Seeing is sensation — Terrapin
And also if we're talking about veridicality versus non-veridicality, we're talking about how sensations link up with something that's not the sensation, which is the same, functionally, at least, as objects external to you. — Terrapin
perception is not the same thing as sensation — csalisbury
What's the difference when we're talking about veridicality versus non-veridicality? — Terrapin Station
EVERY one will readily allow, that there is a considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a man feels the pain of excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he afterwards recalls to his memory this sensation, or anticipates it by his imagination. — Hume
I PRESUME that no philosopher who has attacked the philosophical idea of givenness or, to use the Hegelian term, immediacy has intended to deny that there is a difference between inferring that something is the case and, for example, seeing it to be the case. — Sellars
Perhaps it's reading too much into the texts, but I'm amused that Hume mentions perception first, while Sellars mentions inference first -- as if, I'd want to say, in each case the first-mentioned term is the one held to be less mysterious by the contemporaries addressed by the author, those interlocutors invited to begin speaking together on this common ground. — Cabbage Farmer
Do any of us here deny that there is a difference between inferring and seeing that something is the case? Or more generally, between inferential knowledge and noninferential knowledge, or likewise between judgments based on inference and judgments based on perception?I PRESUME that no philosopher who has attacked the philosophical idea of givenness or, to use the Hegelian term, immediacy has intended to deny that there is a difference between inferring that something is the case and, for example, seeing it to be the case. — Sellars
"what is observed qua being observed": What do we suppose this phrase means? Perhaps a weak sense of "observation", as in, S observes that p, though it's possible that not-p? (In other words, "S observes that p" is consistent with not-p; in this respect "observes" would resemble "believes" rather than "knows"...)If the term "given" referred merely to what is observed as being observed, or, perhaps, to a proper subset of the things we are said to determine by observation,... — Sellars
I presume this is the "data" of the "sense-data theorists"....the existence of "data" would be as noncontroversial as the existence of philosophical perplexities. But, of course, this just is not so. — Sellars
Sellars alludes to arguments made by defenders of the epistemologist's "given", who argued that to deny there is a "given" in the relevant sense is to "fly in the face of reason". Not so, says Sellars: The defender's argument relies on a conflation of the ordinary, common sense, unobjectionable and uninformative sense of "givenness", and the highly contentious sense of "givenness" that figures prominently in epistemological shop-talk.The phrase "the given" as a piece of professional -- epistemological -- shoptalk carries a substantial theoretical commitment, and one can deny that there are "data" or that anything is, in this sense, "given" without flying in the face of reason. — Sellars
With respect to (1), you're then saying that Sellars is agreeing with them that it doesn't make sense to speak of unveridical sensations? — Terrapin
Also, I'm curious if you'd say that Sellars is claiming that propositions are perceived in some sense. Or would he agree that "seeing <a proposition>" is a very loose, metaphorical way of speaking--that is, we're not literally seeing a proposition? — Terrapin
What is it, in this sentence, that "can be said to be the framework of givenness": "a certain way of construing", or "these terms"?Many things have been said to be "given": sense contents, material objects, universals, propositions, real connections, first principles, even givenness itself. And there is, indeed, a certain way of construing the situations which philosophers analyze in these terms which can be said to be the framework of givenness. — Sellars
Would anyone please provide a characterization of "dogmatic rationalism" and "skeptical empiricism" as these terms are intended here?This framework has been a common feature of most of the major systems of philosophy, including, to use a Kantian turn of phrase, both "dogmatic rationalism" and "skeptical empiricism". — Sellars
The framework, the custom of construing situations and analyzing them in terms of certain bits of traditional epistemological shop-talk, has influenced every epistemologist in the tradition Sellars is concerned with here, or perhaps every epistemologist simpliciter.It has, indeed, been so pervasive that few, if any, philosophers have been altogether free of it; certainly not Kant, and, I would argue, not even Hegel, that great foe of "immediacy". — Sellars
These first attacks on intuited first principles and on synthetic necessary connections: When and where were they located? Who were the attackers, and who the defenders?Often what is attacked under its name are only specific varieties of "given." Intuited first principles and synthetic necessary connections were the first to come under attack. — Sellars
