be the default starting position.
— RogueAI
Irrelevant. Physicalism is the default starting position. — Isaac
No, it's a claim that the mind is not a physical thing. It has no physical characteristics. — RogueAI
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