Sellars criticizes his contemporary allies: Many of them miss the deeper point, and "transfer... the characteristic features of the 'given'" to their way of construing situations they analyze in terms of physical objects, relations of appearing, or other bits of shop-talk.And many who today attack "the whole idea of givenness" -- and they are an increasing number -- are really only attacking sense data. For they transfer to other items, say physical objects or relations of appearing, the characteristic features of the "given." If, however, I begin my argument with an attack on sense-datum theories, it is only as a first step in a general critique of the entire framework of givenness. — Sellars
He’s saying that perception takes the form of a proposition. — Aaron R
2. Sense-datum theories characteristically distinguish between an act of awareness and, for example, the color patch which is its object. — Sellars
The act is usually called sensing. — Sellars
Classical exponents of the theory have often characterized these acts as "phenomenologically simple" and "not further analyzable." But other sense-datum theorists -- some of them with an equal claim to be considered "classical exponents" -- have held that sensing is analyzable. — Sellars
And if some philosophers seem to have thought that if sensing is analyzable, then it cannot be an act, this has by no means been the general opinion. — Sellars
There are, indeed, deeper roots for the doubt that sensing (if there is such a thing) is an act, roots which can be traced to one of two lines of thought tangled together in classical sense-datum theory. — Sellars
For the moment, however, I shall simply assume that however complex (or simple) the fact that x is sensed may be, it has the form, whatever exactly it may be, by virtue of which for x to be sensed is for it to be the object of an act. — Sellars
Being a sense datum, or sensum, is a relational property of the item that is sensed. — Sellars
To refer to an item which is sensed in a way which does not entail that it is sensed, it is necessary to use some other locution. — Sellars
Sensibile has the disadvantage that it implies that sensed items could exist without being sensed, and this is a matter of controversy among sense-datum theorists. — Sellars
Sense content is, perhaps, as neutral a term as any. — Sellars
There appear to be varieties of sensing, referred to by some as visual sensing, tactual sensing, etc., and by others as directly seeing, directly hearing, etc. — Sellars
But it is not clear whether these are species of sensing in any full-blooded sense, or whether "x is visually sensed" amounts to no more than "x is a color patch which is sensed," "x is directly heard" than "x is a sound which is sensed" and so on. — Sellars
In the latter case, being a visual sensing or a direct hearing would be a relational property of an act of sensing,... — Sellars
...just as being a sense datum is a relational property of a sense content. — Sellars
Like a living organism may have a disposition to sense items in a certain way, also items may have a disposition to be sensed in a certain way. Perhaps this is what Sellars means by relational property?Being a sense datum, or sensum, is a relational property of the item that is sensed. — Sellars
Is it the act, or the object, the analyzability of which is here contested? Is the object counted as "part" of the act; i.e., we identify an individual act of sensing-awareness, analyze it into two parts, act and object, and then either find that we can go no further, or find that we can continue analyzing (act, or object, or both) into component parts? — Cabbage Farmer
According to Sellars the model-builders agree along these lines: there are facts with the form "x is sensed", and if x is sensed, then x is the object of an act [of sensing]. — Cabbage Farmer
According to Sellars the model-builders disagree about whether a fact of the form "x is sensed" is simple or complex. — Cabbage Farmer
[...]however complex (or simple) the fact that x is sensed may be, it has the form, whatever exactly it may be, by virtue of which for x to be sensed is for it to be the object of an act. — Sellars
being a visual sensing or a direct hearing would be a relational property of an act of sensing, just as being a sense datum is a relational property of a sense content. — ”Sellars”
3. Now if we bear in mind that the point of the epistemological category of the given is, presumably, to explicate the idea that empirical knowledge rests on a 'foundation' of non-inferential knowledge of matter of fact, we may well experience a feeling of surprise on noting that according to sense-datum theorists, it is particulars that are sensed. — Sellars
For what is known even in non-inferential knowledge, is facts rather than particulars, items of the form something's being thus-and-so or something's standing in a certain relation to something else. — Sellars
It would seem, then, that the sensing of sense contents cannot constitute knowledge, inferential or non-inferential; and if so, we may well ask, what light does the concept of a sense datum throw on the 'foundations of empirical knowledge?' — Sellars
The sense-datum theorist, it would seem, must choose between saying:
a. It is particulars which are sensed. Sensing is not knowing. The existence of sense data does not logically imply the existence of knowledge.
or
b. Sensing is a form of knowing. It is facts rather than particulars which are sensed. — Sellars
On alternative (a) the fact that a sense content was sensed would be a non-epistemic fact about the sense content. — Sellars
Yet it would be hasty to conclude that this alternative precludes any logical connection between the sensing of sense contents and the possession of non-inferential knowledge. For even if the sensing of sense contents did not logically imply the existence of non-inferential knowledge, the converse might well be true. Thus, the non-inferential knowledge of particular matter of fact might logically imply the existence of sense data (for example, seeing that a certain physical object is red might logically imply sensing a red sense content) even though the sensing of a red sense content were not itself a cognitive fact and did not imply the possession of non-inferential knowledge. — Sellars
On the second alternative, (b), the sensing of sense contents would logically imply the existence of non-inferential knowledge for the simple reason that it would be this knowledge. But, once again, it would be facts rather than particulars which are sensed. — Sellars
Perhaps this is what Sellars means by relational property? — jkop
No one, of course, who thinks -- as, for example, does Ayer -- of the existence of sense data as entailing the existence of "direct knowledge," would wish to say that sense data are theoretical entities. It could scarcely be a theoretical fact that I am directly knowing that a certain sense content is red. On the other hand, the idea that sense contents are theoretical entities is not obviously absurd -- so absurd as to preclude the above interpretation of the plausibility of the "another-language" approach. For even those who introduce the expression "sense content" by means of the context ". . . is directly known to be . . ." may fail to keep this fact in mind when putting this expression to use -- for example, by developing the idea that physical objects and persons alike are patterns of sense contents. In such a specific context, it is possible to forget that sense contents, thus introduced, are essentially sense data and not merely items which exemplify sense qualities. Indeed, one may even lapse into thinking of the sensing of sense contents, the givenness of sense data, as non-epistemic facts. — Sellars
What is "nonepistemic fact" supposed to mean? — CabbageFarmer
(a) It is particulars which are sensed. Sensing is not knowing. The existence of sense data does not logically imply the existence of knowledge. — Sellars
On alternative (a) the fact that a sense content was sensed would be a non-epistemic fact about the sense content. — Sellars
"not itself a cognitive fact": is "cognitive fact" here synonymous with "epistemic fact", or does it have, in addition, some phenomenological implication or connotation? — Cabbage Farmer
Finally, I will say of a sense content that it is known if it is sensed (full stop), to emphasize that sensing is a cognitive or epistemic fact. — Sellars
I take this to mean that while it is a fact that the sense-content was sensed (in sensing act x and/or by senser y), this does not imply that the senser gained any knowledge about the sense content. If you like, it's a fact in-itself, but not (necessarily) a fact for anyone (any knower.) — csalisbury
Glad to have you on board. I envisioned this thread as a kind of free-form reading group, but unfortunately I've since become too busy to participate regularly. As it stands, I suppose this thread could either become simply a 'place' to discuss Sellars' essay, or, if someone else wants to take the reins, could still remain a week-by-week, section-by-section discussion. — csalisbury
I, too, am a little confused by Sellars' distinction between sense content and sense data - or at least confused by the importance of making such a distinction. The possibility that he draws this distinction simply to remain neutral within a larger controversy makes sense, tho, if that is the case, I wish I understood that controversy and what was at stake (or believed to be at stake) in it. — csalisbury
Being a sense datum, or sensum, is a relational property of the item that is sensed. To refer to an item which is sensed in a way which does not entail that it is sensed, it is necessary to use some other locution. Sensibile has the disadvantage that it implies that sensed items could exist without being sensed, and this is a matter of controversy among sense-datum theorists. Sense content is, perhaps, as neutral a term as any. — Sellars
This analysis leads me to think that the importance of the distinction is that sense contents are something like qualities, something universal, while sense data are something fundamentally immediate — csalisbury
(keeping in mind the Hegelian point that to deal with 'qualities' is already to deal with universals and mediation.) — csalisbury
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.